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ABSTRACT
The biography of John C. Calhoun published in 1843 with his 
sanction was intended to assist in Calhoun's election to the presidency 
in 1844. Only a few pages of this work were devoted to an accounting of 
Calhoun’s career as President James Monroe's Secretary of War from 1817 
to 1825. Scholarship has generally reflected this biography's lack of 
detail concerning this part of Calhoun's official life, and yet it was 
while he was Secretary of War that Calhoun first became a presidential 
contender in the hard-fought campaign of 1824. Not only his participa­
tion in that campaign, but indeed his every activity during this period 
provided Calhoun with a practical education in the relationships between 
politics and military policy in America.
The fact that Calhoun made his first attempt to become President 
while he was a Secretary of War had salient consequences for the American 
military establishment also. Among military historians Calhoun has been 
well regarded for his attempts to modernize the War Department and the 
American Army, but the political context in which Calhoun's reforms were 
attempted rarely has entered into historical evaluations; the result has 
been the considerable distortion of the origins and meaning of these 
reforms. Thus the major aims of this study are an examination of the 
confluence of Calhoun's political and official roles, the impact his 
association with the War Department had upon his career, and the Regular 
Army's reaction to the political attention which Calhoun attracted to it.
v
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Because the clash between Calhoun's ambitions for political advance­
ment and military reform exposed the military establishment to considerable 
stress, an attempt has been made to examine the inner workings of the War 
Department in order to evaluate the impact of politics upon this institu­
tion. Subjects of particular concern are the provenance and effect of 
Calhoun's reforms, his influence upon the making and administering of 
national defense policy, and his execution of American Indian policy. And 
because the War Department was one of the most fiscally important agencies 
of government, Calhoun's role in the monitoring of public expenditures at 
a time of national economic distress is discussed.
The recent p’ olication of the Papers of John C. Calhoun by the 
University of South Carolina Press made it possible to consider a wider 
range of topics than earlier studies, and to expand the scope of this 
work to include relevant collections of official and private papers 
bearing upon Calhoun's activities. In addition to these sources, little- 
used collections at the William L. Clements Library of the University of 
Michigan, and the Library of the United States Military Academy at West 
Point, New York, were instrumental in explaining Calhoun's part in the 
election of 1824 and his associations with the "defense entrepreneurs" 
of the era of good feelings.
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INTRODUCTION
John C. Calhoun was President James Monroe's Secretary of War 
from December, 1817, to March, 1825. Although he was the youngest and 
perhaps the least experienced of Monroe's cabinet members, Calhoun 
fashioned for himself a unique place in the military and political annals 
of the United States while he held this post. Calhoun's stewardship over 
the American military establishment required that he execute many of the 
policies which stamped Monroe's government as one of the most progressive 
in the early history of the republic, and Calhoun's ascent from congress­
man to presidential candidate in the course of a dozen years was 
immeasurably aided by his accomplishments as the civilian chief of the 
War Department.
A question yet to be settled by the time Calhoun came to the War 
Department was the precise role of the military establishment in the 
democratic republic. Aged republican canons taught that standing armies 
were dangerous in times of peace, so dangerous that they should be sup­
pressed even at the cost of early defeats when war did come. Accordingly, 
for the first forty years of the nation's history, the American military 
establishment had been estranged from the nation at large, neither threat­
ening nor encouraging the progress of civil life. The institutional life 
of the military establishment was governed chiefly by these republican 
fears rather than by visions of republican progress.
vii
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Many of the postwar defense programs initiated by Calhoun were 
frankly aimed at rectifying the traditional estrangement of the army and 
the nation. Deliberately attempting to expand the army's range of func­
tions, Calhoun and his most talented officers put the army to tasks 
heretofore seldom contemplated by the nation's political leaders. By 
using the army to ejqplore the West, to make surveys, and to construct 
internal improvements, Calhoun and his staff at the War Department sought 
to strike a bargain with the nation. If by these new activities the 
army could assist the nation in peace as well as in war, the military 
establishment could earn for itself a secure place in the future from a 
grateful nation. Military institutions could thereby become an integral 
part of national life.
While Calhoun explored new ways to use a peacetime military 
force, he also set about reforming the organization of the War Depart­
ment and the army. Techniques of management long applied to other 
executive departments seemingly had been ignored by previous secretaries 
of war. At Calhoun's insistence clearer lines of authority and responsi­
bility were devised: a new general staff system which Calhoun aided in
creating replaced a military command structure that was sustained more 
by personal than institutional authority. Calhoun saw to it that new 
regulations were laid down which demanded a stricter exercise of 
responsibility from officers now held accountable for their conduct of 
official business. New fiscal controls were devised for War Department 
disbursements which minimized the opportunities for official waste and 
peculatiQnwhich had existed almost by tradition.
viii
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Yet these organizational reforms reflected only a part of 
Calhoun's larger ambitions. Even as he endeared the army to the nation 
through the medium of good works, and as he invested the military estab­
lishment with a new efficiency, it was Calhoun's intention to build a 
professional army in the United States for the first time. Any object 
which promised this end received Calhoun's support. In this ambition he 
could be certain of the enthusiastic assistance of a group of young offi­
cers who were already devoted to making their visions of military 
professionalism come true. With Calhoun's support, Major Sylvanus 
Thayer's West Point took its first steps toward providing the American 
army with professionally educated officers. Various other military 
intellectuals found the Secretary of War to be a valuable patron who 
followed their activities with unwavering interest. Under the auspices 
of Calhoun's War Department several military works were translated from 
the French and thousands of dollars' worth of other treatises on military 
subjects were imported from Europe to the United States so that army 
officers could take advantage of the most recent advances in the "science 
of war."
Although it would have been expedient for him to do so, Calhoun 
made no apologies, then or later, for his avid support of a modernized 
and professional military establishment. It is not surprising that his 
avidity left him open to charges of militarism. His opponents used such 
charges against him with good effect during his contest for the presi­
dency. Their anti-military rhetoric showed clearly enough that these 
ancient suspicions were still alive in some quarters, but they were 
hardly accurate when they were turned on John C. Calhoun. Calhoun was
ix
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the sort of man who, although he created his own enthusiasms, was never 
overtaken completely by them. He did not need to mimic imagined military 
virtues. The standards of improvement he insisted that the military 
establishment meet were imminently civilian standards? for Calhoun one 
index of improvement for the army was how well it performed heretofore 
civilian tasks. Calhoun's opponents claimed that, if he could, he would 
make American into a. garrison state, whose swollen defense budgets main­
tained a parasitic and dangerous army, but it is doubtful that Calhoun 
would ever have gone this far. Calhoun did not ingratiate himself to 
the military establishment by imitating the mentality that was associated 
with it, but by providing a bridge between the military and civilian 
worlds of the 1820s.
It is fruitless to speculate how the American military estab­
lishment would have fared had not Calhoun become embroiled in presidential 
politics. That he was politically involved almost from the beginning of 
his tenure in the War Office meant that military policy would become 
even more a matter of partisan contention than it normally was. Calhoun's 
status as one of America's leading political men was a two-edged sword as 
far as the army's fortunes were concerned. If Calhoun's brilliance and 
influence could instill the army with a new efficiency and pride in 
achievement, his role as a Secretary-politician could jeopardize any 
advancements which he happened to effect. Not originally aware of the 
conflict his duty and ambition might cause, Calhoun quickly became so.
From 1817 to 1819 were the creative years for the Secretary of War. By 
1820 the War Department was being assailed by Calhoun's political 
opponents in an attempt to discredit the Monroe administration's
x
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nationalistic policy. After 1821, when all of the prospective presidents 
began their campaigns, the War Department and the army more clearly 
became Calhoun's surrogates in the congressional battles which erupted.
Caught up in the Secretary of War's ambitions, the army's men 
resorted to their traditional defenses: past glories and sacrifices were
recounted, modern dangers were detailed to a defenseless nation. They 
pointed to the new military professionalism which was sensitive to the 
requirements of liberty as well as to the needs of expansion and progress. 
And though there was no danger that the army would be abolished once more, 
just for good measure the army's friends argued for its continued exist­
ence. It is a fair demonstration, also, of Calhoun's popularity among 
these officers that none of them blamed the Secretary of War for focusing 
attention upon their army; as soldiers in a democratic republic, they 
largely accepted the prejudices against them as their lot.
The fact that the Secretary of War was running for the presidency 
was nonetheless unsettling to some, and the participation of several high- 
ranking officers in Calhoun's campaign allowed his opponents to conjure 
up even darker visions of military despotism. Yet these politicians in 
mufti acted more out of self-interest than institutional loyalty; it was 
assumed that Calhoun's election would be good for the military establish­
ment, and if any of them had notions about making a praetorian choice, 
there is no evidence of it. On the contrary, these soldier-politicians 
embraced the civilian political system as ardently as any partisan— as 
ardently, in fact, as their Secretary of War.
Contemporaries often said that Calhoun was a visionary; coming 
from pragmatic politicians, this was no recommendation. But it is
xi
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evident that John C. Calhoun was far more representative of his age and 
its thought than these observers believed. He was only slightly younger 
than the republic •vtoelf, and in his character and thought one can see 
the same ambitions and anxieties which beset the nation at large.
Calhoun and his nation experienced together several of the most salient 
transformations in the history of the nation: his conversion from
nationalism to sectionalism, because he was no much at the center of 
affairs, was hardly less important than that of the nation itself.
During the election of 1824, he saw at first hand the emergence of a new 
electorate, more massive and importunate than any that had come before, 
and one which would change the face of American politics thereafter.
His time in the War Department coincided with that in which the nation 
was reconsidering its steadfastly anti-military traditions, and in which 
the military men of America were striving to replace old amateur forms of 
defense with a new and "scientific" system, based upon professionalism.
Calhoun is therefore the central figure in the pages which follow, 
but this study is by no means an attempt at biography— that has already 
been done, and well. Calhoun's part here is solely confined to his 
activities as a Secretary of War and a politician. It is a part that is 
nevertheless crucial: Calhoun was the first American politician to
attempt to build a bridge between the nation and its army, a fact that is 
equally important to him, the military establishment, and the nation which 
they served.
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CHAPTER I
1817: THE NATION, THE SECRETARIAT,
AND MR. CALHOUN
In November, 1817, John Caldwell Calhoun, of late a congressman 
from the Abbeville district of South Carolina, left his home for 
Washington and his new post as President James Monroe's Secretary of War. 
Matters of war and peace were now very much Calhoun's concern, and as he 
traveled northward, Calhoun could reflect that for the first time in his 
memory, the world was enjoying a new tranquility. The man who was held 
most responsible for disturbing the peace of the Atlantic nations,
Napoleon Bonaparte, had been locked away on St. Helena for nearly two 
years. Almost daily, Calhoun could see in the newspapers the latest 
reports of the infamous exile's doings.^ But the new Secretary of War 
knew, as did any thinking man, that peace was not won so simply— the great 
Corsican could go to his tomb, and national dangers could still persist.
America's latest war was over; the peace was just two years old.
A long period was beginning in which the United States would be free 
from external danger, but only a few of America's leaders realized this. 
John Randolph of Roanoke, always the errant mind, believed that 
America's wars were over, but he was not given to thinking with major­
ities. Calhoun was more in concert with the national mood in warning
^Niles' Weekly Register, November 22, 1817; National Intelli­
gencer, April 10, April 11, April 14, and April 15, 1817.
1
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2that Britain would continually pose a future danger to the United 
2
States. Eight years later, an unembarrassed Calhoun would point to the
Northwest Territory, which he thought was still an object of British
3
desires. But by then voices which sounded such alarms were rarer; by 
then the United States had newer problems, less international, more 
self-considered. For now though the Atlantic world was as peaceful as 
it could have been.
The nature of the post-Napoleonic peace was such that Americans, 
public and private, had to content themselves with a less than secure 
world, and with a mixture of apprehension, vanity, and relief. The 
peace was unsettled and unsettling. One reason for this condition was 
that the enemy which the United States had stalemated recently was else­
where triumphant as the first power among the Allies, and in 1817 the 
Allies were busily putting Europe into their own kind of order. At the 
end of 1818, one young American officer reported from France that there 
were 700,000 Allied soldiers in Paris and that the Louvre had been so 
looted that only four hundred works of art remained in the great palace.
The military schools of France, including the famed Ecole Polytechnique,
4
had been turned into barracks and stables. Since France once had been
2Charles R. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, Nationalist: 1782-1828
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949), p. 107 (hereafter cited
as Wiltse, Calhoun).
^Lewis Cass to John C. Calhoun, October 24, 1821, and John C. 
Calhoun to Lewis Cass, February 11, 1822, W. Edwin Hemphill and Robert 
Merriwether, eds., The Papers of John C. Calhoun, 9 vols. (Columbia, 
South Carolina: The University of South Carolina Press, 1959-76),
6:460-71, 685-88 (hereafter cited as Calhoun Papers).
4
Sylvanus Thayer to Joseph Swift, October 10, 1815, The Papers 
of Sylvanus Thayer, United States Military Academy Library, West Point, 
New York (hereafter cited as Thayer Papers).
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the only other modern republic and was now occupied by the monarchist
Allies, some believed that the United States was being given a preview
of its own fate. Samuel du Pont de Nemours, no friend of Napoleon’s nor
the Allies', warned James Monroe, "XI S'agit d'egorger la Republique
5
americaine, apres avoir assassine la nation Frangaise."
For a world now thoroughly inured to war, there were many poten­
tial causes of conflict easily found in the western hemisphere. Too 
much accustomed to strife, perhaps, some men in ships sortied into the 
southern Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico to continue their private wars, 
and brigands of every description played along the southern coasts.
Creek Indians and fugitive slaves attached themselves to this outlawry 
in the borderlands of Spanish Florida. Nine months in office, President
Monroe had determined to exterminate the notorious "establishments" at
0
Amelia Island and Galvez Town. Before the year was very old, Americans
7
were fighting once again on the southern borders. Naturally, the
Spanish authorities were alarmed.
Spain's South American colonies were in the first stages of
revolt; simply the proximity of the United States to these colonies
meant that there was a possibility that the conflict there would somehow
5 "it is a question of cutting the throat of the American Repub­
lic, after having assassinated the French nation." Pierre Samuel du 
Pont de Nemours to James Monroe, February 26, 1817, The Papers of James 
Monroe, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. (hereafter cited as 
Monroe Papers, LC).
^James Monroe to James Madison, November 24, 1817, Stanislaus M. 
Hamilton, ed., The Writings of James Monroe, 7 vols. (New York: AMS
Reprints, 1969), 6:33 (hereafter cited as Hamilton, Monroe Papers).
7
John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, December 26, 1817, John S. 
Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, 7 vols. (Washington:
The Carnegie Institute, 1926-35), 2:341-42 (hereafter cited as Bassett, 
Jackson Correspondence).
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4involve the United States. This compounded the difficulties between the
United States and Spain, especially after General Andrew Jackson invaded
Florida in 1818. But Britain was involved too. In June, 1817, Monroe
warned Jackson, then commanding the Regular Army's Southern Division, to
beware of future developments; he wrote:
Affairs are unsettled with Spain and by recent intelligence from 
England, it appears that the British govt., is equipping two large 
Squadrons for the Spanish provinces. . . .  It seems probable, that 
this movment [sic], of the British govt., may produce serious conse­
quences, among which, war, with other powers, may be reasonably
presumed.^
The British presence still hung like a pall over North America
two years after the war's end, and the Rush-Bagot agreement made in
April did little to dispel it. On the northwestern frontiers, British
officers, Indian agents, and fur company men in Canada still exercised
an influence on their old Indian allies that made its effect felt even
over the international border. One American Indian agent in Green Bay
insisted that the Indians living in U. S. territory somehow be quaran-
9
tined from the pernicious British. Later that year, the Superintendent
of Indian Affairs pessimistically inquired of his western agents whether
there ware any "lurking evils, or latent fires" in that region which
might break out in the "event of British or Indian wars."10
Interestingly, the British felt similar anxieties about
America1s intentions. The Times voiced apprehension about the growing
®James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, June 2, 1817, ibid., 2:296.
9
John Bowyer to Lewis Cass, July 22, 1816, R. G. Thwaites, ed., 
"The Fur Trade in Wisconsin, 1815-17," Collections of the State Histori­
cal Society of Wisconsin, 20 vols. (Madison, Wisconsin: The State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1911), 19:467 (hereafter cited as 
Thwaites, Wisconsin Collections).
10Thomas L. McKenney to George Graham, September 30, 1817, ibid.,
19:480.
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5power of Britain's late enemy:
We cannot calculate on perpetual concord with the United States. 
Their first war with England made them independent— their second 
made them formidable. They have . . . cultivated with more assured 
and unbending pertinacity the means and resources both of war and 
peace. They now have for the first time a standing army, a moveable 
militia, & a victorious marine. Their next war will be offen­
sive. . . ."H
Mutually suspicious, neither Britain nor the United States 
seemed inclined to demobilize quickly; it was necessary to remain on 
one's guard in a dangerous if momentarily quiescent world. But the 
price of vigilance and defense was great; during the war America's 
national debt had soared beyond one hundred million dollars, an aston­
ishing figure for a Republican government. Although this debt was 
considerably offset by very high customs receipts, soon after the war's 
end some lawmakers called for a retreat in expenditures and an abolition 
of internal taxes. Military costs, comprising the largest single outlay 
of public money, was the logical place to begin the retrenchment. In 
early 1817, the House Committee on Military Affairs offered a resolution 
to consider reductions in military strength. Jeremiah Mason of New 
Hampshire, speaking in support said, "In modern warfare, national wealth 
is essentially national strength. With a view, therefore, to public
safety alone, whatever tends unnecessarily to the impoverishment of the
12
national treasury, should be cautiously avoided." There had been a 
consistent difference of opinion on the necessity of maintaining a large 
"peace establishment" since just after the war. As time went by, advo­
cates of military retrenchment would gain ground, but memories of the
^ National Intelligencer, June 2, 1817.
^Ibid., March 11, 1817.
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6war were still too fresh not to be effectively used in rebuttal. On 
this particular occasion James Barbour averred to the lack of prepared­
ness before the British raid on Washington in 1814; this was a similar
13time, he said, when fatal errors could be made all too easily.
Earlier, Calhoun and his fellow South Carolinian, Williams Lowndes, had
pointedly reminded their colleagues of Europe's "habit of war" during
the last two decades, and questioned the wisdom of going "on in the old
imbecile mode, contributing nothing to the honor, nothing to the repu-
14tation of the country."
The new President stood against retrenchment sentiments and 
repeatedly sounded the theme of vigilant defense. A goodly part of 
Monroe's inaugural address concerned the need for continued military 
protection. "Experiencing the fortune of other nations," he argued,
"the United States may again be involved in war . . .  we should dis­
regard the faithful admonition of experience if we did not expect it."'*'5 
At mid-year, Monroe made a widely-publicized tour of the North, which 
thr -e years before had been the center of war resistance. In New York, 
Boston, and elsewhere, Monroe’s ideas on the national defense were re­
ceived warmly. Addressing a crowd of notables in New York, Monroe told
the gathering that "the honorable termination of the late war . . .
16
should not lull us into repose." Monroe1s views would prevail, but
13Ibid., March 12, 1817.
14John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Additional Revenue Report," 
January 20, 1816, Calhoun Papers, 1:314-15.
15James Monroe, "Inaugural Address," March 2, 1817, Hamilton, 
Monroe Papers, 6:10.
~*5A Narrative of a tour of observation, made during the summer 
of 1817, by James Monroe, president of the United States, through the
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only so long as prosperity continued and the war was so fresh in the 
popular and political minds; a few years later, when the Treasury showed 
a deficit of two million dollars, retrenchment would succeed.
Most Americans in 1817, however, had little faith in humanity's 
peacefulness. Since the Declaration of Independence scarcely a year had 
passed when Americans were not fighting somewhere. Most of them would 
have agreed with John Quincy Adams, who, when asked to support the new
pacifist journal Friend of Peace, replied that pacifism was impractical;
17if tried, "the human flock would soon be butchered by one or a few."
The United States had embarked upon the War of 1812 at least in 
part because it 'was possessed by the same sensitivity to real or fancied 
insult which plagues all immature nations. The same immoderation which 
involved the United States in a world war sustained it in its imagined 
triumph. Europe and Britain were watched closely for signs that they 
coveted America's success and prosperity. Conceivably, hostile envy 
could be a motive for renewed conflict; certainly, the jealousy of
north-eastern and north-western departments of the Union; with a view to 
the examination of their several military defences (Philadelphia: S. A.
Mitchell, H. Ames, Clark and Raser, Printers, 1818), pp. 38-9 (hereafter 
cited as Narrative of a Tour).
17
John Quincy Adams to Noah Worcester, quoted in Merle Curti,
The American Peace Crusade, 1815-1860 (New York: Octagon Books, 1965),
pp. 21-2. The Massachusetts Peace Society, which sponsored Friend of 
Peace, announced during the Summer of 1817 the recruitment of a cele­
brated figure: Czar Alexander I of Russia. A public exchange of
letters between the Czar and the editor, the Reverend Noah Worcester, 
brought on a tclerant, if bemused reaction from a Southern reader: "The
sober-minded statesman," he wrote, "will look upon Peace Societies with 
no hostile or jealous eye— but as among the contrivances of well meaning 
persons . . . [who] are at least innocent and innoxious." National 
Intelligencer, September 10, 1817.
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foreign powers was easily harnessed to the need for defense and vigi-
18lance of the variety which Monroe proposed.
Thus, a common idea which arose in the postwar years was that 
America was constantly in Europe's spyglass. "The British press teem 
with notices of the United States— every movement we make seems care­
fully watched, and minutely scanned," wrote Hezekiah Niles of Niles1 
19
Weekly Register. Speaker of the House Henry Clay, while bragging 
shamelessly about America's unique good fortune, told his fellow legis­
lators that this prosperity was sure to affect other countries "jealous
20of our rising importance." Not all of this was ignorant bravado; 
America was prospering noticeably. What made these contentions at all 
palatable was that they had a bit of truth about them, and that they 
were held on both sides of the Atlantic. With poorly disguised pride,
Niles reported, "The Times calls us Britain's powerful descendant and
• , ,,21 rival.
Such jealousy could foretell new international problems for the 
United States, as many said, or it could give way to friendly admira­
tion. Perhaps conditioned by their desire to see admiration where 
little existed, Americans returning from abroad told of new European 
attitudes toward the United States. As Niles put it, "Every one that 
has traveled in Europe since the treaty of Ghent, is sensible of the 
vast change that has been made in our favor. The opinions about us are
18See, for instance, Calhoun's "Speech on the Additional Revenue 
Report," January 20, 1816, Calhoun Papers, 1:315; and Monroe's Inaugural 
Address, March 2, 1817, Hamilton, Monroe Papers, 6:10.
19Niles' Weekly Register, April 25, 1818.
20 21
Ibid., April 18, 1818. Ibid., April 25, 1818.
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9as extravagant in our favor now, as they were against us some years
„22 ago."
For one source of their newfound pride, Americans looked back to 
the war, and gleaned only the most pleasing parts. Several unexpected 
naval successes were commonly discussed. The hapless Briton who came to 
postwar America without knowing his recent naval history was at a disad­
vantage in social intercourse. Henry Bradshaw Fearon, upon arriving in 
1B17, remarked:
A short residence here . . . will force upon the attention of all 
persons an acquaintance with naval history. Every man, woman, and 
child in America talk about the Guerriere, the Java, the Macedonia, 
the Frolic, Lake Erie, Lake Champlain, and the 'vast inferiority of 
British sailors and soldiers to the true-blooded Yankies1 . . . .  A 
knowledge of such events is certainly desireable; but to cause them, 
as they are here, to be the never-ending theme of conversation, the 
circle round which every thing revolves, is to make the going into 
society a punishment instead of a pleasure.23
Naturally, matters of refinement such as "the sciences, morals, and
literature" suffered terribly in social transactions. Fearon told of an
episode on the occasion of the visit of Francis Jeffrey, editor of the
Edinburgh Review. When James Madison asked Jeffrey, "What did you think
of the war, Mr. Jeffrey?" he was apparently so sick of answering the
24
question that he replied, "Upon my word, Sir, I did not hear of it."
Sometimes this yearning for praise and approval from foreign 
quarters was not always so pointed, and Americans were not always so 
unreasoning in discussing their nation's military feats. One naval
22Ibid., August 30, 1817.
23
Henry Bradshaw Fearon, Sketches of America: A Narrative of a 
Journey of five thousand miles through the eastern and western states 
(London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1818), p. 371 (here­
after cited as Fearon, Sketches of America).
24„Ibid.
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officer with whom Fearon spoke while on a leisurely drift down the
Hudson "much pleased" Fearon with his temperate remarks. "I make no
claims to superiority over the British," the officer said. "Men cannot
be braver than they are." The most the young officer would allow was
that Americans in the navy, at least, were more disciplined and not so
25
sure of success as were their adversaries. To one American, the 
boundless pride which so assaulted the senses of Henry Fearon and other 
visitors was presumptuous and arrogant. The newly-installed Secretary 
of State, John Quincy Adams, fumed to his diary, "When it is so noto­
rious that the issue of our late war with her [Britain] was at best a
drawn game, there is nothing but the most egregious national vanity that
26
can turn it into a triumph."
Whether America was triumphant indeed, or merely vainglorious.:
as Adams suggested, the United States did have an allure to foreigners
in 1817; eighty per cent of all immigration coming through New York was
27from the British Empire. Following the war, several Britishers made a
reconnaissance of the nation and agreed that the country was best suited
28
for the laboring or middling classes. There was a considerable thirst
25
Ibid., p. 56.
26Charles Francis Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, com­
prising portions of his Diary from 1795 to 1848, 12 vols. (Philadelphia 
J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1874-77), 4:33 (hereafter cited as Adams,
Diary).
27
Niles' Weekly Register, January 24, 1818.
28W. Faux, Memorable Days in America, being a Journal of a Tour 
to the United States, principally undertaken to ascertain, by positive 
evidence, the condition and probable prospects of British Emigrants; 
including Accounts of Mr. Birkbeck's settlement in the Illinois (London: 
W. Simpkin and R. Marshall, 1823), pp. 109, 134 (hereafter cited as 
Faux, Memorable Days in America); Niles' Weekly Register, November 29, 
1817.
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for labor in the East, where European redemptioners were still the
objects of frenzied bidding on the Philadelphia docks. Men brought a
29
price of eighty dollars, women seventy, and boys sixty. "There is no
want of employment here if disposed to work," said one immigrant who had
30
obtained a place just two hours after disembarking.
The postwar British travelers were at pains to remark that in
America, few could expect to attain great wealth, but that also the
worst conditions in the United States stood no comparison to those in
England or on the continent. However dim America may have looked, said
the American Traveller and Emigrant's Guide, "the first and principle
[sic] inducement . . .  is the total absence of anxiety respecting the
31
future success of a_ family." One observer reported meeting two of his
countrymen in a mechanic's hall in Pittsburgh, where one of the men, a
stonemason, complained that there was "nothing in America but d— d
Yankies and rogues, and that it was not fit for a dog to live in." His
friend replied, "You forget you were starving in England. Say what you
will, this, after all, is the best poor man's country." The stonemason
32finally agreed, if only it "was free from dirty, cheating Yankies."
Thus the "low ease" with which Americans seemed to live (as one 
Englishman put it) was sufficiently inspiring to cause an immigration of
29
Fearon, Sketches of America, pp. 148-50.
3°The American Traveller and Emigrant's Guide; containing a 
Description of British Possessions in North America; particularly 
Quebec, Montreal, La Chine, and the Flourishing Town of Kingston, in the 
Canadas; of Hartford, in Connecticutt, the Paradise of the United States; 
and various extracts from the Letters of Emigrants (Shrewsbury, England: 
Printed and Published by C. Hulbert, 1817), p. 19.
31 32
Ibid., p. 13. Fearon, Sketches of America, p. 207.
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such magnitude that some in Great Britain feared for the prosperity of
the realm. The Americans were castigated for being immorally willing to
take in any "miscreant" or "malcontent" who aided in the debilitation of
33Great Britain while promoting the wealth of the United States. One
Times correspondent complained that Canada was particularly vulnerable
because of its proximity to the United States. He wrote that no longer
could Britain think of sending colonists to Canada, since they would
34only desert to the Americans once there.
One group of English farmers was, however, sufficiently pros­
perous to send a man to make an extensive inspection of the United 
States in order to select a site for settlement. Henry Fearon argued 
that the nature of emigration had "assumed a totally new character: it
was no longer merely the poor, the idle, the profligate, or the wildly
speculative," who emigrated, "but men also of capital, of industry, of
35 ’
sober habits and regular pursuits." The sight of "agriculturalists
and artificers . . .  in the full tide of emigration" led some British
3 6
observers at home to call for restrictions on leaving the country.
The United States was entering its middle age. As if by a
signal, the end of the war loosed an internal migration, chiefly to the
West. As this pace of restlessness quickened, one visitor noted:
The small and middling tradesmen do not make much exertion, live 
easily, save no money, and appear to care nothing about either the
33The Times, n.d., quoted in Niles' Weekly Register, November 27,
1819.
34
The Times, April 5, 1817, quoted m  National Intelligencer,
June 2, 1817.
■^Fearon, Sketches of America, p. vii.
3°The Times, n.d., quoted in Niles' Weekly Register, November 27,
1819.
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present or the future. If they find business getting bad, they do, 
what is called, "sell out," and pack up for the "back country."37
The volume of traffic on the Pennsylvania pike increased accordingly.
On a journey between Chambersburgh and Pittsburgh, one hundred and three
"stage-waggons" were counted going West, and only seventy-nine going the
other way. Farther West, near Cincinnati, "every immigrant tells you he
is going to Ohio; when you arrive in Ohio, its inhabitants are 'moving'
38to Missouri and Alabama."
After a rough overland journey, the Ohio and Mississippi rivers
waited to provide the traveler cheap, relatively easy transportation.
The immigrant or merchant could scudd down the Ohio at four miles per
hour, and it could be navigated at night. Economy-minded travelers on
the Ohio could buy a skiff, tie on to an ark, and follow it down the
39
river for seven hundred miles at a cost of fourteen dollars. Natu­
rally, cordelling up the rivers was more expensive, slower, and more 
dangerous. Newly-arrived merchants on the frontier who did not figure 
their costs closely were often frustrated in their attempts to start 
trading houses in the Mississippi valley. Goods from New Orleans up­
river were shipped at five cents on the pound; downriver passage from
40
Ohio was thirty days, but upriver it was closer to a hundred. Never­
theless, trade between East and West did not seem depressed. In 1817
37Fearon, Sketches of America, p. 172.
38
Ibid., pp. 196, 234.
39William Cobbett, A Year's Residence in the United States of 
America, in three parts (London: Sherwood, Neely, and Jones, 1818-19),
pp. 460-61.
40
Fearon, Sketches of America, pp. 432-33.
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thirteen thousand wagons arrived at Pittsburg from the eastern cities,
and the value of goods brought from the East was estimated to have been
41seventeen million dollars.
Western cities which before the war were little more than depres­
sing bogs now took on a new luster. Pittsburg and Cincinnati marketed 
luxury items and commodities which were newly demanded by Trans- 
Appalachian folk. On his trip into this district, Fearon was taken with 
displays of goods he hardly expected to find so far from the "civilized" 
parts of the country. He wrote to his sponsors in England:
Spots in Tennessee, in Ohio and Kentucky, that within the lifetime 
of even young men, witnessed only the arrow and the scalping knife, 
now present to the traveller articles of elegance and modes of 
luxury which might rival the displays of London and Paris, while, 
within the last half century, the beasts of the forests, and man 
more savage than the beast, were the only inhabitants of the whole ^  
of that immense tract peculiarly denominated the "Western Country."
As American society expanded physically and materially, older
problems would acquire a new edge of urgency. The vast extent of the
country, said John Calhoun in 1817, was the strength of the United
States. Speaking to the House of Representatives in support of internal
improvements, Calhoun reminded his fellow legislators that there were
two sides to the question of growth, for as the country expanded the
possibility of disunion so increased. Distance, more than any other
factor, had the potential to "estrange man from man." To prevent the
43
estrangements of distance, he said, "let us conquer space."
41Lewis E. Atherton, The Frontier Merchant in Mid-America 
(Columbia, Missouri: The University of Missouri Press, 1971), pp. 64-5.
42Fearon, Sketches of America, pp. 204-05.
43
John C. Calhoun, "Speech on Internal Improvements," February 4, 
1817, Calhoun Papers, 1:401.
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The centrifugal dangers which threatened a vast democracy were a 
well-worn Republican creed by Calhoun's time, but Calhoun had in mind 
more specifically the conduct of the New England states during the 
recent war. When, following Ghent, these states seemed to return to the 
national fold, no one was more pleased than Calhoun, to whom wartime 
threats of disunion from that part, of the country were the rankest ana­
thema. "Factious opposition," he said, was an enemy not only to union,
but to progress as well; if a vibrant union was always in danger of
44
spinning to destruction, a stagnant union would sicken and die.
A nation unified in prosperity and progress was the fit antidote
to the disease of inaction. In times of war, no less than in peace,
Calhoun believed, the life of the republic depended upon the very
absence of dangerous and willful factions (but harmless and beneficial
factions were never acknowledged in 1817). "The hearty concurrence of
the people in such a war," he said, "constitutes the principal force of
45
the country. It is as essential as cannon and ball." The new una­
nimity of purpose Calhoun believed he saw in 1817 encouraged his view of 
the American future. With faction declining, things could be done;
"when party spirit is high, it is very difficult to undertake reforma­
tions . . . happily for us, party spirit has in a great measure 
disappeared.
44John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Dangers of 'Factious Opposi­
tion, '" January 15, 1814, ibid., 1:394.
45John C. Calhoun, "Second Speech on the Compensation Law," 
January 20, 1817, ibid., 1:394.
46John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Transfer of Appropriations," 
February 14, 1817, ibid., 1:413.
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When President Monroe made his tour of the northern states in
the summer of 1817, he may have embarked with some trepidation at what
he would find in a section so recently hostile to the war and to the
central government. Monroe chose to see the northern states as doing
some sort of penance for their recent factionalism. He was amazed and
pleased by the warm reception he received. Newspapers watching the tour
reported cautiously, "The real or apparent moderation of party spirit,
47has caused the present to be called the 'era of good feelings.'" From 
Plattsburg, New York, the mid-point of his visit, Monroe wrote to Thomas 
Jefferson:
In the principal towns, the whole population, has been in motion, 
and in a manner, to produce the greatest degree of excit'ment 
possible. In the Eastern States of our Union, I have seen, dis­
tinctly, that the great cause, which brought the people forward, 
was a conviction, that they had suffer'd in their character, by 
their conduct in the late war, and a desire to show, that unfavor­
able opinions, and as they thought, unjust, had been form'd in 
regard to their views and principles. They say'd the opportunity, 
which the casual incident of my tour presented to them, of making a 
strong exertion, to restore themselves to the confidence and ground 
which they had formerly held, in the affections of their brethern, 
in other quarters. I have seen enough to satisfy me, that the great 
mass of our fellow-citizens, in the Eastern States are as firmly 
attached to the union and to republican govt, as I have always 
believ'd or could desire them to be. 4®
The genesis of the "era of good feelings" was the war itself.
The "factious opposition" of which Calhoun and likeminded Republicans 
spoke had reached a crescendo when the Federalist-dominated Hartford 
Convention met in late 1814 and dispatched agents to Washington to press 
the claims of a resisting New England. The agents arrived just after 
the news of Ghent had reached the capital, and, in the words of histo­
rian George Dangerfield, returned to New England carrying with them
^ Niles' Weekly Register, November 8, 1817.
48James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, July 27, 1817, Hamilton, 
Monroe Papers, 6:27.
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"the ruin of the Federalist Party." In the election of 1816, only three
states voted Federalist; if the occasionally loyal opposition was not
49dead, it was certainly dying.
The frailty of the Federalist party was further confirmed by the 
actions of the Republicans in 1816. As if they sensed no real danger 
from their opposition, the Republicans allowed themselves the luxury of 
disagreement over a presidential candidate.^ The real contest for the 
presidency was fought out in the Republicans' own caucus. Monroe 
expected to receive the prize in payment for his long and meritorious 
service, if nothing else, but other Republicans proposed their own man, 
William H. Crawford of Georgia. Even though Crawford refused to publicly 
acknowledge his candidacy, the close caucus vote of sixty-five to fifty- 
four in favor of Monroe demonstrated for all Republicans to see that
5
majority parties were not immune to their own brand of factional stress. 
By their very absence of power, the Federalists could contribute to dis­
cord within the ranks of the Republicans. With the Federalists all but 
vanquished, Republicanism could collapse of its own weight, the implo­
sions seeding still new factions. The baneful effect of party upon the 
Republic was an American perennial, and it was generally assumed that 
the paramount evil of party was that factional monopoly could easily
49George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings (New York: Har-
court, Brace and World, 1952; Harbinger Books, 1963), p. 98 (hereafter 
cited as Dangerfield, Era of Good Feelings).
50Jeremiah Mason to Mrs. Mason, March 16, 1816, G. S. Hilliard, 
ed., Correspondence of Jeremiah Mason (Cambridge: The Riverside Press,
1873), p. 137 (hereafter cited as Hilliard, Mason Correspondence).
^See Harry Ammon's James Monroe: The Quest for National Iden­
tity (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971), pp. 354-56 (hereafter cited as
Ammon, Monroe), for a summary of the Republican caucus of 1816.
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grow out of party government. So much did Monroe look for an end to
52
partisanism that he sometimes saw no faction when faction was rife.
Jefferson had expressed the same view in 1807; he said then, "When the 
republicans should have put all things under their feet, [I expect] they 
would schismatize among themselves. I always expected, too, that what­
ever names the parties might bear, the real division would be into
53
moderate and ardent republicanism."
Jefferson came close in this statement to saying that parties
were an inevitable feature of democratic government. Nevertheless, when
in 1817 Americans applauded the end of factional strife, they referred
to strife between, not within, parties. Because thinking politicians
thought that parties were unnatural in a truly republican form of government,
they were forced to look elsewhere for the causes of faction. International
unrest offered a likely cause to some. One Ohioan remarked:
The political state of Europe, which, during the reign of French 
despotism, operated so strongly upon the feelings and passions of 
American politicians, has in it nothing now to excite either their 
hopes or their fears. The two great parties are pretty well agreed 
upon the course the national government ought to p u r s u e . ^4
Such pronouncements were a painless way for Federalists, in
particular, to acknowledge the decline of their party's strength.
Excited by foreign assaults upon its political system, the republic had
thrown up parties as well as armies for its defense. The end of these
52James Monroe to James Madison, May 10, 1822, Monroe Papers LC.
53Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, July 9, 1807, Andrew A.
Lipscomb, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 20 vols. (Washington:
The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1905), 11:265.
54Ohio Federalist, May 8, 1817, quoted in National Intelligencer,
May 28, 1817.
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intrigues argued likewise for an end to the need for such protections, 
political or military. In this way, the Federalists' decline could be 
seen as a symptom of the nation's political health and military well­
being. So said a Federalist newspaper in 1817:
One great cause of a violent diversity of opinion in this country 
has passed away; we mean the difference of opinion which existed in 
relation to the friendship and enmity of foreign nations. Napoleon 
no longer moves and agitates the political world. . . . We are happy
in observing a more auspicious epoch dawning upon us.55
Thus, while both parties applauded the beginning of an era, they
did so for different reasons entirely. The Federalists sought ways to
contend with their party's demise. The Republicans, on the other hand, 
were sure enough that the new era would be a Republican one. However, 
the agitations in their caucus of 1816 showed, if anything, that the 
Republicans were not overburdened with unanimity. The advent of this 
curious era, then, meant only that Federalism was in decline and told 
relatively little of the Republican future.
At the confluence of national political— and therefore 
Republican— power in 1817 stood the city of Washington. In a very real 
sense, national politics were sustained by doings in the capital. At a 
time when central government was viewed with some suspicion, the mechan­
ism which disposed of the presidency— the congressional caucus— was
56firmly a city institution. Officials of government served two constitu­
encies when in the capital: Washington's society, and their supporters
^ National Standard (Middlebury, Vermont), quoted in National 
Intelligencer, May 17, 1817.
56See Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 11-13, for a brief summary of the 
caucus and other nominating mechanisms in this period (hereafter cited 
as Bemis, Adams and the Union).
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at home, and at times it is difficult to conclude which constituency 
mattered most to them. It was the Republican congressional caucus which 
held political power so close to the seat of government. When the caucus 
came under attack in 1820, political power began its diaspora, and poli­
tics became more provincial; never again would the Washington environment
57be so intimately important to the building of personal political power.
Monroe's name had stood before the caucus in 1816, and in March, 
1817, after a bitterly cold winter, a clear day welcomed the new execu­
tive as he made his inaugural address in the open air. As a preview of 
stormier days ahead, the House of Representatives and the Senate could 
not agree on final arrangements for the ceremony to be held in the House 
chamber. It was said that Henry Clay, angered by not having received 
the post of Secretary of State, was behind the recontre. But all that 
seemed not to matter for the present; thousands of avid citizens watched
the ritual. It was the largest demonstration of popular curiosity yet
58to witness the inaugural ceremony.
The leaders of Washington's society were curious about the new 
President too. With the glittering Madisons gone, "people seem to think 
we shall have great changes in social intercourse and customs," wrote 
one city doyenne. And because "Mr. and Mrs. Monroe's manners will give 
a tone to all the rest," the social lions were sure to be disheartened.
Some months after the inauguration, Margaret Bayard Smith reported that 
"few persons are admitted to the great house and not a single lady has 
as yet seen Mrs. Monroe," with but one exception. While Washington's
^7Charles Sydnor, "The One-Party Period of American History," 
American Historical Review, 51 (April, 1946), 439-51.
58
National Intelligencer, March 5, 1817; Ammon, Monroe, pp. 367-68.
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social scene changed with the presidents, the Monroes' sociability appar­
ently had not. "Altho' they have lived 7 years in Washington] both
Mr. and Mrs. Monroe are perfect strangers not only to me but to all the 
59citizens."
Such matters were of no mean consequence in Washington. A great
deal of public business was conducted at teas, balls, and private din- 
60ners. The social season corresponded precisely to those times when the
Congress was in session; when it was not, little gaiety could be found in
the city, save in the sloughs which made Washington notorious as an
61
unhealthy summer place. As the public business commenced in the fall,
invitations flew from residence to residence, and it was upon these invi-
62tations that much of the society and business of Washington ran.
Because the Madisons had functioned so masterfully in this 
atmosphere, the timid Monroes were bound to lose the battle of compari­
sons with their predecessors. Those who attended President Monroe's 
first drawing room were greeted by a "beggarly row of empty chairs," 
only to find that an ^ indispensable element of any successful soiree— the 
female— was sadly lacking. There were only five in attendance.^3 On the 
eve of the convening of the Fifteenth Congress, the President announced
59Margaret Bayard Smith, The First Forty Years of Washington 
Society, ed. Gaillard Hunt (New York: Frederick Ungar Reprints, 1965),
p. 141 (hereafter cited as Smith, The First Forty Years).
60See Adams, Diary, 4:30-1, for one of many examples.
61Faux, Memorable Days in America, p. 87.
62Fearon, Sketches of America, p. 291.
63Joseph Seaton, William Winston Seaton of the National Intelli­
gencer (Boston, 1871), p. 144, quoted in William E. Ames, History of the 
National Intelligencer (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1972) (hereafter cited as Ames, History of the 
National Intelligencer).
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that henceforth visitors could be seen only by appointment and at offi­
cial functions. Mrs. Monroe also refused to pay calls upon city ladies, 
as did her daughter. There was an anguished outcry in society. Then the 
senators, their dignity wounded, declared that they would not pay first 
calls either. John Quincy Adams, as Secretary of State, was asked to 
solve this grave impasse. Only in a society where status was so keenly
felt could such picayune resentments be elevated to a hostility of this 
64intensity. What made Washington society run was politics, and natu­
rally some persons were better than others at mixing the two to their 
advantage. This aspect of the city did not change substantially during 
the next decade. Just before the end of the Monroe presidency, George 
Ticknor, down from Harvard, paid a visit to the city. To a friend back 
home, he wrote:
The regular inhabitants of the city, from the President downwards, 
lead a hard and troublesome life. It is their business to entertain 
strangers, and they do it, each one according to his means, but all 
in a very laborious way. . . . The truth is, that at Washington 
society is the business of life. . . . People have nothing but one 
another to amuse themselves with; and as it is thus obviously for 
every man's interest to be agreeable, you may be sure very few 
fail.65
Ticknor added that his only objection to Washington's society was that
66
"there is too much of it."
During his years in Washington, John C. Calhoun had easily 
learned how to move in capital society. As a relatively well-to-do young
64Constance McLaughlin Green, Washington; Village and Capital, 
1800-1878 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 81.
65George Ticknor, Life, Letters, and Journals of George Ticknor,
2 vols. (Boston: James R. Osgood and Co., 1877), 1:349-50 (hereafter
cited as Ticknor, Journals).
56Ibid., 1:351.
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man of some presence, with a lovely young wife, he was, as Secretary of 
War, an "item" in the society of the times. As one of the highest-ranking 
members of the executive branch of government, his presence at official 
and social gatherings was all the more desirable. He had little compe­
tition. His President was "a very plain, practical man of business.1,6‘
The Secretary of the Treasury, William H. Crawford, was engaging enough,
68
but he was still very much the roughhewn Georgian. The Secretary of
State's friends chided him for not going into society more often to
widen his circle of supporters, but he replied that he was "scarcely ever
satisfied with myself after going into company, and always have the
69
impression that my time at home is more usefully spent." Although he
doubted the quality of his social grace, Adams nonetheless continued to
give and attend parties where political business was always a topic of 
70conversation. Abruptly cut off from informal relations with the first
family, Washington society compensated by lavishing attention upon the
next highest ranks: the cabinet officers. As the social season was
about to begin in 1817, one matron fairly gushed upon hearing of the
most recent ministerial appointments: "Every one is highly pleased with
the appointments of Mr. Wirt and Mr. Calhoun, they will be most agreeable
71additions to our society." Calhoun lived up to his promise. At these 
soirees, Calhoun looked for the listeners and was a generous conversa­
tionalist. "You know how frank and communicative he is," Mrs. Smith
67
Fearon, Sketches of America, p. 291.
68
Chase Mooney, William H. Crawford (Lexington, Kentucky: The
University of Kentucky Press, 1374), p. 76 (hereafter cited as Mooney, 
Crawford).
^Adams, Diary, 4:202. ”^ Ibid., 4:323-24, 306-07.
71
Smith, The First Forty Years, pp. 141-42.
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wrote a relative, "perhaps you will not be surprised at our conversing
72
without any interruption until 9 o'clock." Having won his executive
appointment, Calhoun was able to bring his wife, Floride, to the capital
and establish a permanent home. With this social base, the Calhouns
entertained frequently and well. Ticknor partook of all the social
amusements when he visited the city and pronounced "Calhoun's . . . the
pleasantest of the ministerial dinners, because he invited ladies, and
73
is the most agreeable person in conversation at Washington."
In Washington, social intercourse offered unique liabilities.
If a man's reputation could be made at parties, it could be unmade as
well. Contrary to what Ticknor believed, the conversations around the
dinner tables and on the dance floors were not always bland and unpro-
voking. Some guests were not above trying to deflate their adversaries 
74in public company. Because politics formed the superstructure for all
these relationships, they were frequently reordered and adjusted them-
75
selves with reference to new political unions and disunions. Invita­
tions and counter-invitations which tested endurance and patience could
^Ibid., p. 147.
73Calhoun's dinners tended to be of some size and expense and, of 
course, of political significance. While in Washington in 1819 to defend 
himself against the congressional investigation of the Seminole War, 
General Jackson found himself apologizing to Adams for having attended a 
Calhoun party when he had already committed himself to come to Adams' 
house the same evening. Adams, Diary, 4:247, 512; Ticknor, Journal, 
1:349; Smith, The First Forty Years, p. 148.
74Adams, Diary, 4:513.
75The best single analysis of social and political interrelation­
ships in early Washington is James Sterling Young's The Washington 
Community, 1800-1828 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), passim
(hereafter cited as Young, Washington Community). Much of the foregoing 
analysis relies upon Young's work.
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impose a further burden upon the political man. Even the matter of going
to a party was sometimes not so simple in Washington. Returning from a
party in Georgetown, only two miles away, Adams' carriage was almost
overturned twice on the foul roads. Near the Treasury building, the
Secretary of State and his driver had to get out in the mud, beg a lantern
from a guard at the Treasury, and make their way home in the muck. "It
7 6
was a mercy we got home with whole bones," Adams said.
As a capital, Washington was certainly no St. Petersburg. The
ravages of the war were still evident. Congress had to meet in the
"Brick Capitol," which looked to one visitor like "an hotel." The old
capitol still stood as it had burned, its walls adorned with public
comment on who was responsible for the success of the British invasion.
"The capital of the Union lost by cowardice," or more pointedly, "James
Madison is a rascal, a coward, and a fool." Benjamin Latrobe was at
work on the new domed structure, which, however externally imposing,
fell short of comfort and elegance inside. The President's new house
was habitable by mid-September, when he returned from his tour of the
North, but Monroe was "apprehensive of the effects of fresh painting and
plastering" and retreated to Virginia for a few days more. Looking over
the city from Capitol Hill, one received the impression of "a Roman
village," but of a most peculiar kind. Streets were "a mile or two in
length, with houses a quarter mile apart, beautified by trees and
77
swamps, and cows grazing between." The whole establishment showed a 
meager promise for a very distant future.
7 6
Adams, Diary, 4:74.
77Ibid., 4:7; Faux, Memorable Days in America, p. 112; Fearon, 
Sketches of America, pp. 283-85.
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Physically reflecting the constitutional arrangements of the
government, the President's house and the Capitol stood some distance
apart, divorced by a stream, the "Tiber," which regularly flooded, doubt-
78less assisting further the separation of powers. Private houses,
hotels, and boarding houses clustered around the capitol served the
legislators' needs, while executive officers huddled across the Tiber
near the President's house. Close by the executive mansion on the
eastern side stood the Treasury. On the other side of the mansion another
building (part of the old "Seven Buildings") housed the War, State, and
Navy departments. Their building squatted in a depression apparently
not of a natural origin; its grounds had been excavated so that the
79
structure might not exceed the height of the Treasury. Calhoun's
80
offices occupied the southeastern part of this bureaucratic warren.
Here Calhoun did his work for the next seven years. Were he the usual 
kind of Secretary of War, a short time obscured here would have been a 
sufficient test of his stamina, but he was not; he was foremost a polit­
ical man doing political work.
II
The War Department which John C. Calhoun inherited in 1817 was 
hardly the most distinguished of the American ministries. No great 
political power adhered to its chiefs as in the cases of those premier 
departments, State and Treasury. Although these last owed some of their 
repute and power to those individuals who first held them, these depart­
ments were important in their own right.
*7 Q
78y0ung, Washington Community, p. 75. Ibid., pp. 73-5.
80L. D. Ingersoll, A History of the War Department of the United 
States with biographical sketches of the Secretaries (Washington:
Francis B. Mohun, 1880), p. 110.
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By 1816 the man who presided over the State Department was con­
sidered the American crown prince, the president-designate. Presidential 
aspirants naturally vied for the post. By contrast, the Treasury 
Department from the first had a value of a different kind. Although it
lacked the prestige of the State Department, the Treasury possessed
81
patronage in abundance to soothe the faithful supporter.
The Treasury Department began its life well populated; in 1789
there were thirty-nine staff members. Within one year that number
doubled. Two years after that, there were ninety comptrollers, auditors,
and clerks. Guided by the sure hand of Alexander Hamilton, the Treasury
was soon transformed to Hunnic proportions. The office staff declined to
seventy-eight in 1801, but by then there were sixteen hundred civilian
field officers. Neither the State nor War Departments could compete with
Treasury's imperial growth. Both these offices made do with less than
ten staff members until the end of the century. When employment could
expand, it naturally did so, as in the addition of sixty-three consular
and commercial agents to the State Department by 1801; but the War
Department remained a poor relation. By 1801 the Department of War still
82
had only sixteen employees, and that number included two messengers.
Thus, by sheer organizational weight the Treasury was in a posi­
tion to establish suzerainty over the other departments. Because of their 
extensive and well-manned department, Treasury secretaries could encroach 
upon other ministerial prerogatives. This poaching was common enough 
during Hamilton's tenure, and later under Secretary Albert Gallatin,
81Leonard White, The Federalists: A Study in Administrative
History, 1789-1801 (New York: Macmillan, 1948; The Free Press, 1965),
pp. 117-18 (hereafter cited as White, The Federalists).
OO
Ibid., pp. 122-23, 146-48, 128, 136.
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cabinet business all too frequently became Treasury's business.
Although Treasury's administrative empire did not expand markedly during 
the first quarter of the century, it remained a formidable department 
which could easily accommodate to the political needs of ambitious chiefs
Although it is a commonplace to argue that the two great depart­
ments were, in the first instance, made so by their first two secretaries 
Hamilton and Jefferson, it is also true that the tasks which each 
department performed during the Federalist decade demanded their rise to 
pre-eminence in the structure of government. The War Department had 
lesser guardians, and it was subject to clearly prescribed duties which 
were conditioned by two centuries of suspicion of standing armies and 
their governmental accouterments.
Like the other executive departments, the War Department and its 
chief officer were carried over to the new government from the old Con­
federation. Adjustments had to be made, of course. The Secretary at 
War of the Confederation, Henry Knox, had been the military agent of the 
Congress, and in 1789, as the Secretary of War, he became an officer of 
the executive branch. Laws passed by the new Congress in 1789 further
detailed the cautious approach to military affairs which marked the Con- 
84stitution. Because a standing army was considered in some quarters a 
threat to liberty and democracy and a friend of despotism, any machinery 
of government which sustained an army was suspect. Even though the need
83Leonard White, The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative
History, 1801-1829 (New York: Macmillan, 1951; The Free Press, 1965),
pp. 127, 149, 133 (hereafter cited as White, The Jeffersonians).
^Russell Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: 
Macmillan, 1967), pp. 88-9 (hereafter cited as Weigley, History of the 
U. S . Army). See also, White, The Federalists, pp. 145-46.
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for an army during the devolution was uncontested, there was some doubt 
that one was needed by a nation nominally at peace. Likewise, the 
civilian chief of the army seemed less than useful (or even necessary) 
to some. Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania told the Congress in 
1789 that "the first error seems to have been the appointing of a 
Secretary of War when we were at peace, and now we must find troops 
lest his office should run out of e m p l o y m e n t . T h e  special require­
ments of the frontier nation soon accommodated Maclay's desires. No one 
had such doubts about the usefulness of other departments or their 
ministers.
By the time Calhoun was ready to take over the War Department,
this office was known to have attracted an inordinate number of medio-
86crities to preside over it. Those who did have some talent, almost as 
if by common agreement, seemed not to perform well in the job. If one 
had ambitions beyond the Department of War, perhaps it was best not to do 
too well in a post which was the object of republican suspicions. Henry 
Knox was the ablest of the Federalist Secretaries of War; among those 
who served in the Republican administrations before Calhoun, John 
Armstrong— an executive of countless failings— was the best the Jeffer­
sonians could offer. Nine men had filled this post in the first twenty- 
eight years of the republic, their tenure averaging thirty-five months 
each. Of the four presidents before Monroe, only one— John Adams— had 
been contented with just one Secretary of War. Madison had the record
85Quoted in Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, p. 89.
86Massachusetts men also had a propensity for the post; five of 
the first nine secretaries of war were from that state.
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for changing secretaries: under the press of impending hostilities and
87
then the War of 1812, the department had four different chiefs. The 
office was difficult enough to manage in times of peace, but during 
wartime its demands quickly eliminated those lacking talent and dedica­
tion, or those whose attentions were directed elsewhere.
Even though most of Calhoun's nine predecessors were not young 
men when they came to the War Department (their average age upon assuming
office was forty-nine) , their tenures there could hardly be called the
88zeniths of their careers. All except William Crawford had served in the
Revolution and therefore could be said to have possessed at least a
nominal military experience. Most went on to more attractive positions.
After leaving office, Henry Knox remained active in Federalist politics
and indulged his interest in the Society of the Cincinnati. Timothy
Pickering became a Secretary of State, a Senator, and a Congressman.
Henry Dearborn took to the Canadian battlefields of the War of 1812,
without notable success. Even the incompetent William Eustis became a
minister to Holland, and then later the governor of Massachusetts.
Future President James Monroe divided his time between the Department of
89
State and the War Department after John Armstrong was relieved. William 
Crawford took over the Treasury during the Monroe administration and hoped 
for the Presidency. Thus, when Calhoun came to the department, two of 
his fellow cabinet members had held his post. Whether the President or
87Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, p. 557; and also his chap­
ters 5, 6, and 7, passim.
^^Henry Knox was the youngest Secretary of War before Calhoun.
He was 39 years old; Calhoun was 35.
89See Webster's Biographical Dictionary (Springfield, Massachu­
setts: G. & C. Merriam, Publishers, 1968), passim. For a cautiously
favorable view of Armstrong's period in office, see T. Harry Williams, 
Americans at War (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: 'Louisiana State University 
Press, 1961), pp. 28-9 (hereafter cited as Williams, Americans at War).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
the Secretary of Treasury were very solicitous of their old department is
problematical, but it is unlikely that they would take an interest in a
department which they had passed through on their wiy to better things.
The laws under which these secretaries operated were frequently
reshaped in the years following the basic legislation which established
the war Department. Compared to the duties of the Secretary at War
under the Confederation, the legislation of 1789 was quite general. It
enjoined the Secretary to watch over any matters having to do with the
land and naval forces, military stores, commissions, warrant lands, and 
90Indian affairs. The Confederation's "Ordinance for Ascertaining the
Powers and Duties of the Secretary at War" set out in detail the several
obligations of the military's civilian supervisor. He was at once an
inspector general, quartermaster general, commissary, paymaster, and
chief of recruiting and demobilization. The Ordinance also demanded
that the Secretary at War "keep a public and convenient office at the
place where Congress shall reside," thereby binding him physically as
91
well as legally to congressional supervision. Under the law of 1789, 
this last requirement was not spelled out, but presumably the war 
minister was to be attached to the President.
Subsequent legislation under the new Constitutuion tended to 
assign special tasks to military officers or civilian sub-officers, who 
were in turn responsible to the Secretary of War. The Navy was given
901 Stat. 49. Here, too, the name of the officer was cnanged.
He became, officially, the Secretary of War. Both forms were used for 
some time thereafter. Before he took that office, Calhoun referred to 
the Secretary at_ War habitually. See, for instance, John C. Calhoun to 
John E. Calhoun, February 20, 1815, Calhoun Papers, 1:276.
91Ibid., see Ordinance appended to statute.
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the independence of its own department in 1798, and before long other
statutes had created a paymaster, and superintendents of military stores
92and Indian affairs. Secretary John Armstrong's most notable act was 
the encouragement of the creation of what was called a "General Staff" 
in 1813. Unlike a modern General Staff, this group of officers (and 
civilians) had no authority at all over field commanders; staff authority 
was limited either to specific functions or to the supervision of the 
more technical branches of the service. Eventually, separate bureaus 
were established to deal with the pay, subsistence, and medical care of 
the troops; the scientific arms of engineering and ordinance were repre­
sented by departments also. Thus, this arrangement provided for more a 
technical than general staff. Now, however, the Secretary could call 
upon the assistance of military specialists who were required to spend
their time at the War Department instead of being attached to wayward 
93
field commands.
Such legislative forms merely provided general directions to the
secretaries, however. The first official generation of the republic
gave substance to the machinery of government by establishing customs
and usages which laws simply could not apprehend. The laws prescribing
the Secretary's duties told only a part of what he actually did. None
of this legislation designated the Secretary of War an officer of cabinet
94
rank (and indeed the Constitution says nothing of a cabinet). Almost
921 Stat. 279, sec. 3; 1 Stat. 279, sec. 5; 1 Stat. 352, sec. 3;
1 Stat. 352, secs. 1 and 2; 1 Stat. 137; 1 Stat. 452; and 1 Stat. 469.
932 Stat. 819; see, also, White, The Jeffersonians, pp. 236-37; 
and Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, pp. 122-23.
94U. S., Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2.
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casually, the new executive departments were fashioned after British 
models, but still they were not identical to their British counterparts. 
This is especially true insofar as the War Department was concerned. In 
Great Britain the Secretary at War was decidedly a minor official. He 
was not a cabinet officer and had no policy-making authority under the 
Constitution. Any power connected with that post derived entirely from 
the political exertions of the man who held it. Had America's government- 
makers given much thought to the matter of what the exact place and 
function of their Secretary of War were to be (and there is little evi­
dence that they did), they likely would have looked at William Wildman, 
Viscount Barrington. It was Barrington who held this post in Crown 
government from the Seven Years' War to 1778. Barrington was highly 
assertive, frequently visited the King's Closet, and by virtue of that 
familiarity, he was able to act during the last part of his career some­
what more independently of the House of Commons than his predecessors.
Thus did Barrington overshadow his own post and acquire power in his own 
95right. It is therefore interesting to speculate why a nation which 
made so much of its suspicion of standing armies and their appendages, 
would elevate to cabinet rank a position which, even in Great Britain, 
depended less on the Constitution than on personal interest and energy.
The cabinet status of the Secretary of War automatically gave 
more official freedom to this officer than the original law countenanced. 
There he was held rather strictly to the military domain. In practice,
95White, The Federalists, pp. 26-9; John Shy, Toward Lexington:
The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 234-35; Piers
Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1964), pp. 12-15.
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however, he was not just the President's overseer for military affairs. 
As a cabinet officer, he was at once a part of a ministerial collegium. 
From the first musings about an American cabinet, there was no doubt 
that these men were meant to be the President's assistants, not rivals; 
but allowing for the different mixtures of personalities within the
96
various cabinets, degrees of assistance could sometimes vary widely.
On the practical level, cabinet members would oftentimes guide and even 
shape policy. Within the closed politics of the collegium, they could 
argue, cajole, debate, appeal to reason, emotion, patriotism, or parti- 
sanism. The cabinet of which Calhoun was a member offers ample 
illustrations of just such deliberations.
In a situation where the precise functions of office were poorly 
described, distinct and legal boundaries of duty often faded to invisi­
bility. To some extent, each member of the cabinet was responsible not
only for his own department's business, but in cabinet might be called
97
upon to deal with any other matter if the President so wished. At
first Monroe's new Attorney General, William Wirt, complained bitterly
that he did work which was not properly his, but he quickly warmed to
98
an expanded notion of what it meant to sit m  the cabinet.
96White, The Federalists, p. 28.
97On occasion, cabinet members did not wait to be asked for 
their opinions, especially about other cabinet members' business. See, 
for instance, William H. Crawford to James Monroe [December?], 1818, 
Monroe Papers, LC■
98William Wirt to Judge Carr, January 21, 1818, John P. Kennedy, 
ed., Memoirs of the Life of William Wirt, attorney general of the United 
States, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard), 2:73 (hereafter
cited as Kennedy, Life of Wirt).
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Moreover, a cabinet officer in Monroe's administration might well 
find himself filling the role of chef de Consiel when the President was 
away from the seat of government. When Monroe left Washington, one or 
another of the secretaries would take it upon himself to keep the Presi­
dent informed of matters requiring his attention; after having conferred
with other members of the cabinet present in the city, the communication
99of decisions would be made or deferred as needed. On occasion, a 
member of Monroe's cabinet could be left alone in the city, essentially 
in charge of the entire executive branch. Attorney General Wirt lamented 
the leaving of the President and all the other cabinet members except 
himself because, as he put it, "three departments will be in the hands of 
subalterns, who will stand in daily need of the Attorney General to help 
them through their difficulties.
Ministering to the President's whims and the claims made by the 
daily business of state perforce complicated each cabinet officer's 
role. But the President was not a secretary's only constituent; the 
cabinet also owed at least some attention to a group whose opinions were 
often importunate. The chiefs of department had to be aware of and 
calculate upon the vagaries of the congressional mind, contemplations 
sometimes overwhelming and unendurable. If a cabinet officer was to 
champion an administration policy, or if he somehow became personally 
identified with a particular program, ignorance of this special constitu­
ency could cause him much grief. However, the Secretary of War dealt 
with another constituency just as troublesome: the military hierarchy.
99John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, September 6, 1818, Monroe 
Papers, LC.
'L00William Wirt to Judge Carr, August 1, 1820, Kennedy, Life of 
Wirt, 2:109.
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During Monroe's administration, only the Secretary of War had to contend 
with subordinates who were so potentially mischievous. Adams had no 
diplomat, Crawford no revenue officer, who could compare with Calhoun's 
Andrew Jackson problem. Nominally, Jackson was only a militia general 
who had risen to command a significant portion of the Regular Army on 
the southwestern frontier, but his political importance transcended that 
mundane role. Jackson's real power derived from his popularity as the 
Hero of New Orleans, and it was sufficiently strong in 1817 for the 
President-elect to do him the courtesy of discussing at length cabinet 
appointments with him. President-elect Monroe was not merely taking 
casual notice of one of his generals; he did not see fit to consult with 
other high-ranking military figures on the choice of his cabinet appoint­
ments. When Monroe looked at the political horizon, he saw Jackson, and
Calhoun was bound to share his President's sensitivity to the general's 
101
views.
Neither could a cabinet officer afford to overlook public
opinion. The highly politicized newspapers of the day were an excellent
102
forum in which administration policy could be explained. Holding the
government printing contract in the city, the National Intelligencer 
regularly published the proceedings of Congress and all new legislation, 
as well as executive proclamations, regulations, announcements, and
^ James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, March 1, 1818, Hamilton, 
Monroe Papers, 6:4-6; M. Bayley to James Monroe, July 28, 1818, Monroe 
Papers, LC; James Monroe to James Madison, May 7, 1819, Monroe Papers,
LC; John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, December 29, 1817, Calhoun 
Papers, 2:43-44.
102Adams, Diary, 4:371-72.
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important correspondence. Thus, for at least a part of Monroe' s
tenure the newspaper served as a valuable conduit, not only for official
104
news, but also for pieces authored by cabinet officers. During the
Florida crisis of 1818, extensive correspondence between Adams and
105
various Spanish officials appeared in the newspapers. Monroe coun­
seled Adams in some detail about the public impact which the Secretary's
205
pronouncements should have. Occasionally, an officer in the executive 
branch would anonymously author a piece which defended some aspect of 
policy. As "Vauban," Calhoun had the Intelligencer publish a defense of 
coastal fortifications when the program came under attack in the Congress 
Calhoun's Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Thomas L. McKenney, contri­
buted several such articles which opposed the dismantling of the govern-
208
ment's Indian factory system. In an age when the public prints had
frankly partisan sympathies, such official subvention as the National
Intelligencer enjoyed made of its editors, Messrs. Gales and Seatcn,
109
powers to be reckoned with m  Washington.
103Ames, History of the National Intelligencer, pp. 111-13.
104
Adams, Diary, 4:116, 119.
105See, for instance, National Intelligencer, July 27, 1818.
^°^James Monroe to John Quincy Adams, August 17, 1818, Hamilton, 
Monroe Papers, 6:66.
’'‘^ National Intelligencer, April 10, 1821; and John C. Calhoun 
to Virgil Maxey, April 11, 1821, Calhoun Papers, 6:41.
108Washington Republican and Congressional Examiner, September 7, 
18, and 28, 1822, November 16, 1822, and March 22, 1823; see also,
Herman Viola, ed., Memoirs Official and Personal (Lincoln, Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1972; Bison Books, 1973), p. viii (here­
after cited as McKenney, Memoirs).
109Ames, History of the National Intelligencer, p. 132.
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Finally, there was the matter of policy-making. Certainly, the 
President originally was meant to set the direction and tone of his 
administration, but a wide latitude existed within this intention. The 
President could rule the executive branch by virtual fiat, or he could 
encourage his officers' participation in manifold questions of policy. 
Monroe leaned toward the latter. The cabinet he envisioned for his 
administration was a sort of genial college, in which "each member will 
stand on his own merit, and the people respect us all according to our 
conduct."''''*'0 Monroe wanted his cabinet officers to tend to their busi­
ness and did not want the cabinet coalescing into factions, either 
sectional, or personal. To guard against the first eventuality, Monroe 
contemplated a cabinet which would reflect the new sectional arrangement 
of the nation: a Secretary of State taken from the Northeast, a
Secretary of Treasury taken from the South, and a Secretary of War taken
111from the newly important West. He hoped that the cabinet would be so
112
composed as to deny any opportunity of "aggrandizement for any one."
With such a collection of public men, disinterested in their own 
destinies, animated only by a desire to serve the republic, Monroe hoped
to put questions of moment regularly before the cabinet and obtain a
'*''*'0James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, March 1, 1817, Hamilton, 
Monroe Papers, 6:5.
’*■'*''*'Jackson applauded Monroe's plan to balance the cabinet sec- 
tionally, but added that if it could not be done, "the executive is 
entitled to have the best talents, when combined with other necessary 
qualifications that the country can afford reguardless [sic] of the 
section of the country that hold [sic] them [.] Andrew Jackson to James 
Monroe, June 1, 1817, Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, 2:272.
112Monroe explained his plans for building a cabinet to several 
people, including Jefferson and Madison. See Monroe's letters to 
Jackson, March 1, 1817, Hamilton, Monroe Papers, 6:5-6, for example.
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consensus on matters of policy. Those were not politically naive 
aspirations. Monroe well knew that the heads of the three great depart­
ments had "friends" in the Congress. Cabinet consensus therefore could 
smooth the way for administration policy which had to be translated into 
legislation. But unanimity was too much to ask of such a contentious 
set of men. Before long, Monroe's aspirations of a noble collegium 
would be shattered; after a particularly trying cabinet meeting, Monroe 
was "apparently affected" by a protracted argument. This argument, over
whether to retain the just-captured Amelia Island, was just the beginning
11
of more heated disputes which had less to do with islands than politics.
Considering together all the official and auxiliary functions
demanded of a cabinet official, as well as the particular circumstances
of the Monroe cabinet, an entirely happy choice of ministers was almost
impossible to achieve. John Quincy Adams was decided upon rather quickly,
much to the chagrin of Henry Clay, who wanted the State Department for
himself. In compensation, Monroe offered Clay the War Department, which
114he sullenly declined. Crawford was continued in the Treasury, it was
said, as much because of political expediency as for any other reason
(as if there could have been a better reason) Having filled these
two places, Monroe took his time deciding upon his choices for Attorney
116
General and Secretary of War.
■^^Adams, Diary, 4:36-7. ^^Ibid., 4:71-3.
115Jeremiah Mason to Christopher Gore, December 30, 1816,
Hilliard, Mason Correspondence, p. 148.
X1GThere was some slight speculation about the man who would 
fill this position. Lowndes' refusal was known by the Fall. The 
Charleston Courier of October 30, 1817, reprinted a piece from the Rich­
mond Enquirer which asked, "Would it not be best to appoint some gentleman 
of the army to the arduous station— arduous, because the Secretary has
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Monroe seemed less interested in having a good Secretary than in 
making an acceptable political appointment. Aside from building a sec­
tional balance in the cabinet, Monroe did not ponder exactly what made a 
good Secretary of War. He believed his short time with the War Depart­
ment had enhanced his political reputation (even though he ran the State 
Department simultaneously and was ill from overwork much of the time).
He certainly knew that Eustis' and Armstrong's confused administrations 
were insufficient to wreck the department totally, even in hostile times. 
Thus, as Monroe considered the various pretenders to the office, there
were no real pressures upon him to fill quickly a place which seemed
. . . 117
rather immune to maladministration.
Monroe wanted the West to provide one member of the cabinet, and 
in fact a majority of those in the running were from that section. As a 
political and military man of the West, Jackson was naturally and 
directly interested in whom Monroe would choose. Even before the elec­
tion, Jackson had heard it rumoured that Senator Richard Mentor Johnson 
of Kentucky was being considered. Bluntly, the General informed Monroe 
that such an appointment would not do. Jackson argued that Johnson 
lacked "capacity stability or energy," [sic] all the requisites, Jackson 
thought, of a good head of department. He recommended instead William 
Drayton, a South Carolina Federalist. This last suggestion Monroe
sometimes to deal with impetuous spirits, made still more impetuous by 
the reputation they have won during the late war?" Allusions to "impetu­
ous spirits" could have applied to any number of military men of repute. 
The Baltimore Patriot of November 11, 1817, reported Lowndes' refusal 
and named David R. Williams as the new appointee. Finally, on November 
29, 1817, Calhoun's appointment was announced in the Charleston Courier.
117James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, February 23, 1817, Hamilton, 
Monroe Papers, 6:3; see also Ammon, Monroe, pp. 342-48, for a summary of 
Monroe's tenure as Secretary of War.
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tactfully ignored, but during the next several months Jackson went to
some pains to inform the President-elect of the kind of person who should
fill the War Department position. Most of all, the new officer should be
competent and aware of the best interests of the army. A poor Secretary
could be disruptive of good military order, but a wrong-headed one was
potentially "a tyrant.” Other correspondents had discussed the new War
Secretary in general terms, but Jackson's letters to Monroe seemed more
importunate. The General was adamant that the War Office did not need
2.18another incompetent to oversee it. Of course, Jackson himself was an 
obvious choice, as Monroe cheerily and doubtless with some relief informed 
the General when word reached the capital that Jackson was not interested
4- 7 ! 1 1 9at all.
By then Monroe had decided upon Isaac Shelby, the Governor of
Kentucky. The President had gone so far as to place his name in nomina-
120
tion before word came that Shelby did not want the job either. There
was at the same time a minor swell in the West for General William Henry 
Harrison, who did want the appointment. Judge Thomas Todd of Kentucky 
deftly pointed out to Monroe that, rumours to the contrary notwith­
standing, Harrison's appointment would be looked upon with favor in the
121
West. However, Harrison did not receive the call.
xoAndrew Jackson to James Monroe, October 23, 1816, and March 4, 
1817, Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, 2:262, 277-82.
119James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, March 1, 1817, Hamilton, 
Monroe Papers, 6:5.
120James Monroe to Isaac Shelby, February 20, 1817, ibid., 6:1.
121Thomas Todd to James Monroe, February 9, 1817, Monroe Papers, 
LC; see also Rufus King to Jeremiah Mason, April 7, 1817, Hilliard,
Mason Correspondence, pp. 162-63.
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Not until early in the summer of 1817 did Monroe begin to look
to the South. There were three potential Secretaries there, all from
South Carolina: former Governor David R. Williams, Senator William
Lowndes (who had turned down the post when President Madison had offered
it to him) , and finally, Calhoun.
It was by no means odd that Monroe should consider Calhoun as a
prospective cabinet member. The two men had known each other since the
early days of the Twelfth Congress, when Calhoun was closely identified
with the so-called "War Mess," a nest of War Hawks who lived in the same
boarding house in Washington. As the War of 1812 approached, Calhoun had
steadily supported administration war measures while on the Committee for
Foreign Relations. As acting chairman of that committee, Calhoun had
delivered the manifesto for war, which had been written by Monroe. During
the conflict, Calhoun was known to be solidly in the administration camp.
One very good reason Monroe considered Calhoun in the first place, there-
122
fore, was because Calhoun's politics corresponded with the President's.
When the President offered the War Department to Calhoun in
October, 1817, the young South Carolinian was at least the President's
fifth choice for the spot. There is no reason to believe that Calhoun
had expected the offer. It probably came as a happy surprise to him;
just as happily he accepted it. By late November, both Calhoun and his
123
letter of acceptance were on their way to Washington.
129“The best discussion of Calhoun's career before he became 
Secretary of War can be found in Wiltse,- Calhoun, pp. 53-102.
123John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, November 1, 1817, Calhoun 
Papers, 1:418-19. Monroe had tested reactions to Calhoun's possible 
appointment earlier that year during his tour of the North. He appar­
ently asked several officers (perhaps including Jacob Brown) while there 
and drew a favorable response. John C. Calhoun to James Monroe,
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Scholars have argued that ambition drove Calhoun into the
cabinet, but such an argument tells us very little about him. Few of
Calhoun's contemporaries would have shunned Monroe's offer. The fact
that several men turned the post down before Calhoun accepted did not
demean the value of the offer. We may presume that others (such as
Harrison) would have been quite happy with such a position, but Calhoun's
acceptance effectively closed off all other offers. Even if one grants
that Calhoun had presidential ambitions beyond an idle daydream in 1817
(and there is evidence which suggests that he did), his acceptance does
124
not necessarily bespeak an unusual amount of ambition. He had risen 
metearically during his short time in government, and he had not yet met 
with failure or defeat. It is easy enough to forget that by the time he 
became Secretary of War, Calhoun had been in national government for only 
six years. Especially in the era of good feelings, ambition fueled poli­
tics. By 1817, Calhoun's old comrade from the War Mess of 1812, Henry 
Clay, already had presidential visions. Calhoun was surrounded by 
ambitious men, and those who refused the post did so only because they 
thought they could gain more by staying out of Monroe's administration 
than by being in it.
Monroe's search for a Secretary of War entailed little of the 
frenzy we have come to associate with cabinet appointments. The 
President was prepared to be content with a reasonable political choice,
December 9, 1817, J. Franklin Jameson, ed., "The Correspondence of John C. 
Calhoun," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1899 
(Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1900),
2:252 (hereafter cited as Jameson, Correspondence).
124
See Chapter II, p. 76.
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one which would complement those already made. Once he found that the 
more prominent westerners were not interested in a relatively minor 
cabinet post, he doubtless thought that the place could just as well be 
filled by a talented newcomer. As to standards of expertness in affairs 
military and administrative, they were of little moment to Monroe or any­
one else, and thus tradition was followed in the appointment.
There was a decided lack of public excitement about the cabinet 
appointments, as there was about government in general. Calhoun's
appointment was mildly received. Several newspapers, including the
125
Charleston Courier, ran only terse announcements. The leading Federal­
ist of the day, Rufus King of New York, speculated that Calhoun would 
have little influence in the administration. Earlier, King had written 
to a friend, "of the new cabinet, we hear nothing; it is not talked of, 
and with the exception of a few persons, I really believe it is a matter 
of much indifference." Indeed, it seemed to King that the doldrums had 
mysteriously moved northward to seize Washington City, its inhabitants,
J • 126and its affairs.
King had described Calhoun as "a young man, with honorable views,
so far as they are known," but King was too grudging of the new Secre- 
127tary. A more common criticism of Calhoun in 1817 would have been that 
he had quite too many views, expressed them too easily with great
125Charleston Courier, November 29, 1817.
126Rufus King to Christopher Gore, January [n.d.], 1817, Hilliard, 
Mason Correspondence, p. 192.
127Rufus King to Jeremiah Mason, March [n.d.], 1818, C. R. King, 
ed., Life and Correspondence of Rufus L. King, 6 vols. (New York: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1894-1900), 6:50 (hereafter cited as King Correspondence).
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certitude, that he was too adept, and that he was altogether too devoted
to serious pursuits. At the age of thirty-five, he was by most accounts
a severe and humorless pedant. The signs of a South Carolina frontier
upbringing had been polished away by Yale, the Litchfield Law School,
and legal apprenticeship in Charleston. He once told a friend that he
was less in love with the law than with the "delicious theme of the
muses, or interesting pages of history," but there is little else to
prove that he was more comfortable with Horace in his lap than with
128
Blackstone or de Vattel.
John Calhoun styled himself a Republican, but any Secretary of 
War was perforce a nationalist. More than any other of the cabinet 
officers, the Federalist imprimatur had been stamped on this one. In 
the first years of the republic, politicians had shown that it was 
possible to devise foreign policies which were consistent with party 
sentiment. So, too, had the Treasury Department been harnessed to 
partisan designs. When the government fell into Jefferson's hands, the 
differences of administration by party became apparent to all who cared 
to look. But the War Department had been the most unerringly nationalist 
of all, because within the purview of this office there was little which 
could manifestly identify its occupant as anything but a nationalist. 
Insofar as political thought may be said to determine political action, 
it is proper to speculate just how much the Republican ideology of the
128John C. Calhoun to Andrew Pickens, Sr., November 24, 1805, 
Calhoun Papers, 1:22. He found the practice of law even less to his 
liking than the study of it. To his future mother-in-law several years 
later, he wrote: "I still feel a strong aversion to the law; and am
determined to forsake it as soon as I can make a decent independence." 
John C. Calhoun to Floride Calhoun, April 6, 1809, Calhoun Papers, 1:41.
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Jeffersonian secretaries impeded their satisfying the requirements of 
this office. How comfortable could a Republican be doing a nationalist's 
job? Republicanism had to change, for nationalism could not.
If Thomas Jefferson had given any thought to Calhoun's particular
creed, and attempted to place him as an "ardent" or "moderate" Republican,
he would have been hard pressed. Calhoun was certainly more casual about
the greatest question of the Constitution than the old eighteenth century
idealogues; he simply preferred not to quibble about it, as he said to the 
129
House one time. That he could openly assert that constitutional inter­
pretation was a matter of modern irrelevance indicated clearly the changes 
the party phenomenon had undergone by that time. Those who yearned for 
the idealogical integrity of the 1790s, Federalist or Republican, were 
out of date. The Constitution had begun to live.
Calhoun made his political debut in South Carolina when the 
nation was threatened, his national debut when the Republic was on the 
verge of war; thus his formative political education took place in the 
martial atmosphere of a Congress at war. Much as young lieutenants were 
called to the flag in 1812, Calhoun and his legislative comrades were 
unwilling to be retarded in their purpose by the worries of the experi­
enced, were quick to act and content to deal with hidden miscalculations 
in more peaceful times. How much the environment of crisis affected the 
character of Calhoun's thought can only be surmised, but it is evident 
that it was the crisis of national defense which acted as the premise 
for all Calhoun's early political views. From the crisis of the histori­
cal moment devolved the notion that only nationalism could insure
129
John C. Calhoun, "Speech on Internal Improvements," February 4, 
1817, ibid., 1:403.
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survival. Once those grounds were accepted by Calhoun, all that was 
necessary was to aid in the enactment of certain programs. To that end, 
Calhoun was willing to fight in the Congress for internal improvements 
because improvements meant roads, canals, and bridges, and these meant 
faster civil and military communications. He was willing to fight for 
national taxes, national banks, and protective tariffs because he thought 
that the enlivened and orderly economic structure which would emerge was 
so salutary that those who objected from the states would see the wisdom 
that particularism meant, first, martial, and then national disaster.
He made the transition from martial politics to those of peace 
handily. The war's recent conclusion insured that his premise would be 
generally accepted for a time, perhaps so much so that the premise of 
nationalist politics would become commonplace. His early political 
statements mark him, above all, as a progressive politician. Although 
the war's lessons provided the touchstone for his nationalism, Calhoun 
was no Frederick the Great, building the garrison state, preaching the 
politics of a cordon defense. Only insofar as those lessons could make 
a contribution to civil improvement, to prosperity, and to expansion 
were they of interest to him. His attitudes on war were ordinary: he
was neither particularly bellicose nor pacifistic. He accepted war as 
one of the instruments of statecraft. His service in the war congresses 
gave him a military as well as a political education, and it was this 
experience that he would carry with him into the War Office. In his 
capacity as a Secretary of War (and as a politician), he would find 
during the next six-and-a-half years that many of the views he had learned 
in his political youth would no longer sustain him. Eventually, he would 
abandon these youthful ideas; but for now he could do no other.
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CHAPTER II
NATIONAL MILITARY POLICY: 
TRADITIONS AND AMBITIONS
It is said that in the middle ages, battles were watched over by
referees whose duty it was to agree on the winners.^ Defeat became a
signal for military reform and improvement, and history is replete with
2
disasters which fostered evolutions of military thought. No such 
observers reported after the War of 1812: the irresolution that had
dominated the American battlefields found its way to the negotiating 
tables at Ghent, where a peace as indecisive as the war was forged. The 
agreements at Ghent inaugurated the "era of free security," in which the 
United States was left to its own affairs for nearly a century."^ The 
military crises which animate so much of the military thought were
■*"John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: The Viking Press,
1976) , p. 86 (hereafter cited as Keegan, The Face of Battle).
2
See, for two works which treat the theme of how national defeat 
catalyses the evolution of military thought, R. S. Quimby, The Background 
of Napoleonic Warfare; the theory of military tactics in eighteenth- 
century France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957; reprint ed.,
New York: AMS Reprints, 1973), p. 3 (hereafter cited as Quimby, Back­
ground of Napoleonic Warfare), and Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1976), passim.
3
C. Vann Woodward, "The Age of Reinterpretation," American 
Historical Review, 46 (1960), 1-19, quoted in John Shy, "The American 
Military Experience: History and Learning," A People Numerous and Armed
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 233 (hereafter cited as
Shy, "American Military Experience").
48
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hardly present. In this respect, the Civil War was a congenial home
4
affair, conducted by men who were of the same military mind.
Most Americans would have said, if asked, that this inactivity 
by the military mind was just as well. Their animus toward things mili­
tary was an Anglo-American tradition, dating at least as early as the
Mutiny Act of 1689, when Parliament finally bridled its dangerous 
5 __
armies. xne alienation between the state and its culture and the
military forces which guarded it was reinforced in the eighteenth century
by radical Whig ideology, which despised standing armies as enemies of
liberty. As Americans relied upon the British Army during the colonial
period, they were able to indulge their apprehensions. When Americans
went to war on their own in the Revolution and after, it was with the
feeling that it was not really their vocation, not indeed their virtue,
but rather a distasteful necessity. A New England pacifist argued at
the close of the War of 1812 that the act of war itself, even more than
victory or defeat, corrupted the very marrow of society:
The depravity, occasioned by war, is not confined to the army.
Every species of vice gains ground in a nation during a war. And 
when a war is brought to a close, seldom, perhaps, does a community 
return to its former standard of morality.
4
Foreign observers saw more of importance in the Civil War than 
Americans did. See Jay Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959). See also Russell Weigley,
The American Way of War (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 167 (hereafter
cited as Weigley, American Way of War).
^See Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (New York: Collier
Books, 1967), p. 79.
0
Richard Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation
of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York: The Free
Press, 1975), pp. 296-297 (hereafter cited as Kohn, Eagle and Sword).
7
Philo Pacificus [Noah Worcester], A Solemn Review of the Custom 
of War . . . (Cambridge: Printed by Hilliard and Metcalf, 1816), p. 14.
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From this point of view, it made little difference whose army one
considered; soldiers were much alike, regardless of their uniforms. So
said the arch-Republican newspaper Aurora in 1799: "Privates who exchange
the price of honest industry, for the humiliating duties of soldiers, are
'villains more desperate, and cut-throats equally bloody minded, with the
0
soldiery of the British monarchy.1"
Such views comported well enough with the early American experi­
ence: given its limited production capacity and tractless wilderness,
America had always been unmanageable militarily. Whereas the immediate 
defensive capacities of the country were limited, its potential strength 
was formidable. The :nation relied mostly upon the militia, whose 
reaction was sometimes dangerously delayed, and whose recovery from 
disaster was often little short of miraculous. Strategic reaction, not 
anticipation, was consistent with America's military needs and political 
ideas.^
However, the need for some sort of military protection was 
accepted. But America's progressive ideology supported only a reactionary 
military policy, and the few professional soldiers which the nation 
tolerated were viewed as temporary expedients only. The militia remained 
the bulwark of America's defense by the time the War of 1812 began. Some 
who watched the nation go to war did so feeling that the lack of prepara­
tion could prove disastrous. Serving in Congress for the first time, 
Calhoun wrote to a friend: "This is the first war that the country has
0
Quoted in Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 260.
9
Shy, "American Military Experience," p. 239.
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ever engaged in; and the whole of our system has to be commenced and 
organised.
The militia's political acceptability hardly added to its mili­
tary effectiveness during the war; so dismal was its performance that 
some political leaders began to search for new ways to satisfy the 
military requirements of a democratic state. After the war, the militia 
figured less and less in the calculations of policy. Both Monroe and 
Calhoun were careful, however, to pay homage to the militia when the 
occasion arose; but when the time came to decide upon the character of 
the force to be used in the first Seminole War, they instructed Jackson 
and Gaines to use regular soldiers only."^
10John C. Calhoun to James MacBride, April 18, 1812, Calhoun 
Papers, 1:99.
^ A t  the beginning of the Seminole action, the Cabinet decided 
to call out the Georgia militia, only to find that some of its members 
were difficult to control when sent against the Indians. There was a 
massacre of an innocent Chehaw village by a militia Captain, and count­
less other difficulties with the allied Indinas. After nearly a year's 
experience, Calhoun was recommending that his commanders try to do 
without the militia if it could be helped. He made this recommendation 
to Monroe also, who by that time agreed. See, Adams, Diary, 4:31. See 
also John C. Calhoun to Edmund P. Gaines, September 23, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 3:152, in which Calhoun tells Gaines that he should in the future 
use only the Regular Army and Creek allies and avoid "the expenses and 
vexations attending militia requisitions." See a letter in a similar 
vein from John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, September 21, 1818, ibid., 
3:148-149.
In succeeding years Calhoun did not change his mind: the proper
place of the militia was one that was secondary to the standing army. He 
would not have admitted that a nation could rely upon a militia in place 
of a professional establishment. In a letter to Timothy Pickering in 
1821, Calhoun made his position quite clear. He wrote: "It is mere
deception to place our militia on the footing of regular troops and the 
referrence [sic] to the militia of Rome, or Swite'zland [sic] is an un­
worthy sophism to maintain, that deception. These countries ought to be 
considered as cantonments, and their inhabitants the garrison. This 
state of things could only be produced, or continued by that constantly 
impending danger to which you so justly refer, as its cause. No nation 
occupy [sic] a situation so much the opposite, as ourselves. . . .  I am
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English historian John Keegan has written recently that "inside
12
every [professional] army is a crowd struggling to get out." In the 
case of the United States that concept might be reversed. After the 
American Revolution an army of sorts was fashioned out of the crowds of 
mostly unenthusiastic amateurs, but the nation still held it at a dis­
tance and then only grudgingly. The evolution of the professional army 
from the armed crowd was by no means a unique American experience: it
had been repeated in all the countries of western Europe between the 
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, and in each case the new army was 
watched over by the state with a kind of suspicion that no other group 
in society suffered. After a time these nations became accustomed to a 
martial presence; having ingratiated themselves by their actions, the 
armies became integral parts of the societies at large. Keegan has 
argued that one of the reasons for the new receptivity to standing armies 
was a kind of militarizing of the societies themselves. Caught up in the 
beginnings of the Industrial Revolution, the civilians began to mimic the 
supposed efficiency, precision, and purposefulness of their armies.
Crowds were dangerous in any context: they were disruptive, passion-
ridden, and anarchical, regardless of whether they were crowds of 
soldiers or factory workers or c i t i z e n s . I n  the era of good feelings
by no means disposed to set the militia aside . . . "  The nation should 
"be taught to look to their real use, instead of assigning duties to them, 
to which they are wholly inadequate and in which the only results, which 
can be justly anticipated, are defeat and an enormous augmentation of the 
publick expenditure." John C. Calhoun to Timothy Pickering, April 29, 
1821, ibid., 6:81-82.
12
Keegan, Face of Battle, p. 173. Keegan's notion, of course, is 
not a new one to military sociology, but he is the most recent in a long 
line of expositors. As I indicate in the text, I believe that this con­
cept has a good deal to offer American military historians.
13Ibid., p. 175.
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the United States was at the very crossroads which the European nations 
had passed not too long before.
The Regular Army that the nation allowed in 1817 and over which 
Calhoun had charge was very like a radical democrat's dreams: the nation
had created a caricature of an army. The Regular Army was small, dis­
persed, inefficient and costly, and dangerous to serve in. There were 
647 officers and 7,799 men in the army when Calhoun took office. Congress 
had allowed a 10,000 man force in 1815, but only during the year 1820 
(just before reduction) did the establishment reach its authorized 
strength. ^
The numbers of the army did not change much during Calhoun's time 
in the War Department; the average strength between 1817 and 1825 was 602 
officers and 6,426 men. After 1821, when Congress mandated a reduction 
of the total force to 6,000 men, the averages dropped by about 100 offi­
cers and 1,000 men thereafter. Throughout this period the ratio of 
officers to soldiers was about one to ten, but from 1819 on, the number 
of officers in relation to soldiers tended to decline.^
Soldiers enlisted then for the very same reasons they always 
have: to get away from home; to hide from debtors or the law; to escape
an unfortunate affair; or, to travel and seek adventure. But the 
ranker's life was no life for a gentleman unless he was in trouble, nor 
was it a life for the ambitious. Immigrants who arrived after the War 
of 1812 composed an ever greater part of the army as time went by: a
survey of incomplete enlistment records for the six years following the
14These statistics are taken from Weigley, History of the U. S. 
Army, p. 566.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
war showed twenty per cent of all enlistees willing to identify them­
selves as foreigners. By the eve of the Civil War perhaps only forty
16per cent of the Regular Army was native-born.
The soldiers of the Regular 7\rmy were generally posted to inhos­
pitable places. A preponderance of the army's strength was already
located on the frontier; their stations along the Gulf Coast or in the 
Northwest Territory were hardly areas of repose. Less than 2,000 of the 
men in the Army were posted to relatively civilized areas along the 
Atlantic seaboard, and although there was quite a number around New
Orleans, only seven men were posted in the city itself, the rest being 
17in the swamps. In 1818 and 1819, as Calhoun began to execute the
army's movement into the northwest, the chances of a soldier's being
sent to an easy post diminished considerably.
As in every army since antiquity, most casualties were sustained
because of mishap or disease. This was particularly true of an army on
the march, as in the Seminole War, but these kinds of casualties could
18
impede the most ordinary of military operations. One captain reported
16These figures are widely quoted, but Cunliffe believes that, 
apart from their general unreliability, they are much too conservative. 
Many enlistees simply did not care to have their national origins known. 
Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America,
1775-1865 (New York: The Free Press, 1973), pp. 119-120 (hereafter cited
as Cunliffe, The Martial Spirit).
17See the charts accompanying "Reduction of the Army Considered, 
December 11, 1818," in Walter Lowrie, Walter S. Franklin, and Matthew 
St. Clair Clarke, eds., American State Papers. Documents Legislative and 
Executive of the United States (1st through 25th Congresses, 1789-1838), 
Class V, Military Affairs, 38 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Gales and
Seaton, 1833-1861), 1:787-790 (hereafter cited as ASPMA).
■^One study points out that of all the Army's activities in the 
west between 1815 and 1845, only a dozen men were killed in hostile 
engagements with the Indians. Stanley S. Graham, "The Life of the
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plaintively to the War Department that his attempts to set the founda­
tion for a battery at Mobile Bay had been constantly interrupted by
19"Hurricanes & disease." Calhoun's energetic new Surgeon General,
Joseph Lovell, was greatly exercised by the wretched general health of
the army. Lovell assigned two reasons for the deplorable state of
affairs: recruiting officers did not enlist healthy man in the first
20
place, and awful rations were given the soldiers. He recommended to 
Calhoun that the ration be changed immediately and radically. "In 
fact," Lovell said, "there is probably no service in which the officers 
appear to pay so little respect to the character of the soldier as in 
ours, or in which so little attention is given to their comfort con­
venience and health [sic]." Lovell supported his argument by comparing 
the rations allowed soldiers in France, Britain, and the United States.
American rankers got bread and meat only. The others got these items
21
and also some sort of vegetable. In one of his earliest reports to
Congress, Calhoun asked that an improvement in the soldiers' rations
include a complement of vegetables; and, following another of Lovell's
recommendations, Calhoun suggested that the daily ration of a jigger of
22
whiskey for each soldier be done away with.
Enlisted Soldier on the Western Frontier, 1815-1845," unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. North Texas State University, 1972, p. 188.
19James Gadsden to Christopher Vandeventer, December 2, 1819, 
Calhoun Papers, 4:464.
20Joseph Lovell to John C. Calhoun, February 1, 1819, and 
November 1, 1818, ibid., 3:534, 249.
21Joseph Lovell, "Report of the Surgeon General, November 16, 
1818," ASPMA, 1:306.
22 "Reduction of the Army Considered, December 16, 1818," ibid., 
1:781. The whiskey ration was not officially banned until 1830. Some
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The general treatment of the soldier, as Lovell pointed out, left
much to be desired. Aside from sickness, privation, and simple danger,
the soldier was misused. Rumors came to Calhoun from various posts of
soldiers being let out as contract laborers. One officer complained
that two of his men had been ordered to serve under Governor Lewis Cass
at Detroit. The officer informed Calhoun:
These two men have been constantly employed, to the best of my 
knowledge & belief solely for the private employment & advantage 
of Gov [sic] Cass; & have been by him placed on the most laborious 
& fatigueing [sic] duties, such as working out his road tax, pro­
curing timber & pickets, cultivating his farm &c. &c.^3
Apparently some officers considered soldiers as their own labor
pool and that as a perquisite of their rank. The misuse of soldierly
labor outraged Lovell. He told Calhoun that "they are not only put upon
menial and fatiguing duties for the accommodation of officers but even
24
loaned like so many Negroes, to the citizens." Calhoun did little 
about all this, and the extent to which the practice occurred has yet to 
be investigated by historians.
enthusiastic officers banned liquor in their commands when Calhoun and 
Lovell so recommended. See Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the 
Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (New York:
Macmillan and Company, 1969), p. 329 (hereafter cited as Prucha, Sword 
of the Republic).
In an attempt to improve the Army's diet, Calhoun decreed that, 
wherever possible, commands should farm for themselves. Colonel Henry 
Atkinson was an especially devoted military farmer. After a year's 
residence at Council Bluffs, during which floods carried away some of his 
efforts, hi^ garrison had sown forage, and planted more than 200 acres of 
corn and other edibles. Henry Atkinson to John C. Calhoun, June 19, 1820, 
Calhoun Papers, 5:193-194.
23Morril Marston to John C. Calhoun, September 4, 1818, ibid., 
3:100. Marston was eventually court-martialled by General Alexander 
Macomb, the local commander, for trifling with the Governor.
24
Joseph Lovell to John C. Calhoun, November 1, 1818, ibid.,
3:247.
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For the ordinary soldier military justice would have been a
laughable affair had it not been administered in such a draconian way.
Flogging, branding, dunking, binding, imprisonment, and executions— all
were practiced at one time or another. One unusual letter came to the
War Department from a private soldier stationed at Green Bay in Wisconsin
territory. He told Calhoun that he had been "severely flogged" on
several occasions for no good reason and bound and "ducked almost to
strangulation with buckets of water." He brought these incidents to
Calhoun's attention, as he said:
[Because] it has been remarked by a Grecian legislator that the 
most perfect form of Government was that in which the complaints 
and wrongs of the meanest, were equally listened to and redressed
with those of the most powerful subject.25
The most notorious incident of punishment to come to light during
Calhoun's time in office involved the practice of cropping ears. In 1820
the Kentucky Gazette reported that Colonel Talbot Chambers had countenanced
26
such a punishment for two of his men the year before. Once the news
became public, Calhoun had little choice but to order a court-martial for
27
Chambers, who was found guilty. Chambers was sentenced to be suspended 
from service for one month, a judgment which Calhoun thought was too mild 
for the offense committed. In a memorandum to President Monroe on the 
Chambers case, Calhoun remarked:
25Joseph Baxter to John C. Calhoun, July 25, 1821, ibid., 6:279-
280.
26Willoughby Morgan to John C. Calhoun, September 8, 1820, ibid.,
5:350-352.
27John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, January 21, 1821, ibid.,
5:268.
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«4,V
The truth appears to be, that the Officers of the Army, at the end 
of the war, had a very erroneous mode of thinking, as well on this, 
as many other points, which took some years to correct. I believe 
the establishment is now thoroughly reformed of most of the faults, 
which grew out of the incidents of the war.3®
Calhoun was wrong; such punishments did not disappear. Flogging,
which had been abolished in 1812, was reinstated in 1833, a testament to
29
the real or imagined problems of disciplining such an army.
For his service the ordinary soldier was paid five dollars a 
month? the officers, depending upon grade, got a little more. At a time 
when the common laborer could earn as much as a dollar a day, one had to 
have modest ambitions indeed to go soldering. Military pay was low 
enough, but when Congress considered saving money by further cutting 
military salaries, Calhoun protested. "There is no class in the community 
whose compensation has advanced less since the termination of the War of 
the Revolution, than that of the officers and soldiers of our Army," he
4. 3 0wrote.
No wonder, then, that the army which Calhoun sought to administer 
sometimes seemed to be gradually melting away. The desertion rate was 
staggering. This is why the figures for army strength during this entire 
period are unreliable; deserters were carried on the rolls in all but the 
most final reports to the Secretary of War. Calhoun's Adjutant and 
Inspector General, Daniel Parker, informed the Secretary in 1820 that 
"desertions alone, during the last year, in some Regiments exceeded
28
John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, June 18, 1821, ibid., 6:196-197.
29
Prucha, Sword of the Republic, pp. 325-326.
30"Reduction of the Army Considered, December 11, 1818," ASPMA,
1:781.
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one-fifth of the whole & have kept the army far below the [authorized]
31organization." Recruiters were pressed even to keep up with the
desertions; in 1823 twenty-five per cent of the number of recruits
32
deserted, and in 1825, nearly fifty per cent.
II
Militarily (and very nearly any other category one would care to
name) the United States was an undeveloped nation. Although the republic
had succeeded in winning political independence and was on its way to
winning economic independence, culturally the nation was still in its
infancy. The exertions of Noah Webster to develop an American lexicon
were not finished and a uniquely American literature was only beginning
to emerge. There was no such movement toward independence in American
military thought.
Furthermore, there was not much sensitivity among military
thinkers about their lack of independence. On the contrary, it was
believed by most officers who contemplated such matters that the true
font of military knowledge had been discovered. By all evidence, the
dominant influence upon American military thought following the War of 
33
1812 was French. The Germans had not yet come to the attention of
31Daniel Parker to John C. Calhoun, January 13, 1820, Calhoun 
Papers, 4:569-570.
32Prucha, Sword of the Republic, pp. 324-325.
33This is not to say that there were not other influences at 
work. It has been successfully argued that the Americans' own colonial 
experience and British heritage were the most important of these 
influences. What I have reference to here, however, is a conscious 
attempt by American military thinkers after the War of 1812 to build a 
professional army. To those people, the professional army and the 
napoleonic army were the same.
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American military men, and would not for some time to come. The British 
were eliminated from consideration both because of their long-standing 
enmity and because they were the very model upon which republican preju­
dices were founded. A suggestion to create a British-model army would 
have been as well received as a motion to establish a monarchy. But 
gratitude for the old French alliance during the Revolution and ide­
ological affinities were sufficiently binding to withstand episodic 
strains such as the Quasi-war and other maritime harassments before the 
War of 1312. Regardless of how much American politicians railed against 
the policies of revolutionary France in those years, there was a persis­
tent sympathy for the only other nation in the world which had dared to 
style itself a republic.
And then there was Napoleon. It is doubtful that many American 
military thinkers were much concerned about the more dictatorial aspects 
of Napoleonic rule, but the Corsican's success on the battlefields pro­
vided American officers with the excitement of witnessing the emergence 
of a new age of warfare. In a world inured to daily excitements, the 
modern historian is perhaps ill-equipped to understand how mentally 
exciting it may have been for the American officer to have read of 
Marengo, Jena-Auerstadt, Austerlitz, and the other great clashes of the 
day. The fact remains that the military image of France captured the
imagination of American minds and continued to do so until the Civil 
34War. There is no indication that these images, presumably founded upon
34Denis Hart Mahan and Henry Halleck, two of the better known 
soldier-scholars before the Civil War, became almost rhapsodic when dis­
cussing Napoleon. Both men produced works on fortifications which were 
significantly improved versions of the standard French works by Vauban 
and Vernon. See Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (New York: 
Macmillan and Company, 1973), pp. 81-88 (hereafter cited as Weigley,
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Napoleonic successes, suffered from a decline in popularity because of 
Waterloo. There was certainly no corresponding rise in affection for 
British military ideas. By contrast, anyone who had been even remotely 
associated with the martial glories of France immediately piqued military 
Americans' interest. American newspapers even took notices of such 
relatively obscure figures as Baron Henri Antoine Jomini, who was ele­
vated to minor celebrity as the newspapers reminded their readers of his
career and his authorship of several illuminating pieces on the campaigns 
35of 1805-1806. Neither was France's image dampened by the restoration
of the Bourbons under the sponsorship of the Allied powers. To the
Americans, the Bourbon regime was fully as reactionary as the other
major powers, but the military glitter of the French was hardly affected
36by their new politics.
Suffusing the political and military Americans' admiration for 
things French was the belief that warfare had recently reached a new 
plateau. There was a great deal of talk after the War of 1812 about the 
"science of war," a catch-phrase which expressed less a distinct body of 
knowledge than a new attitude that warfare was no longer the province of 
even the talented amateur, but a business for professionals. There was 
the sense that the United States had come perilously close to disaster
American Way of War); Denis Hart Mahan, A Complete Treatise on Field 
Fortifications . . . (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1836; reprint ed., West­
port, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1968); and Henry W. Halleck, Elements of
Military Art and Science . . . (New York: D. Appleton, 1846).
35City of Washington Gazette, February 20, 1818.
"^The newspapers were full of hostile remarks about the Bourbons 
in 1815 and 1816. See, for example, Niles' Weekly Register, December 6, 
1815, September 14, 1816, and November 9, 1816.
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because of the lack of knowledge of this "science." General Thomas
Jesup explained handily why America had not progressed in this field:
"The speculative energies of our country . . . being directed to politics
and the active energies to Commerce, but little mind was left to be
applied to military affairs," and therefore, "thirty years of peace and
37
prosperity had left us almost without military knowledge."
The best way of acquiring current military knowledge was to send
promising young officers abroad on extended tours of observation. There
was no question about where to send them; France was the only place one
needed to go to learn about the "science of war." Scarcely had the War
or 1812 ended than General Joseph G. Swift, Chief of the Corps of
Engineers and the first graduate of the United States Military Academy
at West Point, was pressing President Madison and the War Department for
permission to send two officers to the continent. Since the military
academy was about to be improved, the mission to Europe could serve a dual
purpose: the officers could search for books for the academy's library,
and could acquire up-to-date military information. President Madison
and Secretary of War Alexander Dallas agreed, and in the summer of 1815,
Majors Sylvanus Thayer and William McRee, two officers of engineers, set 
38sail for France. The instructions given them by Secretary Dallas 
attested to the government's main interests. They were to examine
37Thomas S. Jesup to John C. Calhoun, March 31, 1820, Calhoun 
Papers, 4:744-745.
38Joseph G. Swift, The Memoirs of Joseph G. Swift (New York: 
Privately printed, 1890), p. 170 (hereafter cited as Swift, Memoirs).
See also Sylvanus Thayer's note to Swift, asking to be one of the touring 
officers "for my professional improvement." Sylvanus Thayer to J. G.
Swift, March 23, 1815, Thayer Papers.
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"military schools, work shops, arsenals and harbours, [sic] the fortifi­
cations, especially those for maritime defense will claim your particular 
39attention."
Thayer and McRee enthusiastically went about their duties, but
they were impeded at times. When they sailed for France, Napoleon was
still at large; when they arrived, Paris was already occupied by the
40
Allies and Napoleon was on his way to St. Helena. And when the
American Minister to France, Albert Gallatin, applied for permission for
his young charges to visit the great defensive works at Metz (which was
also the location of the Artillery School), Lille, Cherbourg, and Brest,
it was refused; the Due de Richelieu offered instead to allow the
41
observers to see their wooden models at Galerie des Invalides. Un­
daunted, the officers contented themselves with prowling the bookshops of
42
Paris for the most recent texts on military subjects. About to leave
France at the end of 1816, Thayer and McRee crated up more than 19,000
43francs' worth of books and charts for shipment home.
39Alexander J. Dallas to Sylvanus Thayer, April 20, 1815, Thayer 
Papers. Earlier, Swift had instructed Thayer to visit the libraries "in 
France, Germany, and England— particularly the first and last named 
nations— to collect Books, Maps, and Instruments." J. G. Swift [?] to 
Sylvanus Thayer, March 30, 1815, ibid.
40Eight days after Thayer and McRee sailed on June 10, 1815, 
Napoleon had been brought to ground at Waterloo.
41Albert Gallatin to the Due de Richelieu, January 29, 1817, and 
the Due de Richelieu to Albert Gallatin, February 8, 1817, Thayer Papers.
42From Paris, Thayer wrote Swift, "Since our arrival we have 
overhalled the several military bookstores & have acquired a sufficient
knowledge of their contents." Sylvanus Thayer to J. G. Swift, October 15, 
1815, ibid.
43William McRee to J. G. Swift, December 16, 1816, ibid. This 
shipment included, notably, the works of Vauban. In dollars, this ship­
ment was worth between $4,000 and $5,000.
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While Thayer and McRee were still in France, another young mili­
tary intellectual, Captain John M. O'Connor, was translating Gay de 
Vernon's Trait de La Science de La Guerre et La Fortifications for the
the army's use. Vernon's work was reputed to have been the best recent
44study produced on this subject, or so O'Connor claimed. Although he
was moody, and a tireless intriguer, O'Connor nonetheless was regarded
45as a talented officer. He enjoyed the confidence of such diverse
acquaintances as Monroe, Crawford, Swift, Thayer, and the irascible
46
senior professor at West Point, Jared Mansfield. O'Connor petitioned
Calhoun in 1818 to approve a visit to France in order to, as O'Connor
said, "perfect my knowledge of Fortifications and other branches of 
47war." Two years later, another shipment of military books bound for 
the West Point Library preceded O'Connor home; among these works were 
Saxe's Reveries, Jomini's Trait de Grandes Operations, Carnot's Defense
44
O'Connor did most of his translation at West Point, and until 
the writings of Mahan and Halleck it was the standard text on this sub­
ject at the school. See, S. F. Gay de Vernon, A Treatise on the Science 
of War and Fortification . . .  to which is added a Summary of the 
Principles and Maxims of Grand Tactics and Operations, trans. by J. M. 
O'Connor, 2 vols. (New York: J. Seymour, 1817).
45Professor Jared Mansfield's daughter Elizabeth pronounced 
O'Connor "a man of talents, but of most unhappy temperaments." Elizabeth 
Mansfield to Harriet [Drake?], December 8, 1817, The Papers of Jared 
Mansfield, The Library of the United States Military Academy, West 
Point, New York (hereafter cited as Mansfield Papers).
46Entries of May 14, May 26, and June 15, 1817, The Journal of 
John Michael O'Connor, The Library of the United States Military Academy, 
West Point, New York (hereafter cited as O'Connor Journal). O'Connor was 
at that moment promoting his translation of Vernon with high officials 
and deeply involved in a shcme to wrest control of West Point from the 
command of Captin Alden Partridge.
47
John Michael O'Connor to John C. Calhoun, March 4, 1818, The 
Papers of John Michael O'Connor, The Library of the United States 
Military Academy, West Point, New York (hereafter cited as O'Connor Papers) .
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48
des Places and, inexplicably, a volume entitled Theatre de Racine.
Military sabbaticals to Europe such as these continued irregularly up to 
the Civil War; two visits to Europe thereafter were made, for instance,
by the brilliant Denis Hart Mahan in the late 1820s and George B.
49
McClellan during the Crimean War.
Thayer, McRee, and O'Connor all made the American ministry in 
Paris their headquarters during their trips abroad, and there lively 
associations doubtless occurred among these young military representatives 
and French military figures. The final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo 
prematurely ended the careers of many experienced French officers, some 
of whom looked to new opportunities in the United States. While in 
Paris Thayer and McRee had met Claudius Crozet, a graduate of the famed 
Ecole Polytechnique and ex-artillerist under Napoleon. When Thayer 
returned to America and took command of West Point, Crozet became the 
academy1s first professor of engineering.^  Here, too, Thayer may have 
met the dashing William Theobald Wolfe Tone, son of the French general 
of that name, and an adopted son of the French Republic, which saw to 
his schooling at the Prytaneum and Imperial Lyceum. Though relatively 
young, Tone had a wealth of military experience. He had been a sub­
lieutenant of chasseurs, and aide-de-camp to General Bagneres; he had 
also been wounded six times at the battle of Leipzig and was a member 
of the Legion of Honor. Tone came to the United States in 1816 and
48Invoice, dated October 12, 1820, ibid.
49Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, pp. 150, 191.
50Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West
Point (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 97 (hereafter
cited as Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country).
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served for a short time in the Regular Army, but he was a private gentle­
man for the most part, writing about military subjects that intrigued 
him. After coming to America, he became a social acquaintance of Calhoun's 
and of several other individuals in the War Department. Tone later wrote 
a treatise on cavalry operations, but the American military establish­
ment, having no cavalry units nor encouraging their creation, had little
*  - 4. 5 1use for it.
Other military works found ready support from the government.
Calhoun readily supported O'Connor's translation of Vernon's work on
fortifications, and, beginning in 1819, the Secretary supported the
writing and translation of a treatise on artillery by another military
refugee, ex-General Henri Lallemand. Lallemand's Treatise on Artillery
was written especially to serve as a manual of instruction for the
School of Artillery Practice at Fortress Monroe, the first of the army's
52
postgraduate schools, which Calhoun also sponsored.
Certainly the most controversial of the French military men to 
come to America after Waterloo was Simon Bernard, a former General in 
Napoleon’s corps du genie and apparently a favorite of the Emperor's.
The Bourbon regime naturally was anxious to keep under police surveil­
lance this man whom Napoleon had said was more of a Bonapartist than he. 
Bernard was well known to Americans in Paris. He had been acquainted
^James Grant Wilson, and John Fiske, eds., Appleton's Cyclo­
paedia of American Biography, 6 vols. (New York: D. Appleton and
Company, 1886-1900), 6:131.
52See Henri Dominique Lallemand, A Treatxse on Artillery . . ., 
trans. by James Renwick, 2 vols. (New York: n.p., 1820). John Fenwick
to John C. Calhoun, August 6, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 4:212-213; John C. 
Calhoun to James Monroe, July 20, 1821, ibid, 7:267-268; John C. Calhoun 
to Patrick Farrelley, January 27, 1823, ibid., 7:442.
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with William Crawford when Crawford was the U. S. minister to the Tuiler-
ies, and with his successor, Albert Gallatin. Bernard had assisted Thayer
and McRee in their tours of observation as well. Through the good offices
of the Marquise de Lafayette, Crawford, and Gallatin, Bernard was offered
a place in 1816 on the newly formed United States Board of Engineers,
whose mission was the creation of an organized network of coastal 
53defenses. The Frenchman was to have (by a special act of Congress) a
brevet rank of brigadier with the understanding that he had no chance of
actually commanding the American corps of engineers. James Monroe, then
Secretary of War, believed that this special arrangement would quiet any
protests from American officers. Referring to Bernard, Monroe explained
to Andrew Jackson:
It required much delicacy in the arrangement, to take advantage of 
his knowledge and experience, in a manner acceptable to himself, 
without wounding the feelings of the Officers of our own corps,
53Although Bernard had returned to service during the Hundred 
Days, he nonetheless offered his loyalty to the Bourbons later and asked 
to be reinstated in the French Army; the new government refused and ban­
ished him to his home, where he was closely watched by the police. This, 
however, was not the story he told Francis Wright in New York in 1819.
In this version he said that the King had "twice solicited his services, 
but he replied that having been aide-de-camp to the ex-emperor and 
honored with his intimacy, he could not enter into the service of the 
reigning family without drawing upon himself the suspicion that . . .  he 
was guided by interest." Instead, he told Wright, he simply preferred 
to retire to his villa, where he was constantly harassed by the local 
authorities "till his patience became exhausted." Compare his letter 
to the Due de Feltre in 1816, quoted in Joseph H. Harrison, Jr., "Simon 
Bernard, the American System, and the Ghost of the French Alliance," in 
America: The Middle Period, edited by John B. Boles (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 1973) , p. 149 (hereafter cited as Harrison, 
"Simon Bernard"); with Bernard's remarks to Wright, in Francis Wright, 
Views of Society and Manners in America, edited by Paul R. Baker 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 26
(hereafter cited as Wright, Views of Society). See also William McRee 
to J. G. Swift, September 14, 1816, Thayer Papers. On the means of 
Bernard's appointment, see Harrison, "Simon Bernard," p. 150.
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who had rendered such useful services, and were entitled to the 
confidence and protection of their country.54
Contrary to Monroe's expectation, Bernard's appointment stirred
considerable resentment among America's sensitive young officers.
Although General Swift's place as chief of the corps of engineers was
not threatened, Swift chose to take the matter personally; he resigned
55less than a year after Bernard arrived in the country. In order to
take advantage of Bernard's skills, all plans for fortifications had
been suspended until the Frenchman had arrived in America. Christopher
Vandeventer, then attached to the engineers around New York City,
remarked to his old friend Thayer that "I need say but little to expose
the evils to the service and wrongs to the Engineer Officers which will
flow from . . . withdrawing confidence from American talent and exposing
it exclusively in the presumption of adventurers."^
In fairness to Bernard, he was every bit the engineer he was
said to be; no American at the time had the experience and skill of the 
57
Frenchman. Bernard's appointment was, as the outraged American offi­
cers said, an admission by leaders of government that American talent 
was not quite up to the mark. The fact that Bernard's appointment was 
readily approved by the first postwar American Congress was a tacit
54John F. Callan, The Military Laws of the United States (Phila­
delphia: George Childs, 1863), p. 112 (hereafter cited as Callan,
Military Laws of . a United States).
55Swift resigned in November, 1818. See Calhoun's letter 
respecting this, November 17, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 3:277.
^Christopher Vandeventer to Sylvanus Thayer, June 4, 1816, 
Thayer Papers.
57Bernard's training was impressive? he had studied under 
Lagrange and Monge at the Ecole Polytechnique, worked on field fortifi­
cations with the Army of the Rhine, and had been in charge of the
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admission that the modest abilities of American engineers could not be
relied upon to begin the vast military building program which the
government had inaugurated. Bernard clearly did have the confidence of
President Monroe and Secretary Calhoun in the years to come; some said
they were influenced more by this Frenchman than by their own officers.
58
It was probably true.
The wholesale importation of French ideas and men could hardly
have encouraged native military innovations. France cast a long shadow
over the American profession of arms in these years and influenced not
only the thought, but the form and structure of the American military
establishment. When Thayer set about modernizing West Point, he and
members of government looked to the Ecole Polytechnique as their model.
When Calhoun was setting up the new Artillery School of Practice at
Fortress Monroe, both he and his officers were anxious to know how things
were done in the French Artillery School at Metz, and Henri Lallemand's
ideas formed the new school's intellectual foundations for its first
59years in operation.
fortifications at Antwerp in 1811. This last assignment explains George 
Washington Cullum's remark nearly fifty years later that Joseph Swift's 
work at New York City's fortifications was equal to those done at 
Antwerp. Writing in his biographical sketch of Swift, Cullum revealed 
the same sort of national chauvinism displayed Ly Swift, Vandeventer, 
and others when they heard of Bernard's appointment. See Harrison, 
"Simon Bernard," pp. 147-151; Wright, Views of Society, p. 26; and 
George Washington Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and 
Graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, 
from its Establishment in 1802 to 1890, 3 vols. (New York; 1863), 
1:50-55 (hereafter cited as Cullum, Biographical Register).
58Swift, Memoirs, p. 149.
59John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, July 20, 1821, Calhoun 
Papers, 7:267-268.
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All this is not to say that American officers offered no 
resistance to the French way as the only way. When General Bernard sug­
gested that American artillery pieces merely be copied from those of the 
French, Ordnance chief Decius Wadsworth protested hotly. Concerning the 
carriage patterns, he declared, "The making of Wheel Carriages is as 
well understood in this as in any Country; and we should lose a great 
Deal and expose ourselves to Derision, in the Minds of those who know how
Carriages ought to be built, by servilely copying Patterns invented and
SOestablished in France 50 or 60 years ago. Some officers charged that 
the government seemed bent on making America little more than an enlarged 
France, with military policies and organizations to match. General Thomas 
Jesup made an objection to this way of thinking which, if the truth were 
known, did not so much trouble many of his thinking fellow officers. "An 
error prevails in this Country," Jesup told Calhoun, "in relation to the 
organization of the Army . . . which may be productive of the greatest 
injury to the service." European military forms were dangerous, to 
Jesup's way of thinking. "Without reflecting on the difference of 
situation & circumstances in which we are placed . . .  we suppose that 
the same organization is adapted to our service which would answer 
there.1,61
Calhoun became enamored of the French military way. The Secre­
tary, impressed by Bernard, willingly assisted the French general in his 
disputes with American officers and supported him in the government at
Decius Wadsworth to John C. Calhoun, July 22, 1818, ibid.,
2:413-417.
^Thomas S. Jesup to John C. Calhoun, March 31, 1820, ibid.,
4:475.
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
large. "Mr. Calhoun," said a detractor, "aided to infect members of
Congress with an idea that General Bernard had a transcendant genius . . .
62
as if he had been possessed of intuitive knowledge." It was true that
Bernard had a great deal of influence over Calhoun; for the entirety of
Calhoun's tenure in the War Office, Bernard was a major contributor to
63
Calhoun's ideas as a representative of the French way of war.
The immigration of French military influences to the United 
States after 1815 was only the precursor of a greater consequence of the 
war: the nation was on the threshold of a military renaissance which
did not owe its vitality to French ideas alone. The drive to modernize 
the American military establishment had been created in the first 
instance by the embarrassments of the war itself. Domestic experience 
could hardly have been ignored: the rubble which still surrounded the
government in the capital kept the memories alive if nothing else would.
The end of the wTar was a signal for fresh beginnings, and advo­
cates of modernization seemed stronger than they had ever been. Dis­
cussions about America's postwar military policy began as soon as 
President Madison announced the news from Ghent. Understanding well
that tradition dictated a rapid demobilization, Madison admonished the
64
congressmen to take care not to reduce the army dangerously. At the 
war's end there were forty thousand men on the army's rolls; Madison
6 2Swift, Memoirs, p. 149.
63Bernard's contributions to American military policy will 
become evident in Chapter III, below.
64U. S., Annals of Congress, 13th Cong., 3d sess., p. 255.
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65asked that the number be lowered only by fifty per cent. The Senate
was receptive to the administration's proposal, but the House of Repre-
66
sentatives seemed ready to cut the army to a mere token force. James 
Monroe, then in the War Office, attempted to justify a twenty-thousand 
man army; that number, he said, would be hardly sufficient to maintain the 
few coastal defenses and garrison the frontier posts in the northwest.
An army of the kind contemplated by the most anti-military members of the 
House— 6,000 men— would not even be enough to carry on the military know­
ledge the country had acquired during the war, much less put up a
67reasonable defense. During the subsequent debates, the administration's
friends in both houses of Congress were unable to agree on only a fifty
per cent reduction. Disagreements between the Senate and House eventually
forced out a compromise which went further in the direction of orthodox
republicanism; a bill was eventually passed which fixed the peacetime
68army at ten thousand men. One of the few members of the House who had
69
argued the administration's part was Calhoun. Little did he know that 
several years later, he would devise his arguments against reduction 
once more from the War Office itself.
The debates over the peacetime army in 1815 were important not 
only for the effect they had on the military establishment, but also
65Ibid., pp.'1265-1266, 1196-1199, 1164; see also, Weigley,
History of the U. S. Army, p. 566.
66Ibid.
67James Monroe to William Branch Giles, February 22, 18.15,
Monroe Papers LC.
68U. S., Annals of Congress, 13th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 1272-1273. 
69John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Military Peace Establishment," 
February 27, 1815, Calhoun Papers, 1:277-278.
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because they acted as a catalyst for the ideas of the two men who would 
dominate military policy in succeeding years. In a private letter to 
Senator William Branch Giles during the army debates, Monroe pointed out 
that the late war had closed an era of military an. irism. He felt 
that it had been this amateurism which had encouraged British hostility 
toward America. "The late war formed an epoch;" he told Giles, "we 
cannot go back." Cautious military policies bespoke a "yielding spirit," 
which could easily be seen in a string of mediocre coastal fortifications 
and a military force of similar quality. The war had demonstrated the 
poverty of a conservative military policy by showing up weaknesses every­
where. In the Northwest Territory, the United States was now faced 
again with the same problem of taking possession which had plagued the 
country since the end of the revolution. If the nation could not summon
the will to occupy what it already claimed, then the British conceivably
70
could take it all again.
Several times during the next two years Monroe returned to these 
themes. In his first inaugural address, Monroe told his audience frankly 
that the nation could not hope to avoid future wars, and he invoked the 
embarrassments of the war just over in arguing for military preparedness. 
Announcing his determination to continue the fortification program which 
Madison started, Monroe reminded his listeners that one only need cal­
culate the costs of a ravaged countryside to see the utility of coastal 
fortifications, adequately staffed. A proper army would also be of use 
in maintaining the science and implements of war, and with an effective
70James Monroe to William Branch Giles, February 22, 1815,
Monroe Papers LC.
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militia in support of the coastal defenses, a recurrence of the crisis
71on the Chesapeake in 1814 could be prevented.
Monroe's desire for a progressive military policy was by no
means an end unto itself, however. A modern policy, creating a screen
of military protection, would allow the nation to fulfill its ambitions
for expansion and improvements. National prosperity needed only the aid
of internal improvements; protected by an adequate military force, the
72
government could connect expanding western settlements "by degrees."
Calhoun had been similarly affected by the war, perhaps more so.
Even during the war, Calhoun said in a speech to the House that one
result could already be observed: "It has already liberated us from that
dread of British power, which was almost universal." According to
Calhoun, this effect was not merely important by itself, but because the
acquisition of "military skill and means, combined with the tone of
thinking and feeling necessary to their use," would enable the nation to
73prosper in the future. When the darker days of the war were over, 
Calhoun rose again in the House to sound a note of triumph. One of the 
many dividends of the war, Calhoun said, was a maturing of the nation's 
dignity:
The late war has given you a mode of feeling and thinking which 
forbids the acknowledgment of national inferiority, that first of 
political evils. Had we not encountered Great Britain, we should 
not have had the brilliant points to rest on we have now. We, too,
71James Monroe, "Inaugural Address, March 4, 1817," Hamilton, 
Monroe Papers, 6:10-11: £Anon] Narrative of a Tour of Observation . . ., 
passim.
7 2 t i • JIbid.
73
John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Loan Bill," February 25, 1814, 
Calhoun Papers, 1:237.
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have now our heroes and illustrious actions. If Britain has her 
Wellington, we have our Jacksons, Browns, and Scotts. . . .  It is 
impossible that we can now be degraded by comparisons.^
Throughout the war Calhoun had seemed hardly touched by the
perils which the nation faced. When, on the eve of the war, one of his
old law students from South Carolina asked his advice on joining the
Army, Calhoun replied, "Were I a single man I would certainly take a
commession [sic]. The war will be a favourite one with the country.
75
Much honor await those who may distinguish themselves."
It would be easy to dismiss such remarks as martial bombast, and
yet their very overstatement was a clear announcement that Calhoun was
not in the least susceptible to the anti-military prejudices of his
Republican forbearers. To those who hesitated to reinforce the Regular
Army at the beginning of the war, he asked what there was to fear about
76
such an army when the nation could field a million militiamen? If he
had to choose between a militarized nation and national feebleness, he
77
said, he would take the former. Always behind Calhoun's military 
rhetoric lay the conviction that, at last, the nation was capable of 
great things. His utter faith in the vitality of the nation could not 
admit that the political institutions of the country could be threatened 
by a creed as impoverished as military despotism. To have admitted such
^John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Revenue Bill," January 31,
1816, ibid., 1:322.
^John C. Calhoun to Patrick Noble, March 22, 1812, ibid., 1:95-96.
76John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Report of the Foreign Relations 
Committee," December 12, 1811, ibid., 1:81.
77John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Revenue Bill," January 31,
1816, ibid., 1:317.
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a possibility, one would have to betray his confidence in the strength 
of the republic itself, and that Calhoun would not do. It was this very 
sense of the nation's inherent strength and potential that animated 
Calhoun's career in the War Department. Earlier politicians had viewed 
the standing army as an unpleasant necessity and a potential enemy of 
national progress. Calhoun meant to transform the army into a servant 
of that progress. His first task, therefore, was to fashion the military 
establishment to do the nation's bidding and, not incidentally, his own.
Ill
In his old age, Calhoun said that he had taken his first cabinet
post for the administrative experience it offered. He believed that if
a young politician was to advance, a turn of duty in an executive post 
78would be helpful. Just a few months before Calhoun left the House of 
Representatives for the Monroe administration, he remarked at length 
(and disapprovingly) that the structure of American government encouraged
78 [R. M. T. Hunter], The Life of John C. Calhoun, Presenting a 
Condensed History of Political Events from 1811 to 1843 (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1843), pp. 24-26 (hereafter cited as Calhoun Biography).
The authorship of this work has been in dispute for a good while. Gerald 
Capers, John C. Calhoun, Opportunist (Gainesville: University of Florida
Press; Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), pp. 255-256 (hereafter cited as
Capers, Opportunist), argues that while Hunter may have done the actual 
writing of the book, Calhoun supplied the materials and determined the 
"eulogistic" tone; thus, Capers styles this work Calhoun's "autobiography.” 
More recently, James L. Anderson and W. Edwin Hemphill, "The 1843 Bio­
graphy of John C. Calhoun: Was R. M. T. Hunter its Author?" Journal of
Southern History, 38 (August, 1972), 469-474, attribute the effort to 
Hunter and do so persuasively. It seems to me that the attribution 
question is largely a red herring; Calhoun could only have been pleased 
by the work, which is so prone to give him the benefit of every doubt, 
and which distorts Calhoun's services in the War Department considerably.
I would only add that this work should be used with special caution, and 
that it should be taken for what it is: a document which was designed to
influence the outcome of a race for the presidency in Calhoun's favor.
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ambitious young men to seek their fortunes in the executive branch. A 
question of increasing congressmen's allowances had come before the 
House, and Calhoun rose to defend the measure. The executive branch 
attracted the "very best talents," he said, with its habits of rewarding 
its members with profit and honor and offering the chance for the 
public's esteem. By comparison, "the only office in the general govern­
ment in the gift of the people," the Congress, was in danger of 
relinquishing its power by encouraging mediocrity. The system allowed 
the American people to take the political aspirant only so far: "to go 
beyond . . . the Executive must take him by the hand." At that time, 
Calhoun thought that the imbalance of talents could be redressed by
better pay, but ten months after describing the course of political
79
ambition, he set off along that very road.
Although it was true that Calhoun had never held an administra­
tive post in government, he was. not a complete stranger to management, 
nor was he at all mystified by the workings of the executive branch. 
Serving in the House of Representatives during the war, he could hardly 
have ignored the maladministration of the War Department and the lack of 
direction in the executive branch. From the first anticipations of the 
war, Calhoun had misgivings about the Madison administration's ability 
to meet the demands about to be made upon it. Madison himself seemed 
to Calhoun to lack the resolution necessary in a war leader. "Our 
president," Calhoun wrote to a friend, "tho [sic] a man of amiable 
manners and great talents, has not I fear those commanding talents
79John C. Calhoun, "First Speech on Amendments to the Compen­
sation Law," January 17, 1817, Calhoun Papers, 1:388.
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necessary to control those about him." Instead of preparing for war,
Calhoun complained, the administration "reluctantly gives up the system
of peace." Even more ominous than that, Calhoun reported, Madison
80
"permits devision [sic] in his cabinet."
Eventually Calhoun was satisfied that his misgivings about the
executive's abilities to run a war had been borne out:
What I had strong reason to fear has actually happened. Our 
executive officers are most incompetent men; and will let the best 
of causes I fear perish in their hands. We are literally boren [sic] 
down under the effects of errors and mismanagement. I am sorry to 
say that many of them lie deep; and are coeval with the existence 
of Mr. Jeffersons [sic] administration. The organization of the 
government I do not think ^s much to blame. Fairly administered it 
is a strong government. This is a source of consolation.81
He could not have been much consoled by the events which 
followed. After a disastrous six months of fighting, the War Depart­
ment's William Eustis and the Navy's Paul Hamilton left office. Their
removal "promises som[e]thing," Calhoun allowed, but how little even
82
Calhoun could not tell.
As interested in military administration as Calhoun may have 
appeared, other matters occupied his time and he only occasionally dis­
cussed military affairs per se. He defended war programs knowing only
83
that money and men and military skills were all in short supply. The
80John C. Calhoun to James MacBride, April 18, 1812, ibid.,
1:99-100.
81John C. Calhoun to James MacBride, December 25, 1812, ibid.,
1:146.
82John C. Calhoun to James MacBride, February 2, 1813, ibid., 
1:162. Calhoun and his fellow war hawks had worked for several months 
to have both the Secretaries of War and Navy removed. See Wiltse, 
Calhoun, p. 74.
83See, for example, John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Merchant's 
Bonds," December 8, 1812, ibid., 1:136-144.
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minor details he left to others better versed in the arcana of military
science; he had yet to read a military treatise of any kind by the time
84
he came to the War Department.
When he did arrive in Washington on December 2, 1817, to take up 
his new position, he found at first that he needed his brilliance less 
than common sense and physical endurance, for the management of America's
military establishment in this period was largely one which demanded
85mastery of details.
He immediately plunged into the War Department's business, 
learning all he could about the President's policy and current depart­
mental problems. During the first few days he probably talked with 
acting Secretary George Graham. Several days later Calhoun paid a visit
to Monroe in the newly named "White House," and met John Quincy Adams
86for the first time. Calhoun also met with General Joseph Swift and
the President on the matter of the department's organization. From the
first, Calhoun and the President apparently agreed that the major
sections of the War Department should be physically consolidated and
87
close at the Secretary's hand.
Calhoun meant to be deliberate about any changes he would make 
in the organization and structure of the War Department. He first needed 
to acquaint himself with the organization and the people with whom he
84Calhoun Biography, p. 25.
85Calhoun wrote to his mother-in-law on November 15, reporting 
their progress. By then he and his family had been on the road for some 
days. John C. Calhoun to Mrs. Floride Calhoun, November 15, 1817, ibid., 
1:420, xl.
86 87Adams, Diary, 4:28. Swift, Memoirs, p. 170.
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would have to deal during the next few years. As a group, these men
would comprise some of Calhoun's most intimate acquaintances and ardent
supporters. One of these was a young man he had yet to meet, although
he had heard much of him by the time he took office. The day after he
arrived, Calhoun received notes from both Henry Clay and William Crawford
upon the same subject: the appointment of a chief clerk for the War
88Department. Graham had this post before becoming acting Secretary of 
War, and it was assumed that Calhoun would want his own appointee in the 
place. Clay and Crawford had written to recommend the same man: Chris­
topher Vandeventer, late a major on the northern frontier during the war. 
Vandeventer had served Generals Jacob Brown and Swift with some distinc­
tion, had been taken prisoner during a night action at Stony Creek in
891813, and had managed to escape, only to be recaptured. After parole 
and convalescence, Vandeventer began a campaign of his own among a set 
of rather influential friends to gain a post in the new Monroe adminis­
tration. Starting only a few days after the inauguration, letters began 
to arrive at the War Department recommending Vandeventer - the chief
clerk's post. The first was from DeWitt Clinton, but Graham did not
90
reply, filing the letter for the future Secretary instead.
QQ
Henry Clay to John C. Calhoun, December 3, 1817; William H. 
Crawford to John C. Calhoun, December 3, 1817, The Papers of Christopher 
Vandeventer, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan (hereafter cited as Vandeventer Papers).
89"Register, Rules, and Regulations for the Army in 1813," ASPMA, 
1:388; Cullum, Register, 1:91.
90DeWitt Clinton to Secretary of War, March 11, 1817, Vandeventer
Papers.
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Next, Vandeventer wrote former Secretary of War John Armstrong
for advice. Armstrong could not imagine why a vigorous young man would
want to make of himself "a mere quill driver for life," and cautioned
Vandeventer against hoping for advancement to a higher position in the
department or the Regular Army. "Time and chance," wrote Armstrong,
"took [Daniel] Parker [Adjutant and Inspector General] out of that
station and put him at the head of a department, but this is a rare 
91instance." But since Vandeventer had to choose between remaining in
the army and trying to join the government, Armstrong advised the latter:
. . . because we know that a blockhead without any sense, knowlege 
[sic] or delicacy may be a [General?], whereas we cannot allow our­
selves to believe that any other than a gentleman will be called 
upon to administer the War Dept, and if such be called he will sit 
very lightly on the people about him, from the first clerk to the
Door Keeper.
By late October, Vandeventer had won a promise from Secretary
Crawford of his good offices "with the new incumbent." In all, no less
than seven letters in support of Vandeventer had arrived in the War
Department by the time Calhoun got there. On December 10 Calhoun
finally asked Vandeventer to join the department as his chief clerk.
93
Such were the trials of place-hunting.
The chief clerk's position was an important one, paying two
thousand dollars per year— perhaps more if the occupant were willing to
94
take advantage of departmental information. Calhoun's chief clerk
91John Armstrong to Christopher Vandeventer, November 12, 1817,
ibid.
92Ibid.
93William H. Crawford to Christopher Vandeventer, October 29,
1817; John C. Calhoun to Christopher Vandeventer, December 10, 1817, ibid.
94Vandeventer was ambitious, energetic, and not altogether 
scrupulous in his dealings at the War Department, and he was not above
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was not, as Armstrong had said, a "mere quill driver." He was an admin­
istrative assistant who could act as Calhoun's surrogate in the Secretary's 
absence, and Vandeventer often did so. In a modern system, he could be 
called an "assistant Secretary." Moreover, a firm and close relationship 
developed between Calhoun and the young major; in the years following,
Vandeventer would act as one of the Secretary's closest confidants and
95
also as one of his military advisors.
Subject to Vandeventer1s immediate supervision and at Calhoun's
96disposal were twenty-one clerks. Even with this large amount of
97
assistance, Calhoun’s official days were crushingly long. Among tne 
various clerks, several were responsible for certain subjects of corre­
spondence, such as bounties, accounts, and the like, but with the
using Calhoun in any way he could, nor was he hesitant about misleading 
the Secretary on several occasions. Vandeventer eventually became 
embroiled in what today would be called a "conflict of interest." 
Through it all, Calhoun would stand by Vandeventer. See Chapter III, 
pp. 133-137.
95Considering the strategic position which Vandeventer held in 
relation to Calhoun and his work as Secretary of War, it is surprising 
that none of Calhoun's biographers have taken much notice of the clerk, 
or, indeed, used his papers, now located and well catalogued at the 
Clements Library. This is, to my knowledge, the first time that Vande­
venter 's papers at the Clements have been used. As shall be seen, they 
are quite important to an understanding of this period of Calhoun's 
official life and politics.
96White, The Jeffersonians, p. 234.
97Calhoun Biography, p. 30. By this account, Calhoun regularly 
put in fourteen and fifteen hour days; naturally, he was not too happy 
about doing so. Indeed, other cabinet officers complained about their 
work loads. William Wirt had only taken his office upon "the calcula­
tion of being able to pursue my profession on a more advantageous 
ground— i.e., more money for less work." He quickly found, however, 
that "the office . . .  is no sinecure. I have been up 'till midnight, 
at work, every night, and still have my hands full." William Wirt to 
Judge Carr, January 21, 1818, Kennedy, Life of Wirt, p. 73.
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exception of the "Pension office," they could hardly be said to have com-
98
prised special "sections" within the secretariat. With the exception 
of Vandeventer, all were civilians in 1817, although Calhoun eventually 
introduced the practice of employing army officers in this part of the 
War Office.
Beyond Calhoun's clerical entourage lay the so-called "General
Staff" of the army, and then the command system of the army itself.
These two bodies were different and were separated organizationally and
geographically. There was no chief of staff, but merely so many bureaus,
99
each with its own chief, each responsible to the Secretary himself.
The provenance of the general staff concept is French; however 
imperfectly applied to the American military establishment, at least the 
idea had been current in America for some time. Ordinarily, the Etat- 
major was conceived as the staff of the general only; by definition no 
staff was superior to any field commander. This notion was understood 
by American military leaders, but like the martial experience of the 
nation, was applied only as convenience suited.100 An act to regulate
98White, The Jeffersonians, p. 234.
99See the organizational chart accompanying "Reduction of the 
Army Considered," December 11, 1818, ASPMA, 1:783.
100Certainly, the British military system afforded no precedent 
but confusion, nor was attention paid to the Prussian reforms than pro­
ceeding under Gerhard von Scharnhorst. On the other hand, the work of 
Jomini on the French art of war was known in the United States at least 
as early as 1808. A testament to the influence of the French military 
system during this period may be found in William Duane, The American 
Military Library; or Compendium of the Modern Tactics, Embracing the 
Discipline, Manoeuvres, and Duties of Every Species of Troops, 2 vols. 
(Philadelphia: Printed by Author, 1809), l:vii (hereafter cited as
Duane, American Military Library). Duane writes: "As the French system
is now adopted by all the nations of Europe, it is essential, that what­
ever nation is in danger of being attacked by that system should understand
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the military establishment of 1795 described a "General Staff" which
conformed to the Etat-major, in the sense that the staff was attached to
the commander of the line.101 By 1802 a statute creating the Corps of
Engineers revealed a subtle shift in the line of military authority.
The law stipulated that the corps was responsible to the President, not
the commanders in the field, and his military agent, the Secretary of 
102War. Ten years later, the Quartermaster's and Ordnance departments
were given places directly subordinate to the Secretary— a trend toward
concentration of military authority in the hands of the chief civilian
officer that culminated in 1813 with a law "for the better regulations
of the General Staff of the Army of the United States," and which left
no doubt that these departments were superintended by the Secretary on
103
behalf of the President.
The machinery that Calhoun actually inherited was little more 
than a collection of military fiefdoms. Responsibility for the military 
system supposedly focused upon the Secretary; however, there was no real
it." Apparently, it was Duane's work which transmitted Paul Thiebault's 
comments on the modern staff to those interested few in the United States. 
Part III of Duane's work is almost wholly taken up by his translation of 
Thiebault's Manuel de Adjutants Generaux et des Adjoints Employes dans 
let Etat-Majors Divisionaires des Armees (Paris, 1800). For more on 
Duane and his work, see Fred K. Vigman, "William Duane's American 
Mi1itary Library," Military Affairs, 8 (1943-1944), 321-324. For 
Jomini's views on the military staff and its function and organization 
see Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War, trans. by G. H. Mendell, and 
W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1862), pp. 51, 231-234.
101Callan, Military Laws of the United States, p. 112.
102Ibid., pp. 148-149.
103Ibid., pp. 217-220, 226-227, 245-246. The law of 1813, 
however, provided for eight quartermasters, to be attached to divisional 
and regimental commands.
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centralization of authority. The statutes said otherwise, but the dis­
organization of the military establishment ruled as no law could.
Within Calhoun's authoritative reach at Washington were, variously, the 
Paymaster General (Brigadier General Daniel Brent), the Adjutant and 
Inspector General (Brigadier General Daniel Parker), the Chief of Ordnance 
(Colonel Decius Wadsworth), and the Superintendent of Indian Trade 
(Thomas L. McKenney, a civilian).
There were also departments located outside the capital. In New 
York City, an Apothecary General (Francis LeBaron) purchased medical sup­
plies for the post surgeons. In Philadelphia, Callendar Irvine was the 
Commissary-General of Purchases (that is to say, procurement of military 
supplies). General Swift, the Chief of the Corps of Engineers, was 
nominally stationed at the military academy at West Point, but in prac­
tice, Swift's far-flung duties meant that the corps had a flying head­
quarters. Indeed, Swift put in rare appearances at West Point, and then
. 104
only when things were awry (as they often were during this period) .
The command structure of the army was even more muddled, and the 
personalities of the men who made it up made dealing with it all the 
more difficult. The army was split into Northern and Southern Divisions. 
From Brownsville, New York, the senior Major General of the army, Jacob 
Brown, commanded. He was assisted by two Brigadiers, Alexander Macomb 
in Detroit, and Winfield Scott in New York City (both these men were 
brevetted major generals). A similar arrangement obtained in the
Ibid. See also, "Army Register for 1816," ASPMA, 1:627-635; 
and L. D. Ingersoll, A History of the War Department of the United 
States with biographical sketches of the Secretaries (Washington:
Francis B. Mohun, 1880), pp. 76-77; and also, W. Edwin Elemphill, "Intro­
duction," Calhoun Papers, 2:lv-lvi, lxi-lxii.
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Southern Division, where Nashville served as Andrew Jackson's head­
quarters. His Brigadiers (again, both carrying brevets as major generals) 
were Elezar Ripley in New Orleans and Edmund P. Gaines in Augusta. 
Attached to the two divisions were two quartermasters-general and two 
medical officers, none of whom had (as yet) an office in the War Depart­
ment to oversee their operations. A War Department report to Congress 
in 1818 contains an organizational accounting which designates the 
"General Staff" as all those officers serving in the Washington offices,
plus these field commanders; thus capturing adequately the martial con- 
105fusion. The term "General Staff" was commonly used at the time, but 
the War Department's organization was more correctly a hybrid of the 
concept as it was then known, and with the possible exception of 
Bertier's Imperial Staff bureaux under Napoleon, it did not resemble 
any other military organization then used.
These staff and command elements, and their locations were above 
all creatures of the War of 1812. The four brigade headquarters at New 
York City, Detroit, New Orleans, and Augusta, if considered indicative 
of strategy represent the defensive quality which that war acquired 
after the summer of 1814. This arrangement was not, in other words, 
reflective of a strategic concept which was suited to a nation then 
moving rapidly westward. Strategically, as well as organizationally,
^^Raphael P. Thian, comp., Notes Illustrating the Military 
Geography of the United States, 1813-1880 (Washington, D. C.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1880), passim. "Reduction of the 
Army Considered," December 11, 1818, ASPMA, 1:783.
*L06
"Organization of the Staff of the Army," December 27, 1815, 
ASPMA, 1:636. See also J. D. Hittle, The Military Staff (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 106-111.
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the American military establishment had yet to leave the war behind and 
adapt to the newer demands of the nation.
The deficiencies of such a military organization were manifold. 
There was no one officer who could serve as liaison between the army and 
the Secretary of War, nor, for that matter, between the chiefs of depart­
ment and the Secretary. Calhoun served as his own chief of staff, and 
one can only imagine how much his work day increased because of it. He 
had to deal simultaneously with two divisional commanders who were alike 
only in their hostility to one another and in their jealousy of their 
prerogatives of office. The offices such as the Apothecary General and 
the Commissary General of Purchases that were removed from Calhoun's 
immediate control, made for countless inefficiencies, particularly in the 
important matter of departmental accounts. And although the Chief of 
Engineers was at that time executing a centrally-directed military 
fortifications scheme worth several hundred thousands of dollars, he was 
seldom on hand for consultation with his superiors at Washington.
Therefore, there was no great distinction in seeing, as Calhoun
did, that the system of staff and command desperately wanted reforming.
Calhoun's predecessor, William Crawford, recommended to Congress that a
"Staff of the Army" be organized in 1815. Crawford thought that the
reasons for a reorganization of the military system were self-evident:
The experience of the two first campaigns of the last war, which 
has furnished volumes of evidence upon this subject, has incontest­
ably established not only the expediency, but the necessity of giving 
to the military establishment, in time of peace, the organization 
which it must have to render it efficient in a state of war.
It is believed also to be demonstrable, that a complete organiza­
tion of the staff will contribute as much to the economy of the 
establishment as to its efficiency.10?
107"organization of the Staff of the Army," December 27, 1815, 
ASPMA, 1:636.
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the American military establishment had yet to leave the war behind and 
adapt to the newer demands of the nation.
The deficiencies of such a military organization were manifold. 
There was no one officer who could serve as liaison between the army and 
the Secretary of War, nor, for that matter, between the chiefs of depart­
ment and the Secretary. Calhoun served as his own chief of staff, and 
one can only imagine how much his work day increased because of it. He 
had to deal simultaneously with two divisional commanders who were alike 
only in their hostility to one another and in their jealousy of their 
prerogatives of office. The offices such as the Apothecary General and 
the Commissary General of Purchases that were removed from Calhoun's 
immediate control, made for countless inefficiencies, particularly in the 
important matter of departmental accounts. And although the Chief of 
Engineers was at that time executing a centrally-directed military 
fortifications scheme worth several hundred thousands of dollars, he was 
seldom on hand for consultation with his superiors at Washington.
Therefore, there was no great distinction in seeing, as Calhoun
did, that the system of staff and command desperately wanted reforming.
Calhoun's predecessor, William Crawford, recommended to Congress that a
"Staff of the Army" be organized in 1815. Crawford thought that the
reasons for a reorganization of the military system were self-evident:
The experience of the two first campaigns of the last war, which 
has furnished volumes of evidence upon this subject, has incontest­
ably established not only the expediency, but the necessity of giving 
to the military establishment, in time of peace, the organization 
which it must have to render it efficient in a state of war.
It is believed also to be demonstrable, that a complete organiza­
tion of the staff will contribute as much to the economy of the 
establishment as to its efficiency.10?
107"organization of the Staff of the Army," December 21, 1815, 
ASPMA, 1:636.
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Crawford had advocated the centralizing of the Adjutant and 
Inspector General's office, the Paymaster's office, and the Quartermaster 
General's office at Washington. The main difference between the struc­
ture Crawford asked for in 1815 and the one which Calhoun inherited two 
years later was a crucial one: Congress had declined to establish a
central Quartermaster's office. Above all, this omission seriously
affected the "economy and efficiency" that Crawford and Calhoun sought
108
during their turns m  the War Department.
Even before Calhoun took his oath of office, the problem of
structure had thrust itself into his attention, intruding during an
109
interview with the President and General Swift. That chaos was the 
real master of the military establishment was conceded generally;
Crawford had said as much, and Monroe apparently agreed. Calhoun was 
not long in being convinced: less than a week in office, he complained
that "little heretofore has been done to give exactness, economy, and 
dispatch to its [the department's] monied transactions."'1'10 He claimed 
not to be too sanguine about his chances to alter a system which had 
seemingly defied all previous attempts, but his vigorous attack on these 
problems during the next few months told otherwise.111
1 08
Ibid. Callan, Military Laws of the United States, pp. 272-276. 
10°Swift, Memoirs, p. 170.
110John C. Calhoun to Charles J. Ingersoll, December 14, 1817, 
Calhoun Papers, 2:16-17.
111Ibid. Within his first year in office, Calhoun had inaugu­
rated the system of accountability, the Yellowstone movement, the new 
system of coastal defenses, the interdiction of British penetration in 
the northwest territories, and the extinguishment of all Indian land 
claims east of the Mississippi river. No one ever claimed that Calhoun 
was in the least modest about his own abilities.
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It was unlikely that Calhoun needed more convincing of the need
for reorganization than the few days he had spent in the War Office;
but, the first Seminole War had broken out on the Florida border, and as
Generals Gaines and Jackson mounted their operations against the Indians,
Calhoun soon received as much motivation as he would ever need. The
Secretary found himself acting the part of commanding general sometimes,
and quartermaster general on other occasions. The ordinary difficulties
of rapidly staging a frontier action were complicated further by a gross
breakdown of the supply network. A civilian who had been contracted to
furnish the Southern Division with pay and rations had failed to do so.
When General Gaines arrived at Amelia Island, he was greeted by this
news. Despite sizable advances made to the contractor, Benjamin Orr,
that civilian had failed to send sufficient monies to agents in 
112Georgia. It was not long before General Jackson complained of the
same difficulties. Calhoun quickly authorized both generals to purchase 
supplies they might need to bring hostilities to a close, and dispatched 
Major Milo Mason southward with a war chest of forty thousand dollars.'1''1'3 
Thereafter, Calhoun monitored the major’s operations and several times 
corresponded with Jackson, Gaines, and several southern governors on
112John C. Calhoun to Edmund P. Gaines, January 16, 1818, Letters 
Sent by the Secretary of War relating to Military Affairs, National 
Archives Microfilm Publication, M 6, RG 107 (hereafter cited as Letters 
Sent, SWMA). Although the Calhoun Papers reproduce an impressive number
of Calhoun's official and personal letters, some correspondence of use 
to this study are only calendared. In cases where calendared letters 
have been cited, I have taken pains to read the actual texts, all of 
which are available on National Archives microfilm. Only when the 
calendar notes of the Calhoun Papers convey the sense of my allusions 
to those items will they be cited. In every instance the reader's con­
venience in quickly confirming the quote or allusion will be the 
deciding factor.
113John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, January 29, 1818, ibid.
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matters of materiel, personnel, and additional advances sufficient to 
114carry on the war.
Although this was one of the least dramatic episodes of the 
Seminole war, it accurately depicts the magnitude of the organizational 
problem with which Calhoun was faced. Knowing little about military 
organization per se, Calhoun was nonetheless disturbed by what he repeat­
edly called "the dispersed situation of the army," and this applied to 
an organizational as well as the physical dispersal of the establish­
ment.'*''*'^  This was the greatest obstacle to what he wanted to accomplish: 
to make the Army efficient and economical.
Some of the changes Calhoun aimed to make could be done with the 
power of his position; other, more extensive alterations required the 
approval of Congress. Just a few days into the new year, Calhoun began 
to try to centralize the War Department’s organizational elements. His 
first move was to order the peripatetic General Swift to come to ground 
at Washington and fix his headquarters- there after he had settled a 
coastal survey which then occupied the engineers. The Secretary then 
began conversations with friendly congressmen who could sponsor the sort 
of legislation Calhoun had in mind. For the moment, the points of origin 
for friendly legislation were the military committees of the House and 
Senate. Particularly helpful to Calhoun was the Senate committee chairman,
114John C. Calhoun to Milo Mason, February 19, 1818; John C. 
Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, February 19, 1818; John C. Calhoun to Andrew 
Jackson, February 23, 1818; John C. Calhoun to Milo Mason, February 26, 
1818; John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, March 2, 1818, ibid.
'*''*'^ John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, December 17, 1817, January 2, 
1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:22, 53.
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John Williams of Tennessee, who was to work closely with the Secretary
during the next two months.
By mid-January Williams and his committee were ready to bring
Calhoun's plan before Congress. Another friendly member, Senator Isaac
Tichenor of Vermont, moved that the Senate consider altering parts of
the old staff legislation as they concerned the medical services and
judges advocate. Interestingly, he suggested that the Senate determine
how to place the pay and allowances of the "Military and Staff officers"
on a "more economical establishment." Tichenor's resolutions were
quickly accepted by the Senate, and Williams sent them along to the War
116
Department, asking for Calhoun's advice.
117
Calhoun replied to Williams on February 5, 1818. The Secretary 
admitted outright that he knew little about the intricacies of military 
organization, but what was less apparent was Calhoun's blunting of the 
sense of Tichenor's resolutions, which seemed to be aimed at retrench­
ments rather than additions to the staff. The Secretary blithely ignored
the implications of Tichenor's motions and recommended that new officers
118
be appointed "in lieu” of those which were about to be cut. These new
116U. S., Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 129. 
Williams and Calhoun had already talked privately about this legislation 
for the War Department. John C. Calhoun to John Williams, February 5, 
1818; Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 2:133.
117John C. Calhoun to John Williams, February 5, 1818, ibid.,
2:133-134.
118The bill was repeatedly referred to by Tichenor and Williams 
before the Senate as a "Bill to reduce the Staff of the Army," and yet 
there is no intrinsic reason why, under this plan, the staff should have 
been reduced. There could have been demotions, or reassignments of per­
sonnel, and there were changes in the names of medical personnel, but as 
for an absolute reduction in the numbers of staff people, the plan did 
not compel it. Whether this phrasing was a ploy to make the new plan
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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officers were to be a Surgeon General, a Quartermaster General, and a 
Judge Advocate General. After a brief explanation of the duties which 
these officers would perform, Calhoun closed by saying, "I know of no 
farther [sic] retrenchments, that would not impair the efficiency of the 
staff." He had proposed staff additions, not cuts; nowhere in his 
letter did he contemplate a retrenchment in numbers. Only by increased 
efficiency could retrenchment be achieved; at least this was the way 
Calhoun chose to see it.
In the course of his explanation to Williams, Calhoun showed a 
keen interest in consolidating his control over the different parts of 
the army. Referring to the medical staff, Calhoun said that it was 
"without responsibility; and must; I conceive, remain so 'till its duties 
are brought to a centre." A Surgeon General could inspect medical returns, 
supervise post surgeons, monitor the use of medical supplies, and oversee 
the general improvement of the army's health. "It is not to be doubted," 
he wrote, "that the public sustains great losses for the want of such a
system." For much the same reason, the establishment of a central
Quartermaster's department was important. As he argued for its creation, 
Calhoun stated what amounted to the first principle of his system of 
management: "No branch of the general staff is more important or dif­
ficult to be managed than the quarter master's; none requires more
119
eminently the controul of a single and responsible head." To the new 
Secretary, all would be well if responsibility could be fixed and
palatable to Congress is not known, but it seems a reasonable assumption
to make. Mysteriously, by the time the bill was approved in its final
form, it was known simply as "An Act Respecting the Organization of the 
Army." U. S., Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 379.
119John C. Calhoun to John Williams, February 5, 1818, Jameson, 
Calhoun Correspondence, 2:133-134.
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authority centralized in the chief officers of the department. Senator
Williams' reaction to this was to ask Calhoun to draft the new staff
bill himself— in one day. Calhoun took a week. On February 18, 1818,
120Williams promptly reported Calhoun's bill to the Senate.
While the bill made its way easily through Congress, Calhoun was
having to contend with the matter of patronage: these were the first
offices of consequence placed in his gift. Dr. Tobias Watkins of New
York was a formidable contender for the Surgeon General's place. "His
friends in Congress, who are very numerous and influential, [are] very
121anxious" that Watkins should win the place, Calhoun remarked. While
a "great effort" was being made on Watkins' behalf, General Jacob Brown
arrived in Washington with his own favorite for the position: Dr. Joseph
Lovell. Brown had arrived at about the same time that Calhoun was
drafting his bill for staff alterations, but the general seemed far more
interested in getting the new post for Lovell than in any sort of 
122reform. Apparently Calhoun and Brown made a private understanding 
about Lovell, for the physician was ordered to Washington well before 
the staff bill passed into law. As a consolation, Watkins was made the
120John Williams to John C. Calhoun, February 11, 1818; and John
C. Calhoun to John Williams, February 18, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:132, 
147. U. S., Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 210.
121John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, April 25, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 2:259.
122A letter from Calhoun to Brown puts the general m  Washington 
on January 20, 1818, ibid., 2:82. This is of some importance, for Brown 
ten years later attempted to claim a great deal more credit than the 
evidence indicates he was entitled to regarding these reforms. Calhoun 
did talk with Brown about the reorganization, or at least part of it.
See Virgil Maxey to John C. Calhoun, March 2, 1827, Jameson, Calhoun 
Correspondence, 2:791-793; and John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, April 25, 
1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:258-259.
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assistant Surgeon General for the Northern Department, with Brown's 
123blessing.
At the same time, Colonel James R. Mullany was exercising every 
influence he could call upon to win the new Quartermaster General's posi­
tion. Early in April, Vice-President Daniel D. Tompkins threw his 
inconsiderable weight behind Mullany's pretentions, and a few days later
twenty-one members of the House of Representatives also lent their
124
support to the colonel. Mullany then appealed directly to President 
Monroe. The Secretary, however, would not have his mind made up by such 
an impressive display of support: on the day Mullany wrote to the
President, Calhoun asked William Cummings of Georgia to take the new 
post. Less than a month later, Calhoun informed Mullany that his ser­
vices were no longer required.
On April 14, 1818, the new staff bill became law. It gave Calhoun 
almost everything he had asked for: the section creating a Judge Advocate 
had been trimmed, but he pronounced himself pleased with the results of
123Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, April 2, 1818; and John C. 
Calhoun to Jacob Brown, April 25, 1818. ibid., 2:224, 259.
124D. D. Tompkins to John C. Calhoun, April 4, 1818; and John 
Spencer, et. al. to John C. Calhoun, April 10, 1818, ibid., 2:227, 239.
125
John C. Calhoun to James R. Mullany. May 2, 1818; and John C. 
Calhoun to William Cummings, April 13, 1818, ibid., 2:276. 243. There 
was also some question about Mullany's handling of accounts and materiel 
during his service at New York City as quartermaster for the Northern 
Division. See James R. Mullany to John C. Calhoun, March 3, 1818, ibid., 
2:172. Cummings declined Calhoun's offer of the new post as being 
"inconsistent with my present pursuits;" see William Cummings to John C. 
Calhoun, April 27, 1818, ibid., 2:262. Although Cummings obviously 
enjoyed Calhoun's confidence, the Secretary's second choice, newly 
promoted General Thomas S. Jesup, was a happy one; for an idea of the kind 
of Quartermaster General Jesup will make, see his letter of acceptance, 
Thomas S. Jesup to John C. Calhoun, June 5, 1818, ibid., 2:329-330.
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126this first attempt. There was also a bonus: along with the Surgeon
and Quartermaster Generals, a Commissary General was to be created when 
ration contracts with civilians expired in June, 1819. The bill con­
cerned itself much more with this office than with the others. The new 
Commissary was hereafter to be taken from the army. He would carry the 
rank of colonel, and, in a curious departure from the practice of not 
requiring bonds of officers, the new Commissary would have to post a 
bond ensuring performance. The act specifically enjoined the officer 
from participating in any business which might conflict with his official
* 4.- 127duties.
The spectacular failure of contractor Benjamin Orr to supply 
General Jackson's columns in the Seminole War probably influenced the 
inclusion of this section in the bill, because Calhoun did not mention a 
new commissariat to Senator Williams during their exchange of views on 
reorganization. Calhoun was nevertheless aware of the need for such an 
officer: one of the few times Calhoun spoke directly on a military sub­
ject during the war was when he recommended that Congress find a way to
128
supply and subsist the army more efficiently. The objections to 
using civilians to supply the army were numerous. Civilian contractors 
were not subject to martial law. They moved as quickly or as slowly as 
they pleased, even when military movements depended upon them. If
1
Callan, Military Laws of the United States, pp. 285-287.
John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, April 25, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:258-259.
•'■27Callan, Military Laws of the United States, pp. 285-287.
123U. S., Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 212;
John C. Calhoun, "Resolutions and Remarks upon Army Supplies and Disci­
pline," November 10, 1814, Calhoun Papers, 1:262-263; John C. Calhoun to 
John Williams, February 5, 1818, Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 2:133- 
134.
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somehow they defaulted on their contracts, civil courts were the only 
recourse. In his original competition for the contract from the govern­
ment, the businessman could submit a bid so low that honest contractors 
could not compete with the promise of such a thin profit margin. The 
winner of the contract could then resell the contract to a second busi­
nessman, and the profit margin would be thinner still. Sometimes, the 
second contractor sold the contract to still other contractors, who, in 
the words of one outraged general during the war, "are forced to bear 
certain loss and ultimate ruin, or commit frauds, by furnishing damaged 
provisions; they generally choose the latter, though it should tend to 
destroy the army." General Gaines was once forced to confine several of 
his officers and men who had become greatly agitated over their contrac­
tor's shortcomings. Gaines testified to Congress later that the contractor
129
seemed immune to threats, or indeed anything short of outright violence. 
Thus the new commissariat was created at the insistence of Congress alone, 
although Calhoun could only have applauded its initiative.
A new Commissary General would not be required until 1819, but 
Calhoun chose to fill the place right away, along with his other appoint­
ments. Less than a week after the bill became law, Calhoun had arranged 
for his newest officers: Colonel George Gibson, quartermaster for the
Southern Division and a favorite of General Jackson's, became Commissary 
General; Joseph Lovell was from the Northern Division; and Thomas S.
Jesup, the new Quartermaster General, had recently served in both
129
See the remarks of General Winfield Scott and Edmund P. 
Gaines in "Subsisting the Army," January 25, 1815, ASPMA, 1:600.
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divisions. Washington cognoscenti could hardly fail to have noticed the
130
politically wise split in the appointments between the two divisions.
The new act had given Calhoun the skeleton of a good organiza­
tion, but it was only that. The law left Calhoun considerable latitude 
to complement the new arrangements with departmental regulations. Begin­
ning in April, 1818, the first of several sets of new rules was issued 
from Calhoun's office. General Swift received instructions which concen­
trated in detail on how the Corps of Engineers would be held responsible
131for the public monies it spent. Henceforth, Swift's project engineers
were the authorities on the spot: the civilian agents of fortifications,
who supplied the materials under contract to the War Department, answered
directly to the military engineer, as indeed did all civilians connected
with the project. For his part the engineer was required to account
specifically for all materials requisitioned and to attest to the quality
of those materials. Descriptions of civilian laborers, the jobs they
did, and their wages were all to be sent to the War Department every
quarter. Not a penny was to move without the justification of the 
132
regulations.
The weight given in the new Engineer regulations to the dis­
bursement of government money presaged a major direction of the Calhoun 
reforms. With the exception of the Adjutant and Inspector General's 
department, all the other headquarters offices were as much great
'*''^ John C. Calhoun to Milo Mason, April 19, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 2:251.
131John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, April 7, 1818, Letters
Sent, SWMA.
Ibid.
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business offices as military centers. It was to this facet of military 
organization that Calhoun's efforts were nearly constantly directed 
during his time in office; indeed, at first Calhoun seemed little inter­
ested in re-ordering the actual duties of these units, although that was
one effect of the new regulations. To be sure, the project engineer's
133
work would never be the same.
Eventually, all the bureaus under Calhoun's control were given
similar regulations, and even though each bureau's regulations were
fashioned for the office they governed, the common features of these new
rules best express the new system Calhoun had in mind for the War Depart- 
134ment. Calhoun was obviously interested in restricting the access of
civilians to public money. Wherever possible, Calhoun's new regulations 
turned the handling of the department's business over to military offi­
cers, who were at least subject to military justice. Civilian disbursement
agents operating under the aegis of the War Department still numbered in
135
the hundreds, but at least the principle had been established.
133Calhoun divided Swift's duties into five separate tasks, only 
two of which did not directly bear upon the protection of public expen­
ditures: "military reconnoitering," construction and repair of works,
inspection of works, correspondence, and general supervision of 
disbursements. Ibid.
134Quartermaster General Jesup and Surgeon General Lovell, much 
more aggressive in their duties than General Swift ever was, wrote their 
own; Calhoun and Monroe quickly approved their regulations. See Thomas S. 
Jesup to John C. Calhoun, July 7, 1818; and John C. Calhoun to James 
Monroe, September 19, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:390-392, and 3:141.
135In 1822 the War Department controlled some 291 disbursement 
agents. Those charged with fiscal responsibility included quarter­
masters, commissaries, paymasters, surgeons and apothecaries, military 
storekeepers, barrackmasters, agents of fortifications, pension agents, 
Indian agents, factors, assistant factors, and contractors of various 
kinds. It is possible that in 1818 there were many more on the rolls 
left over from the war who still drew their salaries but did no work.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
Neither did Calhoun indulge himself with a simple faith in the
3.36fidelity of the army officer. On the contrary, responsible officers
now found themselves surrounded by a welter of new requirements for the
proofs of their performance: vouchers, receipts, and accountings of
137every kind. As their information came into the War Department, Calhoun
had his bureau chiefs consolidate these data for his own information and 
138use. Administratively, it was as good a system as the War Department 
had yet seen, and it suited Calhoun's tastes: he was the center of
action, and to outside observers, the success of centralization depended 
upon Calhoun alone.
Ill
In the fall of 1818 the verdict on the changes Calhoun had made 
was not yet in; Calhoun was satisfied that the new system would work,
In 1819 General Brown found an "agent of fortifications" at Green Bay, 
paid as a Captain, but doing no work of any kind for years— since the 
war, in fact. Brown dismissed the agent. Calhoun responded favorably 
(and, surprisingly, with a little humor): "So loosely was the business
of the Engineer Department formerly conducted that it was not known to 
this Department that there was an agent for fortifications at Green 
Bay." Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, September 10, 1819; and John C. 
Calhoun to Jacob Brown, September 22, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 4:313, 342. 
"Conditions of the Military Establishment and the Fortifications, and 
Returns of the Militia," November 29, 1823, ASPMft.- 2:554.
3.36Calhoun already had sufficient evidence to the contrary. See 
William Lee to John C. Calhoun, February 11, 1818; and William Lee to 
John C. Calhoun, February 14, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:131, 138.
137See, for instance, Calhoun's instructions "To All Military 
Storekeepers of the Ordnance Department," October 24, 1818, Letters 
Sent, SWMA.
138John C. Calhoun to Thomas Jesup, Daniel Brent, Calendar 
Irvine, Decius Wadsworth, J. G. Swift, and Joseph Lovell, August 29, 
1818; and "Regulatios requiring reports, etc. from the several officers 
of the Dept [sic] of War," September 5, 1818, ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
139but it was a system for the future. Since the centralisation of
authority and the placing of subordinate responsibility were the corner­
stones of the reforms he intended, he expectantly awaited the first 
influx of reports from the various commands and bureau chiefs. A report 
to Congress on the status of the War Department was due in two months, 
and he believed he would then be able to tell the legislators that his 
changes were well underway. Now, he wrote to Andrew Jackson:
I have strong hopes that Qr. masters and other branches of disburse­
ments, will hereafter be brought into much more exact method.
Charged, as the Department formerly was, with an infinity, of 
details, it was quite impossible to bestow the requisite attention 
to any one part without neglecting some other. A responsible heatj 
to each branch of disbursements, will hereafter remove this evil.
It remained, however, for the young administrator to undo the 
mismanagement of the previous several decades. What Calhoun attempted 
throughout 1818 was by no means a new or exotic procedure for the 
governance of an executive department. The requiring of exact reportage 
of disbursements, and fixing responsibility precisely upon the officer 
charged with doing a department's business was known then as the system 
of "accountability," an administrative form whose origins lay in the 
Federalist period. The leading scholar of early American public admin­
istration, Leonard White, has compared the Jeffersonian administrations 
unfavorably with those of the Federalists, and assuredly the pre-Calhoun
War Department represented the worst that Jeffersonian talents had to
.. 141offer.
^^Calhoun's 1843 biography gives the reader the impression that 
this new system was implemented quickly and rather easily, despite "for­
midable opposition" in Congress, and that thereafter, the new system 
worked "without a jar." See Calhoun Biography, pp. 25-26.
-*-40john c. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, September 29, 1818, Let-torsi 
Sent, SWMA.
141white, The Jeffersonians, p. 162.
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Calhoun's drive for economy and efficiency in the War Department's 
administration has impressed many observers; their judgment has been based 
largely upon an often cited managerial feat: when he came to office, the
department's unsettled accounts amounted to forty-five million dollars. 
When he left office eight years later, that figure had been reduced to 
less than four million dollars. Calhoun proudly reported this accomplish­
ment to President Monroe in 1823, and he repeated it in his campaign
142biography years later. Since then, this claim has become enthroned in
143modern scholarship. Calhoun was not dissimulating when he made this 
boast, and what he had achieved had been considerable, but the impression 
left is that Calhoun somehow forced the payment of forty-one million 
dollars in back debts to the War Department. That he certainly did not do.
Confusion on this matter arises from a general misunderstanding, 
explained fully by Leonard White (and ignored by most historians), of 
what was entailed in the settling of an account. In 1817 there existed 
unsettled War Department accounts dating back to 1798. The War of 1812 
further aggravated the problem, and the number of untended accounts made 
a quantum leap into the regions of absurdity. From the inception of the 
republic, vouchers and receipts had been required in the maintenance of 
public business, with varying success. The greatest problem with such 
accounts was in collecting the money after they had been settled. When 
civilians were involved, the only avenue for collection from the recal­
citrant debtor was by court action. White points out that not one, but
142John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, November 29, 1823, Calhoun 
Papers, 8:385. This report also received public recongition; see,
National Intelligencer, December 16, 1823. See also Calhoun Biography, 
25-26.
143se6f for one example, Weigley, History of the U. S. Army,
p. 134.
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two cases were often required: one to adjudge the settlement, charged to
the account, and another to force the debtor to bring forward his records 
for examination. In the matter of forcing the debtor to obey the settle­
ment of the account, the Secretary of War never had any authority over 
the civilians and only the power of suasion (official disapproval) over
military debtors. That affair was left in the hands of the Treasury and
144
the government's attorneys.
Before the spring of 1817 the War Department's accounting opera­
tion was handled by several auditors. From the vouchers and receipts 
submitted in justification of expenditures, the auditors, using criteria 
in War Department regulations, then determined whether claims were 
allowable. If the person submitting the account were unable to justify 
his expenditures on the grounds of regulations or duties performed, he 
automatically became liable for that amount. (One officer pleaded a 
lack of vouchers because his desk had been hit by cannon fire during the 
war.) Once a complete accounting was made, and once the auditor con­
cluded how much the agent owed the government (it was rarely the other 
way around), the account was considered "settled," transferred to the 
Treasury for collection, and thereafter to the courts, if necessary, for 
resolution.^"
The number of unsettled accounts attracted the attention of a 
House Committee in 1816. All of the departments of the executive branch 
had mounds of accounts in arrears, as the congressmen found out when they
144White, The Jeffersonians, pp. 162-175. Of course, no one 
could be sure exactly what the amount of the unsettled accounts were 
until they were, in fact, settled.
145Ibid., p. 162.
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advanced on a tour of inspection, "into a labyrinth, the intricacies of 
which increased at every step." At the same time, the secretaries of 
the departments applied themselves to the problem. In December, 1816, 
the report of the four secretaries recommended the abolition of depart­
mental auditors, and the establishment of a central auditing operation 
in the Treasury. Furthermore, they argued, all power to effect final 
settlement should be vested in the Secretary of the Treasury, who could 
be armed with powers of summary judgment and confiscation. With the 
exception of this last recommendation, these provisions were adopted by 
the Congress in 1817; thereafter, William Lee and Peter Hagner, the
Second and Third Auditors of the Treasury, would handle War and Navy 
146
accounts.
By the time Calhoun had to face the unsettled accounts, then, 
much of the settlement machinery was beyond his control. Only the 
administrative task of assembling the pertinent documents justifying 
accounts could be done within his department. With only a part of the 
means of settlement within his purview, all that was left for Calhoun 
and his clerks to do was climb what must have been mountains of paper. 
That they managed to clear away over ninety per cent of it in less than 
seven years is a testament to their eyesight and determination.
With the exception of revenues marked for the retirement of the 
national debt, the War Department used more of the government's money
146Ibid., pp. 171-175. Over a year later Treasury Secretary 
William Crawford reiterated the need for some sort of summary power of 
coercion to assist in the settling of accounts. In a report to Congress, 
Crawford observed: "The views and opinions presented in those papers
[his previous report of December 6, 1816] not only remain unchanged, but 
have acquired additional force from the experience of the past year."
U. S., Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2349.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
147
than any other branch. The greatest part of the War Department's
budget was taken up by pay and allowances (and pensions), but the total
of all the other expenditures was larger, and these had to do with
148fortifications, and equipping, supplying and moving the army. Regard­
less of the particular system under which such great sums were administered, 
abuses and fiscal malpractice were to be expected. Considering the number 
of officers and agents charged with protecting the public monies, it is 
noteworthy that most performed their duties with fidelity. Naturally 
enough, these agents went unnoticed by Calhoun; those who acted otherwise 
were of more interest to him.
The government's way of doing business sometimes aided fiscal 
abuses. The backlog of unsettled accounts meant that a case might not 
come up for years, and even then no resolution might be possible. The 
House committee formed to investigate accounts in 1816 pointed out 
frankly:
The conviction on the part of an officer that his accounts cannot 
or will not be settled for years presents a certain degree of 
impunity to embezzlement, and powerfully tempts to the commission 
of it. 1-49
147Between 1817 and 1822 the War Department called upon the 
Treasury for about forty million dollars, averaging eight million dollars 
a year. By comparison, monies devoted to the retirement of the public 
debt in 1818 amounted to $12,600,000, while the War Department drew 
$6,000,000 from the Treasury, or 23 per cent of the total revenues for 
that year. "State of the Finances, November 24, 1818," and "Report of 
the Comptroller, November 26, 1822," in Walter Lowrie, Walter S. Franklin, 
and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., American State Papers. Documents 
Legislative and Executive of the United States (1st through 25th Con­
gresses, 1789-1838), Class 3, Financial Affairs, 38 vols. (Washington,
D. C.: Gales and Seaton, 1833-1861), 3:275 and 4:2 (hereafter cited as
ASPFA).
■*-4®For a breakdown of War Department expenditures by year, see 
Secretary of War James Barbour's "Report to the Select House Committee 
on Retrenchment, March 3, 1828," ibid., 5:1078-1080.
149Quoted in White, The Jeffersonians, p. 168.
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The War Department had commonly advanced money to paymasters and
recruiters in anticipation of vouchers during the war, and the practice
of advancing money on government contracts was common as well. At the
end of the war it was reported that 198 paymasters had outstanding
accounts, and that during a two-year period only fifteen of these had
150
been satisfactorily disposed of. Calhoun was given a list of pay­
masters whose accounts were in arrears, but since the auditors were then 
calculating that there were five thousand unsettled accounts, Calhoun 
could do but little. The Secretary sent the list of paymasters on to 
Congress and (doubtless with some relief) remarked that "this department
does not possess the power to coerce persons" to pay what they owed to
^ 151 the government.
Moreover, the system for monitoring current accounts in the War 
Department was s~ill rudimentary. Paymasters (and any other officer who 
disbursed money) could simply take their advances and mix them with their 
own money in local savings accounts and draw interest on the whole until 
such time came that they actually had to pay the money out. This prac­
tice was probably widespread and was seen merely as a perquisite of 
office. Calhoun was convinced this was so serious that he took the 
trouble to issue a general order, requiring that officers keep public 
and private monies in separate accounts in the localities, and that
S., Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2347- 
2352, 2358-2360.
^^William Lee to John C. Calhoun, February 14, 1818, and John C. 
Calhoun to Henry Clay, February 28, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:138, .163- 
1.05.
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152
wherever possible, in the branches of the Bank of the United States.
At the same time, Calhoun instructed his bureau chiefs to watch over
153large cash advances more closely in the future. Thereafter, those 
whom the government owed would have to wait until vouchers arrived in 
the War Department and were approved; the overall effect would be 
greater fiscal control at the expense of local convenience.
Calhoun's attempts to deal with current accounts were further 
complicated by the chaotic monetary system of the country. Government 
bills of credit were very like bank notes, and they did not carry uniform 
value in different parts of the nation. These bills of credit could 
therefore become objects of speculation, fluctuating against local bank 
notes, and usually they did poorly by the transaction. Bills of govern­
ment credit were usually discounted on the frontier because of the sheer 
delay in redeeming them for specie and also because of the poor credit 
reputation of the War Department. This meant that prices to the War 
Department had the local exchange added, plus an allowance for a consid­
erable (some said inevitable) discount. The loss to the department was 
considerable. The situation was described for Calhoun by William 
Cummings of Georgia:
You will ascertain on enquiry that Q, M. Certificates within six 
months have been sold at great discount; & yet that the sellers 
have scarcely been the losers, as they added to the ordinary charges 
a liberal allowance for this probable or rather inevitable discount. 
The bad credit of the Department must I think exceed all its other
152
John C. Calhoun to Thomas S. Jesup, November 11, 1819; John C. 
Calhoun to George Bomford, March 12, 1818; John C. Calhoun to Robert 
Brent, March 12, 1818; and John C. Calhoun to Daniel Parker, March 12, 
1818, ibid., 3:484; 2:186-187.
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evils together. It is improbable that the total loss from other 
causes would equal 10 per Cent on the whole necessary expenditures; 
while in fact Q. M. Certificates have been repeatedly 20 a 30 per 
Cent below par.^-^
As much as Calhoun tried to minimize this sort of speculation,
there was still ample opportunity for agent speculation on exchange
futures, and he knew it. Calhoun told a friend;
I have been taking the most effectual measures to take it out of the 
power of the officers, to commit a fraud on the government by 
pocketing the exchange. Prevention is better than punishment. I 
do hope and believe that the new arrangement of the staff will enable 
me another year, to bring the Disbursements of the Army into very 
exact method. The publick has a right to expect it, and if my 
health and abilities will permit, it shall be done.-*-^
How this speculation damaged the War Department's image and 
credit came to Calhoun's notice shortly after he arrived in office. The 
assistant quartermaster for east Tennessee, Major John Rogers, had appar­
ently been selling fraudulent claims against the government. In 
December, 1817, Rogers asked Senator John Williams to intercede on his 
behalf with Calhoun for the advancement of more funds. When Williams 
inquired of the Secretary about Rogers' affairs, he was told that no 
more advances would be made on Rogers' account until his outstanding 
claims had been a p p r o v e d . T h i s  news, when it reached Knoxville, 
forced Rogers' resignation. With speculators concerned, the accounts of 
East Tennessee in a jumble, and the Tennessee congressional delegation 
calling upon Calhoun to settle these claims quickly, Calhoun took the
154William Cummings to John C. Calhoun, April 27, 1818, ibid.,
2:262.
155John C. Calhoun to Abner Lacock, August 26, 1818, ibid., 3:70. 
^"^John C. Calhoun to John Williams, December 27, 1817, ibid.,
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157best step. He essentially stopped all business by the government in
that area in order to give a new quartermaster time to arrive on the
spot. The new agent was to gather all the claims and vouchers he could
and transmit the lot of them to the Third Auditor, who would pass on the
158validity of the debts. One-third of all the east Tennessee claims
had been bought up by merchants, and it was entirely possible that
Rogers had some of his own as well. Much disgusted by the affair,
Senator Williams told Calhoun: "The reputation of the Government has
been injured among the common people by the Petty vilanies [sic] of our 
159Q masters." The claims approved by the auditor were eventually paid. 
With men like Rogers gone from the service, and the new system of 
accountability being taken more seriously by the military, Calhoun's 
days in the War Office were made easier.
IV
Quite clearly, some War Department business was beyond Calhoun's 
ability to control from his office in Washington. Regulations, once 
promulgated, could be either ignored or manipulated to one's advantage. 
Policies carefully set in the War Department or decided upon in the 
cabinet or Congress could be made a shambles when they were executed.
To his credit, Calhoun never despaired of bringing the unwieldy military 
establishment to heel.
157William Blount, John Rhea, and Francis Jones to John C. 
Calhoun, December 30, 1817, ibid., 2:45.
158John C. Calhoun to Robert Houston, February 10, 1818, ibid.,
2:131.
159John Williams to John C. Calhoun, July 28, 1818, ibid.,
2:434-435.
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It was perhaps an index of how poorly run the previous War 
Department administrations had been that considerable authority had 
seeped away to the localities and attached themselves to figures who 
were technically under Washington's control. One of these figures who 
had arrogated considerable authority unto himself was General Andrew 
Jackson, and he posed problems for Calhoun of a kind the Secretary did 
not face elsewhere.
Well before Calhoun took office, a dispute had been brewing 
between Jackson and the government over the transfer of one of Jackson's 
officers without the general's permission or knowledge. Monroe and the 
acting Secretary of War, George Graham, had handled the affair badly and 
had succeeded in elevating a minor communications problem to a matter of 
principle of civilian control over the military. For his part, Jackson 
had been neither temperate nor skillful in his dealings with Monroe and 
Graham. By October, 1817, Monroe had been forced into telling Jackson 
that "this order involves the naked principle, of the power of the 
Executive, over the officers of the army, in such cases, for the depart­
ment of war cannot be separated from the President." By that time, 
however, Monroe had temporized considerably by telling Jackson that
while the principle stood fixed, as a matter of practice orders should
160
follow the chain of command. Jackson would not be conciliated, and
Calhoun, arriving in office, was instructed by Monroe to write to 
Jackson, reiterating the administration's position, but telling him also
Andrew Jackson to James Monroe, March 4, 1817; James Monroe 
to Andres Jackson, June 2, 1817, August 4, 1817, October 5, 1817, 
Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, 2:281, 296-297, 319, 329.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
110
that thereafter all orders would be issued through divisional com- 
161manders.
This was hardly a victory for civil control of the military, as
X6 2
some writers have represented it. At least Jackson thought not;
Calhoun's letter of December 29 explaining the "new policy" bears a note
163in Jackson1s hand: "adopting the principles I contended for." Cer­
tainly no other officer in the American army was willing to go so far in 
defying civil authority, nor was one likely to be so successful in doing 
so. Neither Monroe nor Calhoun (and indeed few others in Washington) 
was willing to deny that Jackson, as an authentic American hero, was 
jealous of his prerogatives. The conciliatory letters written by Monroe 
and Calhoun are sufficiently convincing on that point, but Calhoun could 
not have been altogether satisfied by the position Monroe had ordered 
him to take in this affair. Subsequent events proved that Calhoun was 
extremely sensitive to military presumptions of independence of any kind, 
regardless 'of their origin.
Although Calhoun got along with Jackson thereafter, the Secre­
tary's private opinions about the hero of New Orleans became progressively 
more jaundiced. When Calhoun and the rest of the Cabinet met to consider 
the official reaction to Jackson's illegal invasion of the Spanish 
territory of Florida, Calhoun was for all but cashiering the impetuous
X6XJames Monroe to Andrew Jackson, December 2, 1817, ibid.,
2:336-337.
X6 2W. Edwin Hemphill, "Introduction," Calhoun Papers, 2:lix; 
Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, pp. 136-137.
X 6 3John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, December 29, 1817, note 
appended to letter in Jackson's hand, Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, 
2:343.
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general. The Secretary was "extremely dissatisfied" with Jackson's
actions in Florida, and he recommended that the President absolutely
164disavow the general's activities there. Later, in a conversation
with John Quincy Adams about Jackson, Cahoun remarked, in Adams' words:
He had no doubt that Jackson's intentions were perfectly pure and 
upright; but his disposition was to exercise to its utmost extent 
every particle of power given to him. He had not sufficient regard 
to the genius of our institutions and to the popular o p i n i o n .
No such hero's mantle as Jackson's hung on General Moses Porter.
Less than one year after the administration's dispute with Jackson over
chain of command, Porter was complaining to Calhoun of the very same
problem and defending the same principle of non-intervention in command
that Jackson had espoused. By this time, however, Calhoun apparently
had decided that if Monroe had not meant to single Jackson out as a
special case, the same procedure should be followed in this one. The
Secretary of War acknowledged that all orders should be sent through the
field commanders and apologized to Porter for not having done so.
Calhoun's reply to Porter clearly indicated that the administration had
. . . 166 
moved away from its original stand of absolute civilian supremacy.
On yet a third occasion, Calhoun was forced to consider, and
then to temporize, his obvious feelings on civil-military relations.
During a Fourth of July oration at Boston in 1819, a speaker (one of
Boston's selectmen) made some indirect and disapproving comments about
General Jackson, and a young officer, James Scallan, who had served
with Jackson and who was present, took umbrage at the remarks. The
^^Adams, Diary, 4:107. ^^Ibid., 5:370-371.
166John C. Calhoun to Moses Porter, April 9, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 2:237.
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officer dispatched a letter to the Selectmen of Boston, demanding a
167retraction of the slur. Apparently, the letter was couched in no 
uncertain terms; the Selectmen promptly informed Monroe of the contre­
temps, and the matter became the subject of several cabinet meetings. 
Calhoun was outraged. He recommended to Monroe that Scallan be cashiered 
immediately from the service. In Calhoun's opinion, this was not a fit 
subject for a court-martial, but "a military offense against the civil 
authority." Monroe called for the opinions of all the cabinet officers. 
Calhoun's stern line did not prevail: he was instructed by Monroe to
make known to Scallan and the Selectmen of the President's "decided
168
disapprobation," but no further action was taken.
It was true, then, that Calhoun was ambitious for his country, 
for the army, and indeed for himself, but it is also true that he was a 
slave to none of these ambitions. The results of the war which Calhoun 
talked about so fondly merely meant to him that the nation could not get 
on to greater things: prosperity and expansion. He believed that
military establishment, so long merely the nation's unwelcome guest, 
could aid in that expansion and national improvement, but only if it 
could be brought under control and manipulated to that end. This last 
effect was Calhoun's main goal as Secretary of War. It was made all the 
more desirable by the fact that any successes he had would redound to 
his credit. After all, the shortcomings of the military establishment 
were familiar enough to all as shortcomings of the nation's own making.
T_67
Adams, Diary, 4:408-412.
168Ibid. John C. Calhoun to James Scallan, John C. Calhoun to 
the Selectmen of Boston, August 21, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 4:263.
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CHAPTER III
THE TRANSIT OF MILITARY NATIONALISM
Considering the endemic tension between nation and army, the 
survival of the army during the republic's first years was as surprising 
as the survival of the nation itself. In a nation relying upon reaction 
rather than anticipatory defense, impulses tending toward independence 
in military thought were stunted. Military policies were set more by 
political intuition than by rational considerations of national needs, 
capabilities, and resources. Military policy became at any given time, 
therefore, an index of the vitality of old republican ideas about a 
standing defense.
This being so, traditional enmity toward preparedness began to 
fade with the first urgings of nationalism after the American Revolu­
tion. The United States was anxious to obtain all the implements and 
accouterments of nationhood: a stable government, a reliant economic
structure, and an inventive cultural life. These things were the work 
of generations; military accouterments, accomplishing the same result, 
could be more easily obtained.'*'
1Obviously, much more is involved here than the evaluation and 
adoption of military ideas and implements. In this view practicalities 
become of only secondary importance: it is the image that counts. One
need only look at the fantastic defense expenditures of certain devel­
oping nations today to understand that defense is not the only reason 
for a sophisticated military establishment. The importation of military 
knowledge and accouterments by underdeveloped nations which have no real 
need of them will have to be explained in other than rational terms. In
113
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The military image which most effectively portrayed nationhood 
at the turn of the eighteenth century was the fortress, or more particu­
larly, the fortresses of France. The man most often associated with the
system of French fortifications was Sebastien de Vauban, who had done his
2
work nearly a century before for Louis XIV. In the early nineteenth 
century, however, Vauban's work had less to do with military policy than 
with the symbolism of national wealth and international prestige. Mili­
tarily, fortresses had long since been redundant.
Americans, however, looked upon the great coastal fortresses of 
Cherbourg and Brest as the penultimate in military protection. Coastal 
defense had long been a national preoccupation. Before independence 
there had been British-built gun platforms or earthen redoubts pro­
tecting several American ports. During the Revolution the American 
coastline was, for all purposes, an open one, since no American navy 
existed to act in conjunction with any of these rudimentary defenses. 
Although a lack of time and meager resources accounted for this poor 
preparation, there was a lack of mental resources as well: French
1975 the African nation of Qatar, for instance, expended $106,000,000 on 
military equipment, or seven per cent of its Gross National Product to 
protect itself against threats which simply did not exist. In this last 
regard, Qatar in 1975 was much like the United States in 1800. See 
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers, 1966-1975 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1976), p. 44.
2
Still the best short treatment of Vauban*s life, thought, and 
works is Henry Guerlac, "Vauban: The Impact and Science of War," in
Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler,
ed. by Edward Meade Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943),
pp. 26-48. See also Sebastien Leprestre de Vauban, A Manual of Siege- 
craft and Fortification, trans. and ed. by George A. Rothrock. (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan, 1968). The regard which Calhoun had for
this military thinker will be demonstrated later in this chapter.
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engineers were imported during the struggle and at the end of the Revo­
lution, the "American engineers" contained only one American out of 
fourteen experts.
The French general in charge of the American engineers, Louis
Duportain, attempted unsuccessfully to establish a school where native
engineers could be trained, but this resistance to military education
3
curiously did not extend to fortifications themselves. In 1794 Congress 
passed the Naval Act which inaugurated a program of fortifications that 
continued for several decades thereafter. That year eight civilian 
engineers were hired to oversee the project; only two did not have 
Gallic names. When Congress recommended so much money for fortifications 
that the program actually outstripped the nation's technological capa­
cities, then clearly fortifications meant something other than the mere 
improvement of the military establishment. The Due de la Rochefoucault- 
Liancourt, traveling through the United States in 1799, noticed what 
happened when advanced military technology was embraced by an under­
developed nation:
Those [fortifications] which the Union erects and keeps up are 
few, and almost all are incomplete. Good engineers being scarce, 
the Americans are obliged to employ such as they can get, who are 
generally foreigners who do not half understand their business, 
and who are generally more attentive to their own interest than 
that of the United States. Great plans are drawn, the works are 
begun at great expense; there is a want of money the following 
year; and the fortifications are either entirely relinquished, 
or reduced to so small a scale that they are either good for nothing 
or at least defective, so that the money spent the preceding year 
may be said to be thrown away.^
3
Don Higginbotham, The War for American Independence (New York: 
Macmillan and Company, 1971), p. 310 (hereafter cited as Higginbotham, 
War for American Independence).
4
"Instructions of Secretary of War Henry Knox to Bechet Roche- 
fontaine, March 29, 1794," ASPMA, 1:73; Weigley, History of the U. S.
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Rochefoucault was correct only in part, however; there was a 
great deal of money being allowed by the government for fortifications. 
Between the Naval Act and the advent of the Jeffersonians, more than 
half a million dollars was spent on eighteen different coastal instal­
lations, and only in 1796 and 1797 did the money expended decline.^
While expenditures for fortifications generally increased during this
period, the total expenses of the military establishment remained fairly
0
constant, averaging two million dollars annually. Fortifications, in 
other words, were absorbing more and more of the total military budget 
of the United States. At the same time, the nation still relied upon 
the citizen militiaman for the bulk of its defense establishment.
The question thus remains: why was a fledgling nation so
anxious to prevent the growth of a standing army developing a military 
building program beyond its capacities to maintain? Considering the 
relative rates of expenditure on fortifications and the military estab­
lishment, one answer presents itself: fortifications did not directly
threaten military amateurism, large standing armies did. But these 
figures tell, as no political rhetoric can, that the nation's makers of 
military policy were beginning to doubt that the. militia could serve the
Army, p. 98; Due de la Rochefoucault-Liancourt, Travels Through the 
United States in North America (London, 1799), 2:625, quoted in Kohn, 
Eagle and Sword, p. 303N.
5
"Statement of Moneys applied for the defence of certain Ports 
and Harbors in the United States, in Pursuance of the 'Act to provide 
for the Defence of certain Ports and Harbors in the United States,' 
passed the 20th of March, 1794, distinguishing the moneys expended for 
the Fortifications of each Harbor to the 16th of November, 1801, inclu­
sive," ASPMA, 1:153.
^"Military and Naval Expenditures, from 1789 to 1810, April 3, 
1.810," ibid., 1:268.
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requirements of defense entirely unaided. The ethic of the citizen at
arms was already being subtly eroded. Simultaneously, the fortifications
7
acted as physical symbols of the nation's ambitions.
All this had little enough to do with the effectiveness of forti­
fications on the American coastline or anywhere else. Twelve years and 
considerable expenditures after the passage of the Naval Act, Secretary 
of War Henry Dearborn reported to Congress that, of twenty different 
locations (some of which had more than one installation), only two— Fort 
Independence in Boston Harbor, and Fort Trumbull at New London— did not 
need extensive repairs. Five of these, Dearborn said, were either mili­
tarily or geographically impractical. Forts Adams and Wolcott (near 
Newport, Rhode Island) were wrongly placed to begin with, and, said 
Dearborn, "would not, in the smallest degree, annoy ships of war, but in 
one of three open and convenient passages by which Rhode Island may be
g
approached." At Charleston three sites had been destroyed by a storm 
in 1804, and Savannah's Forts Green and St. Mary's were flooded, appar­
ently in perpetuity. All work on these forts had stopped, and it was
believed that they would have to move to an altogether different location,
9
once the Georgia legislature saw fit to cede lands for that purpose.
^There was a growing awareness among military men on both sides 
of the Atlantic that militiamen did not operate as well independently as 
when they were supported by regulars, increased artillery, or fortifica­
tions. Simon Bernard expressed this view in a letter to Wolfe Tone,
August 3, 1820, Vandeventer Papers, which was an extended treatise on 
American artillery. Bernard argued for an increase in the artillery arm 
of the standing force precisely because of the number of amateurs in the 
defense establishment. See David Chandler's discussion of how Napoleon 
dealt with a large influx of volunteers in constructing La Grande Armee, 
in The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1966),
pp. 332-333.
^"Report of the Secretary of War on Fortifications within the 
United States and Territories," ASPMA, 1:192-196.
9Ibid., p. 195.
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Dearborn's remarks on fortifications deserve to be noticed 
further, because he was interested in military affairs and at least had 
some claim to understanding them. That he was skeptical of the modern 
practicality of fortresses is evident from his reports as a Secretary of 
War. To a Congress which seemed more than willing to spend huge amounts 
of money on these military artifacts, he pointed out that warships were 
no longer hesitant to engage coastal batteries in order to force a pas­
sage. Referring to the fortifications around the harbor of New York, 
Dearborn said:
So many instances [have] occurred of ships of war not only having 
passed the best batteries within even point blank shot (which is 
less than 500 yards) but of presenting their broadsides to such 
batteries, with springs on their cables, and sustaining the fire 
for a considerable length of time, and even, in many cases, of 
silencing the batteries.
This sort of thing had happened recently, he said, between 
British warships and the harbor defenses at C o p e n h a g e n . T h e  impres­
sion Dearborn's remarks conveyed was that American batteries could not
hope to accomplish what the fine Danish betteries had failed to do. And
yet, after all of this, "notwithstanding the experience of the ages to
the contrary," authorities at New York had persisted in emplanting fixed
12
gun batteries solely to protect the entrance channels to the harbor.
Dearborn's protests went unheeded, and as the War of 1812 broke
out Congress showed no inclination to economize on coastal defenses. In 
1812 more than $750,000 were given over to military building, with the 
greatest part going to forts. During the following year, Congress ap­
proved one and a half million dollars for this single item— the largest
10Ibid., p. 193. i;LIbid. 12Ibid.
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outlay for fortifications in the history of the republic. In the last
year of the war, only three hundred thousand dollars were authorized,
suggesting that even though the money was available, there was simply not
13enough time or skill to spend the sums allotted the year before.
The Chesapeake emergencies of 1814 proved this to be the case;
defenses along the bay were in various states of disrepair. James Monroe
was in the thick of the action, both bureaucratic and military. The
future president saw an undefended coast, due, he thought, to Secretary
of War John Armstrong's stubborn resistance to preparation. Monroe then
witnessed a government in sorry flight, and the capitol sacked, while
well-defended Baltimore stood the British raiders off. Perhaps as much
as any other event, the defense of Baltimore kept the fortifications
14program alive when Monroe finally became President.
Ignoring all contrary lessons of the war, Monroe threw his 
support behind an extensive program of postwar defensive building. Pro­
bably at Monroe's urging, President Madison appointed a Board of Engineers 
to devise a system of coastal fortifications. The promises held out by 
the creation of the board encouraged one young officer then on a tour of 
the continent. Ex-artillerist James Renwick wrote to Chief Engineer 
Swift: "I am glad to see a disposition on the part of the Secretary of
War [Monroe] for fortifications. . . .  An inspection of the ports of
13"Expenditures for Fortifications of all categories, including 
arsenals, by year, 1812-1820, February 16, 1820," ASPFA, 3:489.
14Ammon, Monroe, pp. 318-337. Armstrong had repeatedly resisted 
preparing defenses for Washington and the Chesapeake Bay because in his 
view, neither was of any military importance to the British. All of 
which, of course, was true enough, if one neglected the psychological 
value attached to a nation's capital if not by the citizenry as a whole
then by its powerful residents. See also Harry Coles, The War of 1812
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 172-186.
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France and Holland made me blush at the small expenditure of money to
which we have been willing to limit the defence of places of infinitely
greater importance."15
When Monroe became President, he announced his intention to con-
16
tinue what had been started under Madison's administration. The new
President's ostensible reason for his northern tour during the summer of
1817 was to inspect that frontier's military defenses (he was perhaps as
much interested in Federalist political defenses, however), and he took
care to lecture the northerners on the need for extensive coastal forti- 
17fications. Appropriations in Congress kept pace (for the time being)
18with Monroe's plans. Considering the time, money, and energy which 
Calhoun eventually devoted to fortifications, it was easily one of the 
most important programs. Monroe thought so. He told John Quincy Adams 
that the new system of fortifications was "one of the great objects by
19which [my] administration may be signalized in the view of posterity."
It was also significant that virtually the first high-ranking officer
whom Calhoun met as he entered on his official duties was the Chief of
the Corps of Engineers.
l^Weigley, American Way of War, p. 59. James Renwick to Joseph G. 
Swift, May 13, 1816, The Papers of Joseph G. Swift, The Library of the 
United States Military Academy, West Point, New York (hereafter cited as 
Swift Papers).
l^James Monroe, "Inaugural Address," March 4, 1817, Hamilton, 
Monroe Papers, 6:10.
^See Monroe's remarks to the citizens of Baltimore in Narrative 
of a Tour, p. 18.
18For the five years immediately following the end of the war, 
appropriations for the coastal defense program were at least half a mil­
lion dollars annually. "Expenditures for Fortifications of all categories, 
including arsenals, by year, 1812-1820, February 16, 1820," ASPFA, 3:489.
19Adams, Diary, 5:331.
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If Calhoun was the least hesitant about supporting this grand 
program, he did not show it. With the President so enamored of fortifi­
cations, Calhoun would not indulge the slightest doubt that fortifications 
were what the nation needed before any other military implement. The new 
Secretary carefully did not intend to take the same position as Monroe's 
wartime nemesis, John Armstrong, who had a low opinion of fixed defenses; 
and yet Armstrong was right: the day of the great fortress had gone by.
Watching the new program develop from his exile in New York, Armstrong 
wondered when the expensive folly would end. He wrote to his friend,
Chief Clerk Vandeventer:
A hundred years ago, Europe was fortification-mad and so long as 
this disorder lasted the Art of War was retrograde— Frederich saw 
all this folly and directed his efforts to perfect his field artil­
lery & his infantry and accordingly left all other powers of his 
day far behind him; but it was the war of the French Revolution and 
the men found in it, who completely broke down the fortification 
system, by shewing in its extreme expensiveness & 2d its nothingness 
— that it saved no province or kingdom and that strong armies stood 
in no need of it as a friend and dispised it as an enemy. When will 
our eyes be open to these truths?^
Having no such qualms, Calhoun embraced the fortifications pro­
gram as ardently as did his President. In one of his first reports to 
Congress Calhoun pronounced "the existing fortifications . . . wholly 
insufficient in the event of a future war." The new Secretary also gave 
it as his opinion that the Regular Army was barely sufficient just to 
maintain the few defenses then existing, much less to fend off any sort
of attack. In the absence of a suitable army, fortifications would have 
21to suffice. Moreover, Calhoun's acceptance of Monroe's ideas on this
20John Armstrong to Christopher Vandeventer, November 21, 1819, 
Vandeventer Papers.
21John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, December 17, 1817, Calhoun 
Papers, 2:25.
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matter (as on others) was politically expedient: the Monroe-Calhoun
collaboration was a case of nationalists closing ranks.
Once the policy was set, all that remained for Calhoun to do was
manage it. He fortunately arrived on the scene when a general re-
evaluation of the system was occurring; Madison had suspended all new
work on defenses until the Board of Engineers could finish their survey
of the coastal areas. Thus, Calhoun was able to concentrate first on
those works which were already in progress, leaving the additions the
Board might recommend till later.
For the greater time Calhoun was in office, most new building
was done in two strategically important areas. The first of these was
the Chesapeake Bay. As an avenue of attack which gave onto some of the
most important centers of the nation, the bay was the most valuable
point on the eastern coast. The bay's importance had not escaped the
notice of the British in 1814, of course, although they had not taken
full advantage of it. Four works for the area were in the planning
stages in 1817: Fort Delaware, on the Pea Patch Island in the Delaware
River, protecting approaches to Philadelphia; Fort Washington, above
Alexandria on the Potomac River; Fort Monroe, at Old Point Comfort;
22
and Fort Calhoun, one mile offshore on the Rip Rap shoals. Each of
these was to be of stone construction and pentagonal design; the smalles
23
of the four, Fort Washington, was designed to mount 140 guns.
The second area of defensive importance was the western Gulf
Coast, which had been the scene of a considerable landing by the British
22Joseph G. Swift to John C. Calhoun, December 8, 1817, and 
Walter Armistead to John C. Calhoun, November 6, 1820, ibid., 2:4-6, 
5-241-242.
2^Ibid.
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in 1814. Only two defensive works existed there when Calhoun came to
office: Fort Bowyer on Mobile Point; and Fort St. Philip, along the
Mississippi below New Orleans. The Board of Engineers had few kind
words to say about these two installations: Bowyer "could not hold out
three days against an attack," and Fort St. Philip was "much too small
24
and weak to defend the Mississippi."
With several new fortifications in the offing and a number of
other works needing repairs, the strain on the tiny Corps of Engineers
was considerable. Calhoun had not yet issued his regulations requiring
a supervising engineer for each project, and it was just as well: there
were only twenty engineers in the entire corps, not all of whom were
available for fortifications projects. A report by General Swift just
before he resigned in late 1818 showed that only twelve engineers were
available to oversee the construction of seventeen planned installa- 
25tions. The practice in the field became quite different from what 
Calhoun had planned, then; the engineers were forced to supervise more 
than one site at a time. The lack of trained and accountable personnel 
added to Calhoun's difficulties in making Monroe's dreams of a fortress 
America come true.
The amount of money which the administration contemplated 
spending on the fortification system was staggering by the standards of 
peacetime military operations. General Bernard's Board of Engineers
24
Brigadier Simon Bernard, Captain Jesse D. Elliot, and Major 
Joseph G. Totten to John C. Calhoun, February 7, 1821, ibid., 5:599-616.
25Joseph G. Swift to John C. Calhoun, September 30, 1818, 
December 8, 1817, ibid., 3:175, 2:7. See also, "Engineer Regulations," 
April 7, 1818, Letters Sent, SWMA.
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reported in 1821 that eight million dollars should be enough to finish a 
26complete system. Of necessity, civilians would have to be contracted
to do the actual building of the fortresses; this left the door open for
all sorts of problems which Calhoun would eventually have to cope with.
When news of the Gulf coast projects at Mobile Bay (Mobile Point and
Dauphin Island) became public, an immediate speculation in coastal lands
broke out. "The Speculators even anticipate governmental operations,"
one informant told Calhoun, "the system of defense determined upon by
27
the Executive has awakened all their speculative feelings." The lands 
intended for the defense program's use were otherwise worthless sand 
hills and swamps, but when the public learned of the government's plans, 
claims suddenly appeared which threatened to engross the whole Gulf
4- 28coast.
The practice of advancing money to a contractor against the ful­
fillment of the contract was a long-standing and fully recognized evil, 
and one that Calhoun was decidedly against. Although he avoided making 
advances whenever he could, specie was in short supply in the West, 
making the practice all the more necessary if the government was to use 
any western contractors at all. Monroe's government was sensitive to 
western complaints that eastern businessmen had first claim on the govern­
ment's contracts, and Calhoun was thus forced to operate against his
26Brigadier Simon Bernard, Captain Jesse D. Elliot, and Major 
Joseph G. Totten to John C. Calhoun, February 7, 1821, Calhoun Papers, 
5:609.
27James Gadsden to John C. Calhoun, June 25, 1819, ibid., 4:116-
117.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
125
29instincts. All government contractors were required to post a bond to 
ensure their performance and to protect the government from outrageous 
losses, but Calhoun was put on his guard when he was told by an engineer 
officer in the West that the civilian businessmen there looked upon "any 
government undertaking as a l o t t e r y . T h e  contractors believed, appar­
ently, that a government which had been so lenient with defaulters would 
not now begin to take up bonds for failures.
The fortifications about Mobile Bay were therefore representative 
of the problems arising from the fortifications program at large. The 
contract to construct two forts— one at Mobile Point and another at 
Dauphin Island— had been won by Benjamin Hopkins. The project engineer 
was Captain James Gadsden. There were difficulties from the beginning. 
Gadsden did not believe that the firm of "Hopkins and Hanes" had any 
business winning the contract in the first place, since they were 
entirely ignorant of the techniques of military building. Hopkins and 
Hanes, Gadsden told Calhoun, "have never been engaged in any persuits [sic]
29Representative Richard Mentor Johnson of Kentucky was, as ever, 
interested in encouraging western business (primarily his own). In late 
1818 and early 1819 Johnson and Calhoun exchanged several letters having 
to do with the encouragement of western manufacturing. Johnson was of the 
opinion that western businessmen should be given contracts lasting more 
than a year because of the difficulties of transportation, and secondly, 
that the government, not the western businessmen, absorb the costs of 
transportation. Johnson had particular reference to the encouragement 
of a fledgling textile establishment in the west, but Calhoun's tempered 
replies indicate that Calhoun was anxious, in harmony with the rest of 
the administration, to accommodate the westerners if he could. Monroe's 
sentiments regarding the west were illustrated by the fact that it was 
in that region that he searched first for a Secretary of War. See 
Richard M. Johnson to John C. Calhoun [c. January 3, 1819]; and John C. 
Calhoun to Callendar Irvine, January 5, 1819, ibid., 3:411, 450, 452-453.
^^James Gadsden to John C. Calhoun, June 25, 1819, ibid., 4:116-
117.
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which could possibly prepare or qualify them for their present under- 
31taking." Second, although the contract allowed no advances, Hopkins
and Gadsden fell out over whether the government should pay in advance
for the construction of a brickyard in the vicinity. Fearing that the
project would come to a complete halt, Gadsden reluctantly authorized
Hopkins to draw upon the government, and Gadsden did so with the certain
knowledge that if the accounts were not allowed by the Secretary of War,
32
he would stand liable for every penny. Gadsden was so vexed by the
33dispute that he requested a transfer from the engineers altogether.
As for Hopkins, he took his vexations to the grave, or rather transferred 
them to Calhoun, for the contractor was carried off shortly by the 
"bilious fever."33
Calhoun did not believe Hopkins had died. Amid rumors that the 
contractor was about to fail and go into bankruptcy, the news of Hopkin's 
death was altogether too fortuitous. The Secretary had first learned of 
Hopkins' death from Joseph Swift at New York. Swift had got the informa­
tion from a ship's captain in the harbor. Calhoun promptly sent off a 
query to the ex-general:
As it is a matter of some importance that the fact should be accu­
rately ascertained, if it does not give you too much trouble, I 
would be glad if you could see the Capt. of the Vessel who brought 
the Intelligence, & learn the fact from him. I do not put much con­
fidence in the character of Hopkins and the whole may be a sham as 
the government is considerabley [sic] in advance to him.34
31James Gadsden to John C. Calhoun, June 27, 1819, ibid., 4:122-
123.
32
Ibid.
33James Gadsden to John C. Calhoun, August 7, 1819, ibid., 4:215.
34John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, August 6, 1819, ibid.,
4:215.
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Only bad news followed. Less than three weeks after he learned
of Hopkins' death, Calhoun found out that Hopkins had "farmed out his
contract to several sub-contractors" who had done their work as agreed
but had received no money whatever from Hopkins. A clerk working for
the firm at Mobile Bay believed that the project was about to fail and
that the bonds Hopkins had put up were insufficient to protect the 
35government.
Calhoun was so incensed that he refused to believe that Hopkins
was actually dead. In September, 1819, Calhoun told his friend Swift:
"I fear Hopkins has had fraudulent views from the first, yet I will not
permit my mind to receive any impression to throw embarrassments in his
36
way unless they become absolutely necessary to secure the government."
In October Calhoun finally found out that Hopkins' death was not simply
37
a low trick, but the Secretary was not relieved. By the end of the
year Gadsden was asking for money to cover advances and pronouncing the
Mobile Point fortification "paralyzed" by the contractor's death.
Gadsden was so disgusted by the entire affair that he recommended to
38
Calhoun that the government abandon the Gulf projects.
35Christopher Vandeventer to John C. Calhoun, August 23, 1819, 
ibid., 4:268.
3 6John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, September 29, 1819, ibid.,
4:351.
37Calhoun learned from a former officer m  October that reports 
of Hopkins' death were not merely a subterfuge, as the Secretary had 
expected. James Mullany took ship at Mobile, bound for Philadelphia; 
the fever swept the ship, which was forced to put in at Havanna.
Hopkins was on board; he died at sea. James Mullany to John C- Calhoun, 
October 7, 1819, ibid., 4:362-366.
38John Lind Smith to John C. Calhoun, November 22, 1819; James 
Gadsden to John C. Calhoun, December 2, 1819; and James Gadsden to John C. 
Calhoun, December 4, 1819, ibid., 4:427, 461-462, and 462-465.
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At this point, the cast of characters changed. Richard Harris, 
Hopkins' surviving partner, sold part of the contract to a group of 
Virginia businessmen, led by Nimrod Farrow. The government seemingly 
had no control over such subsequent contractual adjustments; only a re­
negotiation of the Hopkins' bond was required to satisfy the government. 
Former General Swift had a hand in this interesting transaction. Farrow 
had chanced by Swift's New York office at the very time the ex-general
was writing Calhoun about Hopkins' death; it is thus possible that Swift
39
was a silent partner m  the new contract.
But Richard Harris did not find his new guarantors very con­
genial; he and Farrow, who went down to Mobile shortly, fell to arguing,
40
and Harris complained that Farrow seemed bent on killing the project.
But the construction at Mobile had already become nearly inert: although
the government eventually advanced more than $162,000 to the contractors,
the project showed few signs of improvement. Subsequent official
reports showed that the value of the work actually done at Dauphin Island
41
was worth less than one-third of the advances.
Nimrod Farrow and his associates executed a bond in August,
1819. It guaranteed the completion of Dauphin Island under the provi­
sions of the original contract. That the securities for the contract 
were re-negotiated after Hopkins' death indicated official nervousness 
that Hopkins' old bond was insufficient. Thus Farrow became Richard 
Harris' partner in the works on Mobile Bay. Harris was not consulted 
about this trnasaction, and therein lay the trouble between the new con­
tractor and the old. "Performance Bond of Nimrod Farrow,” August 2,
1819; James Gadsden to John C. Calhoun, December 2, 1819, ibid., 4:198,
461. See also Swift's letter to Calhoun confirming Hopkins' death in 
which he adds the postscript: "Mr. N. Farrow has just called at my
office." Joseph G. Swift to John C. Calhoun, September 11, 1819, ibid., 
4:319.
40James Gadsden to John C. Calhoun, January 20, 1820, ibid., 4:461.
41 "Fortifications on Dauphin Island: Commissioner's Report,
February 7, 1825," ASPMA, 2:830.
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At this point, Congress became involved, and in a most circuitous 
way. General Bernard and his team of engineers had originally recon- 
noitered the area around Mobile Bay. He placed a high strategic value 
upon the position: it would, he said, protect the channel giving onto
the bay; Dauphin Island could further protect the coastwise trade from 
Pensacola to New Orleans and prevent the latter city from being invested 
from the east. Yet there was a great deal of shoal water here, too 
shallow to handle ships of war. Thus, the entire bay need not be pro­
tected, but it was important, crucial in fact, that all the channels be 
charted and fortifications placed so that their guns controlled them. If 
somehow these entrance channels coursed out of gun range of any site on 
shore, then fixed batteries were of course useless. Apparently, Bernard 
had failed to chart and sound the bay. A naval chart appeared in Congress
in early 1820 which showed the bay cut by channels far away from either
42of the fortifications under construction.
This alarming development occurred just as Samuel Smith of 
Maryland, chairman of the House Ways and Means committee, was considering 
new appropriations for the coastal defense program. Disturbed by the 
rumors, Smith's committee recommended that all funds devoted to the
Bernard's strategic assessment of Mobile Bay was evident in a 
report submitted to Calhoun by Colonel Walker K. Armistead, then chief 
of the Corps of Engineers, in 1820. See Walker K. Armistead to John C. 
Calhoun, November 6, 1820, Calhoun Papers, 5:423. The House Committee 
on Military Affairs which investigated the Mobile defenses, at which time 
the original chart was compared with the soundings on a civilian pilot's 
chart. Both charts agreed that the ship channel into the bay ran two and 
a half miles away from Dauphin and, in the words of the committee, "no 
ship of war larger than a sloop can pass the bar or approach the city of 
Mobile nearer than twenty-five miles." "Fortifications for the Pro­
tection of Mobile; Report of the Committee on Military Affairs, February 
28, 1822," ASPMA, 2:345-346.
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Dauphin Island installation be cut off. At the same time the committee
voted other monies— $800,000 in fact— for the remainder of the program,
a clear indication that neither Smith nor his fellow committee members
43
were hostile to the idea of forts in general.
Calhoun could not believe that it was possible that an experi­
enced engineer such as Bernard could make such an "incredible" mistake, 
or that the other board members, Elliot and Totten, were wrong. The 
Dauphin Island case was brought up before the cabinet for discussion.
Both Monroe and Calhoun were displeased by the preemptory demands of 
Smith's committee; obviously, by designating how monies could be spent 
within a particular program, Congress could go a long way toward con­
trolling the Executive. Against the advice of William Crawford and John
44
Quincy Adams, Monroe and Calhoun resolved to fight back. In a defiant
letter to Smith, Calhoun explained that the President would decide how
the $800,000 appropriation would be spent and that Dauphin was deemed a
45
most important point on a defenseless coast. During the following 
year Calhoun shifted money which the Ways and Means committee had desig­
nated for other installations and applied it toward the building of the 
46Mobile forts. This was the rankest sort of opposition to congressional
43Samuel Smith to John C. Calhoun, April 4, 1820, Calhoun Papers,
5:6-7.
44Adams, Diary, 5:331-333.
45John C. Calhoun to Samuel Smith, April 12, 1820, Calhoun Papers,
5:27-28.
46See W. K. Armistead to John C. Calhoun, January 9, 1821, ibid., 
5:543-546. Armistead's report to Calhoun was intended to answer an 
anticipated request for information from the Ways and Means Committee.
The report admitted that neither Mobile Point nor Dauphin Island would 
be finished by the times stipulated in their contracts, and thus would
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demands, and it earned neither the administration nor its coastal
defense program much good will.
While Calhoun was jousting with Congress the project limped
along much as before. In October, 1820, Richard Harris, apparently
fearing for his investment because of congressional attention, divested
himself of the contract. With War Department approval, Harris sold his
contract to Colonel Turner Starke. Starke had bought into a losing pro-
47
ject; Harris' move was that of a keen businessman.
Finally Congress drastically cut all funds for fortifications in
the spring of 1821, and Dauphin Island was the first to go: the generous
$800,000 of the year before had been slashed to a little over $200,000,
and that, Calhoun said, "distributed in such a way, as to abandom [sic]
Dauphine [sic] Island, one of the most important position [sic] on the
48Gulph [sic] frontier." As Calhoun found that year, he was now dealing 
with a very different sort of Congress than the one which had allowed 
him to write his own bills his first year in office. Retrenchment was 
the theme in 1821, and retrenchment conveniently satisfied motives far 
beyond the economic sense that it made then. Dauphin Island, a project 
doomed from the beginning by mismanagement and a fair amount of chicanery,
default. The report further detailed Calhoun's intention of using unex­
pended balances from previous appropriations on the Gulf coast by 
applying them to Dauphin now. Armistead also reported that the security 
for Dauphin Island was valued at $211,951. Whether this sum included 
the original bonds of the deceased Benjamin Hopkins, the report does not 
make clear. Obviously Armistead is interested in showing the works to 
be fully secured and posing no danger to the government.
47John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, March 14, 1821, ibid., 5:679-
680.
48John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, March 7, 1821, ibid.,
5:662.
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was given only a slightly premature end. The government, having cut the
funding for the fort, now stood liable to the new contractor, who
49
pressed hxs claim to his eventual satxsfaction.
Whenever the dishonesty or unethical practices of a contractor 
came to light, Calhoun's view of civilian businessmen dealing with his 
department was reinforced. The Secretary had come to have little regard 
for this species of capitalist early in his War Department career, "ever 
willing," as he said, to support his officers "against contractors."^0 
But those who drew Calhoun's disapproval were the inept ones. The sums 
of money supporting War Department programs were too large not to attract 
those with real talent, and there is evidence to suggest that there was a 
group of men who knew much more of what they were about than the ill- 
starred Benjamin Hopkins. And these were men with whom Calhoun was 
closely associated during his time in the War Office.
With the possible exception of the Gulf Coast forts, the govern­
ment was most interested in erecting a string of fortifications which 
could guard the approaches to the lower end of the Chesapeake Bay at the 
Hampton Roads. As Calhoun was coming into office, General Swift was 
engaged in a survey of possible sites, and Swift reported later that two 
fortifications, one at Old Point Comfort, and another at the Rip Rap 
Shoals, a short distance away, could be built for a total of three 
million dollars.^
49The government eventually awarded Colonel Turner Starke $72,000 
in damages arising from the stoppage of funds in 1821. "Fortifications 
on Dauphin Island: Commissioner's Report, February 7, 1825," ASPMA, 2:830.
50John C. Calhoun to Talbot Chambers, September 1, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 3:85.
51Joseph G. Swift to John C. Calhoun, January 6, 1818, xbid.,
2:61.
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The contract for the first phase of building these installa­
tions— the laying of the stone foundations— was let in the summer of 
1818 by General Swift in his capacity as the head of the Corps of 
Engineers. The defenses at Old Point Comfort were to be called Fortress 
Monroe; those located on the shoals would be known as Fort Calhoun.
Although no law then demanded it, most large construction projects were
52
let only after advertisement and competitive bidding had taken place.
This was not the case with these works. As the facts later came to light, 
there were several questionable aspects of this project which threatened 
the reputations of Calhoun and some of his closest associates.
The man who won the contract to supply the stone for the founda­
tions of these two works was Elijah Mix, a New York businessman with a 
dubious financial reputation. It happened that he and Christopher 
Vandeventer, Calhoun's chief clerk, were brothers-in-law. At about the 
time when General Swift (also a friend of Vandeventer's) was deciding
upon letting out the contract, Mix appeared at Swift's Washington office
53to chat about the project. Swift already knew from various reports 
that this contract could not be filled successfully at a price lower 
than $3.50 a perch. Mix was anxious to have the project, even though he 
was so insolvent at the time he knew that no bondsman would support his
The customs of advertisement and competitive bidding were ob­
served in other cases both prior to and after the letting of the Mix 
contract. In the case of Mobile Bay fortifications contracts were 
announced three months in advance. Swift later testified that since the 
Chesapeake fortifications had received so much publicity anyway he did 
not think it necessary to release a special announcement. This, and 
other parts of the account of the Rip Rap scandal (as it was called) is 
drawn from "Contract for Stone at the Rip Raps and Old Point Comfort,
May 7, 1822," ASPMA, 2:431-449.
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application. Apparently without an inquiry into Mix's disreputable 
finances, Swift awarded the contract to Mix, and Major Vandeventer was 
obligingly present as a witness. Mix agreed to deliver not less than
54three thousand perches of stone per month at a price of $3.50 per perch.
But having won the contract, Mix still had to find a bondsman.
In order to increase his financial respectability Mix prevailed upon his 
brother-in-law to buy into the contract. In the fall of 1818 Vandeventer 
bought twenty-five per cent of Mix's contract; the major later told a 
congressional investigating committee that he had first asked Calhoun in 
general terms about the legality of such an investment. Calhoun had 
reportedly said that Vandeventer's involvement in government business 
was not illegal, but that it might cause doubts about his reputation. 
Vandeventer, apparently not caring much for reputation, bought into the 
project. In April, 1819 Vandeventer bought yet another twenty-five per 
cent; he was now half-owner of the contract, although Mix was still 
liable for the fulfillment of the contract.^
Vandeventer's service to Mix was considerable. His participation 
in the venture had enabled Mix to find bondsmen. Moreover, Vandeventer 
had paid off $18,000 worth of debts which the insolvent Mix had acquired. 
By the fall of 1819 Vandeventer saw the chance to divest himself of part 
of his holdings and win a profit; he sold twenty-five per cent (half of 
what he had) of the contract to the father-in-law he and Mix shared, Major 
Samuel Cooper of New York."^
Sometime in early 1820 Calhoun learned that Vandeventer had not 
taken his advice (perhaps it was over-subtle for Vandeventer), and the
54 55 56
Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.
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Secretary learned it from a most unexpected source: President Monroe.
Monroe had received an anonymous letter spelling out the extent of
57
Vandeventer1s involvement with Mix. Shortly afterward Vandeventer
58sold the remaining shares of his contract. By that time the news of
Vandeventer1s indiscretions was out: the National Intelligencer ran an
article on the Rip Rap affair in February, using the incident to impugn
59the fortifications program. On March 6, 1820, Congress became involved,
calling upon Calhoun for a detailed accounting of how all contracts of
this kind had been let in the past, to whom, their value, the current 
60prices, and so on. Calhoun could only comply. The House Committee on
Military Affairs made a report on the Rip Rap contract on April 4, but
it was tabled, there to rest until two years later when the scandal
61
could be put to more profitable uses.
After the committee's report in the spring of 1820 the Rip Rap 
affair dropped out of the public's view, but not from Calhoun's. Sur­
prisingly, work was going well at the shoals. By the end of 1819 
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Gratiot, the supervising engineer for the
Hampton Roads, reported that the stone mole showed twenty-five feet
62above the waterline. Mix, however, was still juggling his contract:
57Wiltse, Calhoun, p. 205. I have been unable to locate this 
letter to Monroe.
58"Contract for Stone at the Rip Raps and Old Point Comfort," 
ASPMA, 2:431-449.
59National Intelligencer, February 4, 1820.
60
U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1594.
61Ibid., p. 1951.
62Charles Gratiot to John C. Calhoun, November 30, 1819, Calhoun 
Papers, 4:457.
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he sub-let part of it yet again, and by 1821 there were at least two
other firms involved in transporting stone from the York River quarries.
In the course of settling a dispute over the legal status of the Mix
sub-contractors Calhoun may have been startled to learn that his former
Apothecary General, Francis LeBaron of New York, was a partner with
both of the firms cooperating with Mix— Howes Goldsborough and Company,
63and Jacob Lewis and Company. Thwarted in his attempt to win legal
recognition from the War Department for his share of the work on Rip
Rap, Lewis charged that an illegal combination existed between Chief
64
Engineer Armistead, Swift, Mix, and Vandeventer. Even though he was
Lewis’ sole partner, LeBaron claimed that he knew nothing about any such
combination.Because of the recent trouble with Vandeventer, Calhoun
felt that he could not ignore such charges; he set an inter-departmental
investigation in motion as quickly as he could, particularly calling
66upon Armistead for an explanation. All the legal depositions taken
during Calhoun's investigation predictably denied any collusion between
the accused parties; and Calhoun, armed with these, dropped the inquiry,
67
especially after Lewis was jailed in New York for avoiding his debts.
6 3Elijah Mix to John C. Calhoun, April 23, 1821; Howes Golds­
borough & Co. to John C. Calhoun, June 14, 1821; John C. Calhoun to 
Jacob Lewis & Co., June 14, 1821; Francis LeBaron to John C. Calhoun,
July 1, 1821, ibid., 6:46, 188, 234.
64Jacob Lewis to John C. Calhoun, July 25, 1821, ibid., 6:281.
65Francis LeBaron to John C. Calhoun, July 1, 1821, ibid.,
6:234.
66John C. Calhoun to Walker K. Armistead, August 3, 1821; John C. 
Calhoun to Jacob Lewis, August 2, 1821, ibid., 6:312, 309.
67Francis LeBaron to John C. Calhoun, August 6, 1821, Walter K. 
Armistead to John C. Calhoun, August 16, 1821, ibid., 6:318, 337.
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Public men of apparent means and influence in Calhoun's genera­
tion habitually seemed to run close to financial collapse. President 
Monroe was so straightened for funds that he was trying to arrange for
a secret high-interest loan from New York speculators after only a few 
68years in office. Calhoun was obliged to keep up a standard of living 
(and his expenses were about to increase) which forced him to watch the 
commodities market closely all the time he was in Washington. There is 
little reason to think that either of these men would have taken out­
right advantage of their positions. But farther down the ranks it was a 
different matter: the opportunities thrown in the way of poorly-paid
army officers must have been especially tempting. With large sums of 
money in their charge, casual accounting methods, and the quirks of the 
government's contractual arrangements with civilians, there was virtually 
no means of policing federal largess. Once charges were made it was 
seldom possible to prove malfeasance unless the thieves had fallen out.
The connections between Calhoun, Vandeventer, and Swift are
particularly interesting. In Vandeventer's case it is obvious that the
chief clerk was always ready to use his position to improve his career
69
and not incidentally his finances. Swift's position after his
00
See two very interesting letters from Monroe to General Swift, 
December 12, 22, 1822, Swift Papers, in which the President discusses 
the matter of a private loan from General [Robert] Swartweout [sic]. To 
my knowledge this aspect of Monroe's financial problems (then known in 
certain circles) has never been discussed by historians.
69Vandeventer's ambitions were evident even before he took the 
chief clerk's job, which he saw as a stepping stone to a higher War 
Department position. See John Armstrong to Christopher Vandeventer, 
November 12, 1817, Vandeventer Papers. No one was more pleased than 
Swift when Vandeventer won the clerkship under Calhoun. Swift wrote to 
Sylvanus Thayer: "Van deventer [sic] is installed 1st clerk at the War
Dept. Very good on all sides." J. G. Swift to Sylvanus Thayer,
December 11, 1817, Thayer Papers.
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resignation from the army was most intriguing: he won the position of
Surveyor of the Port of New York, a job not obviously lucrative until
one considers that this officer had a great deal of influence in locating
70new fortifications, docks, and wharves around the port. At the same
time, Swift's friendship with Calhoun was a decided advantage to him in
his new investment, the West Point Foundry, a company which cast cannon
71
on government contract. The ex-general had also become involved with
the Swartwout brothers of New York in their newest enterprise, the New
Jersey Salt Marsh Company, which was then lobbying for preemption rights 
72in that state. President Monroe obviously had this connection in mind
when he wrote confidentially to Swift, asking the ex-general to intercede
73
in his behalf with the Swartwouts for a loan. Clearly, Swift kept up
his interest in fortifications, and his interest was not merely academic;
his Memoirs dutifully record the money appropriated by Congress each
year for defense building, and his fortuitous association with Nimrod
74Farrow throws an entirely different light on the troubles at Mobile.
That Swift was serving as an informal conduit for various kinds 
of War Department business is evident in an episode which occurred well 
after he had resigned from the army. One of Swift's old friends, General
^Thomas Hutchinson to John M. O'Connor, December 10, 1818, 
O'Connor Papers; Christopher Vandeventer to Sylvanus Thayer, June 4,
1816, Thayer Papers.
72A. J. Weise, The Swartwout Chronicles 1338-1899 and the Ketel- 
huyn Chronicles 1451-1899 (New York: Trow Directory, Printing and
Bookbinding Co., 1899), p. 396. This work details the origin and prin­
cipal stockholders in the New Jersey Salt Marsh Company.
73James Monroe to Joseph G. Swift, December 12, 22, 1822, Swift
Papers.
74Swift, Memoirs, p. 137, and passim.
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Alexander Macomb, commanded the Fifth Military Department around Detroit
until 1821. In his position, Macomb had limited control over military
business in the area and was of course accountable for expenditures in
his command; like any other departmental commander, Macomb also had
some control over where he would locate his headquarters and was in a
position to influence troop dispositions and strengths.
Beginning in 1819 Macomb started pressing the War Department for
more troops. He argued that the presence of Fort Malden, just across
the Detroit River in Canada, was much stronger, and that more troops
were needed for an effective defense. As matters then stood, Macomb's
own garrison was several miles up the river from the British fort; he
asked that permission be given to locate directly across from the British 
75installation. The delegate from Michigan Territory to Congress,
William Woodbridge, also wrote to Calhoun, urging the establishment of
76
a new military depot directly across from Fort Malden. Later that
year Governor Cass added his voice to those of Woodbridge and Macomb.
Calhoun understood well enough that there was some British activity in
that area, but he decided to wait on authorizing reinforcements until
the commander of the Northern Division, Jacob Brown, could inspect the
77region and report back to him. In August, 1819, Brown told Calhoun
78
that reinforcement was "inexpedient."
75Alexander Macomb to John C. Calhoun, February 8, 1819, Calhoun 
Papers, 3:557.
76William Woodbridge to John C. Calhoun, March 4, 1819, ibid.,
3:630.
77John C. Calhoun to Lewis Cass, July 26, 1819, ibid., 4:176.
78Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, August 9, 1819, ibid., 4:221-
222.
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Macomb's interest in augmenting the military force around
Detroit could thus far be considered as simply the exertions of a zealous
officer. But in January, 1821, Macomb wrote to his old friend Swift,
explaining that he had recently purchased 670 acres of land near the
mouth of the Detroit— just opposite Fort Malden; it was, Macomb
79reckoned, "a choice spot." If the international boundary line then
being settled gave the island in the mouth of the Detroit River to the
British, then his land would be the only place for American ships to
anchor. But more important, Macomb said, was that, "in a military point
of view it is the best position for defending this position." The site
overlooked Fort Malden; it was well timbered and thus would make an
excellent naval depot. Macomb told Swift that he intended to move his
"Head Quarters there taking with me my staff and endeavor to get a post
80office established at the place." When he did that, of course, land
values would rise accordingly.
All this was bad enough, but Macomb's high hopes for encouraging
a town on his new land did not stop there. He had already noticed that
"there is abundance [sic] of lime stone in the immediate vicinity of
81this place." And then Macomb came to the real point of his letter:
If ever the Government make permanent works in this country they 
will be built at or near this position and if they had done so 
during the late war the country would not have fallen into the hands 
of the enemy. It has often been recommended as the most proper 
place for a fortification & military Depot for the frontier. If
Mr. Calhoun could with pressing enter into the speculation he might
79Alexander Macomb to Joseph G. Swift, January 12, 1821, Swift
Papers.
80Ibid. Just how long Macomb owned the land is not made clear 
by his letter.
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serve his country & make his fortune too. Because if troops ever 
moved down to this place instead of keeping them at Detroit where 
they are exposed to every vice, the merchants would soon follow & 
our lots would sell immediately for any p r i c e . ^2
There is no evidence that Swift passed this offer on to Calhoun.
Obviously, this does not mean that Swift was a model of rectitude, but
only that he knew Calhoun far better than Macomb did. Two months to the
day after Macomb wrote to Swift, Calhoun offered the command of the
83
Corps of Engineers to General Macomb and Macomb accepted. Since the 
Secretary of War was then being attacked regularly by some members of 
Congress, it is unlikely that Calhoun would have appointed someone he 
knew had a tendency to use his place for personal advantage.
There is no reason to think that Calhoun ever knew of General 
Macomb's real estate deals, and that is the real significance of the 
affair. The Secretary regularly received reports from military officers 
which called for more troops in a particular area or which suggested a 
military post on this spot or that; there was no way to distinguish 
Macomb's letters from any other. Alexander Macomb was not particularly 
possessed of an original mind; if he could conjure a way to profit by 
his position, others could have also. Calhoun never gave any indication 
that more things were associated with military building than defense 
policy.
The Macomb letter demonstrates further how vulnerable the entire 
military establishment was during the era of good feelings to illegal
82Ibid. I am convinced that had Calhoun known about Macomb's 
proposal he would have forced Macomb from the service. The Secretary 
had already reprimanded Macomb in 1819 for some irregularities in the 
officer's accounts for that year. See John C. Calhoun to Alexander 
Macomb, March 27, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 3:698.
83John C. Calhoun to Alexander Macomb, March 12, 1821, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:675.
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and questionable dealings— dealings which sometimes stultified Calhoun's 
military programs altogether. From the halls of official Washington 
where policy was invented to the totals on the vouchers was a long way 
indeed, and although few cases of official malpractice were ever brought 
to light, a cursory examination of this feature of Calhoun's fortifica­
tion program shows that technical and professional shortcoming endangered 
it as much as congressional hostility.
These problems illuminate a larger historical concern as well. 
Calhoun was anxious to create a professional military establishment— an 
army and all its accouterments— with qualities and functions which no 
other American army ever had. For nearly fifty years the United States 
had relied upon the arms of the amateur, and many of those sensibilities 
which characterized the professional military establishment still 
existed. Waste, inefficiency, divided loyalties— all were the most 
obstinate remnants of military amateurism, and Calhoun had only just 
touched on some of them before he left office.
II
The expansive (some said grandiose) nationalistic programs spon­
sored by Monroe and managed by Calhoun often carried certain liabilities. 
Whenever Monroe was committed to a certain program, Calhoun's latitude 
was circumscribed. Usually Calhoun's enthusiasm matched Monroe's, but 
as Calhoun was bound to observe departmental form, the President some­
times compelled Calhoun to take positions he undoubtedly would not have 
chosen for himself. Certain of these programs caught the public eye, 
too; and popular opinion always caused Calhoun a great deal of discontent 
he knew neither how to ignore it nor how to use it, and mostly it vexed
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84him. When a program coincidentally served business interests, the 
liabilities increased. The involvement of private capital in a public 
program, as had been seen, usually meant spectacular success or a 
similar kind of failure. Calhoun came to know this all too well.
All these liabilities and more were inherent in the so-called 
Yellowstone expedition, a movement to secure America's possession of 
the lands between the Great Lakes and the Rocky Mountains. At the end 
of the War of 1812 American authority barely extended beyond St. Louis 
up the Missouri and Mississippi rivers. In this fur-rich area the 
British trader still held sway, operating among Indian tribes generally 
hostile to the Americans and often supported by the great British com­
panies, the North West and Hudson's Bay. British presence was actually 
strengthened in the postwar period by Lord Selkirk's establishment of a
new colony on the Red River of the North, near Lake Traverse in what is 
85
now Minnesota. By contrast, American authority was represented here
by a few hundred forlorn soldiers garrisoned along the southern edge of
the Great Lakes. The Indians of the region indicated their disdain of
the Americans by regularly traveling to Fort Malden, opposite Detroit,
86
and other British outposts in order to trade and receive gifts.
84Adams, Diary, 5:361.
85
The St. Louis Enquirer, November 3, 1819, tacitly admitted that
the area from the Upper Missouri to the Pacific was controlled by the
British. The location of Selkirk's new colony was an important factor 
in Calhoun's decisions about troop movements and the location of garri­
sons in that area in 1818. See John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, October 
17, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 3:215. For an acocunt of the Selkirk colony, 
see Alexander Ross, The Red River Settlement: Its Rise, Progress and
Present State with Some Account of the Native Races and Its General
History to the Present Day, edited by W. C. Morton (Rutland, Vermont: 
Charles Tuttle Company, 1972).
86Lewis Cass to John C. Calhoun, August 3, 1819; Thomas L.
McKenney to John C. Calhoun, April 8, 1818; William Clark to John C. 
Calhoun, April 30, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 4:200-203; 2:234-235; and 4:42-43.
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James Monroe had adduced this hostility in 1815 when he argued
for a large standing army before Congress, and when he became President,
Monroe's interest in the region had been made even more acute by subse-
87
quent reports he had received. By late 1817 the United States had
begun to move slowly into the area: an arc of outposts stretched from
Green Bay (Port Howard), which guarded the Fox River, to Prairie du
Chien (Fort Crawford) at the junction of the Mississippi and Wisconsin
rivers, southward to Fort Armstrong, where the Rock River met the
Mississippi. The westernmost outpost was Fort Osage, at the great bend 
88of the Missouri.
Calhoun meant to extend the power of the United States beyond 
this arc of garrisons if he could. In the spring of 1818 Calhoun inaugu­
rated what came to be known as the Yellowstone expedition, with Monroe's 
enthusiastic support of course. St. Louis was the launching point for
the expedition. On March 16, 1818, Calhoun ordered General Thomas A.
89
Smith to prepare for the movement. Extra men were to be recruited in 
Ohio and Pennsylvania and marched to St. Louis, where they would be 
taken into the Rifle Regiment which Calhoun expected would form the 
expeditionary detachment. Although Calhoun wanted the force to ascend 
the Missouri to the Mandan villages (near present-day Bismarck, North 
Dakota), he recognized that the objective would probably not be reached
87James Monroe to William Branch Giles, February 22, 1815,
Monroe Papers, LC.
88Francis Paul Prucha, A Guide to the Military Posts of the 
United States, 1789-1895 (Madison, Wisconsin: The State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, 1964), p. 5.
89John C. Calhoun to Thomas A. Smith, March 16, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 2:194-195.
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until sometime the next year. In the meantime, he ordered Smith to
establish staging areas along the Missouri and thus a line of communica-
90tions once the Indian villages were finally reached. As to the purpose
of the movement and the conduct required of the troops, Calhoun left no
doubt in his instructions to General Smith. Calhoun wrote:
You will instruct the officer who may be detailed to command the 
detachment, to use every means to conciliate the Indians, and 
impress on them the belief that our intention is friendly towards 
them. It is expected the English traders will take unusual pains to 
make a contrary impression. They have great advantages in con- 
trouling the sa\ages thrtf their commanding station of Red river [sic], 
and as our contemplated establishment at Yellow Stone, will greatly 
curtail their trade towards the head of the Missouri, we must expect 
every opposition from them. No pains must be spared to counteract 
such efforts.^1
The Yellowstone expedition was actually part of a two-pronged 
movement into the areas of British influence. While preparations were 
in the making in St. Louis, Calhoun ordered General Jacob Brown to 
establish a new garrison at the confluence of the Mississippi and Minne­
sota [then called the St. Peter's] rivers. Because of the proximity to 
Selkirk's colony and the Sioux tribes, Calhoun recommended that an entire
regiment hold this position. From here, overland communications could be
92
established with the projected garrison at the Mandan village.
If these plans won favor with the government, they were no less 
popular with the western public. Because it was the more spectacular of 
the two, attention focused upon the Yellowstone expedition. Romance had 
little to do with the expedition's popularity: the troops would be
opening up a lucrative trading area which had been formerly denied to 
Americans. An editorial in the St. Louis Enquirer estimated that the 
annual trade in furs from this area alone would come to a million dollars
90Ibid. 91Ibid.
92john C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, October 17, 1819, ibid., 3:214-
215.
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and called the Indian trade of the region "the most lucrative internal
93commerce in North America." An added dividend for those adventurous
few who wished to press beyond the projected American posts into the
Oregon country was also expected: if one included the Russian fur
trade in that area, the value of the trade west of the Mississippi would 
94double. "The establishment of this post will be an era in the history
95
of the west," said the editor of the Enquirer.
As the season approached in early 1819 when the expedition could
96
get underway, Calhoun's own reputation began to soar in the West.
Doubtless the Secretary was pleased, but this meant at the same time
that the stakes of the expedition's success were now personally high.
Concerning part of the expedition, Calhoun wrote Joseph Swift: "It has
excited too much interest to fail, without producing unhappy conse- 
„97
quences.
But the Yellowstone expedition did fail. It is known today more 
modestly as the Missouri expedition, for after more than a year and a 
half of activity on the part of Calhoun and his department, the inter­
cession of President Monroe and several other high officials in the West, 
and several hundred thousand dollars, the detachment of troops only 
managed to ascend the Missouri four hundred miles from St. Louis to the 
Council Bluffs, there to remain. The failure of the expedition had
93St. Louis Enquirer, January 12, 1822.
94National Intelligencer, August 14, 1819.
95St. Louis Enquirer, September 4, 1818.
96Ibid., April 23, and October 2, 1819.
97
John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, August 29, 1819, Swift
Papers.
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little to do with the resolution of the troops or their officers, but 
with the coincidental political and business interests which the move­
ment excited.
The immediate cause for the misfiring of the expedition was the
dubious financial operations of the western businessman, James Johnson.
Johnson was a Kentuckian who had been in the business of army rations
and transportation contracting since the war, and in late 1818 he won
the contracts for the Yellowstone expedition. Johnson was also the
brother of Richard Mentor Johnson, a hero of the late war, and now a
member of Congress who was close to Monroe, Calhoun, and a host of other
politicos. When word went out that the War Department was looking for
rations and transportation contractors, Calhoun began to receive letters
98
recommending Johnson.
Aside from demonstrating the range of Johnson's influence, these
letters of recommendation tell a good deal about western business at the
time, and the prospects Johnson's supporters thought the impending
expedition had. Several letters, including one from Henry Clay, advised
Calhoun that this movement was altogether too important to allow the
usual competitive bidding and consequent speculation. The implication
was that any government contract which was let in the West under these
conditions was sure to fail; this Calhoun was already finding out in his
99
dealings with the fortifications at Mobile.
98T. Quarles to John C. Calhoun, August 27, 1818; W. T. Barry to 
John C. Calhoun, September 14, 1818; Robert Wickliffe, September 14, 1818; 
Amos Kendall, September 23, 1818; John T. Mason, Jr. to John C. Calhoun, 
October 1, 1818; and Armistead T. Mason toJohn C. Calhoun, October 25, 
1818, Calhoun Papers, 3:72-73, 129, 152-153, 180-181, 233-234.
99See Henry Clay to John C. Calhoun, September 16, 1818, ibid.,
3:133.
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In late November and early December, Johnson and Quartermaster 
General Jesup were working up the details of the unusual contract. This 
contract did not specify the amount that Johnson would receive upon 
completion; rather, the instrument provided for "fair payment" once 
Johnson had done his job. The contract also called for Johnson to pur­
chase two (and possibly four) steamboats to use in carrying the troops 
up the Missouri, even though the first such vessel had yet to navigate 
that r i v e r . S u f f e r i n g  from the shortage of specie which seemed to 
plague every western businessman, Johnson was to draw upon the govern­
ment for advances in order to complete the business. This blank check 
was a provision which would cause Calhoun no end of trouble.
Within six months Johnson had alienated most of the army officers,
the citizens of St. Louis, and not incidentally Calhoun himself by his
repeated delays, breakdowns, and pleas for m o n e y . C a l h o u n  had come
to have so little confidence in Johnson that he dispatched Quartermaster
General Jesup to St. Louis to oversee the operation, but Jesup1s presence
102did not seem to help. By the middle of the summer, Colonel Henry 
Atkinson, the putative commander of the putative expedition, had grown 
so impatient with Johnson that he set his men off without the steam­
boats (and many of the rations they were supposed to carry). Johnson's 
steamboats were becoming the joke of the Missouri. Of five in all, only
"Transportation Contract of James Johnson," December 2, 1818, 
ibid., 3:329-330.
■^ ■''Such a body of correspondence developed between the Johnsons 
and Calhoun that a "James Johnson file" was established in the War 
Department. One example among many is James Johnson to John C. Calhoun, 
February 12, 1819, ibid., 3:570-571.
102John C. Calhoun to Thomas S. Jesup, March 27, 1819, ibid.,
3:697.
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three actually attempted to navigate the river, which was still in full
flood above Cantonment Beliefontaine The problem was not so much the
river itself as the steamboats; in May a steamboat not owned by Johnson
104
had already navigated the river. In August the St. Louis Enquirer 
reported to its readers: "The sentiment of the country, from the day of
the arrival of Col. Johnson's steamboat, was unanimous that these boats 
were unfit for the Missouri. The truth of that sentiment is now made 
manifest.
Meanwhile Calhoun, alarmed by the vast sums Johnson had drawn in
advance on his open-ended contract, had been attempting to limit
Johnson's expenditures. It was during that summer that President Monroe
was visiting Kentucky, however. At Lexington Monroe was set upon from
all sides by interested westerners, including, of course, the Johnson
brothers, all of whom explained that the Yellowstone expedition was too
106
popular in the West to fail for want of government support. Ever 
solicitous of western interests, Monroe authorized still more advances 
to the Johnsons, even though at the time officers at St. Louis were 
advising Calhoun not to allow more funds. Calhoun knew by then that the 
entire Quartermaster's account in the War Department had been drained
^■^Thomas S. Jesup to John C. Calhoun, July 8, 1819, ibid.,
4:139.
104St. Louis Enquirer, July 14, 1819.
105
Ibid., August 11, 1819.
■I
James Monroe to John C. Calhoun, July 5, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 
4:135-136. Several prominent citizens who went to Lexington to see 
Monroe drafted a joint letter to Calhoun, urging support for Johnson.
See Isaac Shelby, Andrew Jackson, W. A. Trimble, John T. Mason, Jr., 
Robert Wickliffe, James Morrison, W. T. Barry, and Thomas Bodley to 
John C. Calhoun, July 5, 1819, ibid., 4:136-138.
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by the Johnsons, but he nevertheless followed the President's instruc- 
107
trons. Monroe had authorized another $50,000 in advances for the
Johnsons, but by the end of the year the brothers had gone well beyond
that. A Treasury auditor eventually reckoned that the total monies
108advanced to Johnson was $229,000.
By the end of 1819 rumors were flying in the East that the
Johnson contract was about to fail. John Quincy Adams confided to his
diary that he had heard remarks even in Boston to that effect. A
Kentuckian had written him: "Let the Administration be prepared to be
attacked about the Yellowstone expedition." Calhoun still believed,
however, that the government was protected against ultimate loss by 
109
Johnson's bonds. True to the Kentuckian's prediction, on December 21
Congressman John Cocke of Tennessee called for a report from the War 
Department on both the object and expenses of the e x p e d i t i o n . C a l h o u n  
replied on December 29, but he was careful to remark only upon the 
benefits that the expedition promised; that part of his report dealing 
with expenses was left to charts which told little about the insolvency 
of the Johnson b r o t h e r s P e r h a p s  because the troops had at last 
moved to Council Bluffs (without Johnson's help), Calhoun still hoped
107John C. Calhoun to Thomas S. Jesup and Eleven other Officers, 
July 19, 1819, ibid., 4:157-158.
108Peter Hagner to John C. Calhoun, January 28, 1820, ibid.,
4:611.
109Adams, Diary, 4:472-473.
110U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 1st sess., p. 750.
John C. Calhoun to Alexander Smyth, December 29, 1819, Calhoun 
Papers, 4:519-523. See this report, complete with attachments showing 
expenses, in "Expedition to the Mouth of the Yellow Stone, January 3, 
1820," ASPMA, 2:31-37.
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that the expedition would succeed. Dissatisfied by the Secretary's
report, Congress called for even more information, and with this new
data which Calhoun grudgingly supplied, the legislators voted to stop
112funds for the expedition in March, 1820. Calhoun told Colonel 
Atkinson the news shortly afterward. The expedition to the Yellowstone 
got no farther up the Missouri; the grand movement into the Northwest
i. 1 4 .  j  H 3was halted.
The military programs which Calhoun was charged with managing 
were of a cost and a magnitude unprecedented in the history of the 
republic. Never before during a time of peace had the nation supported 
such an enlarged military policy as the one that Calhoun watched over. 
Projects under his control literally reached from one end of the nation 
to the other, and in the West these projects outstripped the pace of 
settlement itself- The total cost of this military policy placed more 
of a burden upon the national revenues than any that came before, and 
while he administered the program and the money, Calhoun was required to 
depend upon a larger number of subordinates than had ever operated under 
the War Department's aegis in time of peace. More civilians involved 
themselves in the War Department's business, and Calhoun was answerable 
for their activities even though he did not exercise the authority over 
them that he obviously would have preferred.
As these various programs took shape, the young man in the War 
Department gained in reputation. What had at first been President
112John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, February 2, 1820, John C. 
Calhoun to Henry Atkinson, April 10. 1820, Calhoun Papers, 4:630-632, 
5:19-21.
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Monroe's policy became Calhoun's policy. When newspapers praised or 
condemned a program or policy, it was Calhoun rather than Monroe who was 
increasingly identified with it. The cabinet member who Senator King 
had originally thought would not have much influence had become an impor­
tant public figure. What mattered less to the public was that Calhoun 
exercised very little control over some matters, and it was an important 
thought for Calhoun's enemies to bear in mind as well.
Throughout it all, Calhoun's military programs depended upon the 
goodwill of Congress as well as the dedication of his own subordinates. 
Either of these groups could fail him, or betray him, and time and the 
stresses of enacting an expansive military program chipped away at what 
otherwise would have been solid achievements.
Ill
As the United States settled into the long peace, the rationale 
for supporting the military establishment became less and less compel­
ling. Whether Calhoun realized what was happening is unclear; he was
still concerned about Great Britain's activities in the western 
114hemisphere. Certainly, he did not think that the millenium had 
arrived, and he was never beyond averring to foreign dangers when he 
justified his military programs.
But Calhoun sensed that America's military establishment could 
not be maintained forever by intimidating the nation with suspicions of 
war. The practice of associating the military with constant danger had 
been partially responsible for the continued alienation of the army from
114
Adams, Diary, 6:138.
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the nation. As a result, the exact place and function of the army— the 
role of the army in a democratic republic— had yet to be agreed upon.
If somehow the army could be transformed so that it would become asso­
ciated with national progress rather than national danger, then Calhoun 
would have come to grips with the fundamental problem of how to arm and 
protect a democracy.
Calhoun was a nationalist, a civilian, and (aside from the 
President himself) the highest official in the military establishment, 
and it was in his combination of these roles that Calhoun was most 
creative during his War Department years. A large part of Calhoun's 
nationalism had to do with the idea of internal improvements, the 
building of roads, canals, bridges and such with federal sponsorship. 
Public men disagreed fervently on what the constitution would allow, but 
for Calhoun the question turned not so much on the constitution as the
obvious benefits of such programs, benefits which should of themselves
115remove all objections. He believed while he was still a congressman
that Congress had the power to sponsor improvements, but the states
would approve these projects nonetheless in statesmanlike cooperation.
There was "room enough," Calhoun said, "for all . . .  to exert their 
,,116resources.
Others were not as ready to give up the dispute as Calhoun.
When President Monroe strongly favored internal improvements in his 
first message to Congress, he asked at the same time for a constitutional
"^^See John C. Calhoun, "Speech on Internal Improvements," 
February 4, 1817, Calhoun Papers, 1:398-407.
116Ibid., 1:399.
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amendment in order to eliminate the question al together.J"1'' Congress1 
response to this was confusing: Henry Clay indulged himself with pettish
remarks about the President's usurpation of legislative prerogative be­
cause Monroe had delivered himself of opinions in advance of congressional 
action. Money was voted for improvements in early 1818, but there was no 
hint that its use was actually authorized. It was as though all were 
holding their breaths, waiting for someone to speak. Congress called
upon Calhoun for his opinion of the issue in April, knowing well that the
118
Secretary's ideas were even more progressive than Monroe's.
Calhoun was confident that he could follow his constitutional
scruples and remain in the administration. He wrote to a friend, just
before Congress called for the report, stating that he thought "the
question had been decided before my arrival at Washington. My sentiments
are so well known in relation to the constitution, that he [Monroe] must
expect in any question of that nature, I will act in conformity with my
119established opinion." But the Secretary did alter hxs opinion; when
Calhoun presented Monroe with the report to Congress, it was in confor-
120
mity with Calhoun's ideas, but not Monroe's. The final version of
121
the report avoided the constituional question altogether.
John Quincy Adams believed that Congress had asked for Calhoun's 
opinion on internal improvements out of a spirit of hostility, and he
James Monroe, "First Annual Message," December 2, 1817, Hamilton, 
Monroe Papers, 6:33-34.
118Ammon, Monroe, pp. 388-389. Adams, Diary, 4:217-218.
119John C. Calhoun to J. G. Jackson, March 31, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 2:216.
120Adams, Diary, 4:218.
121John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, January 7, 1819, Calhoun 
Papers, 3:472.
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implied that Clay's disappointments were behind it all. Yet in one
sense the congressional resolution was a friendly one: it asked Calhoun
to devise a plan to facilitate military defenses by "such means as are
122within the power of Congress." The use of the military in internal
improvements for the expressed purpose of defense was just one of the 
several wedges which had been driven in the application of strict con­
stitutional interpretation of this question. When Monroe took his 
inaugural tour of the North in 1817, he had personally authorized the
building of a "military road" from Sackett's Harbor to Plattsburg, New 
123York. As Clay happily pointed out, Monroe's view of the constitu­
tionality of improvements did not exactly comport with his building of
124
this road, military or not.
Whereas President Monroe was confused on the issue, Calhoun was 
not. Certain already that it was the duty of Congress to use its powers 
in an expansive fashion, Calhoun saw in the use of the military for such 
projects several interesting prospects. The apology that the improve­
ments could be used for defense seemed a pertinent one to him; it was a 
means by which constitutional objections could be avoided: if internal
improvements were rationalized on military grounds, perhaps the more 
ardent defenders of the Constitution would not be so alarmed.
This was no theoretical argument; opponents of internal improve­
ments were already presented with faits accompli. Calhoun merely set
122Ibid., 3:462. Adams, Diary, 4:217.
123
U. S. Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess. , p. 1373, 
records Henry Clay's remarks on the Sackett's Harbor road.
Ibid.
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out to justify programs already in effect. The late war had demonstrated
the need to concentrate large forces quickly and the consequences of
failing to do so. The very roads and canals which served the civil
public could answer a military purpose also. Calhoun therefore made no
attempt to argue for the civilian uses of construction; he concentrated
on the military arguments alone.
His first appeal was to frugality, a notion dear to the hearts of
the most hide-bound Republicans. Small and dispersed armies such as
America's, Calhoun said, were "under the best management . . . more
expensive, even were our supplies equally cheap, than European armies
collected in large bodies, in the midst of populous and wealthy communi- 
125ties.” Some of this cost could be avoided by building military highways
to link all the military commands. Even more could be saved by using
troops to do the labor where possible: an officer supervising the
Sackett's Harbor road reported that the cost of one year's labor in
completing fourteen miles of the road was $13,000, whereas locals esti-
126
mated that civilian labor would cost twice as much and take longer.
By the end of 1818 two other roads were being built: one from Detroit
to Fort Meigs, Ohio, and another from Muscle Shoals, Tennessee, to
127Madisonville, Louisiana. One of the most assiduous of the military 
road builders was Colonel Henry Atkinson, who, soon after arriving at 
Council Bluffs in 1819, began cutting a road from there to Bellefontaine.
125 "Reduction of the Army Considered," December 11, 1818, ASPMA,
1:781.
126Henry Atkinson to John C. Calhoun, January 22, 1819, Calhoun 
Papers, 3:511-512.
127John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, January 14, 1819, ibid.,
3:491-492.
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Atkinson planned even more roads to link his command with other military 
units up the Mississippi. Calhoun could not have approved more enthu­
siastically: "The troops cannot be more usefully employed than in such
128works." All this activity, apparently, had taken place entirely
without the approval of Congress.
Encouraged by what he had seen so far, Calhoun finally sent his
129report on internal improvements to Congress in early 1819. It was
couched in military arguments only. He asked for authority to build a
military road from Maine to Louisiana, with a canal paralleling it as
far south as Savannah, Georgia. He also recommended linking the main
eastern cities with the Ohio valley by so many "Cumberland roads," and
130
canals from Albany and Pittsburg to Lake Erie.
Hidden away in the report, and unnoticed by most, was a subtle 
appeal for a larger military establishment in order to carry these pro­
grams into effect. After remarking at length on the savings that were 
possible from using military labor, Calhoun wrote:
We ought not to be sanguine in the expectation of the aid to be 
derived from the army in the construction of permanent military 
roads and canals at a distance from the frontiers . . . thinly scat­
tered along so extensive a frontier, it will be impossible, I fear, 
without leaving some points exposed, to collect any considerable 
bodies in the interior of the country to construct roads and
canals.131
A larger army was, then, the price that Calhoun was asking for 
internal improvements. In return the army could perform useful and
128John C. Calhoun to Henry Atkinson, February 7, 1820, ibid.,
4:646.
129John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, January 7, 1819, ibid., 3:461-
472.
130..,. 131T,Ibid. Ibid.
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efficient services— positive services— for a progressing nation. The
Secretary of War clearly wanted to weld the nation and the army together
for their common benefit. Aside from the obvious desirability of his
goal of cutting the costs of the army and increasing the professionalism
of the officers, Calhoun wanted to transform the military establishment
into an institution which was consistent with the requirements of the
democracy. It was in this spirit that Calhoun reprimanded an officer
whose extravagance had been found out: "Nothing is so calculated to
132
render the Army unpopular." In the same spirit Major General Jacob
Brown wrote Calhoun to congratulate him on his report on internal 
improvements:
I believe that we shall not again here [sic] of an opposition to the 
Army making military Roads; but we may flatter ourselves with the 
hope that our fellow citizens of the military establishment will 
achieve a victory over some of the prejudices of the country by 
their useful labours in peace if they could not by their deeds of 
arms in War.-*-33
Brown and Calhoun assumed much on the basis of a slender perform­
ance. At this point the military building program was quite small; a
guess would be that less than a thousand soldiers were engaged in con-
134
struction at any one time. For his part Calhoun miscalculated the
popularity of internal improvements; he believed that improvements were
universally sought after in the West, but a study by Charles Wiltse has
shown that the West was surprisingly divided on the issue. The strongest
135
support of all came from New York and Pennsylvania.
132j0hn £_ Calhoun to Alexander Macomb, March 27, 1819, ibid., 3:698. 
133jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, June 11, 1819, ibid., 4:99-100.
-*-3^ This is an educated guess. There are no figures on military 
labor which separate the number of men working on roads from those engaged 
in other, more traditionally military projects, such as the construction 
of barracks and fortifications.
135wiitse> Calhoun, Appendix B, p. 406. See also John C. Calhoun 
to Micah Sterling, October 1, 1823, Calhoun Papers, 8:311.
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However chimerical Calhoun's ideas on internal improvements may 
have seemed in the light of the politics of the time, his idea of endear­
ing the army to the republic was well founded. Already military 
explorers had caught the nation's attention, navigating the Missouri far 
beyond the ill-fated Yellowstone expedition. Still making their surveys 
along the coastline, the Board of Engineers were doing work of national 
as well as military importance. Even if Calhoun's dreams of a vast net­
work of interior communications could not yet be realized, there was 
still a great deal the army could do for its reputation. By increasingly 
involving the army in affairs associated with the growth of the nation, 
perhaps the identification eventually could be made between national and 
military progress.
Many of the officers Calhoun used on these programs were engineers, 
the elite corps of the military establishment and in many ways the model 
for the kind of institution Calhoun wished to make of the entire army.
The Corps of Engineers had the distinction of having been the only part 
of the military establishment singled out for legislative protection 
from reductions since its creation in 1 8 0 2 . The more technical 
aspects of war had long since excluded even the gifted amateur, and the 
new appreciation of warfare as a professional matter naturally increased 
the stock of those most clearly identified with military knowledge as 
were the engineers. But the engineers had the added advantage that their 
skills were readily translatable to civil tasks such as internal improve­
ments .
1 o /-
Callan, Military Laws of the United States, pp. 148-149, 266.
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American engineers were aware of the distinction they held, both 
within the army and the nation. They considered themselves a class 
apart from the ordinary officer, who may have owed his appointment to 
influence alone. Such men, the professionals believed, did the army no 
honor; indeed, as one professional put it, they caused a great deal of 
harm;
I honor an intelligent and scientific officer as much as I despise 
the puppies who consider their uniforms as giving them the right to 
be insolent & impertinent of which character I am sorry to say I 
have seen too much in the new levies of our American a r m y . - 1- ^
Thus when General Bernard was imported from France, American 
officers full of their new-found confidence were sorely offended. One 
young officer, while complaining about the Bernard appointment, showed 
that he understood that the Corps of Engineers had achieved a unique 
reputation for a part of the military establishment. Christopher Vande­
venter, while still attached to the engineers in New York, wrote to 
Sylvanus Thayer in Europe;
The truth is, the Government is hostile to an Army— and the Corps 
of Engineers having done more and deserved more both from its 
achievements and abilities, it becomes necessary for their purpose, 
to degrade it. The nation have uniformly made this corps an excep­
tion from the censure bestowed on the Army; and all parties seemed to 
unite in acknowledging the necessity of educating the most promising 
youths in the country to the higher grade of the Military profession. 
Whenever the Army has been assailed for ignorance and deficiency in 
Science, the Corps of Engineers have always been exempted. To it 
the friends of a respectable Army have constantly pointed as a proof 
of the usefulness of well educated officers.138
Vandeventer was overstating. Some of the harrowing experiences 
of the war had left political leaders convinced of the necessity of
137James Renwick to Joseph G. Swift, January 4, 1816, Swift
Papers.
138Christopher Vandeventer [?] to Sylvanus Thayer, June 4, 1816, 
Thayer Papers.
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"preserving the science of war," the science which distinguished both the
Corps of Engineers and the school of the corps, the United States Military
Academy at West Point, New York. Just as Calhoun was making ever more
varied use of engineer officers, the Military Academy was entering upon
its most expansive period of development up to that time, much of which
took place under Calhoun's administration.
Calhoun understood the academy's potential, but he also saw that
the academy had far to go to fulfill it. The school was as yet a pitiful
outpost along the Hudson River, and it had led a fitful existence since
its establishment in 1802. The first Superintendent of the academy,
Jonathon Williams, decrying the government's lack of patronage, told
139
Congress that the school was like a "foundling" in the wilderness.
This was much too romantic a description. One of the academy professors
was closer to the mark: the place, he said, looked like "a desert camp
of Arabs," with its ramshackled buildings, and civilians, horses, and
140cows spreading their offal where they would.
The education provided at the academy was at best mediocre.
Cadets, some of them as old as 30, came and went much as they pleased; 
instruction was lacklustre when the professors deigned to teach. There 
was little equipment and few books. The nominal head of the academy was 
the Chief of the Corps of Engineers; but when the War of 1812 came,
Joseph Swift had duties elsewhere, and so, as it happened, did the cadets, 
who were regularly requisitioned by the army to fill gaps in the officer
139"Report of Colonel Jonathon Williams, to the Secretary of 
War," March 4, 1808, ASPMA, 1:22.
140Jared Mansfield to Sylvanus Thayer, March 27, 1817, Thayer
Papers.
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corps. Captain Alden Partridge was left in charge of the post while
Swift was away, and since Swift never returned thereafter when he could
141
avoid it, Partridge inherited the position of commandant by default.
The extraordinary situation which Calhoun found existing at West
Point upon entering office had been in the making for some time: a
recently contested change of command, with the former commandant in
uncertain exile and the incumbent assailed by a mutinous student body; a
professoriat to whom factional loyalty was more important than their
duties; and a welter of courts-martial, finished, or in the offing.
There was a pretender to the command who had been entirely passed over
and who was still searching for a way to win the prize.
The focal point of all this sordid activity was Alden Partridge.
After the war William Crawford, then Madison's Secretary of War, turned
his attention to improving the school, and he first decided that Par- 
142tridge had to go. The academy was in a generally deplorable condition, 
thought Crawford, but apart from that very good reason, the Secretary had 
a positive dislike of Partridge himself. He considered the captain
Two newer works which cover the history of the academy are 
Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country, and Thomas J. Fleming, West Point: The
Men and the Times of the United States Military Academy (New York: 
William Morrow and Company, 1969) (hereafter cited as Fleming, West 
Point). Both contain errors of consequence and are clearly favorable to 
the institution and its graduates. A more critical examination of the 
institution is Joseph Ellis and Robert Moore, School for Soldiers; West 
Point and the Profession of Arms (New York: Oxford University Press,
1974). The literature of West Point probably surpasses that on any 
other education institution in the United States, and most of it is 
favorable to the academy. Beginning with George Washington Cullum's 
works, West Point has had an excellent "press," sometimes at the expense 
of accuracy. To my mind, a critical history of West Point has yet to 
be done.
142Swift, Memoirs, pp. 141-142.
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uncouth, considerably lacking in style and social grace. Crawford 
began pressuring General Swift to replace Partridge in 1816, but Swift 
resisted, saying the most self-respecting officers considered the posi­
tion a dead end. Having just learned of Simon Bernard's appointment,
144
Swift was not on friendly terms with the secretary either.
In the meantime there had been considerable trouble between 
Partridge and the professors. Captain Partridge and the senior pro­
fessor at the academy, Jared Mansfield, had seemingly despised each 
other at first sight. When Mansfield first arrived at the school 
Partridge h~d at first refused him quarters on the post, "all this," 
Mansfield fumed, "forsooth, because he happened to have company, or 
because he foolishly supposed, he might trifle & sport with me his
[sic] superior in rank, age, & I hope in moral & intellectual require- 
145ments." Partridge had another enemy in Captain John M. O'Connor, 
who was then on the post translating Vernon's treatise on fortifica­
tions. O'Connor had ambitions for the commandant's position, and with
146
Mansfield's aid he set about trying to take it from Partridge.
O'Connor journeyed to Washington in early 1817 and there formed
an alliance with William Crawford. The ambitious young officer was
sufficiently convinced of Crawford's support to write to Mansfield from
143Ibid., p. 170. John Quincy Adams remarked in his diary that 
when the cabinet was discussing a matter at West Point, "there was some 
desultory conversation about Captain Partridge, against whom he [Craw­
ford] told several very ugly anecdotes." Adams, Diary, 4:429.
144
Swift, Memoirs, pp. 141-142.
145Jared Mansfield to Joseph G. Swift, August 26, 1814, Thayer
Papers.
146Jared Mansfield to John M. O'Connor, August 21, 1821, June 28, 
1819, Mansfield Papers.
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147
the capital, urging the professor "to strike the final blow." The 
final blow was coming, but not from the quarter O'Connor had expected, 
and not in his behalf. In May, 1817, President Monroe asked Sylvanus 
Thayer, who was returning from his sojourn in France, to take command of
V. ! 148the school.
That summer there occurred, as Mansfield said, "the most extra­
ordinary events." When Thayer arrived to take command, Partridge, with
the moral support of a group of cadets, virtually ran Thayer off the
_____ L49__. _________ ,______ „___ .___ . ._____ .  ,________ .
post. Partridge had-already piacecT^Ehe entire faculty under arrest
for plotting against him.^^^ General Swift, being informed of the con­
tretemps, stood by Thayer and ordered Partridge to give up the command;
151
a series of charges, including mutiny, was levelled at Partridge.
Eventually Partridge was cleared of the most serious of the 
charges and allowed to resign his commission, but the entire incident 
was embarrassing to the institution and was hardly an auspicious begin­
ning to Thayer's administration. The newspapers had not failed to 
notice the disturbance and were acutely sensitive to the possibility
147Entries of May 14, 26, and June 15, 1817, O'Connor Journal.
148George Graham to Joseph G. Swift, May 20, 1817, Thayer 
Papers. Swift finally received this letter in 1855, when Thayer sent 
it to him. Graham had neglected to actually send the order, but of 
course Thayer had been informed of the President's decision.
149Jared Mansfield to Joseph G. Swift, August 30, 1817, The 
Papers of Alden Partridge, the United States Military Academy, West 
Point, New York (hereafter cited as Partridge Papers).
150Alden Partridge to Joseph G. Swift, July 24, 1817, Thayer
Papers.
Joseph G. Swift to Sylvanus Thayer, September 1, 1817, Thayer
Papers.
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152that a mutiny had actually occurred at the school. As for O'Connor,
his plans were entirely thwarted by Thayer's appointment. Even Partridge
and his friends were elated that Thayer, not O'Connor, had won the 
153post. O'Connor went off to France the next spring, and Partridge
began a new career of trying to destroy the academy. For the next few
years Partridge was interested in any rumor coming out of the school and
rushed into print with every accusation which had the slimmest evidence 
154behind it.
The confusion, divided loyalties, and outright hostility created 
by the feud remained for Calhoun to deal with. Swift most likely ex­
plained the affair to Calhoun, with the result that whenever Alden
Partridge demanded court-martials of the faculty (as he did several
155times), Calhoun ignored him. Since Thayer's appointment, there had
152New York Columbian, September 1, 1817; Niles' Weekly Register, 
September 6, 1817; National Intelligencer, September 27, 1817; and New 
York Evening Post, September 29, 1817.
153Benjamin 0. Tyler to Alden Partridge, August 17, 1817, 
Partridge Papers.
154Partridge was still criticizing the academy in 1830. That 
year he accused Claudius Berard, the French instructor, of selling 
cadets "very cheap watches" for six or seven dollars. Americanus [Alden 
Partridge], The Military Academy, at West Point, Unmasked: or Corrup­
tion & Military Despotism Exposed (Washington: Privately printed, 1830) ,
p. 17 (hereafter cited as Americanus, The Military Academy).
155Joseph G. Swift to Sylvanus Thayer, December 11, 1818, Thayer 
Papers. Swift's part in the controversy was no doubt difficult for 
Partridge to fathom. Swift apparently told the captain at one time that 
if he could prove a cabal against him, he would support Partridge's 
demand for a court-martial of those responsible for his troubles. No 
doubt he suspected a plot himself, and so did Partridge. Proving col­
lusion between Mansfield and O'Connor and others, however, was another 
matter. Partridge promised Swift that he would fight on until justice 
was satisfied. See Ambrose's account in Duty, Honor, Country, pp. 61-62. 
Partridge eventually preferred charges against his old patron Swift, but 
Calhoun disallowed them entirely. See John C. Calhoun to Joseph G.
Swift, April 11, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:242.
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been in effect two camps at the school: one loyal to the new regime,
156
the other to Partridge.
One of the first officers to owe his appointment to Thayer was
Captain John Bliss, the new commandant of cadets, who was responsible
for the discipline of the corps. After the lax discipline under Partridge,
Bliss was sure to be unpopular, and to Partridge's favorite old cadets
157Bliss seemed representative of the Thayer command. For the better
part of a year the cadets had been restless because of the unorthodox 
153
change of command. Then Captain Bliss made the mistake of manhandling 
and cursing one of the cadets; a cadet grievance committee was formed, 
and it demanded redress of Thayer. Thayer could not tolerate insubordi­
nation: group action against authority now had occurred twice since his
156Various letters among the correspondence of Alden Partridge 
described the divided academy after Thayer took over. It seems that the 
academic staff was generally on Thayer's side, while a few garrison 
officers and a faction of the cadets were on Partridge's. See E. J. 
Lambert to Alden Partridge, July 25, 1817, Alden Partridge Papers,
Library of Congress (hereafter cited as Library of Congress Partridge 
Papers). See also J. Wright to Alden Partridge, August 4, 1817,
Partridge Papers.
157Expose of Facts, concerning Recent Transactions relating to 
the Corps of Cadets of the United States Military Academy, West-Point,
New York (Newburgh, New York: Printed by Uriah C. Lewis, 1819), pp. 12-
13, and Sylvanus Thayer to Walker K. Armistead, November 30, 1818, 
pp. 39-40 (hereafter cited as West Point Expose). This is a very rare 
pamphlet containing reproductions of much of the correspondence con­
nected with this case. This copy is from Duke University Library.
158Ruminating on these events in his old age, Thayer told George 
Washington Cullum that he believed the whole story of the famous change 
of command had never been told. He wrote: "In fact, the history of the
Acad'y [sic] from 1813 to 1817 is sui generis. It requires a separate 
investigation & all parts of it should be viewed in connection otherwise 
[sic] much of it could not be well understood. It is altogether a queer 
history. It is covered with a thick veil. I do not pretend to have 
fathomed all its mysteries, but as before remarked I have had a peep 
behind the curtain & may raise it for you to take a look one of these 
days should I think it worth while, [revenous] a nos mou[n]tons."
Sylvanus Thayer to George Washington Cullum, March 2, 1853, Thayer Papers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
167
arrival. Thayer dismissed the cadets from the academy pending a court 
159
of inquiry. In the meantime the suspended cadets unleashed a public
relations campaign against Thayer and his new rule at West Point; even-
150tually a congressional investigation was forced. Both the court of
inquiry at West Point and the congressional investigation found that both
parties had been wrong; Bliss for his temper and zeal, and the cadets
161for the manner in which they protested their mistreatment.
Calhoun, of course, had been following the matter of the errant
cadets all along, keeping President Monroe informed. In 1819 the case
came before the cabinet. The President was prepared to be lenient and
reinstate the cadets if they seemed to be reasonably contrite, but the
162cadets presumed to carry their complaints to Monroe himself. This, 
said the President, was considered improper. After the cabinet dis­
cussed the affair for the better part of three days, Monroe called upon 
Attorney General William Wirt to render an opinion on whether the cadets 
were subject to martial law. The court of inquiry had side-stepped the 
issue, and although the cadets were suspended, their sentence had more 
to do with the academic rules of the school than with military law.
Hardly conversant with military law himself, Wirt delivered himself of 
the opinion that the cadets were, like enlisted men, subject to military
159Lt. James D. Graham, "Orders," November 27, 1818, West Point
Expose.
160 "Complaints Against the United States Military Academy,
April 11, 1820," ASPMA, 2:138.
Ibid.
162N. H. Loring, Thomas Ragland, W. M. C. Fairfax, C. Vining, 
and Charles R. Holmes to James Monroe [September, 1819?], West Point 
Expose, pp. 44-46. See also Adams, Diary, 4:424-427.
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justice. President Monroe instructed the court of inquiry to reconvene 
with Wirt's opinion in mind; once again the court did not decide upon
4-- 163the question.
Calhoun did not agree with Wirt's opinion; neither did the
faculty at the academy. Jared Mansfield, still acting as spokesman for
the professors, addressed several long and detailed arguments to Calhoun.
Mansfield believed that the school should follow its own regulations, as
164indeed the academy had done since 1815. It is problematical that the
Secretary was convinced by Mansfield's arguments. Calhoun held his view 
in common with John Quincy Adams, whose opinion he respected at the 
moment. Both men believed that the governance of the academy could best 
be accomplished by the regulatory powers of the War Department, rather 
than by legislation."*"^ The immediate case of the cadets' indiscretions 
had long faded from importance. When new regulations were drawn up for
"‘"''"'See Calhoun's remarks to the House of Representatives on the 
matter of the governance at West Point in "Military Academy at West 
Point," February 25, 1820, ASPMA, 2:76. There is a good deal of con­
fusion on this case in the standard secondary works. The case of the 
cadets did not end with Wirt's decision; in fact, the cadets' c?' 3 was 
theoretically a separate affair. The judgment had already been nade on 
them. Several works imply that after 1819 the cadets at West Point were 
under martial law, but Wirt's opinion did not make it so. The courts- 
martial were not obliged to follow an opinion of the Attorney General at 
that time. Compare Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country, p. 79; Fleming, West 
Point, pp. 43-44; Cunliffe, The Martial Spirit, p. 157. See also General 
Daniel Parker's order for a re-trial in "General Order," September 23,
1819, Calhoun Papers, 4:344-345. Concerning Wirt's lack of information 
on military justice, see his letter to Calhoun, asking for books on the 
subject, July 20, 1820, ibid., 5:227; and Calhoun's summation of the 
case to Henry Brush, February 2, 1820, ibid., 4:629-630.
164
For example, see Jared Mansfield to John C. Calhoun, May 31,
1820, Calhoun Papers, 5:138.
165
Adams, Diary, 4:424-427.
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the army by General Winfield Scott in 1821, West Point's rules were
included in the compendium.
Throughout the first turbulent years of Thayer's rule at West
Point Calhoun had always taken the new superintendent's part. Both men
had seen what had happened when Partridge had lost the confidence of the
government: cadets and professors up in arms, newspapers crying military
uprising, and the institution's reputation blemished. Thayer had much to
167
make up for, and Calhoun was inclined to support the major.
The Secretary of War could not have asked for a more devoted
superintendent. Certainly, Thayer took as long to become attached to
West Point as the academy did to him. Nine months after he arrived,
when it seemed sure that the congressional investigation would be
168launched, Thayer asked to be relieved of command. Thayer's request 
was ignored, and he stayed at the school until 1833. These were the 
most formative years of the "desert camp of Arabs" on the Hudson. Not 
only did Thayer improve the discipline and academic system of the 
academy, but beginning in 1817 he and other friends of the school began 
building a formidable system of patronage and protection which trans­
cended the administration of a single secretary of war.
1 C.C.
Winfield Scott to John C. Calhoun, May 25, 1821, Calhoun 
Papers, 6:146.
167In 1820 when the House Committee on Military Affairs was 
investigating the cadets' complaints, Calhoun saw to it that the head 
of the committee, Alexander Smyth, received unofficially a laudatory 
report by the Board of Visitors on recent improvements at the school.
See John C. Calhoun to Sylvanus Thayer, January 15, 1819, and John C. 
Calhoun to Alexander Smyth, February 1, 1820, ibid., 3:500, 4:628.
168
Sylvanus Thayer to Joseph G. Swift, May 12, 1818, Thayer
Papers.
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From the academy's first days those associated with it had a 
keen sense of its uniqueness and were determined to see it prosper.
Since the academy was in effect the government's university, West Point 
was susceptible to influences and pressures which were foreign to other 
institutions of higher learning. Officers who considered the matter did 
not necessarily see the academy's intimacy with government as dangerous; 
on the contrary, governmental patronage was considered essential for the 
school's growth and acceptance by the nation. Like Calhoun, General 
Jacob Brown, and other officers who sought to bind the army to the 
country, academy advocates were ever watchful for any opportunity to 
endear the school to the nation and its leaders. In part at least this 
meant that the academy's friends had to be sensitive to political and 
social influences. It was by just such a method that the European mili­
tary schools had become important institutions. An academy graduate 
touring Europe remarked upon how this patronage could be won;
The Military School at West Point is a glorious institution, did it 
receive such patronage from our government as to make it, as it 
easily might be made, the best seminary of education in the United 
States were its advantages not confined to those who actually enter 
the service of the US [sic], but the children of the opulent 
admitted on the same terms as at other scientific institutions & 
their fees applied to the support of additional teachers, it would 
do more to spread a military spirit among us than anything else.
The Military Schools of France & Germany are the favourite schools.
In the light of this need for patronage, Wi 1 xXcmi Crawford's 
objections to Partridge become sensible. Although Partridge did have a 
way with the cadets, he cared not for society, nor was he particularly 
interested in improving the image of the institution, physical or
169James Renwick to Joseph G. Swift, January 4, 1816 Swift
Papers.
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170academic. As a place where luminaries might visit, some friends of
171
the school considered Partridge's neglect of "police" reprehensible.
By contrast Sylvanus Thayer clearly believed that part of his duties was
improving the appearance as well as the public image of the place.
Thayer did not ignore any opportunity to enhance the academy1s academic
reputation, but he also saw to it that the school's progress to celebrity
did not rely entirely upon well-educated graduates.
By all accounts Thayer was a natural master of public relations.
172
Under his superintendence the academy was transformed into a showplace.
Thayer took the corps of cadets on marches to show off his students, and
he made himself far more accessible to society than Partridge had ever 
173been. His students may have seen Thayer as a stern taskmaster, but
his social companions found the new superintendent of West. Point a gay
174
addition to any gathering.
ft
170
Andrew Ellicott to Joseph G. Swift, February 10, 1815, Thayer 
Papers. Entry of June 15, 1817, O'Connor Journal.
171Thayer was quick to sense the value of allowing visitors on 
the post; after he began his superintendency there was a parade of 
American and foreign visitors, all of whom spread glowing reports about 
the school.
172Jared Mansfield to John M. O'Connor, February 19, 18.18, 
Mansfield Papers.
173Fleming, West Point, pp. 51-52.
174
There are numerous testimonials from Thayer's friends about 
his affability when he was out of the sight of the cadets. More telling 
comments come from Partridge's friends. See, for instance, 0. G. Burton 
to Alden Partridge, March 12, 1818, Partridge Papers. One disgruntled 
officer still at the Point told Partridge: "Thayer would count or unit
in a French ball room much better than in the American Army but our 
Government is as fond of french [sic] manners as a frenchman is of 
Soup.” J. Wright to Alden Partridge, April 10, 1819, Library of Congress 
Partridge Papers. For a well disposed view of Thayer, see Elizabeth 
Mansfield to Daniel Drake, March 8, 1818, Mansfield Papers.
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In his campaign to increase the standing of the academy, Thayer
was assisted by well placed friends. Joseph Swift, influential with
Calhoun both before and after his resignation, was acquainted v vxth Thayer
when the superintendent was himself a cadet. Swift was the first graduate 
175
of the academy. Vandeventer was a graduate and a friend of Thayer's.
When Calhoun was first appointed Swift and Vandeventer were the first two
military officers he saw. After Vandeventer won the clerk's position
Swift wrote triumphantly to Thayer: "Van deVenter [sic] is installed
176
1st [sic] clerk at the War Dept. Very good on all sides." The clerk
reassured his friend Thayer when the latter was still surrounded by
controversy over the change of command:
Whenever I can communicate any thing useful to you or the institu­
tion of course I shall do it: and shall especially be careful to
prevent as far as representation can do it, the introduction of any 
measure which may be injurious to our Military 'aimer mater.'177
The most important protection West Point could acquire, however,
was by appealing to the self interest of the nation's public figures.
Because admission was based upon the candidate's parent's service to the
nation, those in charge at West Point had to be alive to the influences
which sustained the school through its students. When in 1816 acting
Secretary of War George Graham heard complaints about punishment at
West Point, his reaction was tempered by his sense of how important this
form of patronage was; he explained to the academy's officers:
175
Sylvanus Thayer to Joseph G. Swift, October 16, 1818, Thayer 
Papers, asking about impending legislation.
176Joseph G. Swift to Sylvanus Thayer, December 11, 1817, ibid.
177Christopher Vandeventer to Sylvanus Thayer, February 2, 1818,
ibid.
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All such punishment must necessarily partake of disgrace; but in 
such an institution as the military academy, composed of the sons 
of the most respectable families of the country, and many of whom 
are destined to fill the highest military stations in the Army,
they should not be d e g r a d i n g . 1^8
Thayer’s successful management increased the number of applica­
tions for places at the school. West Point had already become something 
of a refuge for privileged sons, however. On the eve of Thayer's 
arrival, the academy counted among its number the nephew of the President 
of the United States, two sons of former Secretary of War John Armstrong, 
a son of DeWitt Clinton, four sons of George Graham, as well as other
representatives of the "first families" of the land, as one cadet 
179
recalled. Academic integrity suffered accordingly. Thayer put a 
stop to the admission of some of the more grievously unqualified candi­
dates, but he and his entrance examination came into play only after the 
appointment had been made by the Secretary of War. Cadets could not be
dismissed by unilateral action of the faculty; they could only advise
1.80the Secretary of War that the student was unacceptable. At the end
of Calhoun's period in the War Department, statistics showed that many
181more prospective cadets had been accepted than rejected. By then the
178George Graham to J. G. Swift [?], October 29, 1816, ibid.
179
Major General George Douglas Ramsay, "Recollections of the 
U. S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, 1814-1820," unpublished 
typescript, n.p., n.d., Library of the United States Military Academy, 
West Point, New York, p. 18. Although there has yet to be done a com­
prehensive study of the lines of influence enjoyed by the academy during 
these years, enough research has been done by one scholar to enable him 
to declare flatly that "the institution in the second third of the nine­
teenth century had an importance for prominent American families far 
beyond its present standing." See Cunliffe, The Martial Spirit, pp. 161- 
166.
180
White, The Jeffersonians, p. 255.
181Ibid., p. 256.
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Secretary of War's exclusive hold over the appointments was already
recognized as a valuable source of patronage, and while he was in office
182
Calhoun benefited by it.
As if to reaffirm his faith in the value of West Point, Calhoun
recommended in 1818 that several other academies should be created. In
an attempt to make an elite academy palatable to the democracy, Calhoun
and other of the academy's friends pointed out that the best protection
against military despotism was for military knowledge to spread throughout 
183the citizenry. This was the image which the officers at the Point
took care to convey to impressionable visitors such as Francis Wright.
This usually realistic observer wrote after a visit to the academy:
You will understand, from what I have said upon this military aca­
demy, that the object of the government, under whose eye and at 
whose expense it is conducted and maintained, is not to rear a band 
of regulars . . . the slender force which is maintained at the 
national expense and which is barely sufficient for the hard duties 
in which it is engaged . . . admits but of few openings to such as 
might be ambitious of so arduous a service. . . . There is little 
fear in these pacific states of any portion of the citizens acquiring 
a taste for military glory.^84
A great deal of such praise was romantic. The facts were that 
all of the cadet's training was directed toward convincing him that he 
was a class apart and above mingling with the nation's military amateurs. 
One cadet who learned this lesson well probably spoke for many of his 
fellows when he said, "They talk about 'these young gentlemen becoming 
officers of militiai Hem! . . .  If they ever see a Cadet among the
182Adams, Diary, 6:106; and Niles' Weekly Register, March 16,
28, 1822.
183
"Additional Military Academy," January 15, 1818, ASPMA, 1:834.
184Wright, Society and Manners m  America, p. 82.
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185militia, I am very much mistaken." At the same time Fanny Wright was
marvelling that "the army is the people," Calhoun's War Department had
just announced that the lack of state militia returns made it impossible
to give an accurate account of the civil force which could be called out 
186for emergencies. If the militarizing of the entire nation had really
been on President Monroe1s or Secretary Calhoun1s minds, there were
plenty of opportunities for doing so; Monroe had received an extensive
plan for upgrading the militia shortly after he reached the White House,
187and nothing came of it. Calhoun, especially, was not interested in 
militarizing the nation— he wanted to nationalize the military.
At no time while Calhoun was Secretary of War was the army or 
the academy threatened with utter extinction, even while the War Depart­
ment itself was under constant attack. One congressman made a dubious 
reputation for himself recommending such a course, attacking the military
institutions as anti-democratic, but he was not so popular because of it
188
to prevent his defeat at the next election. From exile in Connecticut
185Quoted in Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country, p. 85.
186Wright, Society and Manners in America, p. 82; Niles1 Weekly 
Register, January 16, 1818.
187Monroe received an extensive and well informed proposal out­
lining how the American militia might be upgraded considerably shortly 
before the inauguration. See Major John Clark to James Monroe, December 
16, 1816, Monroe Papers LC.
188Congressman Newton Cannon of Tennessee, known as "The Tennessee 
Cannon," introduced several bills to abolish the United States Military 
Academy and upgrade the militia, all to no avail. He and Alden Partridge 
carried on a little correspondence during this time. See Newton Cannon 
to Alden Partridge, January 8, 1822, Library of Congress Partridge Papers, 
in which Cannon remarks: "I have always believ'd [sic] there were great
abuses in the military academy at West point [sic] on the part of the 
officers. It savours too much of the aristocracy for my political 
notions and is not indeed the proper mode to infuse military science 
into the great body of the people, nor does it at all favour the prin­
ciples of equality."
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Alden Partridge became such an ardent critic of the regular army that he
189
was (in most circles) thought of as a quixotic figure. Yet as he 
opposed the existence of West Point, he laid the foundations for the 
modern reserve officers' training corps.
West Point's immunity from serious or threatening criticism 
during the Calhoun years reflected a general agreement by members of 
government that the school served a purpose beyond that of educating an 
army. There were still politicians who dutifully attacked the military 
establishment as a rhetorical device, but the forbearance of these very 
same men concerning the academy showed that they saw the school in a 
very different light. Education, even of the military sort, could posi­
tively assist the growth of the republic. This was the status which 
Calhoun sought to achieve for the military establishment as a whole.
189For two of Partridge's more notable attacks on the academy 
and the professional military establishment, see Americanus, The Military 
Academy, passim; and Alden Partridge, Captain Partridge's Lecture on 
National Defence (n.p., n.d.), pp. 1-14. At the same time that Partridge 
and Cannon were working together against the academy, an army officer in 
Washington informed Sylvanus Thayer that there was nothing to fear from 
the government. The officer was quite right. See Henry Stanton to 
Sylvanus Thayer, January 16, 1822, Thayer Papers. At various times when 
the War Department was under political attack, Thayer received letters 
from politically knowledgeable officers, assuring the superintendent 
that the academy was safe.
After Partridge was out of the army he established a private 
military school at Norwich, Vermont (the parent school of Norwich Univer­
sity) . Hearing that two sons of a South American general were about to 
be transferred to Partridge's academy, General Winfield Scott had this 
to say about Partridge; "Now as I know that P[artridge] is cursed with 
genius & eccentricity in equal quantities, that he never did, & never 
can, impart more than a superficial knowledge of any branch of learning,
& that he has not one practical military idea in his head, I am anxious 
to save these young Colombians from the mischief of falling into such 
hands." Winfield Scott to Christopher Vandeventer, March 9, 1823,
Calhoun Papers, 7:510-511.
190
Thomas M. Spaulding, "Alden Partridge," Dictionary of American 
Biography, 14:281-282.
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In each of the major programs which Calhoun oversaw, his confi­
dence and ambitions outstripped his control. What began as an expansive, 
nationalistic military policy was stopped short of fulfillment. His 
attempts to associate the growth of the nation with military progress 
were the fullest expression of Calhoun's nationalistic thought, and 
indeed the fullest expression of military nationalism in the history of 
the republic. The combination of civil and military nationalism offered 
the army a place in American life that it had never had: deeply involved
in national progress, the army could ingratiate itself to a suspicious 
nation in peace as well as war. These ambitions displayed Calhoun's best 
qualities as a Secretary of War.
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CHAPTER IV
"TELLING WELL IN HISTORY": CALHOUN
AND AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY
In 1820 the Reverend Jedediah Morse of New Haven undertook a 
commission from President Monroe to make a survey of the Indian tribes 
then living in the United States.'*' The results of Morse's reconnais­
sance provided the most complete picture of these folk up to that time 
and verified what most makers of national Indian policy then suspected. 
From a prehistorical population numbering perhaps in the millions, the
peoples who once had constituted a formidable human frontier to arriving
2
Europeans had dwindled to near extinction. Morse counted a total of
I am aware that some confusion exists presently over what name 
one should use in discussing the native people of America. Objections 
have been made that the term "Indian" unnecessarily homogenizes these 
people. This is a fair representation of what whites did in Calhoun's 
time, when observations of the aboriginal peoples were, at best, unsci­
entific. The Indians of America had really only three features in 
common: they were aboriginal, they were pre-literate, and they had a 
"white problem." The pages which follow have much less to do with the 
Indians than with the whites and their misconceptions about the Indians, 
and I have therefore employed those terms in use during Calhoun's day, 
bearing in mind the views which informed them.
2
Estimates of pre-contact Indian numbers in the continental 
United States have ranged from slightly over one million to as much as 
twelve million. See a discussion of population figures and the pitfalls 
in making them in Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians,
Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976),
pp. 15-31 (hereafter cited as Jennings, Invasion of America).
178
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3
less than half a million Indians. More telling than Morse's statistical
tables, however, were his summaries of the natives still in the eastern
states. He reckoned that in Virginia, "of these tribes [the Nottaways,
Pamunkeys, and Mattaponies], twenty-seven of the former, and a still less
number of the two latter, it seems are all that remain of those numberous
tribes, who once constituted the formidable Powhatan confederacy." Morse
found no Indians at all in Kentucky. There were none in Pennsylvania,
where, Morse remarked, "they have been scattered and diminished in the
4
manner that hundreds of other tribes have been before them."
Morse drew a dismal enough picture, but compared to other esti­
mates, his was optimistic. Five years after he made his report to the 
government, the War Department rendered an official statement showing 
that only about 130,000 native people lived in the United States and its 
territories, claiming for themselves a mere seventy-seven million 
acres.5 If the recitation of these cold figures were not enough, there 
was evidence aplenty that the natives of America were the victims of a 
precipitous cultural decline. A majority of whites seemed bent on has­
tening the Indians' destruction. Members of both races understood that 
the Indians could stave off extinction only by means of utter cultural 
surrender.
Jedediah Morse, A Report to the Secretary of War of the United 
States on Indian Affairs (New Haven: Printed by S. Converse, 1822; re­
print ed., New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1970), p. 375 (hereafter cited
as Morse, Report on Indian Affairs).
4
Ibid., pp. 30-31.
5
Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, January 1, 1825, Calhoun 
Papers, 9:486.
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Originally, the Indians of America had served whites in several 
valuable ways. They were wilderness tutors, military auxiliaries, and 
important consumers. They were also landlords. As the white population 
increased in size and confidence, the value of native functions was 
sloughed off gradually. By the last decades of the eighteenth century 
natives were no longer crucial to military action. Only their value as 
consumers and trading partners forestalled their wanton destruction, and 
even these relations were no longer conducted in an atmosphere of racial 
equanimity. When the whites arrived at this point, their claims of 
sovereignty over the Indians and their affairs were no longer hollow. 
Indeed, white demands of the Indians were met with such facility that 
there seemed to be a touch of the providential about the whole process; 
what happened seemed to whites to be sadly inevitable. Some whites
7
began to consider how the Indians might be snatched from their fate. If 
civilization could bring the Indians to such a sorry state, civilization 
might be able to save them as well.
Such a view at least partially informed the earliest attempts of 
the Crown to regulate Indian affairs? and they had been resisted stead­
fastly by the colonials and their governments. At a time when centrali­
zation of any kind was held in the lowest repute, all parties in America
0
Jennings, Invasion of America, p. 41.
7
This concern took the form of attempts to cordon off the 
Indians in a protected area of their own, free from white interference. 
The efforts of Sir William Johnson and other Crown officials after the 
French and Indian war to establish an "Indian country" are well docu­
mented. For a discussion of these attempts see the summary of Francis 
Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian
Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834 (Lincoln: The University of
Nebraska Press, 1970), pp. 5-25 (hereafter cited as Prucha, American 
Indian Policy).
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insisted upon dealing with the Indians just as they found them, indi­
vidually. Relations between these two races were best left to the 
occasions of the frontiers, not to the protective attempts of some Crown 
agency. Despite the best efforts of Sir William Johnson and John 
Stuart, the first British Superintendents of Indian affairs for the 
Crown, American-Indian relations retained their chaotic and dangerous 
character.®
Once the American Revolution had succeeded, individual traders,
land companies, and the various states all competed assiduously for
sovereignty over the tribes in matters of land and trade. Leaders of
the new republic found that resistance to official control over Indian
affairs would not cease merely because one government had been exchanged
for another. All these competing jurisdictions made the conduct of
Indian affairs "incomprehensible," said James Madison. He argued that
9
only the national government should deal with the natives. Eventually 
it became clear that any attempt by the government to monopolize the 
affairs of the Indians would advance only in the face of the stiffest 
resistance from the individual states and their frontiersmen.
It has been customary for scholars to portray the government and 
the frontier as having been somewhat estranged from one another on the 
question of Indian affairs."*-^  Yet the only real difference between the
^Ibid.
9
William Hagan, American Indians (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1971), pp. 34-37 (hereafter cited as Hagan, American Indians).
See Madison's remarks in Number 42 of "The Federalist," in Clinton Ros- 
siter, ed., The Federalist Papers (New York: The New American Library,
1961), pp. 268-269.
■^Arthur DeRosier, for instance, portrays Calhoun as a moderate 
on the Indian question, which he undoubtedly was, but DeRosier miscon­
strues the role of moderates in the whole scheme of Indian-white
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two concerned the rapidity of the Indians' eclipse by civilization. The 
first Secretary of War, Henry Knox, came to the conclusion that violence 
against the Indians was simply inefficient. Natural forces then 
operating on the frontiers, he believed, could accomplish much more than 
punitive expeditions or wars of conquest. The subjugation of the Indian 
was inevitable because the march of white civilization was inevitable.
To deny one would have been to deny the other. Thus, just as the govern­
ment was about to launch a pacification campaign among the tribes of the 
Northwest, Knox told George Washington:
As populations shall increase, and approach the Indian boundaries, 
game will be diminished, and new purchases [of land] may be made for 
small considerations. This has been, and probably will be, the 
inevitable consequence of cultivation. 11-
Several judgments were hidden in Knox's hypothesis. Presuming 
cultural superiority, Knox had no fear that this process would be in the 
least impeded by Indian resistance. Further, regardless of the policies 
set by government, the real policies would be played out on the frontier, 
not in the capital. Leaving matters to the frontiersmen, then, was 
practical and wholly within the means of the new nation for which Knox 
spoke.
Men of Knox's high position indulged themselves by seeming to 
disapprove of what happened between Indians and frontier whites. Lest
relations. He and Professor Prucha see the government as fighting a 
sort of holding action against the perpetually genocidal frontier. I 
see a community of the attitudes held by the government and the frontier. 
See, in particular, Arthur DeRosier, The Removal of the Choctaw Indians 
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), pp. 55-57 (hereafter cited as
DeRosier, Removal of the Choctaws).
"^"General Henry Knox, Secretary of War, to the President of 
the United States, in continuation," July 7, 1783 [1793?], in Walter 
Lowrie and Walter S. Franklin, editors, American State Papers, Class II, 
Indian Affairs (Washington: Gales and Seaton), 1:53 (hereafter cited as
ASPIA).
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they be confused with the westerners and their unremitting avarice, these 
more leisured thinkers looked for exoneration. History would have to be 
satisfied.
In his remarks to Washington, Knox relied upon a theory which
elevated the American experience to a principle of natural law. The
Secretary traced the reason for the inevitable conflict between the races
to their modes of subsistence. Whites long had been fond of depicting
the Indian as an inveterate hunter, consumed by the excitement of the
chase. The hunt was symbolic of the anarchic freedom and utter savagery
of the Indian and most separated him from the qualities of white culture.
Since Indian hunting was rarely a solitary business, but rather one
which required group participation for a proper return, it enhanced that
anathema of white social organization— the tribe. The fondness of the
Indian for the hunt also seemed to explain the way in which the Indians
regarded their lands: as vast hunting parks in which the value— the
game which coursed over it— fluctuated and was mobile. Individualized
possession of specific property being impossible, communal ownership was
thereby reinforced. Because it appeared that the land was of subsidiary
importance to the Indian, and because a vast amount was required for the
poorest existence, it followed that this casual devotion to the soil was
made doubly sinful by the inefficiency of its use. Yet all these notions
were palpably erroneous, as even the most cursory observation told the
whites. They served the cause of white expansion much more ably than
12
they did the truth.
12
None of the tribes east of the Mississippi River survived en­
tirely by the hunt, but were in some combination hunters, gatherers, or 
agriculturalists. Far from being ignorant of the value of agriculture, 
the Indians of the eastern woodlands practiced a kind of agriculture 
that was considerably more efficient than that of the earliest white
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
184
Civilized people were as committed to farming as savages were to 
hunting. So bound up, in fact, was farming with the idea of civiliza­
tion that it became a basic quality of civilization itself. Savages, 
being so, could not possibly possess an attribute of civilization. Even 
if they did sometimes farm, it could not mean the same things to them 
that it did to whites. Whether Indians actually did farm or not, there­
fore, was quite immaterial.
These notions, although current for some time, were finally 
canonized in the eighteenth century by the French legal theorist, Emmerich 
de Vattell, in The Law of Nations. Accepting the farmer-hunter dichotomy, 
Vattell reasoned that there would one day be far more farmers than 
hunters, if only because farmers were more efficient producers of food.
In a passage reminiscent of Malthus, Vattell hinted that one day mankind 
would not be able to afford the luxury of allowing hunting to continue.
At any rate, hunters had historically made way for cultivators of the 
soil, and this process of replacement was nothing less than the law of
farmers on the continent. Indian farming was based upon a balance 
between soil fertility, labor availability, and population. Only when 
the whites arrived, throwing off balance the third variable— population—  
was native argiculture itself endangered. Because of their partial 
attraction to farming, the Indians were far less mobile than white 
theorists believed at the time. Although tribal ranges sometimes num­
bered in the hundreds of square miles, the locus of tribal activity was 
always found around permanent villages where the annual tillage was done. 
A rough estimate of the duration of village occupancy among the eastern 
Indians indicates that soil fertility would give out once every ten 
years or so, at which time another village would be founded not far away 
from the original site. It was not unusual for a tribe to eventually 
return to the first site after having moved several times over a genera­
tion or two. This pattern of native activity was implicity recognized 
by whites during the colonial period, when the burning of Indian crops 
by whites on the warpath was a favorite tactic. Whites fighting the 
Indians knew well enough the agrarian proclivities of their enemies.
See Jennings, The Invasion of America, pp. 60-73, for a discussion of 
Indian farming.
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nature in operation. Lands could therefore be taken justifiably from
13
those who used them poorly.
When Vattell wrote, the Indians were still obstinately resisting 
white encroachment, and he did not bother even to consider that an endan­
gered culture might be receptive to adaptation. His theories justified
the most brutal sort of cultural imperialism. No wonder, then, that
14white Americans took to Vattell's theories so readily.
It would seem, considering this, that attempts by a few well- 
meaning whites to prevent the destruction of the Indians were inconsistent 
with the tenets of Vattell and the realities of the frontier. Surely 
most frontiersmen, not given to refinements of thought, considered them 
so. There is little doubt that these concerned whites felt that their 
ambitions for the Indians were more enlightened than those which the 
frontiersmen entertained. Yet the method by which whites hoped to pro­
tect the Indian depended utterly upon what the frontiersmen accomplished. 
Cultural reform was a continuation— albeit subtler— of the same process 
of destruction begun on the frontier. And although both parties liked 
to view themselves as competitors in determining the fate of the Indians, 
they were in fact cooperating in the same campaign. As the frontiersman 
sought to eliminate the presence of the native, the reformer sought to
13
This work was originally published in 1758 as Le Droit du Gens; 
ou, Principes de la Loi Naturelle. The translation most likely used in 
America was Emmerich de Vattell, The Law of Nations; or principles of 
the Law of Nature; applied to the conduct and affairs of Nations and 
Sovereigns [translator unknown] (New York: Berry and Rogers, 35 Hanover
Square, 1787). See pp. 67 and 165 in this edition for remarks on the 
primacy of farming cultures.
14
American statesmen of the early nineteenth century, Calhoun 
included, showed a thorough familiarity with Vattell's work, and they 
regularly pressed his notions into service in their dealings with the 
Indians. Morse significantly included remarks on Vattell in his Report 
on Indian Affairs, p. 281.
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15
eliminate his very identity. This is why there were few disputes 
between the forces of reform and interests in any of the Indian areas 
which threatened a real crisis of thought among the whites.
White humanitarians in America had long thought that the survival 
of the Indian depended upon the native's ability to imitate the society 
which was overwhelming him. Reformers had selected certain highly-valued 
elements of their culture which they felt were worthy of Indian adoption.
That men directly involved with the Indians on the frontiers 
took a less than philanthropic stand will be demonstrated later in these 
pages. As for the reformers, their comments about whites on the fron­
tiers constituted a critique of their fellows in which frontiersmen were 
consistently portrayed as lower class, ill-educated, and generally 
avaricious. The presence of the missionaries in these Indian areas 
attested to the concern reformers had that only the "right kind" of 
whites could help the Indians out of their quandary. The only work that 
I am familiar with which addresses this question is Robert K. Berkhofer, 
Jr.'s, Salvation and the Savage: An Analysis of Protestant Missions and
American Indian Response, 1787-1862 (New York: Atheneum, 1972) , pp. 89-
106 (hereafter cited as Berkhofer, Salvation and the Savage). Much work 
remains to be done on this interesting subject.
Bernard Sheehan's recent work is the most extensive on the 
question of Indian reform during this period. We disagree on the role 
which civilizing programs played in the over-all scheme of Indian 
affairs and policy. Sheehan takes these programs largely for what the 
whites imagine them to be: as philanthropic attempts to save the
Indians from extinction. He accounts for the failure of these programs 
(and for their irregularity of application) by saying that "the main 
reason for the programmatic deficiencies of Jeffersonian philanthropy 
could be found in its basic optimism. The philanthropists had no more 
than an inkling of the obduracy of the task before them." This stand 
leads him to assert that there had long been a selfless desire by whites 
to convert the Indians, yet the work of Francis Jennings and Edmund S. 
Morgan has shown recently how programs of civilization in the colonial 
period were much more productive of subjugation than civilization. John 
Eliot's praying villages of Indians in Massachusetts and the so-called 
Indian college at Henrico, Virginia, serve as pertinent examples.
Jennings' and Morgan's work, plus my own reading of the sources convince 
me that civilization programs were adopted precisely because they served 
the more important goals of dispossession and eclipse. Bernard Sheehan, 
Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), pp. 120, 122 (hereafter cited as Sheehan,
Seeds of Extinction); Jennings, Invasion of America, pp. 240-244; and 
Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of
Colonial Virginia (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 98.
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Those most readily pressed into the cause of Indian protection were
language, religion, and cultivation. Of these, Thomas Jefferson believed,
16cultivation promised the greatest return to the whites.
However beneficial whites believed their language and religion 
were to the Indians, it was evident that the immediate benefits to the 
whites of religious or linguistic conversion were small. The picture of 
ex-savages praying in English was doubtless an uplifting one, but the 
fondest sight of all was an Indian giving up his land. By transforming 
the native into a red yeoman, whites believed that they could strike at 
the heart of native solidarity. The newly-converted Indian would engage 
in the labor-intensive form of agriculture practiced by whites. Using 
"civilized" techniques, natives would begin to consume goods for which 
they had heretofore had the smallest use. The acquisition of new tech­
niques and tools in turn demanded a different appreciation for the land 
they occupied. Needing only individual tracts rather than hunting 
parks engrossing miles of forest, the Indians' physical world would 
shrink to accord with that of the whites. The final dividend of a 
transformation by the means of cultivation was the ultimate destruction 
of tribalism. Being the obverse of white civilization, tribalism was 
the enemy of reform.
Reform had arisen in the first instance when whites became con­
cerned by the rapid degeneration of the tribes who had been encircled by 
white settlements. These natives seemed simply to disintegrate, and by 
the 1820s many native areas in the East were little more than "slums in
16
DeRosier, Removal of the Choctaws, p. 28.
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17the wilderness," according to one close student of this period. Since 
Sir William Johnson's time, men had thought about somehow moving these 
endangered natives away from the deleterious effects of too intimate an 
association with frontier settlers. With the purchase of Louisiana, such 
a movement became possible. Prior to the purchase, Indians had ceded 
their lands in return for money or goods, both of which were quickly 
spent, leaving the Indians impoverished in their forest ghettos. It was 
suspected by white reformers that there would come a time in the degenera­
tion process when it would no longer be possible to rescue the native 
from his decline and that extinction would soon follow. The presence of 
the Louisiana territory provided the time to arm the natives culturally 
against the white advance and its sorry effect upon them. New lands in 
the territory could be exchanged for threatened homelands east of the 
Mississippi River.
"Emigration"— as this notion was called— challenged neither the 
basic idea of civilization nor the ambitions of the frontiersmen to 
somehow wrest all lands from these Indians. President Jefferson believed 
that the very influences which had formerly convinced the Indians to 
cede land— the decline of game, the intrusion of white squatters, indebt­
edness, and social degeneration— could now be put to use to persuade the
18eastern Indians to move across the Mississippi.
Jefferson meant removal to be gradual and voluntary. Overt force 
was not to be used for the time being. Superficially, it appeared that
17See Anthony F. C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the 
Senecas (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), pp. 184-202 (hereafter cited
as Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Senecas).
^DeRosier, Removal of the Choctaws, p. 28.
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emigration was an idea born of the noblest intentions and thus was in 
direct conflict with the exterminationist sentiments on the frontier. In 
fact, emigration took its place in the white scheme of things and com­
plemented these other notions. This gradualist policy justified all the 
more the necessity to extinguish every Indian claim east of the river, 
for Jefferson had no intention of giving Louisiana entirely to the 
Indians. If an exchange of land was to be the selling point in per­
suading the eastern Indians to move, the cost to the United States could 
be minimized by extinguishing land claims before the final exchange was 
arranged. In this way, fewer western lands would have to be given over 
to the Indians. Jefferson hoped that the eastern Indians would become 
indebted to the new government-supported trading posts. If the chiefs 
could be mired in debts, they would be all the more willing "to lop them 
[their debts] off by a cession of lands," Jefferson said. Thus, between 
removal by brute force and a happy jaunt to the west, there lay a range
of coercive techniques which the whites had been developing for a good
19
while and meant to bring into play in this case.
The notions of civilization and emigration, although consonant 
with the less refined ideas on the frontier, constituted the most humani­
tarian view of the Indian and his problems in the early nineteenth 
century. From the American Revolution on, they were held with remarkable 
unanimity by white statesmen responsible for overseeing Indian-white 
relations. If their perceptions were so riddled with illusion and were 
conveniently self-serving, they nonetheless served as the foundation for 
beliefs which were acted upon with conviction and sincerity. Then as
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now, however, the question was how effective a defense sincerity could
be. Those who made Indian policy and formulated programs based upon
these ideas took the only way they felt was open to them which would not
20bring down upon them the condemnation of history. Some editorial 
remarks by Hezekiah Niles in 1820 illustrate well the anxiety of enlight­
ened convention to be vindicated by history. Niles wrote:
We do hope that a remnant of this people may be saved— that something 
may be done to stand as a monument of desire to prevent their exter­
mination— to shew posterity, by irresistable evidence, that if our 
honest efforts to introduce them within the pale of civilization 
failed of success, the fault was in the character of the original 
possessors of the soil, not in ours.
We have several times spoken on this subject, for we are deeply 
interested in it, not more perhaps for the benefit of the Indians 
than on account of the national reputation. We desire to have some­
thing that will "tell well in history."21
Thus the contest between white culture and history itself had 
been joined. All knew that the battle between civilization and savagism 
had been won.
II
The Superintendent of Indian Trade, Thomas L. McKenney, was in a 
hopeful mood. Having just spent some months working with the new Secre­
tary of War, McKenney observed to Christopher Vandeventer about their 
secretary and Indian affirs, "Our excellent friend Mr. Calhoun has got
20Sheehan feels that white philanthropists were sincerely moti­
vated; he writes that the "white man dealt with the Indian as he 
perceived him," and the implication is, of course, that the Indian 
received from white reformers as good a treatment as was available at 
the time. Yet there were those who on rare occasions placed themselves 
directly at odds with the ideas of both the frontiersmen and the 
reformers by taking what was perceived as an unprogressive and racially 
disloyal position. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, p. ix.
21Niles' Weekly Register, December 30, 1820.
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it in his power to promote the welfare of this people; and in doing so,
22
to erect a monument to his memory." McKenney could not have been more 
wrong. Of all the problems Calhoun faced in his official life at the 
War Office, none was more resistant to his reforming impulses than that 
of Indian affairs. In his attempts to modernize the army, Calhoun con­
fronted prejudices sufficiently long-standing to endanger his every 
program; and yet, compared to those he would encounter in his supervision 
of Indian affairs, anti-army sentiment was patently superficial.
Calhoun inherited Indian policies and programs which had been 
evolving without much real purpose since Knox's first administration. 
Officially, the United States had committed itself to the regulation of 
Indian trade and the monopolization of all land transactions between 
natives and whites. A series of trade and intercourse acts stipulated 
that all such activities be monitored and supervised by the War Department 
and its chief officer. Government agents were dispatched to several 
tribes in order to enforce these acts with the help of the local military 
commander. Working directly under the Secretary of War, the Indian 
agents (and sometimes sub-agents) policed private traders (to whom they 
issued licenses), settled disputes between races and tribes, negotiated
treaties, and administered payments legally due the tribesmen as the
23result of past settlements.
Beginning in 1796, a system of government trading posts— or 
"factories" as they were called— was established to offer the Indians an
22
Thomas L. McKenney to Cheistopher Vandeventer, June 21, 1818, 
Vandeventer Papers.
23
White, The Jeffersonians, pp. 496-511.
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alternative to duplicitous private traders. More symbolic of official
benevolence than anything else, these factories never seriously threatened
private trading operations since the system was inadequately capitalized.
The system's nuisance value apparently was quite high, however, because
24this arrangement was eventually destroyed by its private competitors.
While Calhoun watched over relations with the tribes generally, 
the Superintendent of Indian trade was responsible only for the factory 
system. This officer was theoretically the government's wholesaler and 
warehouseman for the goods which went out to the tribes through the fac­
tories. In practice, however, the Office of Indian trade in Georgetown 
became a clearing house for intelligence about the tribes and their 
affairs. Much could be told about the situation on the frontier from 
the factors' letters to their Superintendent, and on occasion the Indian 
agents wrote the Superintendent as well as the Secretary of War about
year when Calhoun came to the War Department. A Quaker, a Marylander, 
and a failed Georgetown businessman, McKenney was thirty-one years old 
when he went into government service. He likely owed his appointment to 
influence, for he was no expert on the Indians, and although he threw 
himself into his duties with ardor, his views and opinions were based 
upon an education far removed from the tribes themselves. His knowledge
24Ibid. See also pp. 231-240 below.
25
Herman J. Viola, Thomas L. McKenney: Architect of America's
Early Indian Policy, 1816-1830 (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1974), pp. xi-5,
8-20, 26, for a summary of the day-to-day duties of the Superintendent 
and the doings of his office. On the whole, Viola assumes a general 
agreement on Indian affairs between McKenney and Calhoun and a far 
greater impact upon Indian policy than I am willing to concede, as shall 
be seen later in this chapter.
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of Indians, gained during the course of his duties, came from occasional
meetings with deputations of Indians in the capital on business. He did
not get to the frontier hims&Li until after Calhoun had left office. 
McKenney was nonetheless available to Calhoun on short notice; he pos­
sessed a fund of information and advice, and he was an impassioned
26advocate of Indian reform.
There was little about the Indian policy of the Monroe adminis­
tration to distinguish it from its predecessors. As the President made 
plain in his first annual address to Congress, the United States was
still bound to extinguish the Indian claims to all lands east of the
Mississippi, to persuade the Indians to move west, and to civilize them 
if possible. The over-all success of the Monroe administration in pur­
suit of these goals is best told by the number of Indian land cessions 
negotiated between 1817 and 1825. Under Calhoun's supervision the
national government obtained forty-one cessions, while in the previous
27
eighteen years only fifty-seven had been managed. Although Monroe 
acknowledged that it was necessary to make some provision "for the pre­
servation, improvement, and civilization of the native inhabitants," he 
forthrightly defended the avid expansion which had made the Indians 
objects of concern. Looking forward to the settlement of the Mississippi
basin, the President told Congress that "the rights of nature demanded 
28
it." And even though it was hardly likely that the westward movement
26Ibid.
2^Charles C. Royce, comp., "Indian Land Cessions," Eighteenth 
Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1899), pp. 660-774.
2®James Monroe, "First Annual Address," James D. Richardson, 
comp., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the President, 11 vols. 
(Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National Literature, 1899), 1:585 (here­
after cited as Richardson, Messages and Papers).
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would be hampered in the least by humanitarian concerns for the plight
of the native, Monroe called upon Vattell for justification; he wrote:
The hunter state can exist only in the vast uncultivated desert.
It yields to the more dense and compact form and greater force of 
civilized population; and of right it ought to yield, for the earth 
was given to mankind to support the greatest number of which it is 
capable, and no tribe or people have a right to withhold from the 
wants of others more than is necessary for their own support and 
comfort.29
Few whites would have cavilled with the sentiment expressed here, 
so unlimited were its assertions. Monroe's friend and predecessor, James 
Madison, wondered idly about the implications of the new executive's pro­
nouncements. "It might also be not easy," Madison cautioned, "to repell 
the claims of those without lands, in other countries, if not in our
own, to vacant lands within the U. S. likely to remain for a long period
30
of years unproductive of human food." However, Monroe had no patience 
with such ruminations and he did not relent.
The President did not enlarge upon the foundations he laid for 
his Indian policy. As in most matters, he set general policy and let 
his underlings add substance as necessity arose. Reflecting the impor­
tance he assigned to dispossession and civilization, government 
functionaries devoted considerably more time, money, and energy to 
outright dispossession than to any sort of cultural transformation. 
Dispossession, either by means of emigration or outright land cessions, 
and civilization were presumably pieces of the same cloth; and if we are 
to believe the rhetoric of policy-makers, civilization was regarded more
James Madison to James Monroe, December 27, 1817, Monroe 
Papers, LC.
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highly until the balance between the two ideas frankly shifted in the
1830s to forced removal. Yet the real goal of government policies can
be seen in the appropriations having to do with these two programs. The
emphasis upon dispossession is evident. In 1819 Congress voted an annual
31
sum of ten thousand dollars for the education of Indian children. After
five years of operation, this program used something on the order of
twelve thousand dollars annually; yet private contributions in 1824 to
the same end— mostly coming from missionary societies— amounted to over
$170,000. The niggardliness of the government's participation becomes
evident when one considers that the expenses associated with but one
land cession could easily exceed that spent by the government on a program
32which presumably lay at the heart of the policy of civilization.
In his assiduous pursuit of Indian lands and his nominal dedica­
tion to the concept of civilization, Calhoun conformed with the priorities 
laid down by his government, but during his first years in office Calhoun 
seems to have entertained the notion that it was possible to satisfy 
government priorities and reform the Indians' affairs at the same time.
His first inclination was to adopt the rhetoric of reform, and this was 
one reason for McKenney's enthusiasm over Calhoun's appointment. The 
Secretary's confidence matched that of the Superintendent. "Our system 
in relation to the Indians," Calhoun told a missionary in 1819, "ought 
to undergo an entire and radical change. The great point is, by
313 Stat. 516 (March 3, 1819).
32Thomas L. McKenney, "Condition of the Indians," April 20,
1826, ASPIA, 2:669. The Georgia Creeks, in whose lands the national and 
state governments were considerably interested, cost the Indian depart­
ment more than $20,000 in negotiation expenses during the year 1024 
alone, and even then no cession was agreed upon.
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33
instruction to prepare them to become a part of our community." But
McKenney's remark that Calhoun had an opportunity to build a monument
for himself made an observation more profound than the Superintendent
intended. Calhoun was educated to the futility of reform only gradually.
Five years after he made this remark, Calhoun had rejected the assimila-
tionist ambitions which had been born of his optimism and had recommended
the creation of an Indian enclave in the West in which the natives could
34be protected from white encroachment. The remainder of this chapter
chronicles the progress of his change of heart.
Calhoun's first order of busines was always the extinguishment
of Indian land titles. The War of 1812 had provided a brief respite in
the campaign to acquire Indian lands, but the war's end signalled a
resurgence of interest. Between 1817 and 1825, thirty-one of the forty-
six treaties negotiated by the government entailed tribal movement of
35
some kind because of lands ceded. A great deal of this campaign 
against Indian title was conducted in the southern states, where the 
pressure of white population had created considerable hostility to native 
possession, and in the instance of Georgia, the United States had agreed 
by means of a compact with that state in 1802 to eliminate native possession
33John C. Calhoun to J. H. Hobart, March 24, 1819, Calhoun 
Papers, 3:686.
34John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, January 24, 1825, ibid.,
9:516-517.
35Charles J. Kappler, com., Indian Affairs, Laws, and Treaties, 
5 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1904-1931; re­
printed edition of vol. 2, New York: Interland Publishing Company,
1973), 2:138-230 (hereafter cited as Kappler, Indian Treaties).
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35
as soon as it could be done peaceably. As it happened, the natives in 
this area were the most numerous and cohesive of all the eastern wood­
lands Indians at the time. Collectively, they were known as the
"Civilized Tribes," whose members were Cherokees, Choctaws, Creeks, and 
37Chickasaws.
By Calhoun's time it had become almost axiomatic that when
native groups were surrounded to the degree of the southern Indians,
extinction was soon to follow. "Helplessness," he ventured, "has sue-
38
ceeded Independence." That being so, the debility of the encircled
tribesmen made the pretense of treating the tribes as independent
nations all the more absurd. "They neither are, in fact, nor ought to
39be, considered as independent nations," Calhoun observed. As Calhoun
learned more and more about the wretched prospects of the Indians, his
knowledge of their situation and the need to treat them as independent
peoples clashed. In his first report to Congress on Indian affairs,
Calhoun concluded that "it is only by causing our opinion of their
interest to prevail that they can be civilized and saved from extinc- 
40
tion." The paternalism which Calhoun's attitudes embodied was, in
36
For a summary of the Georgia Compact of 1802 and the circum­
stances of its creation, see Ulrich B. Phillips, "Georgia and State 
Rights: A Study of the Political History of Georgia from the Revolution
to the Civil War, with particular regard to Federal Relations," Annual 
Report of the American Historical Association for 1901, 2 vols. (Wash­
ington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), 2:44-49 (hereafter
cited as Phillips, "Georgia and State Rights").
37
The Seminoles are usually included as a distinct part of the 
Civilized Tribes, but the Seminoles were actually renegade Lower Creeks, 
or at least they were so regarded by the Creeks.
38
John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, December 5, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 3:342.
39 40Ibid. Ibid., p. 350.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
198
fact, hostile to any exercise of native independence. It made possible
the use of coercive methods otherwise unthinkable.
Calhoun's was not a unique view. He had at his disposal a
coterie of like-minded men who had close contact with the tribes. The
most active were officers of the so-called "Indian Department" of the
War Office, the agents and the regional Superintendents of Indian
affairs (who were, with one exception, governors serving in an ex officio
capacity). Keen to satisfy the land hunger of their constituents, these
last officials were eager to cooperate with Calhoun on any program which
41promised dividends in Indian lands. Missionaries were attracted by 
the pagan souls, yearning to be converted. Private individuals from 
both races involved themselves for reasons which were best known only 
to themselves and about which Calhoun never inquired.
As long as none of these individuals threatened his own objec­
tives, Calhoun unselfconsciously exploited them all. The first 
requirement for those who participated in Indian affairs was the support 
of the government. Calhoun felt no remorse about summarily dismissing a 
sub-agent because he "countenanced and aided the Indians" in their oppo­
sition to a proposed treaty. He accounted for this lapse of fidelity by
42the agent's marriage into the tribe. Of course, Calhoun had control 
over all those who operated in an official capacity among the tribesmen,
41The only difference of substance ever to arise between Calhoun 
and these governors concerned the speed at which the government's policy 
of dispossession was carried out. Not surprisingly, the most energetic 
and cooperative of these men was Governor Joseph McMinn of Tennessee, 
where a large population of Cherokees lived.
42John C. Calhoun to John Crowell, January 13, 1825, Calhoun 
Papers, 9;492-493.
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but since Calhoun took such a proprietary interest in the Indians, he
insisted that outsiders hew to government policy also. The missionaries,
requiring the good will of the government, were susceptible to Calhoun's
influence. He let it be known that he expected from the missionaries,
too, "a proper support of all its [the government's] measures, growing
out of our best relations with these tribes, and prompted by our best 
43policy." Because there was such racial and programmatic unanimity to
begin with, there were few incidents of this kind, but they were all the
more noticeable because of their rarity. Disloyalty of any kind was
construed as an exploitation of the Indians' weakness, and Calhoun,
44
along with other officials, was exceedingly close-minded about it.
Indians who resisted government policy were considered in much the same
way. The Secretary could not suppose, he said, "that those who make
such violent opposition . . . are governed by a regard to the good of
45the [Indian] nation." To him there was little difference between
46
white and native obscurantism.
43John C. Calhoun to Thomas L. McKenney, February 16, 1818, 
ibid., 2:241. After rumors were heard that a missionary had been 
working against the idea of emigration, the secretary of the missionary's 
board felt obliged to reaffirm his organization's support of government 
policy and assured Calhoun that those under his charge had been instructed 
"to withhold themselves sacredly from even colour of interference" with 
the government's designs. See Samuel Worcester to John C. Calhoun, 
February 6, 1818, ibid., 2:124-125.
44See two letters from New York Representative David Ogden on 
the intrigues of one Jabez B. Hyde, a schoolmaster, against the emigra­
tion of the Six Nations. Ogden was torn between ignoring Hyde and 
prosecuting him under any law that could be found. David Ogden to John C. 
Calhoun, November 7, 1818, ibid., 3:255; and David Ogden to John C- 
Calhoun, November 24, 1818, ibid., 3:295.
45John C. Calhoun to Joseph McMinn, July 29, 1818, ibid., 2:437.
46See on this matter Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, pp. 143-144.
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If whites were generally agreed on the wisdom of the government's 
programs, the Indians certainly were not. Their opinions ran the gamut 
from those who were willing to forsake tribalism altogether and assimi­
late to those who threatened to kill Indian agents who advocated a
47
program such as emigration. As Calhoun and others who had an interest 
in moving the tribes west increased pressure, native factions broke out 
which the Secretary always attempted to manipulate to the government's 
advantage. Having no qualms about ignoring lines of tribal authority, he 
placed his faith and his sanction in more pliable men who he thought 
would be able to educate the obstinate members of the tribe to his con­
ception of their best interests.
In 1817 the Eastern Cherokees of Tennessee had agreed to an
48
exchange of their lands for an equal acreage in Arkansas Territory.
47It is doubtful that the number of Indian assimilationists was 
very high at this time. Those who wrote to Calhoun, petitioning for 
individual headrights or expressing other assimilationist sentiments—  
such as an appeal for schools— certainly were not matched by letters 
arguing for tribal or territorial integrity. Letters of the former kind 
were, of course, much more pleasing to Calhoun, who may have let such 
letters, combined with the optimistic reports of his agents and the 
missionaries, shade his opinions of how well the Indians were progressing. 
My impression is that the resisting Indians were much less visible than 
the assimilationists, even though the former probably composed a majority 
of the tribesmen. See, as examples of assimilationists sentiments,
Richard Brown to John C. Calhoun, January 14, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:57; 
Abraham Williams to John C. Calhoun, May 1, 1818, ibid., 2:273; and 
John Jolly to John C. Calhoun, January 28, 1818, ibid., 2:99.
48Kappler, Indian Treaties, pp. 140-144. This agreement of 
July 8, 1817, was negotiated by Andrew Jackson at the Cherokee Agency, 
Tennessee, and it was the first treaty of exchange agreed upon after the 
war. It called for an equal exchange of lands and allowed those remain­
ing behind 640 acres as "life estates." After the death of the family 
head, title would revert to fee simple. No date was fixed for the 
exchange, because the amount of lands involved was to be determined by 
a native census yet to be taken. Any monetary payment to the tribe as 
a result of the exchange depended upon the census also.
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Although it appeared that a considerable number of Cherokees would make 
the move west quite soon, there was significant resistance from within 
the tribe. Established tribal authority was opposed to any precipitate 
emigration. In an attempt to circumvent tribal authority, white offi­
cials cooperated. Senator John Williams of Tennessee sent to Calhoun's 
office Major David Walker, a Cherokee chief who had been opposed to emi­
gration. Now, Senator Williams believed, Walker's "friendship and aid 
can be procured." Williams suggested that Walker be given an appointment 
to help take a census required by the late treaty. "I wish you to have
a confidential conversation with Major Walker on the subject," Williams 
49told Calhoun. Walker represented himself well; he was given the 
appointment, A month later Calhoun told Governor Joseph McMinn of 
Tennessee that Walker "has entered warmly into the notion of emigrating 
. . . it is a matter of great importance to keep him well affected to 
the removal of the Cherokees West of the Mississippi.
Official optimism that the treaty would soon be executed was 
dashed in early 1818 when rumors went out from the Cherokee towns that
serious resistance was developing among the headmen of the tribe. As 
Governor McMinn was attempting to arrange a meeting with the Cherokees 
on the subject, Chiefs Path Killer and Charles Hicks called a meeting
of the national council in which opposition to emigration was so domi­
nant that it was resolved to put to death any Indian who advocated 
fulfillment of the treaty. It was said, furthermore, that any who tried
49John Williams to John C. Calhoun, March 9, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 2:183.
^°John C. Calhoun to Joseph McMinn, April 11, 1818, ibid.,
2:241.
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to emigrate stood in danger of having their lands confiscated on the
pretext of "bad debts" to the nation. Since the amount each Indian was
calculated to give up had a direct bearing upon how much he got across
51
the river, this rumor was quite intimidating.
Major Walker returned from Washington just in time to accompany 
Governor McMinn into the Cherokee homelands to the town of Oostallanny. 
Walker was not much help. The governor's party was greeted, by his 
account, by two thousand very drunk and very hostile natives of the 
Southern and Underhill clans. If he even mentioned emigration, McMinn 
was told "they would chastise me with their light-horse [native 
police]." McMinn nevertheless tried to convince the Cherokee chiefs of 
the errors of their position, but Charles Hicks carried the standard of 
opposition and argued forcefully against the provision of the treaty 
which granted "life estates" to those who remained behind. This stipu­
lation, Hicks said rightly, took the control of tribal lands away from 
the chiefs. Hicks reminded McMinn that the Cherokees were still an 
independent nation. All that McMinn could do was to propose a very 
large bribe and hope that this would cause the Indians to agree to move 
within two years. The chiefs flatly refused. McMinn laid the blame 
for the misfired treaty squarely upon Hicks and his party. "Were it not
for these declarations," said the governor, "I should be able to enrol
52[sic] nearly their whole nation."
^Joseph McMinn to John C. Calhoun, January 18, and June 8, 1818, 
"Extinguishment of Indian Title to Lands in Georgia," ASPIA, 2:281.
52
See McMinn's correspondence to Calhoun, detailing this inci­
dent in "Plan for Extinguishing the Cherokee Claim to Land in Georgia, 
Tennessee, and Alabama," January 12, 1825, ibid., 2:526-529.
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When Calhoun received McMinn's dispatches from Oostallanny, the 
Secretary allowed himself a fit of temper. He was shocked by the hos­
tility which McMinn had encountered at the Indian town. His initial 
optimism disappointed, Calhoun told McMinn;
It is in vain for the Cherokees to hold the high tone which they 
do, as to their independence as a nation, for daily proof is exhi­
bited, that, were it not for the protecting army of the United 
States, they would become the victims of fraud and v i o l e n c e . 5 3
If the Cherokee leaders wished to be independent-minded, he said, let
them indulge themselves in the only place where that sort of conduct was
possible— west of the river. "Let them reflect," Calhoun said heatedly,
"how nation after nation have sunk before the United States, and they
54
will see the necessity of coming into our views."
Calhoun was not content, however, merely to leave the Cherokees
to their ruminations. In the months that followed, white officials were
busy persuading Indian leaders and sounding out their reasons for oppo-
55
sition, and then bluntly appealing to their self-interest. Cherokee
^John C. Calhoun to Joseph McMinn, July 29, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 2:436.
54
John C. Calhoun to Joseph McMinn, July 29, 1818, ibid., 2:438- 
439. This is a different letter than the one previously cited. The 
first letter to McMinn on that day was Calhoun's immediate reaction, in 
which he simply vented his spleen against the Cherokee chiefs. The 
second was more moderate in its tones. It began, "after mature 
reflection . . . "
55The first order of business was to get the Cherokees to meet 
with McMinn and discuss the emigration question at all. The fact that 
such an agreement was made in the fall of 1818 was taken as a good sign 
that the Indian leaders' opinions were changing. See John C. Calhoun 
to Joseph McMinn, October 13, 1818, ibid., 3:200. McMinn thought all 
along that Hicks was the chief to convert; so great was his prestige, 
his conversion would perforce solve much of the opposition problem.
See McMinn to John C. Calhoun, January 26, 1819, "Extinguishment of 
Indian Title to Lands, ASPIA, 2:482-483.
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agent Return J. Meigs singled out Charles Hicks as the principal target 
for the government's campaign against resistance, and Meigs and McMinn 
sought to isolate Hicks from his fellow oppositionists in several 
meetings during late 1818. McMinn gave bribes to all the principal 
chiefs except Hicks and added to the cash the promise that when the 
treaty went through, those chiefs who cooperated would receive grants of 
land in fee simple for their pains.^ As Hicks watched his fellow 
chiefs defect, he too became more receptive to emigration. 3y the begin­
ning of 1819 plans were in the making for the chiefs to visit Washington 
for discussions with Calhoun. McMinn informed Calhoun that Hicks was 
beginning to moderate his views:
His mind had, however, undergone a considerable change, insomuch as 
to be visible to many who attended the last conferences; and this 
change is to be accounted for, in a great degree, by the loss which 
the nation sustained in the selection of those persons named in my 
report of the 24th instant [in which McMinn stated the amounts of 
money given to each of the chiefs]. The remarks will particularly 
apply to [Major John] Walker, [Walter S.] Adair, and [Richard]
Taylor; the latter having been in the employment of the United States 
for some time in attending the delivery of corn to the Arkansas 
settlers.^
Thus, when the Cherokee delegates arrived in the capital, all of
them had been seduced in some degree by the government. Hicks took the
lead in the discussions with Calhoun, and the delegation's main concern
seemed to be how much land was to be ceded and how the members of the
58
delegation would be affected by the agreement. Calhoun meanwhile
56Joseph McMinn to John C. Calhoun, January 24, 1819, Calhoun 
Papers, 3:519.
57Joseph McMinn to John C. Calhoun, January 26, 1819, "Extin­
guishment of Indian Title to Land," ASPIA, 2:482-483.
58See Charles Hicks to John C. Calhoun, February 12, 19, 1819, 
Calhoun Papers, 3:569, 588-589.
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pressed his advantage. "The tone of the nation has greatly altered," he 
59observed. The Secretary said he sympathized with their desire for
some guaranteed homeland in the East, but he cautioned the delegates in
no uncertain terms:
To secure such great benefits, it is indispensable that the cessions 
which they make should be ample, and the part reserved to themselves 
should not be larger than is necessary for their wants and convenience. 
Should a larger quantity be retained, it will not be possible by any 
stipulation in the treaty, to prevent future cessions. So long as 
you may retain more land than what is necessary or convenient to 
yourselves, you will be inclined to sell and the United States to 
purchase; the truth of what I say you know cannot be doubted, as
your own experience and that of all Indian nations, proves it to be
true
The Cherokee Treaty of 1819 was the first of two with which 
Calhoun was directly involved. Its provisions spelled out in detail the
concerns of the chiefs; the bulk of the treaty had to do with the pro­
tection of their lands. In the document, these individuals were referred 
to as "persons of industry, and capable of managing their property with 
discretion." A list of names of the principal chiefs, detailing their 
property improvements, was appended. The provisions of the treaty of 
1817 were reaffirmed, but no lands in addition to those already mentioned
* ^ 61 were ceded.
Calhoun obviously had ambitions to extinguish the entire Cherokee 
title during these negotiations, but he had fallen far short of that. As 
he predicted, the failure to rid themselves of all but their most necessary
59John C. Calhoun to Joseph McMinn, December 27, 1818, ibrd., 
4:428. Hicks protested that McMinn had misrepresented him, and that he 
had never been so opposed to the execution of the treaty as the Governor 
had said. See Hicks to John C. Calhoun, February 8, 1819, ibid., 3:555.
^John C. Calhoun "To the Cherokee Del egation," February 11, 
1819, ibid., 3:565.
^Kappler, Indian Treaties, p. 178-179.
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lands would eventually cause the Cherokees a great deal of trouble. A 
residue of ill-will was created among the whites of the South which 
would lead to the forced removal of the Cherokees fifteen years later.
Calhoun's part in these proceedings is illustrative of the 
larger role he played as the nation's highest Indian officer. These 
negotiations were Calhoun's baptism of fire in Indian affairs, and 
during their course he countenanced acts which, in any other undertaking, 
he would have condemned as blatantly unscrupulous. While dealing with 
the Indians, Calhoun discovered an ability in himself to lay aside his 
principles for a time; these were the niceties of civilized intercourse 
only. In doing so, he could have made no clearer demonstration of the 
disdain he held for the legitimacy of the views which uncooperative 
natives had to offer, whatever the justice behind them. The denial of 
the native's ability to decide his own fate was the real price of the 
humanitarianism which Calhoun and other reformers then professed.
Because of their numbers, territorial claims, and the growing 
militance of the states involved, the southern tribes were particular 
objects of official concern. But every eastern tribe faced the possi­
bility that they might be asked to give up their lands and move west. 
There were no official criteria which told Calhoun that the time for a 
tribe's removal was propitious, but when other political, speculative, 
and humanitarian groups evinced an interest in a particular tribe's 
removal, Calhoun was bound to act, if only to represent the government's 
position.
This was the case of the remnants of the once-great League of 
the Iroquois of New York. Altogether, the Six Nations occupied fourteen
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reservations in New York state which engrossed more than a quarter of a 
million acres from the Mohawk valley west beyond the Finger Lakes, a 
distance of some two hundred and fifty miles in which the Indian pre­
sence was noticeable. A little more than 4,500 natives claimed
62aboriginal title to this vast'estate. Such was their situation that 
unofficial interest groups fixed upon them as candidates for emigration 
even before the government did. Calhoun had no thought to initiate emi­
gration talks with the Six Nations until private interests brought them 
63
to his attention.
Alarmed by the poverty, alcoholism, and violence among the Six 
Nations Indians, missionaries had been moving into their areas before 
the War of 1812. The missionary campaign coincided with the emergence of 
a revivalistic, anti-Christian religion among the Indians. For about 
twenty years Handsome Lake (Connediu), a Seneca Chief, had been preaching 
among the nations and had made considerable headway by the time he died 
in 1815. It would have been difficult for Handsome Lake to have devised 
a creed more opposed to the tenets of civilization as the missionaries 
and the government saw them. Led now by the remarkable Seneca Chief,
Red Jacket, the Handsome Lake adherents were also suspicious that human­
itarian interventionists served purposes uncongenial to their national 
welfare. Above all, the Handsome Lake religion dictated temperate self-
reliance and tribal integrity, two concepts which ran directly contrary
64
to the white outlook. For the missionaries, and later for Secretary
62Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, December 3, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 3:336.
r t
John C. Calhoun to Jasper Parrish, March 14, 1818, ibid., 2:294.
64Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, pp. 32,1-337.
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Calhoun, one standard of how well civilization was being accepted was 
the lack of progress of this new apostasy.
The Ogden Land Company naturally was less interested in souls 
than the missionaries. Since the company had acquired the rights of 
preemption to Iroquois lands in 1810, the company stood to benefit if 
the Indians could somehow be persuaded that emigration was in their 
interests. And since the company had no portfolio to treat directly 
with the Iroquois, company directors attempted to manipulate tribal 
strife, missionary philanthropy, and in the end, Calhoun himself. The 
company stood a good chance of success in this last task. Several of 
the company's directors were at one time or another members of govern­
ment themselves and were well connected in the capital. David B. Ogden, 
Robert Troup, James Wadsworth and Peter B. Porter all dealt with Calhoun 
on behalf of their company's interests.^
Calhoun first became involved in the affairs of the Six nations 
in 1818, when Congressman David Ogden told him that the Indians might be 
induced to emigrate if the government could find suitable western lands 
for their new settlements.^^ Calhoun did as Ogden asked, but he had 
considerable evidence already that Ogden had misrepresented tribal senti­
ment. Only a short time before, a group of Six Nations Chiefs had let
Calhoun know that they were apprehensive that the government was about to
67
force a land exchange upon them. This was not true, and so he told
k^Ogden, Troup, and Wadsworth were all large landowners and con­
gressmen representing New York. Peter B. Porter was a former Secretary 
of War.
^See John C. Calhoun to David B. Ogden, May 14, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 2:293.
67Six Nations Chiefs to John C. Calhoun, January 1, 1818, ibid.,
2:50.
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the chiefs. Calhoun's feeling that the Indians would be better off if
they emigrated certainly applied to the Iroquois too, but he clearly did
68
not see the Iroquois in the same light as the Cherokees. On the other 
hand, the recent Cherokee treaty was the very model of what the Ogden 
Land Company hoped to arrange.
Although the War Department received several other such memo­
rials from anxious Iroquois during the course of the year, Calhoun's
own convictions moved him to at least a partial association with the goals
69of the land company. When he found a place for the Iroquois m
Arkansas Territory and the Iroquois rejected it as being too unhealthy
for them, he reacted in much the same way he had when he had first heard
of Cherokee resistance: he attributed opposition to "officious and
70designing men" influencing the tribesmen. Despite the continued atten­
tions of the land company, the efforts of the missionaries, and even a
blunt message from President Monroe, the Iroquois majority held firm in
71their refusal to move. Calhoun had explained the government's policy
68John C. Calhoun to Jasper Parrish, March 14, 1818, ibid.,
2:294. In this letter, Calhoun outlined the government's intentions 
toward the Iroquois, which were simply that there was no plan to remove 
the Indians by force or otherwise, but that if sentiment existed favor­
able to emigration, the government would have no objection to it. The 
letter emphasized the voluntary aspect of emigration.
69In November, 1818, a group of Oneida chiefs protested the idea 
of emigration, arguing that it would impede their progress toward civili­
zation. The Oneidas, however, were the most thoroughly Christianized of 
the Six Nations, and thus the most receptive to government persuasion.
See Oneida Chiefs and Warriors to John C. Calhoun, November 11, 1818, 
ibid., 3:262.
70John C. Calhoun to David Ogden, August 19, 1818, ibid., 3:56.
71In early 1819, President Monroe took the unusual step of ad­
dressing the Six Nations on their welfare. Probably in response to the 
protest from the Oneida Chiefs lodged earlier, Monroe told these Indians: 
"You cannot become civilized 'till you advance one step farther." That
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that all such moves west were to be arrived at voluntarily and that the
choice was up to the Indians. The Iroquois took him at his word, and, to
72Calhoun's mind, chose wrongly.
Already feeling the strains caused by white encirclement, the 
Iroquois had split into at least two groups, which were identified as the 
"Christian party" and the "Pagan party," the last of which drew its sup­
port from disciples of Handsome Lake and Red Jacket. The disagreement 
between the parties turned at least partially on how the Six Nations 
should confront the problems presented by white encroachment upon their 
lives and lands. Confronted now with the prospect of emigration, 
factional antagonism magnified considerably. The Christian party was
the smaller of the two, and it was not initially unified on the emigration 
73question. Neither were the members of the Pagan party, but they were 
possessed of a creed which justified social resistance to white cultural
one step had to do with the division of their lands into family lots 
with titles in fee simple. James Monroe to the Six Nations, January 15, 
1819, ibid., 3:499. Ogden and his company arranged, over Indian pro­
tests , a conference between the Six Nations and commissioners from New 
York to discuss emigration and the extinguishment of the Iroquois title, 
but the conference fell through. Interestingly, Calhoun appointed a 
federal representative to attend this state conference and oversee the 
welfare of the Iroquois. See John C. Calhoun to Morris Miller, March 27, 
August 17, 1819, ibid., 3:698, and 4:216. Calhoun was by no means happy 
that the state conference had misfired; on the contrary, he told Miller,
"I only regret, that the Indians had not sufficiently understood their 
interest to have accepted the liberal offers."
72John C. Calhoun to Jasper Parrish, March 14, 1818, ibid.,
2:294.
73As late as 1820, Jedediah Morse believed that all of the 
Iroquois were undecided on the issue of emigration, party notwithstanding. 
See Jedediah Morse to John C. Calhoun, May 31, 1820, ibid., 5:160. In 
1824, after a considerable expenditure of missionary, speculative, and 
political effort, the most optimistic census of Christians among the 
Iroquois counted just less than 2,200, or less than half the total 
number. See Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, February 5, 1824, ibid., 
8:52-521.
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influences, and thus they were more firmly set in their opposition to
emigration, and, indeed, to civilization programs as well. The chances
of whites manipulating the Pagan party were therefore more remote, while
74
the Christians were at least not doctrinally opposed to white advice. 
Accordingly, it was the minority party of the Six Nations which won the 
sponsorship and patronage of white interests.
The cause of these interests won two important supporters in 
1819, important because they were prepared to involve themselves directly 
with the internal affairs of the tribes in the name of the righteous 
mission. The first of these was an educated son of an Onondaga chief, 
Eleazar Williams, who had been working among the Oneidas as a Presby­
terian lay-reader since 1815. Williams was at that moment falling under
the spell of Episcopalianism as a result of the efforts of the Reverend 
75Jedediah Morse. Williams was introduced to Calhoun by the Episcopal
Archbishop of New York, J. H. Hobart. Hobart thought that Williams
might be of some use in the difficult task of convincing the Iroquois to
emigrate to the west, and Calhoun, ever mindful of the worth of any
16native assimilationist, agreed. At the same time that Williams was 
being brought to Calhoun's notice, Williams' new patron., Morse, was at­
tempting to educate the New York authorities to the cause of philanthropy.
74See Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Sececa, passim; and Berk- 
hofer, Salvation and the Savage, pp. 131-132, for a discussion of the 
internal stresses upon the tribes and how they affected Iroquois politics.
75See Morse's own account of Williams' conversion to Episcopa­
lianism and Williams' background in Morse, Report on Indian Affairs, 
Appendix M, pp. 79-80, n; and Berkhofer, Salvation and the Savage, p. 132, 
for a modern appraisal. Williams is credited with having converted a 
substantial number of Oneidas to his newest creed as well as the out­
right conversion of some of -the Pagan party.
*7 ^
John C. Calhoun to J. H. Hobart, March 24, 1819, Calhoun 
Papers, 3:686.
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Morse had become committed to emigration after a visit to that state's
Indian towns in 1819, and he was interested in removing and civilizing
as many natives as he could lay hands on. Sordid and humanitarian
interests converged as Morse enlisted the aid of the Ogden Land Company.
After a meeting with David Ogden in Albany, Morse went about his business
with the company's happy sanction, not to mention influence. Ogden wrote
to Calhoun about Morse:
It is his intention to be at this place [Albany] at the Meeting of 
our Legislature early the next Month, to obtain a Law authorizing 
the Executive of this State, to co-operate with that of the United 
States, in adopting such measures as may promote his Benevolent 
views; he then proposes visiting Washington to develope [sic] his 
plan and solicit the aid & patronage of the General Government.77
Blessed with such an upright ally as Morse, the company tried to
make sure that Morse received a proper hearing in the capital. Another
director of the company, Robert Troup, asked Senator Rufus King to use
his influence on Morse's behalf. Troup wrote:
I am informed that Dr. Morse, and his friend Mr. Williams— an Indian 
Catechist of the Oneida tribe— are at Washington in prosecution of 
their plan for civilizing the Indians, by getting them to concen­
trate on some particular reservation or remove farther West. Such 
is also supposed to be the plan of the government; and it is one 
that would promote the interest of my self and friends owning the 
reservations in this State. As far as you can with propriety favor 
the success of Dr. Morse with your advise & influence, I should be 
happy if you would do it.-^®
From all points of view except the Indians', Morse's and 
Williams' visit could hardly have been more successful. Morse received 
a commission from the President to begin the tours of the Indian nations
77David B. Ogden to John C. Calhoun, December 10, 1819, ibid.,
4:475.
78Robert Troup to Rufus King, February 16, 1820, King Correspon­
dence , 6:275.
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which would eventually result in the publication of his report on Indian 
affairs in 1822. Calhoun's instructions to Morse reflected the govern­
ment's general concerns at the time. Morse was charged to gather 
information in order "to devise the most suitable plan to advance their 
civilization and happiness." Calhoun wanted summaries on each tribe's 
condition "in a religious, moral, and political point of view," their 
customs, and significantly, "the character and disposition of their most
influential men." An accounting of the number and character of all the
79missionary schools was to be made also.
As for Williams, Bishop Hobart had well prepared the Onondagan's
way. Calhoun was predisposed to take advantage of any Indian assimila-
tionist in behalf of his goals, but it was obvious to the Secretary that
Williams was no ordinary native. "It is more desirable to make use of
the Indians themselves to bring about so great a change," Calhoun said,
"and where a native so intelligent as Williams, can be found, much good
80
may be effected by giving a proper direction to his zeal." Hobart had
suggested boldly that Calhoun purchase Williams' support by appointing
the Indian to "an authoritative superintendence over them," in order to
31
secure to the government the aid of his "important services." Calhoun 
followed Hobart's advice and gave Williams a special commission of his 
own. The Secretary allowed Williams several hundred dollars and the 
support of the War Department to conduct a number of Iroquois on a tour
79John C. Calhoun to Jedediah Morse, February 7, 1820, Calhoun 
Papers, 4:648-649.
80John C. Calhoun to J. H. Hobart, March 24, 1819, ibid., 3:636.
81J. H. Hobart to John C. Calhoun, January 25, 1820, ibid.,
4:604.
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82of the Great Lakes to search for colonization sites. This was as good 
as an announcement of the War Department's hopes for the Iroquois.
Williams' subsequent activities took place against a background 
of ever-stiffening resistance by the Pagan party. Williams and his 
fellow Christians had been patronized indirectly by the national govern­
ment from the start, but the New York state legislature voted several 
thousand dollars to aid in the emigration of those Indians who chose to
move, and of course the Christians had the moral support of missionaries 
83such as Morse. The more evident it became that the minority party had 
the favor of white interests, the more obstinate were the Pagan party 
members. In 1822 Williams arranged for the right of settlement around 
Green Bay with the Menomini and Winnebagos. Calhoun and Monroe quickly 
voiced their approval, but a convocation of the Six Nations chiefs did
4. 8 4not.
Indians and whites alike identified Red Jacket as the champion
of the opposition. David Ogden, chagrined by the failure of Williams'
treaty at the central council, laid the blame squarely on Red Jacket and
explained the old chief's views to Calhoun:
The Pagan Party, being the most numerous, and being led by Red
Jacket, whose Talents give him a powerful ascendancy, control the
affairs of the Seneca Nation. He lays it down as a principle, that
no Indian Nation has ever adopted Civilization, without becoming 
merged, in the White Population, & losing their National Character 
and respectability. He asserts that an Indian is incapable indi­
vidually of providing for himself, or of taking care of his Property, 
& he Cites himself as an example of this.88
82John C. Calhoun to Eleazar Williams, February 9, 1820, ibid.,
4:656.
83David Ogden to Christopher Vandeventer, March 2, 1822, ibid.,
6:723.
84Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, June 22, 1822, ibid., 7:178.
S^oavid B. Ogden to John C. Calhoun, May 9, 1822, ibid., 7:103-104.
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Until 1822 white patronage did not fix upon a particular segment 
of the Iroquois: any Indian who took the white line could count on the
affections of interested whites. This allowed for the greatest number 
of defections from the opposition. But as the dispute between the parties 
intensified, such hopes of mass desertions dwindled. Regardless of the 
views of the Indians, they were still loyal to the decisions of the cen­
tral council of the League, and there Red Jacket was in control.
Red Jacket and his party began to apply pressure of their own 
kind against the presence of both white ideas and persons; and the 
Christians, among whom the greatest inroads had been made by these influ­
ences, Red Jacket believed, were the first who needed pressuring. Rumors 
went out that all those who emigrated against the wishes of the council 
would have their lands confiscated along with any improvements which had 
been made upon them. Since the Christians were the least propertied of 
the Iroquois to begin with, this was an important consideration. It was
said, furthermore, that those who went west might lose any claim to pro-
. . 86
ceeds from future land sales or government annuitxes. Several
Christians attested to Red Jacket's new animosity toward them when they
told Calhoun that "were it not for Red Jacket and Captain Cole [another
Pagan leader] we believe there would be [no opposition]. These men are
87
opposed to us in all our ways." Red Jacket and his party had also
®^David B. Ogden to John C. Calhoun, May 9, 1822, ibid., 7:103- 
104. Parrish was informed definitively by the Six Nations Chiefs that 
if some of their tribesmen were bent on moving west, it would have to be 
done without tribal money, and that it was indeed true that the leaders 
of the League would consider whether any future monies would be allotted 
to the emigrants. Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, June 22, 1822, 
ibid., 7 :178.
^Jasper Parrish identified the Christian party as the group most 
amenable to government policies. Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, 
November 29, 1821, ibid., 6:543. See also Colonel Pollard [a Christian 
party leader], Silver Smith, Big John, et al, to John C. Calhoun, June 19, 
1820, ibid., 5:199.
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begun a campaign to rid the reserves of direct white influence as well.
Already one Baptist minister had been forced to leave the Buffalo
reserve, and there was talk that the Pagan party was asking the local
District Attorney to remove yet another. The Christians and their spon-
88
sors were being assailed from all sides.
The government of the Six Nations was already a democratic 
legend in the United States, praised (if in an off-handed way) by 
Benjamin Franklin at the Albany Congress, and much later by Calhoun him­
self in his Disquisition on Government. But the majority decisions of 
the central council, however admirable theoretically, did not prevent 
Calhoun and other whites from condemning these decisions. For the time
being, Calhoun thought democracy was admirable only if it was the product
89
of civilized minds.
New subtleties began appearing in the communications of those 
committed to the government's views. These remarks forecast a change in 
the official attitude toward the parties of the Six Nations. Describing 
the Iroquois factions after the Williams treaty had been rejected, sub­
agent Jasper Parrish said that the two parties were "at variance upon 
almost every issue,” but, he added, "the most respectable part of the
88Zecharaiah Lewis, Domestic Secretary of the United Foreign 
Missionary Society in New York, informed Calhoun of these proceedings, 
and innocently recommended that Calhoun merely tell the pagans to quit 
bothering the missionary. Zecharaiah Lewis to John C. Calhoun, Septem­
ber 2, 1822, ibid., 7:264.
89John C. Calhoun, "Disquisition on Government," The Works of 
John C . Calhoun, ed. by Richard Cralle, 6 vols. (Charleston, S. C.: 
Walker & James, and New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1851-1856), 1:37-38,
48-49, 64-73. Franklin had attempted to persuade fellow delegates at 
the Albany Congress in 1754 that in attempting to form a plan of union, 
whites ought to be able to do at least as well as "Six Nations of 
ignorant savages." Quoted in Hagan, American Indians, p. 20.
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Chiefs" were Christians who were happy to take the government's advice.90
Parrish recommended that President Monroe take a hand in the dispute.
Calhoun laid the matter before Monroe and later conveyed to Parrish the
news that the President "views their [the Pagans'] conduct with marked 
91
disapprobation." The Pagans' lack of "respectability" had robbed
their actions of legitimacy in the eyes of the government's officials.
Further explaining his own and the President's disapproval of the tribal
strife, Calhoun instructed Parrish to tell the Pagans:
The [educational and religious] institutions in the Six Nations, 
having been established with the consent of a number of the most 
respectable Chiefs, and with the approbation of the government, a 
continuance of the violent opposition which they have lately mani­
fested towards them, against which the wish of so many of their own 
people, and that of the government, will be considered as highly 
unjust to the former and disrespectful and offensive to the latter; 
That if they do not choose, themselves, or their children, to profit 
by them, it is an act of selfishness and injustice to attempt to 
deprive those of their people that do.92
In his attempt to intimidate the Pagans by shaming them, Calhoun
was cheered on by the supporters of the government policy. Peter B.
Porter, one of the Ogden directors, was convinced that "the difficulties
now existing amongst our Indians, are principally to be ascribed to Red
Jacket, who is a man of great talents, and a great intriguer." Porter
93
urged Calhoun to persevere, and sternly, in his present course.
90Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, January 11, 1822, Calhoun 
Papers, 6:616.
91John C. Calhoun to Jasper Parrish, September 6, 1822, ibid.,
7:266-267.
93Peter B. Porter to John C. Calhoun, October 21, 1822, ibid.,
7:266-267.
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In September, 1822, for the first time, Calhoun decided to wed 
the government to the Christian party explicitly. He wrote to the
Christian party leader, Young King: "While you pursue this wise course,
94
you will always receive the approbation and support of the government." 
But the Secretary's frank alliance with the minority party only seemed 
to encourage the growth of the Pagan party. Early in 1823 leaders of the 
two factions traveled to Washington to meet with Monroe and Calhoun. The 
Christians may have entertained the hope that the President and the 
Secretary of War could persuade the Pagans to relent in their purges of
95
white influences on the reserves and in their opposition to emigration.
But Red Jacket, who made the visit over the objections of the Christian 
delegates, wanted nothing at all from Calhoun. For his part, the Secre­
tary made clear to the delegation that if any compromising was to be done, 
it would have to be the Pagans who gave in. He told the delegation:
You say there are two paths— one for the Whiteman and another for 
the red man. This was the case and did well enough many years ago 
. . . but now . . . necessity will eventually compel the Red man 
to leave his path and travel in that of the whiteman.^
Later in a private interview with Calhoun, Red Jacket was not
in the least contrite about his refusal to be guided by the government's
opinion of his welfare. "He appears to be inveterately opposed to
removal and declared it to be his intention to live and die on the lands
94John C. Calhoun to Young King and other Deputies of the Chris­
tian Party of the Six Nations, September 2, 1822, ibid., 7:264.
95Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, October 21, 1022, ibid.,
7:311-312.
96John C. Calhoun, "Speech to the Iroquois Delegation," enclo­
sure in John C. Calhoun to Jasper Parrish, March 14, 1823, ibid., 7:522.
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97
he now occupies," Calhoun observed. Doubtless, Calhoun would have 
liked to persuade the old chief otherwise, but Red Jacket was one of the 
most experienced Indian diplomatists then living. Moreover, Calhoun was 
limited by the necessity of sustaining the myth of voluntarism. Some 
actions on behalf of Indian welfare were difficult enough to justify on 
the grounds of philanthropy, but to have even hinted at the use of offi­
cial force would have called the entire concept into question.
Thus the majority party continued its purges of white influences 
in the Seneca areas where they were the strongest. By Calhoun's last 
year in office Parrish was reporting to the War Office that the Pagans
intended "to dissolve the compact entered into between the Indians & the
98
Missionary Society and break up their Establishment altogether." The 
Reverend Thomson Harris, one of those harassed missionaries, asked his 
Christian charges to plead his case before the central council, but to no 
avail. Harris' plaintive report to Jasper Parrish on the council pro­
ceedings was a testament to the vitality of the Pagan party. Harris 
wrote:
The Chiefs of the Christian Party have requested me to inform you 
that they have experienced a severe defeat in the transactions which 
have lately occurred here. Red Jacket, they say, is at length per­
mitted to triumph. He has trampled them under foot."
The Pagan party was not inclined to stop with the missionaries.
Sub-agent Jasper Parrish, like Calhoun himself, had so thoroughly
97John C. Calhoun to Thomas L. Ogden, March 15, 1823, ibid.,
7:524.
98Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, March 13, 1824, ibid.,
8:578-579.
99Thomson Harris to Jasper Parrish, March 10, 1824, ibid.,
8:572.
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identified himself with the Christian party that he had alienated the 
most powerful segment of the Six Nations and was clearly no longer of 
much use to the entire native population.100 Several times, the Pagans 
asked that Parrish be replaced with someone who would enjoy their con­
fidence as well as the government's and the Christians'. Thomas 
McKenney was now installed as the new Superintendent of Indian affairs, 
but he replied with Calhoun's voice in a way that was tantamount to the 
breaking off of diplomatic relations with the Iroquois hierarchy. 
McKenney told Parrish not to fear for his position:
The Government condemn [sic] the proceedings of the Pagan party; 
and consider [sic] them hostile to the interests and prosperity of 
the Six Nations. No attention is due, and none will be paid, to 
the representation of Red Jacket and his party, they being not 
only hostile to the views of the larger, and more respectable por­
tion of the Six Nations, but also to their own interests, and to 
the recognized policy of the government towards them.-*-®-'-
The Cherokee and Iroquois cases were but two pieces in the huge 
mosaic of Indian affairs. Calhoun dealt with a multiplicity of other 
eastern tribes, and as he did so he became more convinced than ever that 
his view of their best interests should prevail, as though the social 
debilities of the natives somehow diminished the legitimacy of their
The Pagan party had been trying to rid themselves of Parrish 
for some time. In August, 1822, the central of the Six Nations held 
at Tonowanda condemned Parrish and his interpreter, Horatio Jones, and 
demanded their removal, making in the process several charges against 
them both. Calhoun laid on an investigation, but he significantly 
appointed General Peter B. Porter, an Ogden Land Company director and 
friend of the beleaguered Parrish to conduct the inquiry. Porter found 
that the charges against the sub-agent were "without foundation." See 
Peter B. Porter to John C. Calhoun, September 23, 1822, and January 6, 
1823, ibid., 7:276-277, 407; and also Younnontalae, et al to James 
Monroe, April 5, 1824, ibid., 9:15.
101Thomas L. McKenney to Jasper Parrish, April 9, 1824, ibid.,
9:25.
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102views. Thinking that the eastern tribes were on the very eve of 
their extinction— an extinction which would not "tell well in history"—  
Calhoun and his fellow reformers sought to "save" the Indian and also 
themselves.
Setting out on this noble mission, involved whites were occa­
sionally uneasy about the less than noble methods which they used to try 
to persuade the Indian to accept reform. Even the classic Indian-hater, 
Andrew Jackson, was anxious lest these methods somehow impugn those who 
used them. Jackson wrote:
The Strength of our Nation is now sufficient to effect any object 
which its wisdome [sic], humanity and justice may please to adopt 
with regard to those unfortunate people. And it is now discovered 
that no thing can be done with the Indians without corrupting their 
Chiefs— this is so inconsistant with the virtue, and principles 
of our Government, it is high time the Legislature should interpose 
its authority and enact Laws for the regulation and control of the 
Indian Tribes.
Nevertheless, white reformers continued to believe that somehow the 
Indians were not fit subjects for the exercise of scruples, and philan­
thropy itself was their justification. Thus assured, Calhoun and his 
subordinates used bribes, threats of one kind or another, and recruited 
pliable Indians, gullible missionaries, and self-interested businessmen
in order to interfere wantonly in the internal affairs of tribes marked
104
by one interest or another.
102The most recent and detailed study of one tribe's experience 
with philanthropy is DePosier's Removal of the Choctaws. The techniques 
of manipulation war are admirably discussed within Sheehan's Seeds of 
Extinction.
^ ^ Andrew Jackson to John C. Calhoun, August 24, 1819, Calhoun 
Papers, 4:271.
104At one time or another Calhoun threatened to withhold annuities 
and to withdraw protection from white intruders on Indian lands if the 
tribes did not accede to his wishes. The cutting of roads through tribal 
territories was a reliable means of intimidation as well. A list would 
be very nearly endless.
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III
It was in the East that the rhetoric of philanthropy was given 
its fullest play; western whites tolerated little pretense of charity 
toward the Indians, and although they were forced to treat the natives 
with more circumspection, the currency of Indian-white relations in the 
West was force, violence, and chicanery.
If only because population and the government had not yet over­
whelmed the Indians of the West, the opportunities for manipulation, in 
whatever cause, were fewer here. Calhoun recognized that the case of the 
western tribes was different from that of those in the East, not only 
because the western Indians still retained their "original character and
customs," as Calhoun said, but also because of the character of the
105
frontiersmen themselves.
The ordinary hostility between the races proved difficult enough 
for Calhoun even to keep up with, much less to influence. Calhoun's 
sense of justice was offended when he found out that while white mur­
derers of Indians generally went unpunished, Indian murderers of whites
106rarely survived to stand trial. Even in areas where Calhoun offi­
cially had control, it was all the Secretary could do to oversee the 
dispensation of justice for Indian defendants. When two soldiers were 
murdered by Winnebagos, Colonel Henry Leavenworth told Calhoun that he 
would not "trouble with civil authority," and hinted elsewhere that he
■''^John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, December 5, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 3:346.
^William Clark to John C. Calhoun, April 20, 1820, July 10, 
1821, ibid., 5:67, 6:251.
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107would "Jacksonize" the Indians once they were found. After an Indian
family was murdered on the western Ohio, however, Calhoun was forced to
take the extraordinary step of paying for guards for the captured white
108
offenders for fear that they would be rescued from jail before trial.
As if conflict between whites and Indians were not enough, wide­
spread wars between tribes on the prairies also erupted; at least one of 
these clashes seemed to owe its origins to the effects of emigration.
The so-called "western" Cherokees, who had moved to the Arkansas terri­
tory before the War of 1812, were engaged for several years in hostilities 
against the Osages. The sudden appearance of the Cherokees in an area 
where there was already a delicate cultural balance may have set off the 
sporadic violence which so plagued white officials and threatened white 
settlers.
In the northernmost reaches of the western territories, however, 
a wholly different situation obtained. There, most of the tribesmen had
107Henry Leavenworth to John C. Calhoun, May 14, 1820, ibid.,
5:117; and Henry Leavenworth to Daniel Parker, June 10, 1820, ibid., 5:171.
108See John Johnston to Thomas L. McKenney, December 22, 1824, 
ibid., 9:459.
109While Army officers were attempting to quell the violence 
between the Cherokees and Osages, Niles' Weekly Register reported that 
the Indians seemed well disposed toward the whites and seemed to attri­
bute this development to the wars between the tribes. "They are at war 
with other Indian tribes and ever will be at war with one another unless 
their thirst for blood be not turned against the whites by a general
peace among themselves, which has been too often effected by a mistaken
philantropy existing at Washington!!!" See Niles' Weekly Register,
July 4, 1818; and also a dispatch from an Army officer attempting to 
effect such a peace as Niles feared, William Bradford to John C. Calhoun, 
July 8, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:366. Aside from hostilities between the
Cherokees and Osages, there were, at one time or another during this
general period, wars between the Chippewa and Sioux, between the Winne­
bago and the Pottawattomies, between the Winnebagos and the Kickapoos, 
and incessant skirmishing.
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been British allies during the late war and what peace existed from the 
Great Lakes to St. Louis was maintained only by precarious treaties 
negotiated since Ghent.110 Having won the territory, the United States 
now hoped to win the trade of the area as well. Americans were sensi­
tive, therefore, to the slightest hint of a continued British presence 
or foreign influence among the Indians with whom the lucrative fur trade 
was carried on.
Officers and agents of government pointed to British encroach­
ment— real or imagined— at every opportunity. Doubtless influenced by 
the bitterness hanging over from the war, Americans automatically con­
sidered every foreign trader as a British agent provacateur. Agent 
Benjamin O'Fallon arrived at Prairie du Chien (formerly a British fur- 
trading post) in 1817 and was greeted, so he said, "by numerous British 
traders . . . whose conduct during the late Indian war was the most 
unprincipled, the most inhuman, and disgraceful to civilized man." He 
was convinced that "the faithless Mackinac traders" were alienating the 
Indians against all Americans. These men, he believed, had encouraged a 
band of Chippewas "to massacre and rob" him, and he was certain that had
not a party of friendly Sioux arrived to protect him he would have been
111the worse for wear. The remotest American Indian agent at the time
110The Treaty of Spring Wells, for instance, September 8, 1815, 
allowed pardons to Indians who allied with Britain during the war in 
exchange for a promise of loyalty to the United States. Those tribes 
participating included bands of Wyandots, Delewares, Senecas, Shawnees, 
Miamis, Chippewas, Ottawas, and Pottawatomies in Ohio and Michigan and 
Indiana territories. Spring Wells was just one of a welter of treaties 
of friendship negotiated with the Indians of the northwest after the 
war. See "Treaties with Twenty-One Tribes," December 6, 1815, ASPIA, 
2:12-25.
111Benjamin O'Fallon to Governor William Clark, May 10, 1817, in 
Thwaites, Wisconsin Historical Collections, 19:378.
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wrote from the outpost of Michilimackinac in no uncertain terms:
The object and policy of the British Government in their Indian 
relations cannot be mistaken. . . . [It is] to alienate the Indians 
from the American Government and people, to attach them to the 
British Interests by every and by any the [sic] most insidious 
means.
In their eagerness to assert American power in the Northwest, 
many westerners did not bother to separate the actions of the British 
Indian department from those of private British subjects who operated in 
the area. The Indians contributed to American suspicions by making occa­
sional pilgrimages each year to British posts on the Great Lakes. At 
Fort Malden, opposite Detroit, and at Drummond's Island, not far from 
Mackinac Island, British agents welcomed Indians from the United States 
with traditional gifts meant to cement good relations between themselves 
and the natives. This practice continued for much of the decade following 
Ghent, much to the chagrin of Lewis Cass, Michigan's territorial governor. 
In one of the first of his many letters complaining of these visits, Cass 
told Alexander Dallas, then Secretary of War, that he had "every reason 
to believe that the Indian Department opposite to us are about to adopt 
the same systematick [sic] course of measures which they have so long
and so successfully pursued"— that of estranging Indians from Americans
113
by means of lavish gifts and trade.
112William Puthuff to Lewis Cass, May 14, 1816, ibid., 19:409.
113Cass estimated "that at least Three [sic] thousand Indians 
have visited Malden this season and that the quantity of goods, of arms, 
and of ammunition which has been distributed to them greatly exceeds 
anything which they have heretofore received for the same term, either 
in peace or war." By the next year (1820), the number of visiting 
Indians had doubled. See Lewis Cass to John C. Calhoun, October 8,
1819, and December 16, 1820, Calhoun Papers, 4:367, and 5:497; and Lewis 
Cass to Alexander J. Dallas, June 20, 1815, Thwaites, Wisconsin Histori­
cal Collections, 19:377.
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Causing even more concern, however, was the campaign to the West 
then being mounted by fur trading companies in the area, and the fact 
that there were so few Americans actually engaged in the trade. John 
Jacob Astor's South West Fur Company (soon to become the American Fur 
Company), though nominally an American concern, regularly used the more 
experienced engages of French and Indian extraction to carry on the busi­
ness of the trade. With better and cheaper goods, the British traders
114
had little difficulty in dominating the market. Astor's company,
114
Astor had arranged with the North West Company after the war 
ended to assume operations in American territory; in the process of 
doing so, he inherited virtually all of the personnel of the old company 
who, according to one source, were all Canadians of one stripe or another. 
Astor professed to believe that Americans "will not submit to the hard­
ships and habits of living which they have to endure" in the Indian 
trade. Although it was true that Canadians had more experience in the 
trade, Astor had other reasons for wanting to use the Canadians. His 
agreement with the North West Company had stipulated a five-year partner­
ship, provided the American government did not prohibit such an 
arrangement. Astor told Monroe, then Secretary of State, that he hoped 
that such a prohibition would be made. Then, he would succeed to the 
trade and company facilities below the border, and the North West Company 
could have little to say about it. See John Jacob Astor to James Monroe, 
December 30, 1816, quoted in Kenneth W. Porter, John Jacob Astor:
Business Man, 2 vols. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1966), 2:691
(hereafter cited as Porter, Astor). See also Henry Schoolcraft, Per­
sonal Memoirs of a Residence of Thirty Years with the Indian Tribes on 
the American Frontiers (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo, and Co.,
1851), pp. 485-486 (hereafter cited as Schoolcraft, Memoirs).
Factor George Sibley at Fort Osage gave it as his opinion that 
"a prejudice has already gone among the Indians that the American cannot 
make goods of a good quality. They believe that all blankets, cloths,
&c. of common quality, are of American manufacture, and that the British 
only make the best kind. The traders tell them that there are none but
American goods for sale at the factory, and that, although they are sold
at low prices, they are, nevertheless, very dear, considering the quality; 
but that their goods are of the real British kind." George Sibley to 
Thomas L. McKenney, January 3, 1818, "Operations of the Factory System," 
ASPIA, 2:363. Indian Agent Thomas Forsyth at St. Louis went even 
farther: he believed that goods on the open American market were even
better than those at the factories. See Thomas Forsyth to John C.
Calhoun, April 22, 1833, Calhoun Papers, 7:59.
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plus the formidable Hudson's Bay Company and the North West Company, 
moreover, were all heavily capitalized.
Competing with all these concerns, and poorly, were the govern­
ment trading posts, the "factories," which were supposed to provide a 
humane alternative to the less than philanthropic private traders. When
Calhoun came into office, there were only three such trading houses in
116
the far north, at Green Bay, Chicago, and Prairie du Chien. Because
these government establishments were forbidden to deal in whiskey or
117
credit, the Indians did not hold them in much esteem. The factories
Thomas McKenney's best estimate of the capitalization of the 
North West Company alone exceeded one million dollars. It was reported 
in 1820 that the best market value of the furs collected by that company 
in that year was more than $700,000. See Thomas McKenney to John C. 
Calhoun, December 31, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 3:442; and Thomas S. Jesup 
to John C. Calhoun, April 26, 1820, ibid., 5:76-77.
'L'''^ There were five other factories besides these three: Fort
Mitchell; Chicasaw Bluffs; Fort Confederation; Fort Osage; and Sulphur 
Forks. The operating capital for the factory system was set at $300,000. 
Since the factories were supposed to pay for themselves, this principal 
was not supposed to be touched. In addition, the salaries for the 
factors was a separate annual appropriation which, by 1818, was set by 
Congress at almost $20,000. See John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay,
December 5, 1818, ibid., 3:344.
117The Intercourse Act of 1802 forbade trafficking m  liquor, 
and in 1822, Congress additionally provided for the confiscation of all 
goods of traders who violated the law. See U. S. Stat. II, 146; U. S. 
Stat. Ill, 682-683.
On the matter of the government houses refusing credit, one offi­
cial close to the business attributed this refusal to the failure of the 
factories. Ninian Edwards, then territorial governor of Illinois, 
argued that advancing native hunters enough goods to make the winter1s 
hunt was the traditional practice in the northwest territories. Trap­
ping fields were even then as much as 300 miles away from the factories. 
Indians did not wish to leave their families in the wilderness while 
they trekked back with furs to sell for more provisions. Moreover, it 
was the long-standing custom of the area for the Indians to sell furs to 
whomever had advanced them credit. Edwards pointed out that the engages 
who worked the area were also more adept at trade because of their mobi­
lity and aggressiveness. "If we want to go into competition with them," 
he told the Secretary of War, "then we must do the same." See the notes 
appended to the letter by Ninian Edwards to William Crawford, November, 
1815, in "Indian Trade and Intercourse," ASPIA, 2:66.
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were also fixed to one location and their native customers had to go to 
them, whereas the private traders pursued the Indians into the wilder­
ness. 'The Chicago factory, although well situated to interdict the 
Indian portage from Lake Michigan to the Upper Mississippi, did not do
enough business during one six-month period to pay the factor's salary 
118of $650. To Superintendent of Indian Trade Thomas McKenney, the
factories were a means whereby the government could protect the Indians
"from oppression," and any interference with the Indians by private
traders was harmful. It made little difference to him that some traders
might be working for an American company and others for a British com-
119
pany, or still others were totally independent. He attributed to
them all the downfall of the Chicago factory and said to Calhoun:
The csuss v.Thi ch has so successfully prostrated the once flourishing 
hopes of this establishment is so notorious as hardly to need 
refering [sic] to. It lies deep in the influence (principally 
British) which is spread so generally over that region and in the 
combinations which have been entered into to do away, from amongst 
the Indians inhabiting that Country, whatever control the U.S. may 
essay to acquire over them, either by the Factory or any other system.
118Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, July 7, 1820, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:243.
ll^Prucha argues that, contrary to what McKenney believed, there 
were considerable differences between the small, independent trader, the 
so-called "whiskey traders" (actually peddlers), and the company men. 
Prucha infers that Astor's men did not use liquor in their trade, but 
offers no evidence. The fact that Astor once petitioned the government 
to allow him to use liquor in order to combat the operations of rivals 
does not mean that he was not using it himself. Making the practice 
legal could have saved a great deal of trouble and money, and Astor was 
always looking out for a way to cut costs. There is no doubt that liquor 
was very nearly a necessary part of doing any business with the Indians. 
Even McKenney acknowledged that, all things being equal, the trader with 
the whiskey got the business. See Prucha, American Indian Policy, pp. 110 
111; and Hiram Martin Chittenden, The American Fur Trade of the Far West,
3 vols. (Stanford: Academic Reprints, 1954), 1:26 (hereafter cited as
Chittenden, The American Fur Trade).
120Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, July 7, 1820, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:243.
120
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But because the American factory system was inadequately capi­
talized, the government of necessity had to allow private business to 
operate, lest the proceeds of the fur trade (in money and in influence 
over the Indians) fall back into British hands. The palladin of the new 
American fur trade in this area was John Jacob Astor, whose western 
headquarters was Mackinac Island. This made the island truly a hardship 
post for the agents stationed there, and it was from them that McKenney 
and Calhoun formed their opinions of the effects of private trade upon 
the Indian.'^ '*'
Since the end of the war, Astor had been by no means hesitant to
operate the way he pleased in the northern territories. The Indian
agents who were supposed to control the private trade through a licensing
system were rightly intimidated by the power of Astor's company. When a
new law was passed giving President Madison discretionary power over the
licensing of foreigners in the trade, Astor pleaded with Madison to give
him the authority to issue the permits. The agent at Mackinac Island
was aghast. "I wish to God the President knew this man Astor as well as
he is known here," the agent remarked. "Licenses would not be placed at 
122
his disposal."
121Astor's reputation for sharp trading did not make him the 
most popular man in the West, but it did reflect the power he and his 
company wielded. No doubt his willingness to go over the heads of local 
agents did little to improve his image. McKenney was the recipient of 
all sorts of complaints about Astor. See, for instance, Thomas L. 
McKenney to George Graham, March 19, 1817; William Puthuff to Lewis Cass, 
June 20, 1816; and Talbot Chambers to Willoughby Morgan, September 19, 
1817, in Thwaites, Wisconsin Historical Collections, 19:452, 423-424, 
478-479; and also Schoolcraft, Memoirs, 485-486.
122William Puthuff to Lewis Cass, June 20, 1816, Thwaites, 
Wisconsin Historical Collections, 19:423.
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Armed with reports from the upper Mississippi that "the blackest
of characters" were regularly being issued licenses, Superintendent
McKenney managed to convince President Monroe to suspend the licensing
123authority of the agents in November, 1817. Astor, however, had only
the remotest interest in the character of his employees, and he was not 
about to let this threat go unchallenged. Astor himself called first in 
Washington and, failing to see Calhoun, later sent one of his most 
trusted associates, Ramsay Crooks, to the capital "to ascertain defini­
tively the ground on which private citizens engaged in this trade are to 
be placed." Crooks apparently had his interview with Calhoun in mid-March, 
1818, during which he handed Calhoun a letter from Astor which complained
of the interference in his trade by government officers. If this sort of
124
harassment continued, Astor said, it would be "ruinous" to the company.
A few days after Crooks and Calhoun talked, the Secretary issued new
regulations to all the territorial governors to allow foreigners licenses
125as interpreters and boatmen. For all purposes Calhoun had re-created
the wide-open trading climate which had previously existed, because no
one was to tell when one of these licensees was in the wilderness exactly
X 26
what function he served.
1?3See the letter of John W. Johnson, Factor at Prairie du 
Chien, dated January 8, 1817, extracted in Thomas L. McKenney to George 
Graham, March 19, 1817; and Thomas L. McKenney to George Graham,
September 30, 1817, ibid., 19:452, 480-481.
124John Jacob Astor to John C. Calhoun, March 14, 1818, Calhoun 
*.i?.&pers, 2:191-192.
125John C. Calhoun to Lewis Cass, William Clark, Ninian Edwards, 
et al, March 25, 1818, ibid., 2:209.
126Porter, Astor, 2:691.
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If Calhoun seemed to give in too easily to Astor's representa­
tions, it was because the Secretary of War had other plans in mind which 
would regulate the private trade more strictly than ever before. At the
very time Crooks was on his way to Washington to treat with Calhoun, the
127Secretary was setting the Yellowstone movement in play. Calhoun's 
avowed purpose was to counteract British influence among the Indians of 
the area, but Army troops could regulate the activities of "American" 
traders as well. At the same time, the Yellowstone movement could 
materially assist the business of St. Louis fur traders then going up 
the Missouri.
But not even the Army could ensure the success of the factory
system. Astor had vowed to destroy the system if he could, and there was
128
a consolidation among the fur interests to effect this end. In view
of the inefficiency of the factories in winning business and influencing
the Indians, the private traders' hostility is difficult to account for,
but as one close student of the fur trade has pointed out, the factory
system was an anomaly in a nation committed to nothing if not to free
129
enterprise. It was not easy for an aggressive frontiersman on the
127
John C. Calhoun to Thomas A. Smith, March 16, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 2:194-195.
128Matthew Irwin, United States Factor at Green Bay, reported to 
McKenney that "the Agents of Mr. Astor hold out an idea that they will, 
ere long, be able to break down the factories; and they menace the Indian 
agents, and others who may interfere with them, with dismission from 
office, through Mr. Astor." "Extract of a Letter from the United States 
Factor at Green Bay to the Superintendent of Indian Trade," [1818?] ASPIA, 
2:360. The forlorn and perpetually troubled George Boyd (John Quincy 
Adams' brother-in-law) wrote Calhoun that at Mackinac there was a "fixed 
and settled plan . . .  to harrass [sic] & bring into disrepute, the 
affairs of the Government in this quarter." George Boyd to John C. Cal­
houn, December 13, 1820, Calhoun Papers, 5:433.
129
Prucha, American Indian Policy, pp. 84-85.
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make to be sympathetic to a system that was founded on humanitarian
principles, that took any amount of business away just at the time when
a promising market had appeared, and that did not work. The factory
system was only a government's dream. And, finally, it was a system
which did not have the full support of the government, including 
130
Calhoun.
A congressional resolution in 1818 forced an evaluation of the
entire system upon Calhoun. As was customary, Calhoun consulted with
interested officials. Not surprisingly, McKenney stoutly defended the
factories, claiming that their abolition would "blast, at once, the
happiness of thousands of Indians who now enjoy its benefits." McKenney
told Calhoun that he had "never detected any evidence to shew the least
unwillingness on the part of the private adventurer to adopt any resort
131that should promise to favor his scheme of profit."
Whereas the profit motive was the bane of the Indian in 
McKenney's opinion, it was his salvation as far as Lewis Cass was con­
cerned. Cass looked forward to the abolition of the factory system, 
whose existence he believed was an insult to the integrity of the 
citizens engaged in the private trade, an ingenuous view at best.
Abuses, said Cass, would automatically be curbed by increased competition
130Chittenden and later scholars have contended that the American 
factory system had a good chance of success until the American Fur Com­
pany began its campaign against it. It is easy to blame, as McKenney 
did, the demise of the factories on the company, but had not Astor begun 
operations, others would have. The fur trade of the west was about to 
explode in activity. Individuals, as well as companies, would have 
eventually brought the factories down, especially since high members of 
government were rather ambivalent about the factories after 1818. See 
Chittenden, The American Fur Trade, 1:12-16.
1-^Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, August 19, 1818,
Calhoun Papers, 3:47.
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and by the perspicacity of the natives themselves, who, he said, were
shrewd businessmen when they were not drunk. Cass would limit the
132whiskey trade only and trust thereafter to humane capitalism.
Cass and the fur trading interests had the West only in mind
when they attacked the factories, even though most factories were
located in more settled areas. In the East, for entirely different
reasons, the factories were not operating with a great deal of success.
At Fort Mitchell, Georgia, for instance, the Indians were "independent
of U. S. supplies" because the chiefs themselves had monopolized the
133trade with their own people in cooperation with white sutlers.
Besides, in the South the peltry had been trapped out and the natives 
had precious little to trade anyway.
In the end the policy on the factories had to be decided by 
Calhoun. He was careful not to claim too much for them, since it was 
widely understood that the system was a shambles. Instead, he told the 
Congress:
132
Lewis Cass to John C. Calhoun, September 14, 1818, ibid.,
3:123-127.
133Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, July 26, 1818, ibid., 
4:181-183. The apparent leader of this combine of Indian traders was 
the Creek General William McIntosh, who was a partner in a store on 
Creek territory with David B. Mitchell, the Agent to the Creeks, who was 
later fired for having trafficked in contraband slaves on agency grounds. 
Andrew Jackson believed that McIntosh allowed fellow tribesmen to run up 
enormous debts at his store in order to take their annuity payments when 
they were made. Considering the state of national finances at the time, 
when specie was in limited supply and when goods were easier to get, 
McIntosh may also have been an important supplier of specie in southern 
Georgia, for annuities were usually paid in gold or silver. In this 
enterprise, McIntosh had the assistance of a party of the stronger 
chiefs of the Lower Creek towns, including the well-known Big Warrior. 
McIntosh was later killed by a fellow tribesman for agreeing to a land 
cession. See Andrew Jackson to John C. Calhoun, January 12, 1822, ibid., 
6:618-619.
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It was commenced, and has been continued, from motives both of pru­
dence and humanity; and though it may not have fully realized the 
expectations of its friends, it has no doubt produced beneficial 
effects. If wars have not been entirely prevented by it, they 
probably, without it, would have been more frequent; and if the 
Indians have made but little advances in civilization, they pro­
bably, without it, would have been less.'*"34
Behind this lukewarm defense of the factories, there was scant
encouragement waiting for private enterprise. The Indians themselves
had been forgotten by most of the parties in this dispute; McKenney
defended the factories as though they were sacrosanct, and Cass was much
135too sympathetic to the business dealings of Astor. Calhoun reminded
his readers that the basic point of the government's participation was
still the protection of the Indians "against the fraud and violence to
which their ignorance and weakness would, without such protection, expose
them." The Secretary therefore presented a scheme which would increase
X 3 6the regulation of private trade.
In the settled areas, traders would be required to fix their 
establishments, pay for licenses, post bonds, and keep accounts so that 
Indian agents could inspect them on demand. For the trade in those 
areas beyond the line of settlement, Calhoun proposed a semi-public 
corporation, a monopoly supervised by the government for a term of twenty 
years. All other traders would be excluded. In essence, Calhoun wanted
134_John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, December 5, 1818, ibid.,
3:341-355.
135
Astor's biographer indicates strongly that Governor Cass had 
close relations with the businessman. See Porter, Astor, 2:702, 723-725, 
n. 54. See also a letter from Cass to Calhoun defending Astor and other 
private traders, July 30, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:440-442.
3.36
John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, December 5, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 3:341-355.
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to remove the anarchy which then existed in the private trade. "The
mere objection that it would create a monopoly," he argued, "ought not
to outweigh so many advantages. The Indian trade had never been opened
entirely to private citizens; the government had always attempted to
137
regulate the business in some way."
It is clear from the Secretary's report that Calhoun and McKenney 
were not of one mind on how the Indian trade should be regulated. The 
Superintendent of Indian Trade had not managed to enlist Calhoun's out­
right support of the factory system. McKenney was hostile to the 
licensing system administered by the Indian agents; in his view, if the
government had to choose between licensing and the factories, the licenses 
X38should go. Calhoun had said in his report, however, that he suspected
that the very existence of the factories had impeded the licensing
system, and if Congress chose not to accept his plan for a government
corporation, licenses should be relied upon more heavily than ever 
139before. McKenney had insisted that the protection of the Indian 
could hardly be served by such a system. "An invoice upon the horns of 
a stag would be as easily got at, as would be the Indian adventurers, 
who might wish, even if the law should forbid it, to extend their
1^7
Ibid.
138McKenney's views on the relative merits of the licenses and 
factories are best expressed in his report of August, 1818, to Calhoun. 
Significantly, he believed that were the factories abolished, all trade 
would then "be soon swallowed up in one vast engine of monopoly."
Calhoun would hinge his recommendations five months later on the bene­
ficial effects of monopoly. The two officials were obviously not of one 
mind on this question. Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, August 19, 
1818, ibid., 3:44-56.
139John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, December 5, 1818, ibid.,
3:341-355.
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enterprise into the wilds of Missouri," the Superintendent told Calhoun 
after he made his report.
Congress took no final action on Calhoun's report following its 
submission, and the Secretary used the time to gather as much informa­
tion as he could on the fur trade and the activities of the "Indian 
adventurers," as McKenney called them. Hoping to anticipate any further 
licensing authority he might be given, Calhoun asked for Indian agents to 
accompany the military expeditions to the upper Mississippi and Missouri 
rivers. As a sign of what he intended, Calhoun told his new agent for 
the upper Missouri not to take action against unlicensed traders until
the military posts had been established. After that, any unlicensed
141
trader was to be evicted from the region.
When Senator Walter Leake of the Committee on Indian affairs
asked Calhoun in early 1820 to compose a bill "better calculated to
secure the peace of the frontier," he quickly responded with his most
142
extensive licensing plan to date. He recommended that the authority
to issue trade permits be vested in the President or in those whom he 
might specially commission, and he insisted that only those who could 
afford large bonds would be involved in the trade in the first place.
If a licensee engaged in wrongdoing, the permit could be recalled by the 
President at any time, and the bond (from one to ten thousand dollars)
140
Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, December 31, 1818, 
ibid., 3:442.
141John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, December 5, 1818, ibid.,
3:341-355.
142
Walter Leake to John C. Calhoun, January 29, 1820, ibid.,
4:615.
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would be forfeited. In addition, a fine would be levied up to one
143thousand dollars, along with six months imprisonment.
American Fur Company officials looked on in horror while the 
Senate actually considered Calhoun's bill, passed it, and sent it to the 
House. The fur interests were galvanized into direct political action.
In April, 1820, Ramsay Crooks told William Woodbridge, Michigan's terri­
torial representative to Congress, that Vice President D. D. Tompkins 
had agreed to lobby with House members in opposition to Calhoun's pro­
posals. There were already some in the House, Crooks said, "who I trust 
will especially aid us in defeating this outrageous license system about 
to be imposed on us." He asked Woodbridge to "please suggest any thing
you may think will aid our cause with Mr. Calhoun's new license system,
144and I will do all I can to meet your wishes."
By the end of the session Crooks' efforts had stalled Calhoun's
bill. A vote in the House was never taken. Crooks afterward reported
confidently to Astor, "I have not the smallest doubt, had the bill been
brought forward, but the monster would have been strangled." This
victory was only the opening shot in the fur interests' battle to win
145the field entirely from interference by the government.
Crooks believed that Calhoun's bill was merely a ruse to elimi-
146nate the American Fur Company and thereby rejuvenate the factory system.
143John C. Calhoun to Walter Leake, January 31, 1820, ibid.,
4:623.
144Ramsay Crooks to William Woodbridge, April 7, 1820, Thwaites, 
Wisconsin Historical Collections, 20:163.
145Ramsay Crooks to John Jacob Astor, May 30, 1820, quoted in 
Prucha, American Indian Policy, pp. 95-96.
146 , . ,Ibid.
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Convinced of the Secretary of War's hostility to private trade in general
and to the American Fur Company in particular, Crooks urged Astor to take
preventive action against the other of the two government programs, the
factory system itself. With the survival of the company at stake, Crooks
told Astor that the only remedy was to "interest some of your numerous
147
friends to obtain if possible the abolition of the Factory system."
In the fall of 1820 Crooks and fellow employee Russell Farnham 
began to lobby with a new-found dedication. One of their easier con­
verts was Thomas Hart Benton, then still only a territorial delegate to
Congress from Missouri, but soon to become a Senator. Both agents took 
up lodgings in the same Washington hotel as Benton that winter. This 
happy coincidence gave the agents the opportunity to tutor Benton in 
preparation for the coming fight over the factories. By Benton's own 
account, many conversations occurred between the three men that winter 
of 1820. When Benton finally took his seat at the winter session of
1821, he had gathered an impressive array of anti-factory testimony
148already. With Benton installed in the Senate, Crooks wrote to his
employer that he meant to use "every fair means to obtain a decision on
149
the Public Trading House System."
Once Benton's hearings began, it was evident that much of the 
testimony was to come from Calhoun's Indian agents. There was no surer 
indication of the administration's lack of resolve to defend the system
148Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years' View, or a History of the 
working of American Government for Thirty Years from 1820 to 1850,
2 vols. (New York: D. Appleton, 1854), 1:13; and Porter, Astor, 2:713,
732, n. 92.
149Quoted in Porter, Astor, 2:713,
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than the assistance rendered by official men. Calhoun's own lack of
faith in the factories is evident. The Secretary of War was not above
forcing his subordinates to hew the line on other policies; that he did
not in this case is significant. The tenor of the agents' comments was
the same: factory goods were inferior to both British and American
commercial goods; the factories charged too much and even then they lost
money; the factories were too few, and being stationary, did not attract
Indians to them; therefore, even the pretense of their civilizing effect
was lost.150 Significantly, only one factor gave testimony. George
Sibley of the Fort Osage factory condemned the system for being no
system at all. Since the Osages had a treaty which guaranteed them
their own factory, Sibley had no fear of losing his office.151 All that
remained was for the only trader who testified— Ramsay Crooks— to administer
the coup de grace. He told the committee that the liquidation of the
entire system would not "create a murmur loud enough to disturb the pri-
152
meval stillness of the forest."
Thomas McKenney's attempts to save both his position and the 
system were thwarted further by the adverse testimony of a well-known 
"friend" of the Indian, Jedediah Morse. Morse, in his recently-printed
150The most extensive remarks on the system came from Agent John 
Biddle at Green Bay, and Benjamin O'Fallon, agent for the upper Missouri. 
Colonel Henry Atkinson and Major John Bell, associated with the Yellow­
stone movement, were decidedly against the factories as they were then 
constituted. See all this testimony collected in "Operations of the 
Factory System," March 8, 1822, ASPIA, 2:326-332.
151Sibley remarked concerning the factory system: "I said
'Indian trade system;' so it is called; but it is no more like a system, 
than the yells of an Indian are like music." Ibid.
152Ramsay Crooks to Thomas Hart Benton, January 23, 1822, ibid.,
2:329-332.
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Report, argued against the factories and for his own plan of civiliza­
tion, which was little more than an exalted version of the existing 
153system.
Indecisively supported by the government, failing in both its
humanitarian and practical goals, and assailed by the rapacious and
enlightened alike, the factory system was struck down by Congress on 
154
May 6, 1822. Arrangements were made to phase the system out gradually
to minimize the effect on the Indians, if any, and George Graham was
appointed as executioner.1^  Although the reasons were many for the
abolition of the factory system, Superintendent McKenney put the blame
squarely on the fur traders. "No man knows better than Mr. Crooks the
causes of this decline, and the means which it is necessary to adopt at
any time to produce the same results elsewhere," McKenney had told the
committee.1^6 Earlier McKenney had undertaken to explain to Calhoun why
the factory at Prairie du Chien was in trouble. His remarks on that
occasion would serve as a fitting epitaph for the system as a whole. As
he said to Calhoun:
The multitude of traders, British, and all other sorts, made a sort 
of wall about the Factory. Few Indians could get to it. The Prin­
ciples emenating [sic] from it, which are enlightening and humane, 
and which all tend to attach the natives to our Government, could 
not operate.157
153Morse, Report on Indian Affairs, pp. 92-93.
154U. S. Stat., Ill, pp. 679-680.
155After having attacked the system partly on the basis of the
inferiority of the goods sold to the Indians, Ramsay Crooks was piqued
because the government would not allow his company to take over the dis­
posal of those same commodities. See Porter, Astor, 2:714.
156Thomas L. McKenney to Henry Jackson [Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs], n.d., "Operations of the Factory System," 
ASPIA, 2:356.
157Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, July 17, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 2:293.
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IV
Contrary to McKenney's expectations, Calhoun erected no monu­
ments to himself in- his dealings with the American Indians. And as 
McKenney continued to make the most sanguine forecasts for native 
improvement, Calhoun came to believe that true Indian reform was a task
for the generations; history weighed more heavily upon the Indians and
2.58the whites than he had imagined. During his tenure he had failed to 
demonstrate that even coercive philanthropy could work the radical 
changes he had earlier believed possible. A number of Indians had 
accepted the ideas of civilization which the reformers then purveyed, 
but many more had not. The activities of Calhoun and his associates 
among the Iroquois and the Cherokees actually intensified tribal resis­
tance to humanitarian intervention. The story was much the same elsewhere: 
after years of the most avid work by the government's best Indian handlers,
the Choctaws of Mississippi brought in their verdict on voluntary emigra-
159
tion. No more than fifty of this tribe had resettled west of the river. 
Religious philanthropy produced small results, even with government help. 
Missionaries operated thirty-two schools in 1825, most of which had begun 
operations only in the last five years. The increase in the number of 
these schools had less to do with Christian enthusiasm than with the fact 
that the government made it easy for anyone to receive grants; most of 
the money spent in this program went to buildings rather than minds.160
158John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, February 8, 1822, ibid.,
6:680; Thomas L. McKenney to Solomon Davis, October 26, 1824, ibid.,
9 : 3 5 5 .
159DeRosier, Removal of the Choctaws, p. 98.
16°Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, November 24, 1824, 
ibid., 9:402-403.
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From the Seneca reserve at Buffalo, where it was said the greatest native
hostility to mission schools still existed, one Seneca argued that after
thirteen years of missionary presence, "not a single schollar [sic] has
been produced . . . who can attend to his private concerns with any accu- 
161racy." The tragedies of forced removal in the following decade had 
as much to do with the failure of these programs as with Andrew Jackson's 
frontier style of Indian reform.
Calhoun was a conservative, restrained philanthropist: tradi­
tion said, and Calhoun agreed, that when national weal and native life 
clashed, it was the latter which gave ground. No Indian program ought
to be considered, he said to Monroe, which failed to take national inter- 
162ests into account. Since the factory system was not his, and since he
knew that its administration was a shambles, he made no attempt to save
the dubious program. His position on the factory system defined the
limits of his benevolence. And again, when the Georgians began their
campaigns against all the Indians in their state and accused the Monroe
administration of bad faith, Calhoun's only concern (other than not
wanting to "bully" the Indians) was to preserve the prestige of the
163
national government and to face down the Georgians' impertinence.
He held his views of the Indians and their problems with com­
placence. There was something too facile in his policy; his affectation 
of the rhetoric of Indian reform, his professions of regret at their 
161Jacob Jimeson to John C. Calhoun, July 15, 1824, ibid., 9:225.
162John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, January 24, 1825, ibid.,
9:516-517.
163Adams, Diary, March 11, March 26, 1824; John C. Calhoun to 
James Monroe, March 29, 1824, Calhoun Papers, 8:608.
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demise, his bringing of a delegation of "almost naked" Indians to a
formal Washington party, and his easy magnanimity toward the once-hunted 
164Seminoles. There was no emotional cost to any of this: he was
simply performing his off:cial duties. It was expected.
Being for the present a nationalist whose faith in progress was 
even more intense than that of most of his race, Calhoun faced in the 
Indians' way of thinking an attitude which, had it appeared in his own 
culture, he would have despised as the worst kind of conservatism. But 
for him, as for other whites, the civilized verities did not penetrate 
the forests and had no meaning there; thus, he was not obliged to exer­
cise them except as his own private dictates moved him. In his way, 
Calhoun may have recognized that the Indians were not so much enemies of 
progress as strangers to it. Eventually, Calhoun embraced a reactionism 
of his own devising, but he could not make the same apologies as the 
Indians had for theirs.
164Adams, Diary, July 16, 1819; John C. Calhoun to John R. Bell, 
September 28, 1821, Calhoun Papers, 6:395.
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CHAPTER V
THE WAR DEPARTMENT UNDER SIEGE
One of the more enduring American myths tells of a military 
establishment which has assiduously remained neutral in the course of 
political agitations, and of army officers and War Department function­
aries trusting in their civilian masters to support their cause, without 
regard to the philosophy of one faction or another. Professing all the 
while to be content, the military establishment, until recently, has 
been viewed as a passive agent in the political working of the republic, 
more a victim than victimizer. Yet studies now exist which span the 
entirety of American history and which demonstrate that, at various 
times, what might be called "the military factor" in politics was hardly 
negligible.'*'
During wartime, of course, political leaders in America have
been keenly sensitive to the tendency of military institutions to
2
increase their power in the operations of civilian government. But the 
times of peace have brought with them their own special opportunities 
for the extension of military influence as well, and for the most part,
"*"Two works which bear upon this general period and which have 
been particularly helpful to me in understanding its civil and military 
interrelationships have been Kohn's, Eagle and Sword, and Cunliffe's,
The Martial Spirit.
2
During the Army debates of 1821 Speaker of the House John W. 
Taylor confessed that he was "fill[ed] with apprehension that our liber­
ties after a war or two more are to be controlled by our standing 
armies." U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 2d sess., p. 367.
244
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historians dealing with the era of good feelings have not taken this 
influence into account.^
Scholars have generally agreed that the War Department and the 
military establishment as a whole were caught up in the political acti­
vities which inaugurated the second American party system. The assault 
on the War Department w mch followed has been attributed to Calhoun's 
presence, which, once his presidential ambitions were known, acted as a 
magnet for his competitors. The War Department thus became a proxy for 
Calhoun himself. The most detailed studies of his period of Calhoun's 
life have focused upon his relations with fellow cabinet members and
with the congressmen representing the various factions contesting for the 
4
presidency. But the reaction of the various officials in the War 
Department and the military establishment has not been examined. For 
the most part the military has been viewed, again, as merely the passive 
institution, accepting as its due the vicissitudes of political contro­
versy. Yet it would be surprising indeed if Calhoun had not sought to 
use every means at his disposal first, to thwart attacks upon his candi­
dacy, and second, to protect the very institution which had elevated him
3
By the same token military historians have treated their subject 
as most episodic, governed in their work by what seems to be an ineluc­
table desire to discuss war only. As always there are exceptions, such as 
Weigley's, American Way of War, and his History of the U. S. Army, as well 
as T. Harry Williams', Americans at War. Cunliffe's The Martial Spirit 
defies categorization and comes closest to a sensible appreciation of the 
interrelationships between the American society and the American military 
during this period. Political historians seem to believe that only civi­
lians can participate in presidential contests: I have not found one who
even approaches a satisfactory appreciation of the military factor in the 
American politics of this time.
4
For all the work done since it was written, Wiltse's Calhoun is 
still the study which best covers activities within the military estab­
lishment. His, of course, is a much broader focus than that of 'Ms work.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
246
to the status of candidate. As this renewal of avid partisanism devel­
oped over the presidential election of 1824, members of the American 
military establishment underwent a politicization which largely has gone 
unnoticed by historians.
The spell of partisan controversy, so intense during the war, 
diminished only momentarily as James Monroe assumed the presidency. 
Federalist debility was only partly responsible for the political con­
fusions of this period; some Republicans such as Monroe and Calhoun were 
busily preempting much of the Federalist credo while more orthodox party 
members were attempting to decide between loyalty to party and loyalty to 
doctrine. Others consulted their ambitions, mostly, and there was ambi­
tion aplenty in the councils of national government. There seemed at 
first to be indecision upon what policy was dictated by the requirements 
of the nation, and it is likely that the congressional support for the 
early programs of the Monroe administration derived from lack of agree­
ment about national goals rather than from a solid consensus. A solid 
consensus would not wither so quickly as this support did. And although 
Monroe ruminated about the withering away of parties, John Quincy Adams 
professed an indefinable anxiety about what the political future held.
"It is a sort of instinctive impression that Mr. Monroe's administration 
will terminate by bringing in an adverse party to it. . . . All the 
restless and uneasy spirits naturally fall into the ranks of the 
opposition.
Because they seemed more justified in their ambitions by reason 
of experience, position, and age, there has never been any question but
Adams, Diary, 5:119.
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that Adams, Clay, and Crawford all had their eyes on the presidential 
succession as early as 1817 or 1818. Calhoun, less justified by experi­
ence and age, and less well represented by a diary such as Adams' has 
been censured for his unseemly hurry to reach the top.6 More sympathetic 
biographers of Calhoun have traced his presidential ambitions to that 
time when he could no longer stand by and watch his nationalist programs 
in the War Department being assailed by other, smaller-minded Republi­
cans, Only then, it has been said, did Calhoun contemplate entering the
7
contest for the White House. Yet this view gives Calhoun little credit 
for the original and aggressive mind that he was already known to have 
had.
From congressman to cabinet member in five years was a dizzying 
ascent for a man as young as Calhoun was when he became Secretary of 
War. With such a record behind him, could the presidency be far beyond? 
His spectacular rise in national politics doubtless had a great deal to 
do with a characteristic of thought for which Calhoun later became well 
known: an autocratic mentality which admitted no possibility of error,
which transcended the pettiness of any faction, and which presumed to 
represent the best interests of national progress and genius. It was a 
cast of mind that was rapidly obsolescing.
Calhoun's faith in the superiority of his views encouraged a 
certain amount of inflexibility even at an early date. Still a congress­
man, Calhoun rose on the floor of the House to discuss the extent to
6See Gerald Capers, John C. Calhoun, Opportunist (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 1960), pp. 83-85 (hereafter cited as Capers, 
Opportunist).
7
The reactionary aspect of Calhoun's presidential ambitions is 
well represented by the chapter title in Wiltse, Calhoun, p. 249,
"Calhoun fights back."
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which a constituency could require their representative to do their 
bidding. Some argued that the congressman was merely a creature of the 
voter and no more. Calhoun argued to the contrary: "The Constitution is
g
my letter of instruction," he said. To a friend Calhoun wrote about
himself and his political temperament on the eve of the War of 1812:
"Want of firmness! All know, that in the short time I have been in pub-
lick service, I have ever stood obstinate against all local, party, or
factious interest. . . .  I love just renown; but to me undeserved
9
popularity ha[s] no charms."
All that followed merely confirmed and accentuated Calhoun's view 
of himself and his place in American politics; he took these sensibil­
ities with him into the War Department in 1817. To a man with such 
enlarged views of himself, there was only one place remotely free of 
localism, parti-santem, and faction, and that was the presidency itself.
The cabinet and the Department of War could serve as the avenue of his 
rise to power. During the first few years in the cabinet, Calhoun 
played his role as the transcendent politician well enough to impress 
the critical Adams. After having dealt with his younger colleague only 
a short time, Adams recalled:
He [Calhoun] observed that it would be of great advantage to this 
country to have statesmen of a philosophical turn of mind. He is 
himself of that character, and it has brought him to a high dis­
tinction at a very early age. But he is the only man of the present 
administration who does possess it. We are obliged to live from 
hand to mouth, and to leave posterity to take care of itself.10
g
John C. Calhoun, "First Speech on Amendments to the Compensa­
tion Law," January 17, 1817, Calhoun Papers, 1:387.
9
John C. Calhoun to James MacBride, September 10, 1821, ibid.,
1:61-62.
^Adams, Diary, 5:221.
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Adams would eventually change his mind about Calhoun and heap 
the score upon the young secretary which he had earlier reserved for the 
likes of Clay and Crawford. It is difficult to tell when reading Adams' 
tirades against Calhoun, whether Adams is merely angry at the defection 
of a potential supporter or disappointed that Calhoun's pose as a 
statesman has been tarnished.
In his first two years as Secretary of War, Calhoun was the bell­
wether of nationalism. His programs of fortification and military 
expansion, and internal reforms made him even more of a public figure to 
reckon with than he had been before. A mind as lively as Calhoun's 
could hardly have resisted contemplating what the future held. This 
applied to others who were associated with Calhoun as well. Sometime in 
early April, 1818, Calhoun's chief clerk produced an extraordinary docu­
ment which had all the marks of a campaign biography. Christopher 
Vandeventer entitled his piece, "The Secretary of War," and it bears the 
signs of his superior's cooperation. Vandeventer wrote:
The career of this young statesman has been active and elevated.
He has aimed to advance the true interests of his country untrammelled 
by party and unbiased by sectional prejudices— He already occupies a 
wide space in the public view, and an analysis of the past will to 
us the best hopes of his future career.
To a mind active and discriminating he adds strength and solidity 
of judgment; he forms his opinions by a rapid intuition, but he 
forms them correctly, for having settled in his own breast certain 
general principles he brings to this standard any subject which pre­
sents itself. With a moral intrepidity which fears no consequence 
when the [illegible] call to action is honest he had [sic] uniformly 
appeared as the champion of national interests at times at war with 
the peculiar traits of all parties but invariably consistant [sic] 
with himself. The change of rulers in the eventful contest of 1801 
produced a corresponding change ["of policy," interlined] measures? 
and in th'e heat of the conflict the true interests of the nation 
were sometimes forgotten.— When Mr. Calhoun came forward on the 
theatre our Statesmen pursued the lines of party demarcation fixed 
and unswerving. They adhered to early opinions with the pertinacity 
of bigots, and seemed willing to aspire even to the character of 
martyrs in defense of their faith. Now that the period of excitement 
is over, and public opinion has consecrated leading national measures,
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the history of past times appears almost incredible. Will posterity 
believe that in the management of our external relations, the policy 
of the federalists [sic] since this epoch was to render this country 
subservient to England? That instead of wishing to assume the 
position which Providence has assigned to us, they seemed determined 
to place us in an attitude secondary and humiliating, [sic] Hence 
when our commercial rights were assailed, our Flag disgraced, our 
citizens incarcerated, the federalists [sic] as a party virtually 
advocated submission; They [sic] went further and declared that 
England had done us no essential injury ...........................
While the nation was thus destracted [sic] with the prejudices of 
the two political parties in 1811-1812 Mr. Calhoun appeared in our 
national Legislature [sic]. The crisis was eventful and the aspect 
of the time portended the storm which was to follow. There were 
associated with him from his own State [sic] two colleagues of whom 
I shall only here remark that they possessed commanding talents and 
the most elevated patriotism— His [sic] views soon developed them­
selves as resting upon the basis of the national welfare. He refined 
the gold [?] from the drip of both political sects and adopted the 
amalgamation as the standard of his policy. He wrested from the 
administration opinions which time had consecrated, and the opposi­
tion have since repented their follies in sack cloth and ashes— on 
the subject of our foreign relations he sought to protect our 
sovereignty, to defend our lawful commerce as a vital right, and to 
place the nation in the attitude she now sustains, commanding, 
respected, and feared. To accomplish these objects it has been the 
constant effort with reference to internal measures, to organize 
our institutions to enlarge our modes of thought to expend our views 
to lofty principles of action [sic]. He combatted on the side of 
the administration when it determined to make [the community?] a 
citadel and protect it with the national force. He brought all his 
talents into action for the increase of our naval establishment for 
the abandonment of the system of commercial restrictions, for the 
creation of a bank as necessary to our finance as well as our com­
merce.
The loss of this statesman from the halls of Congress will be 
severely felt, but in the new duties in which he is called we 
predict the nation will reap a higher benefit from his intelligence 
and services.— In the Cabinet [sic] he will give weight and to the 
army reputation; the former will receive the full benefits of an 
intellect which analyses the future almost with the spirit of pro­
phecy; The [sic] latter will we are confident experience new vigor 
from the decision and energy which marks his character. The impor­
tant duties of fortifying our different frontiers so as to present 
an armor calculated for any contingency; of reforming and elevating 
our military school, of establishing at every point capacious 
arsenals and depots; of exploring our country in all directions, and 
concentrating the result in a board of topography at the capitol [sic]; 
imparting new life to the officers of our little army; and rendering 
them habituated to that mental exertion which leads to distinction
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in science as well as in arms. These we trust will occupy his 
attention and distinguish the epoch of his present employment.
As a Legislator [sic] the nation in adopting his principles 
has marked him out as one of her brightest ornaments; as the chief 
of an important department . . .  we feel assured he will exemplify 
these principles by the whole course of his administration.H
It is difficult indeed to believe that John C. Calhoun did not 
have a hand in the composition of this panegyric on his young life. The 
candid Calhoun is revealed here, his nationalism and his self confidence 
in full flood, a transcendent politician who had heroically rescued the 
nation. Appended to this document, in Vandeventer1s hand, is a post­
script which re-emphasizes the real message, one which would have to be 
integrated with the body when the piece was later polished:
At times he opposed each party in some antequated and favorite creed 
and he came off victorious, in every conflict. The highest eulogium 
which can be paid to his political career is the circumstance that 
all parties have adopted his leading opinions as settled axioms of 
national policy and have awarded his talents and virtues unanimous 
approbation.12
That the document was written less than five months after he 
became Secretary of War is significant. Presuming Calhoun's connivance, 
if not authorship (the writing is a poor imitation of Calhoun's syntax), 
the purpose of the document can only be surmised. Certainly its author 
put Calhoun in the best possible light, writing with a cavalier regard
I have reproduced this document very nearly in full here for 
two reasons: first, because it portrays what I believe to be an unguarded
side of Calhoun's thoughts about his and the nation's past and future at 
a relatively early time, and because it demonstrates how completely 
Calhoun identified his own progress with that of the nation. Second, 
this document is used here for the first time, and its reproduction may 
be of some benefit to future students of Calhoun's life and thought. The 
manuscript was found at the William L. Clements Library. See Christopher 
Vandeventer, "The Secretary of War," April 5, 1818, Vandeventer Papers.
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for the truth. Perhaps the Secretary of War saw it after it was written 
and decided to delay the campaign for popularity which the document pre­
saged. The eulogy may have been only the result of Vandeventer's 
ambition to ingratiate himself with his chief; if that is so then Van­
deventer had penetrated to the core of his superior's personality and 
politics in a very short time and the paper is a testament to the young 
clerk's precocity. In either case, this document reflects the close 
personal relationship which had already emerged between the secretary 
and the clerk. Despite some anxious moments the relations between the 
two would deepen in the following years. More importantly, Vandeventer's 
commitment to Calhoun's cause reveals in miniature what happened to the 
American military establishment while Calhoun was in the War Office.
The Secretary of War kept his counsel for the time being. Any 
announcement on his part would have been grossly premature, and at any 
rate he was far too busy for the present to do anything but think about 
his prospects. In the meantime factions were already taking shape within 
the Republican party. John Quincy Adams was particularly sensitive to 
the political winds. Occupying the seat that Henry Clay had wanted,
Adams saw Clay working against him in Congress from the very beginning
13
of the Monroe administration. And although it seemed to take longer
for him to decide, Adams soon began counting upon the enmity of William
14Crawford and his friends as well. Soon after the beginning of the
Sixteenth Congress, Adams had concluded that the delicate Republican 
consensus had broken apart. "All public business in Congress now 
connects itself with intrigues," Adams observed, "and there is great
13 14Adams, Diary, 4:119. rbid., 4:407.
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danger that the whole Government will degenerate into a struggle of 
cabals.
This forbidding aspect of public affairs was compounded by the 
first hints of the Panic of 1819. By January, 1819, the buoyant postwar 
economy broke into so many pieces: banks had already begun to fail the
previous year and so had some eastern businesses. The reverberations of 
the general collapse were not to affect the West for a few months, but 
already cotton prices had fallen precipitously and land prices would 
shortly follow. In May Adams called the prospects "alarming" in a con­
versation with Treasury Secretary Crawford. The Secretary of State 
described a dark picture to his diary:
The staple productions of the soil, constituting our principal 
articles of export, are falling to half and less than half the 
prices which they have lately borne, the merchants are crumbling to 
ruin, the manufactures perishing, agriculture stagnating, and dis­
tress universal in every part of the country. The revenue has not 
/et been, but must very sensibly and very soon be affected by this 
state of things, for which there seens to be no remedy but time and 
patience, and the changes of events which time effects. Crawford 
showed me his last bank returns, which are as large as usual, and 
the condition of the Treasury is daily improving. But there will 
be a great falling off in the revenue of the next year.-*-®
For once Adams was not overstating. Later that year, he and
Calhoun discussed the worsening depression. Calhoun thought that "we
17
shall unavoidably come within a year to a paper-money currency." How
much the depression would have to do with his own political career,
Calhoun did not yet perceive, nor, probably, did other political leaders.
The panic was the harbinger of the Industrial Revolution in America, and
18
with it came the first stirrings of Jacksonian nationalism.
15Ibid., 4:212. 16Ibid., 4:375. 17Ibid., 4:401.
18This summary is based upon a reading of George Dangerfield1s, 
The Awakening of American Nationalism (New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
pp. 72-96; see especially p. 89 (hereafter cited as Dangerfield, American
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
254
By the end of 1819 it was evident that this had been a year of
portentous beginnings. Adams thought that the next year would see the
fulfillment of his worst fears. He told Monroe that "the great battery
opened upon the Administration at the session before last was South
America. That of the last session was the Seminole War." The next
session of Congress promised to be agitated in the extreme: "Before the
Congress will be all the moneyed [sic] embarrassments of the country,
the affairs of the bank [of the United States], the manufacturing claims
[for protective tariffs], and the Missouri slave question, which might
19excite ardent debates."
Calhoun had little of his own reputation invested in the diffi­
culties of the past few sessions of Congress, and so at the start of 
the session in December, 1819, he was relatively self-satisfied. The 
extended debates over Jackson's invasion of Florida the previous session 
had little to do with Calhoun personally, and his stand against Jackson
in the cabinet had befuddled Adams. "I had not exactly understood what
20he meant or what he was after," complained the Secretary of State. 
Calhoun's main concern during 1819 was about the effect the failure of 
the Yellowstone expedition would have upon the next military appropria­
tions bill. Because the expedition had virtually bankrupted the
National] srr.); and Bray Hammond' s, Banks and Politics in America from the 
Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1957), pp. 251-285, and passim. On the interrelationships of the new 
partisanism to national economic problems, see also Charles Sydnor, The 
Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1948), pp. 134-156 (hereafter cited as Sydnor, 
Southern Sectionalism); and William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War. 
The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 7-133 (hereafter cited as Freehling, Prelude 
to Civil War) .
19 20
Adams, Diary, 4:473. Ibid., 4:307.
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Quartermaster's account, the entire War Department budget might be
scrutinized more closely. And since the extent of the financial panic
daily became more evident, he was concerned that certain retrenchment-
minded congressmen would have much more to say about the standing army
than had been the case. In the summer of 1819 Calhoun told General Brown
that because of these two problems, "I consider the next Session [sic]
as the most trying for the Army [sic] of any which will probably occur 
„21in many years.
Crawford's report on the state of the Treasury at the end of 
1819 was alarming. Because of the decline in revenues, Crawford recom­
mended a loan to defray the five million dollar deficit caused by 
increased expenditures. He believed that, whether expenditures were
decreased or not, the loan would still be necessary in order to offset
22
future deficits which he expected would occur.
The drive for retrenchment began in Congress in the wake of 
Crawford's gloomy report. The first moves against the War Department 
were tentative, but the congressmen putting retrenchment into action 
against the department were all easily identifiable as friends of the 
Secretary of the Treasury: Lewis Williams of North Carolina, John Floyd
of Virginia, and John Cocke and Newton Cannon of Tennessee. By the 
first of the year, Eldred Simkins, who held Calhoun's old seat from 
Abbeville and who was one of Calhoun's past law students, wrote to 
Calhoun's cousin, Patrick Noble, that it looked as though the main
21John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, August 15, 1819, Calhoun 
Papers, 4:249.
22See Crawford's report, dated December 10, 1819, m  U. S.,
Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 719-723.
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contenders for the presidency in 1824 were already limbering up their 
batteries. The importance of this intelligence for Calhoun was evident 
to Simkins: "Crawford s Adams both appear very friendly to Calhoun per­
sonally, but the friends of the first show a spiteful spirit towards the 
War. Dept, almost constantly." There was every prospect that the defense
of the nation could be "prostrated" by the combination of retrenchment
23
and presidential maneuverings.
Newton Cannon and John Cocke were the most active congressmen in 
their pursuit of military retrenchment. Just two days after Simkins had 
complained of the activities of Crawford's friends in Congress, Cannon 
moved that the House Committee on Military Affairs consider suspending 
appropriations altogether for coastal defenses, and Cocke devoted him­
self to stopping the Yellowstone expedition by denying little more than
24operating money to the Quartermaster's accounts in the War Department.
This business was put aside for the time being in late January
as the concerns of the House of Representatives turned to the admission
of Missouri to the Union. It was not until the middle of March that the
opponents of the military establishment were able to return to the attack.
On March 8, Newton Cannon introduced a bill to reduce the army to five
thousand men, and it was no trick for Cannon to link reduction with
retrenchment. He told his fellow congressmen:
It might appear a little astonishing to the people of this country 
that, notwithstanding the vast revenue that had been brought into 
the public Treasury, from various sources, since the termination of
23Eldred Simkins to Patrick Noble, January 8, 1820, Calhoun 
Papers, 4:560.
24U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 891, 936.
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the late war, to find that we are unable to meet the current demands 
against the Government; that such has been the extravagance of our 
public expenditures on this Military Establishment, as well as others 
equally useless or unnecessary, that there now seems to be a deficit 
to the amount of five millions of dollars, and this too during a 
time when we are enjoying the most perfect peace and boasted pros­
perity.^
Cannon's proposed bill stirred army supporters to action. A few 
days after William Lowndes1 Committee on Foreign Relations proposed 
that Congress virtually order President Monroe to seize Florida by force, 
but Lowndes had no thought that the recommendation would pass the House. 
Even though Lowndes protested that he would vote for such a bill him­
self, it was widely said that he had merely meant to excite the House 
to foreign dangers in order to help Calhoun's military appropriations 
requests through. John Quincy Adams thought that this was the case, and 
since Lowndes and Calhoun were very close friends, it was a reasonable 
assumption to make.2^
At the same time, Eldred Simkins championed the War Department 
and the military establishment on the floor of the House, using some of 
the very same arguments which Calhoun had employed five years before.
"Can a single gentleman in the House," he asked, "believe that ten 
millions of enlightened freemen are endangered by an army of ten thousand
men, divided at eighty-five posts, and spread over a space of several
27
thousand miles? I will not discuss the proposition." Furthermore, 
said Simkins, the army was no longer the band of idlers which had so
25Ibid., p. 1598.
26Adams, Diary, 5:16-17, 34: and U. S. Annals of Congress,
16th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1618-1620.
21
‘u. S., Annals of Congress, 16th. Cong., 1st sess., p. 1610.
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drained the treasury in past years: "The camp of your army will not be
a seat of idleness and corruption, if it is properly organized and 
judiciously attended to? and is it not true, that your soldiers are
already employed in constructing valuable roads; in raising provision
28 *for their support."
The vote on money for fortifications came up on March 14. Josiah
Butler of New Hampshire gave the final speech for the anti-military
forces. His remarks were illustrative of the general unease in Congress
about several problems, not the least of which was the growing power of
the executive branch. Butler said:
Now our Treasury is empty, we are required to increase this expendi­
ture $300,000. You are told that contracts are made; that the 
Secretary wants the money; that he must have it; nothing less than 
the demands will do. This plea of necessity you have at every 
session. If you propose a reduction of the expenditures, you are 
charged with want of confidence in the departments. Thus, sir. you 
are the humble servant of the Executive. Passing appropriation bills 
has become a matter of course. It is even considered uncivil to 
hesitate in giving the sum demanded. . . .  If you propose a reduc­
tion of the Army, there is a cry of war, and a war bill is laid on 
your table. If you propose to abolish the Military Academy, that 
sink of dissipation, you are told that military science will be for­
gotten, and martial spirit and ardor will become extinct in your 
country. If you propose to stay your hand in fortifying your 
extensive coast and building islands in the sea, large specks of 
war are seen, your cities will be demolished, unless the work is 
done without delay. Sir, your expenditures are increasing faster 
than your revenues.29
Despite Butler's rather accurate portrayal of the importunity of 
the executive branches, the fortifications moneys were voted by a large 
margin: 103 to 51.^ Among the fifty-one dissenting votes was a
phalanx of men determined somehow to reduce the military establishment 
if they could. Not yet strong enough to force a reduction immediately,
28 29 30
Ibid. Ibid., p. 1636. Ibid.
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the best that they could do was to pass, nearly at the end of the session, 
a resolution calling upon Calhoun for a plan to reduce the army to six 
thousand men.^
Calhoun took all of this with seeming equanimity. He did not
think, as his young friend Simkins obviously did, that there was any
move afoot in Congress against him. Discussing the attacks on the
Missouri (or Yellowstone) expedition with Micah Sterling of New York,
Calhoun said that he could not believe "that the vote in the House . . .
had much relation to me individually. The real cause, will principally
32
be found in the state of the Treasury." This, of course, was before 
the House resolved to demand a plan for army reduction at the end of the 
session. But still, Calhoun did not waver in his opinion that he was 
not the target of these votes even after the resolution on reduction was 
passed. He further miscalculated the depth of the panic and its conse­
quent effects on the War Department, particularly those expansive 
programs that he had begun. He ascribed the vote on the Yellowstone
expedition to the "accidental state of publick affairs at the time that
33
the vote was taken." He told Andrew Jackson that he hoped that "a
34better state of feelings will exist in Congress at the next session."
After the resolution was passed Calhoun told the general that the move 
was undoubtedly due to the "low state of the Treasury;" still, he thought
^The resolution was agreed to on May 11, 1820. A roll call vote 
was not taken. See ibid., pp. 2232-2233.
32
John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, April 15, 1820, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:40.
34
John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, March 27, 1820, Calhoun 
Papers, 4:735.
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it was probable that "Congress will not reduce the Army [sic]." No
"sound mind," Calhoun thought, would really consider such a reduction 
35proper.
II
The military men of the United States watched all this congres­
sional activity closely. General Jacob Brown, then in Washington, was 
rather more gloomy on what the session portended for the army than his 
Secretary of War. In January, 1820, Brown wrote to Joseph Swift in 
New York; the major general thought that the anti-military sentiments in 
Congress had more to do with Andrew Jackson than the army itself, but he 
presumed that some sort of alteration would be made in the military estab­
lishment as a result of hostility toward Jackson. Brown wrote:
You must not consider the vote taken upon the Army as indicating the 
sentiments of the national legislature on this subject. The 
deliberations of Congress upon the military peace establishment will,
I confidently believe, result in an organization that can be 
approved by military men. As I write to you in great confidence I 
may venture to say that much of the opposition to the Army grows 
out of the deadly hostility of some of the members to the Hero of 
New Orleans— this interest has been joined by many others hostile 
to the Exec. Govmt. [sic] the Army or any of its permanent officers. 
. . .  I consider it next to impossible that the Bill [sic] you have 
seen or anything like it can become a lav;— Even the majority of 
the House of Representatives do not expect or desire this— But there 
is, I fear, a fixed determination at all hazards to legislate 
Genl [sic] Jackson out of the service. The Pres, [sic] and Sec. on
1 O C  1
this point find it a duty to yield.
Brown's solicitude for the army is not difficult to fathom. He 
had faced reduction before, and so had every other officer who had served
^John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, June 1, 1820, ibid., 5:164. 
36Jacob Brown to Joseph G. Swift, January 25, 1820, Swift Papers.
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since the War of 1812. The American military establishment had, in fact, 
been confronted with the threat of extinction since it had come into 
being. For the intelligent and observant officer, the continuing exist­
ence of his institution was always in the balance; for the politician who
favored a standing army, the problem was how the republic could fashion 
a military establishment which enhanced rather than endangered democracy. 
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the most astute of 
America's military men were extremely sensitive to political trends and 
that they had evolved a sophisticated response over the years to this 
very problem.
Their response was known as the "expansible," or "skeleton" army. 
Put simply, an expansible army was a peacetime military establishment
arranged so that it could mobilize just by calling for recruits. The
organization of an expansible army— the general staff, command structure, 
order of battle, and logistical systems— theoretically remained constant 
in peace or war. The substance of the army— the number of men in actual 
service— varied according to the military requirements of the nation.
When war approached, a skeleton army stood ready to receive levees who 
would complement the standing forces to battle strength. If all went 
well, only the number of private soldiers in each company would change.
This concept is hardly exotic today, but on the eve of the War 
of 1812, the United States Army was organized virtually in the face of 
the enemy. An expansible army, by contrast, bespoke a degree of readi­
ness that the pell-mell army did not have. Command duties increased 
only by degree; there was little qualitative difference between leading 
a company composed of one hundred than one of fifty. This kind of army 
was more efficient economically; the cost of maintaining it during
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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peacetime, it was argued, was more than offset by a prompt resistance 
which prevented early enemy depredations while an unprepared army 
mobilized. Moreover, it was less costly to fill up an existing organi­
zation than to build one anew on the eve of a war.
But these military and economic benefits were no more important 
than the fact that this was a concept which was politically feasible in 
the United States. In a nation long wary of standing armies, an expan­
sible army did not threaten the nation or the liberties of its citizens. 
At the same time, it provided a modicum of protection that, for all its 
suspicions, the nation could not profitably neglect. The expansible 
army was therefore the smallest effective army possible for the republic. 
Its power, potentially great, could be adjusted as political sentiments 
demanded. It was the next evolution in military organization and policy 
for a new nation anxious to protect the fruits of its progress.
Scholars have credited Calhoun with the invention of the expan- 
37sible army concept. Calhoun’s friends considered his proposal for this
38
kind of army as one of his most noteworthy acts in the War Office. But 
the concept of the expansible army antedates Calhoun's period in the War 
Department by some years, and earlier references to this unique military
37Calhoun's most authoritative biographer says that the expan­
sible army had been on Calhoun's mind since 1815, but there is nothing 
in the Calhoun Papers to support this conclusion. Calhoun was present 
during the debates on the peacetime army in 1815, and he took the admin­
istration line there, but he did not refer then or in the years succeeding 
to an expansible army. See Wiltse, Calhoun, p. 224; and U. S., Annals of 
Congress, 13th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 1215-1217.
38One need only consult Calhoun's own correspondence between 
1821 and 1824 to see how importantly both he and his friends regarded 
this plan. Throughout, Calhoun never hinted that the expansible army 
plan he had presented to Congress had any precedents at all. See, for 
instance, Andrew Jackson to John C. Calhoun, January 4, 1821, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:528.
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idea suggest that it was a well developed concept by 1817. Calhoun 
became an expositor of the expansible army concept, but it was by no 
means original with him.
Richard H. Kohn has recently pointed out that William Heath 
recommended such a concept to George Washington while the future presi­
dent was writing his "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment" in 1783. Con­
tending with many of the same problems Calhoun would be facing forty
years later, Washington also sought, in Kohn's words, "the bare minimum,
39politically feasible army." Aside from the actual numbers involved,
General Washington devised a kind of army which, he said, "will give us a
Number of Officers well skilled in the Theory and Art of War, who will be
ready on any occasion, to mix and diffuse their knowledge of Discipline
to other Corps, without that lapse of Time, which . . . would be necessary
40
to bring intire [sic] new Corps."
It is reasonable to expect that the merits of this concept from 
the military professional's point of view could not go unheeded. It was 
a rational concept which took into account the anti-military proclivities 
of the nation as well as the need for some sort of army. That an expan­
sible army was not created along with the republic simply indicates the 
depth of anti-military feeling at the time; in no wise was the concept 
itself degraded. It remained a favorite response of army advocates to
39Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 45-46.
40
George Washington, "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,"
May 2, 1783, The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manu­
script Sources, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick, 39 vols. (Washington, D. C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1931-1944; reprint ed., West­
port, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), 26:374-400.
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the threat of military retrenchment, for in a sense it was timeless, 
having more to do with political climate than with military danger.
James Monroe believed in 1815 that the time was propitious to 
bring the concept into play once more. Peace was at hand in February of 
that year. One of the first questions before Congress after Ghent was 
announced was the adjustment of the American military establishment to 
fit the new peaceful situation. There was no danger that the army would 
be abolished altogether, and Secretary of War Monroe pondered the next 
logical question: if there was to be an army, what kind would be allowed
In a letter to Senator William Branch Giles, Monroe argued for a twenty 
thousand man army, an army which he probably knew the House of Represen­
tatives would never approve. In the course of his remarks to Giles, 
Monroe wrote:
Two modes have occurred by which to regulate the reduction [of the 
army]. One by retaining the skeleton of every corps now in service, 
dismissing as many officers and men in each as will reduce the estab­
lishment to the proposed number, the other by reducing the number of 
regiments, down to that standard.
A few days before Monroe's letter to Giles, General Swift visited
him. The subject of reduction was discussed, and later Swift recalled
that "the general idea of Congress seemed to be to reduce the army to a
42
standard upon which an army of fifty thousand men might be engrafted." 
Following Monroe's proposal to Giles, Congressman George M. Troup of the 
Committee on Military Affairs put the plan to his colleagues in some 
detail, arguing for the retention of "skeletons of regiments" at the very
41
James Monroe to William Branch Giles, February 22, 1815,
Monroe Papers LC.
42Swift, Memoirs, p. 137.
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43least. But the bill fixing the military peace establishment did not
44
reflect the proposal; it summarily cut the army to ten thousand men.
Apparently it was only the reluctance of the Senate to cut the
army more that prevented the House from going even lower; proposals were
45heard in the House which went as low as five thousand men. The bill
of 1815 was therefore a compromise between the two houses of Congress.
Army officers were watchful of any move in Congress thereafter to reduce
further the military establishment as the passage of time made it clear
that foreign dangers were subsiding.
At leaS't one professional soldier perceived a threat of further
reduction late in 1817. As the first session of the Fifteenth Congress
opened in December, Brigadier General Winfield Scott suspected that the
army was due for a reduction of some kind. Newspaper articles did
46
appear that month which alluded to military reorganization. Scott was
anxious that Congress was about to look closely at the army once more.
The letter that Scott dispatched to the War Department on
December 16 would have startled the newly appointed Calhoun, had he
actually received it; but there is some doubt that the new Secretary of
47War ever saw Scott's letter. It contained a plan, unsolicited by 
Calhoun (or anyone else), to reduce the army in accord with the expan­
sible army concept. There is no record that Calhoun replied to Scott on 
this matter or ever acknowledged that he had seen the proposal. For
43U. S., Annals of Congress, 13th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 1196-1197.
44 45
Ibid., pp. 1272-1273. Ibid., pp. 1196-1216.
46Niles- Weekly Register, December 20, 1817.
47Winfield Scott to John C. Calhoun, December 16, 1817, Letters 
Received, SWMA. See also, pp. 267-268, below.
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reasons which will become clear, Scott's letter bears going into. The 
letter was hastily written, but the plan the general proposed was as 
detailed an exposition of an expansible army as Calhoun later saw. In 
an apologetic tone, Scott assured the Secretary that if he had had time 
to develop his arguments properly, he would not have marked them "confi­
dential." He nonetheless offered this plan, he said, because he had
seen "that a disposition exists in The [sic] House of Representatives
48
to reduce and otherwise modify the army."
Although he thought that the army was already too small for its 
mission, Scott believed that "if reduction be resolved on, the parts the 
least essential should doubtlessly be the first [lopped?]." When Scott 
wrote, the army was composed of eight regiments of infantry, one regi­
ment of riflemen, and one corps each of light and regular artillery. He 
thought first of all that the rifle regiment could be converted into a 
ninth infantry regiment and that two companies could be added to each of 
the new regiments. These extra companies would act as "flank" companies, 
serving as riflemen or grenadiers. To lend authority to this scheme,
Scott observed that "this organization is believed to be the most perfect
49that has yet been devised. It is that of France at present."
Having outlined the new military organization, Scott turned next 
to the actual number of reduction. The ideal combat strength of a 
company was one hundred men; Scott proposed that company strength be 
reduced to fifty-five privates and a small non-commissioned cadre. If 
similar arrangements could be made in the two corps of artillery, Scott 
estimated, 1,690 men could be trimmed from the rolls without deranging
48_, . 49 . .Ibid. Ibid.
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the army organization. This was the foundation of Scott's plan. He 
wrote:
In this view it is hoped that the present number of companies may 
not be diminished, because on that number depends the capacity of 
the base for the reception of a war establishment. I will rather 
hope that this base will be enlarged altho' the total of the army 
should be reduced. The enlargement might take place in the infantry 
without any augmentation of the rank & file or rather or aggregate
[sic] & the reduction be made in the rank and file o £ tiiG other
  50corps.J
By this method, Scott argued, "the aggregate of the new regiment[s]
will be precisely that of the old— at the same time the base for the
51reception of a war establishment is one fifth greater!"
Eventually Calhoun would be exposed to the ideas contained in 
Scott's 1817 proposal, but the Secretary of War would not know that they 
were the general's. The distinction of being the first to acquaint 
Calhoun with the merits of an expansible army belongs to Christopher 
Vandeventer.
On January 16, 1818, one month after Scott made his proposal to 
Calhoun, Vandeventer composed a memorandum for his chief on this very 
subject. A comparison of the texts of the two plans reveals considerable 
agreement between them. Scott's and Vandeventer's plans, in fact, were 
the same. In Vandeventer's memorandum grammatical indiscretions which 
appeared in Scott's proposal were corrected, but in content and form, both 
proposals were identical. There were no references to Scott's plan in 
Vandeventer's memorandum.^
51t,Ioid. Ibid.
52Christopher Vandeventer to John C. Calhoun, January 16, 1818, 
Vandeventer Papers. There is, in fact, so much agreement between Scott's 
and Vandeventer's proposals, that only one conclusion may be drawn. As 
one of many examples, compare the following passages; from Scott's 
letter of December 16, 1817: "It is believed that the peace establishment
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After Calhoun left the War Office some years later, a dispute 
arose between Generals Brown and Jesup over which of the two was the 
first to educate Calhoun to the possibilities of the expansible army 
concept. Both men claimed the honor, but it was by then fairly well
known, as one of Calhoun's friends said, that "VandeVenter [sic] . . .
53
was the first who laid before you the project of the Central Staff."
This means that Calhoun actually saw Vandeventer1s memorandum, because 
both Scott and the chief clerk extended their comments to that subject 
in their proposals as well. What Calhoun actually saw in January, 1818, 
was a plan plagiarized by his chief clerk from the letter of a general 
who, disturbed by rumors and preferring to believe the worst, hurriedly 
produced a way to blunt the effect of yet another army reduction. It
seems clear enough that Vandeventer had taken Scott's plan and passed it
54
off as his own. As far as can be told, Calhoun was never the wiser.
General Scott had misread congressional intentions in 1817; an 
enlarged military establishment could still be tolerated. Perhaps Scott 
did take alarm unnecessarily, but he knew that army reduction was always 
possible in the United States during peacetime. That he concocted a plan
is already too small for the objects to which it is applied or for which 
it is intended: nevertheless if reduction be resolved on, the parts the
least essential should doubtlessly be the first [lopped?];" and from 
Vandeventer's memorandum: "It is believed that the peace establishment
is too small for the objects for which it is intended; nevertheless if 
Congress determine to reduce it, the parts the least essential should be 
discarded."
53Virgil Maxey to John C. Calhoun, March 2, 1827, Jameson, Cor­
respondence , 2:791-792.
54Despite the fact that Vandeventer eventually became involved in 
the Rip Rap scandal, the chief clerk never lost favor in Calhoun's eyes. 
In the middle of the presidential campaign, Calhoun used a trip to Balti­
more to attend Vandeventer's wedding in order to meet several political 
confederates. See John C. Calhoun to Samuel L. Gouverneur, October 4, 
1823, Calhoun Papers, 8:299.
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like this in so short a time suggests that the expansible army concept 
already had some currency among American military thinkers. Such was 
the nature of the plan that it could be held in readiness, an answer to 
the periodic dismantling of an army that served political requirements 
so well and the national defense so poorly. On the whole, however, 
Scott’s fears were needless. It was true that the army was larger than 
normal for peacetime, but military dangers had not yet disappeared by 
the time Scott wrote. General Gaines was fighting in the south, soon to 
be joined by General Jackson; Spain's reaction could not be estimated. 
There was no financial crisis to threaten government expenditures; 
revenues were still high enough for Congress to have abolished taxes 
without apprehension. For the time being, there was no political turmoil 
in which the army could serve as an issue. A certain residue of mock 
good will existed among the politicos, sufficient at least to create the 
image of partisan harmony.
All this had changed by the summer of 1820, of course. Secretary
Calhoun began soliciting advice on the reduction of the army from his
senior officers. Between July, 1820, and the fall the Secretary received
memoranda from Generals Brown, Jackson, Gaines, Macomb, Scott, and 
55Jesup. Each of these men thought that the problem they faced had less 
to do with the army's practicality than with its political acceptability.
55Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, October 6, 1820; Andrew Jackson 
to John C. Calhoun, August 9, 1820; Edmund P. Gaines to John C. Calhoun, 
July 27, 1820, ibid., 5:377-380, 317-319, 293-296. See also Alexander 
Macomb to John C. Calhoun, September 30, 1820; and Winfield Scott to 
John C. Calhoun, August 20, 1820, Letters Received, SWMA. The plans of 
Macomb and Scott are calendared in the Calhoun Papers; the references 
above contain the complete plans, with accompanying charts.
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Like Calhoun these generals to a man professed surprise that the congress­
men were willing to go so far against the new army. The generals believed 
that the congressmen's thinking was out of fashion: they were looking at 
the old army when the resolution was passed. The professional army could 
hardly be so undeserving of their support.^ Thus when they wrote their 
reports, the generals began by answering a question which had not been 
asked. The generals argued for the survival of the army, but the army's 
existence was not at stake. In a neat juxtaposition of the old Republi­
can creed, they insisted that if the new army were harried into obscurity,
57
liberty would be endangered all the same.
Having made their objections to any reduction at all, the generals 
considered next how, if reduction were unavoiadable, the disruption of 
the army could be minimized. Several of the plans argued for minor reor­
ganizations in the line and staff only. A recommendation common to all 
plans merged the- two branches of artillery, for instance. This merger 
meant, at least, that one full colonelcy would be created along with 
several more staff positions. None of this seemed to have much to do 
with reduction at first glance. But this proposal and several others of 
the same kind aimed for the same effect: the profc ition of the officer
corps from the dislocations that reduction were sure to bring. If some­
how the staff could be exempted from reduction, and if somehow more 
officers could be moved from line to staff positions, the best of the
^Thomas Jesup to John C. Calhoun, March 31, 1820, and John C. 
Calhoun to Jacob Brown, July 21, 1820, Calhoun Papers, 4:744-745, 5:274.
57 ■ .Andrew Jackson to John C. Calhoun, August 9, 1820, ibid.,
5:317. Jackson was dismayed that there was some prospect for the army 
other than "a gradual annual increase."
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officer corps could be preserved. In such an interest, then, the 
generals who reported to Calhoun during the latter half of 1820 construed 
the congressional resolution so that the officer corps, whatever the final 
reduction, would remain unscathed. This interpretation of Congress' 
resolution was entirely unwarranted, of course, but it did answer the 
most basic requirements of an expansible army concept. As General Scott 
pointed out again in 1820: "If reduction be unavoidable, the parts the
least useful should be sacrificed to those more so [Scott's italics].1,88
The congressional resolution had reawakened the officer corps' 
instinct for survival. In framing their reduction plans, the generals 
tested just how successfully the army had ingratiated itself with the 
republic. Calhoun's efforts since taking office had been directed toward 
that very end; if in fact the military establishment had been made poli­
tically defensible, then perhaps the officer corps (or more narrowly, the 
staff) could be exempted from the evils of retrenchment, just as their
58This passage is based upon a "composite" view of the generals' 
reduction plans. Of the whole set of recommendations, Jackson and Gaines 
seemed less emphatic about the keeping of an officer corps at the expense 
of the rest of the army. Gaines bitterly told Calhoun that it was better 
to dismantle the army altogether if it was to become only a token force. 
The generals of the Northern Division and the War Office, however, were 
the most insistent that the officer corps not be reduced at all. For 
Scott's comment, see Winfield Scott to John C. Calhoun, August 20, 1820, 
Letters Received, SWMA. Once again, Scott's plan was one of the more 
extensive of those which Calhoun received, and it bore a marked resem­
blance to his 1817 plan which Calhoun had seen with Vandeventer's help.
See also note 55, above.
As for the generals' interesting interpretation of the congres­
sional resolution, the preservation of the staff or, indeed, any other 
part of the army was not comprehended by the resolution. When the vote 
was taken in early May, 1820, Samuel Smith of Maryland attempted to alter 
the resolution so that it read only "six thousand— exclusive of officers." 
Lewis Williams of North Carolina rushed forward to re-amend the resolu­
tion, apparently seeing what Smith was about, so that the entire army 
would stand at 6,000 men, officers and all. See these final moves in 
U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2233-2234.
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brother officers in the Corps of Engineers had been since 1815. Need­
less to say, the actual number of soldiers in suclT^iPari^4^ - .U££V_ nearly 
irrelevant to this design.
While the generals of the army were pondering their fate, Calhoun 
was thinking about his own. By the middle of the summer Calhoun had 
decided that right-thinking congressmen would not countenance another 
reduction of the army, but he was anxious to arrange the affairs of the 
department so as to "present nothing at the next session, which will
59
enable those opposed to our Military institutions to take any advantage."
On August 15 Calhoun began a long-needed rest and tour of the
60
northern states, ostensibly to examine military defenses m  that region.
He was gone nearly two months from Washington and went as far north as 
Montreal; it was a "very pleasant and useful excursion," he thought.^ 
While the Secretary was gone, his young friend and staunch supporter in 
Congress, Eldred Simkins, carefully monitored his progress through New 
York and Pennsylvania. In September Simkins wrote to Christopher Vande­
venter, who was acting Secretary of War in Calhoun's absence:
Will you be so very obliging as to inform me particularly by the 
return of mail what papers or journals in the State of N. York 
are friendly to Mr. Calhoun, & more especially those (if any) which 
would be favorable to his future political rise and ascendance?
. . . It wd [sic] seem that Mr. Crawford's friends are of opinion 
that they had gotten rid of Calhoun, by calling him a man of genius, 
a very growing character, but too young.* C and others, a little 
more ill natured, say he would [illegible] with his army.— They also
5:274.
59John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, July 21, 1820, Calhoun Papers,
60Christopher Vandeventer to James Monroe, August 15, 1820,
ibid., 5:330. 
61John C. Calhoun to John Ewing Colhoun, October 23, 1820, ibid.,
5:408.
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say (I mean the ill natured class) that he is a visionary chimerical 
politician. . . .
*Remember that by the 4 March 1825 he will be about 42 years of 
age— Pitt, governed [sic] the Parliament at about 25.62
How is one to regard Simkins' candid solicitude? It is evident 
that Simkins felt that Calhoun was presidential material, and his frank­
ness with Vandeventer indicated that the subject was not a new one to 
the chief clerk. Just how much Simkins' letter reveals about Calhoun's 
presidential ambitions at this point remains an open question. The most 
that can be said is that by September, 1820, some of Calhoun's closest 
friends thought he could be president in 1824, and that they believed 
firmly that the congressional friends of William Crawford were already 
trying to eliminate Calhoun as a possible candidate by demolishing the 
army. If on the other hand one views Calhoun's actions in the most cyni­
cal light, the Secretary's northern tour was a political reconnaissance, 
calculated to measure the sources of possible support in the wake of the 
Missouri debates and financial crisis of the previous year. Unfortunately, 
cynicism seems to be the best guide for the student of the election of 
1824. Whatever the case, the Simkins letter is the first extant evidence 
which suggests strongly that Calhoun was preparing for the presidency 
even before President Monroe was elected for his final term and was doing 
so a year or more before that fact was generally known.
Eldred Simkins to Christopher Vandeventer, September 11, 1820, 
Vandeventer Papers. This is just one of several pieces from this col­
lection which have never been used before. I do not wish to hedge on 
the importance I assign to this source; had not scholars been ignorant 
of this letter, I believe it would have materially altered the interpre­
tation of Calhoun's activities during this period. I believe it 
indicates that Calhoun was seriously considering the presidency over a 
year before previous scholarship has argued that his ambitions took 
shape.
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After his return to Washington the Secretary's complacency began 
to moderate. He wrote to his old friend Charles Tait (who was neverthe­
less a friend of Crawford's) that "our political horizon[s] present no
63reason to expect a storm." Yet less than two weeks later Calhoun told
Samuel Ingham in Pennsylvania: "Your opinion, that the storm will next
turn in this direction concurs with my own; provided any point be pre-
64
sented with the least hope of success."
Calhoun thought that he could ride the storm out. He counted on 
Congress' providing for a loan if revenues were still too far below 
expenditures. There was no doubt but that a retrenchment-minded Congress 
would be able to see clearly the savings already made in the War Depart­
ment, and he estimated that the department would need no more than five 
million dollars out of a total government expenditure of sixteen million 
dollars. He was even willing to concede that some sort of reduction 
could be made in the army, but beyond a minimal dislocation, he said, "I 
would hesitate much."^5 He was at this moment working upon his expan­
sible army report.
By November 12 the outlines of his report to Congress had taken 
shape. The Secretary gave Jacob Brown a preview of what he intended to 
recommend:
I am strongly inclined to think, that if the Army should be reduced 
as proposed, still the officers both of the line & staff, ought to 
be retained with very few exceptions. I know this will not suit 
the wishes of many both in & out of Congress, yet, as I have always
63John C. Calhoun to Charles Tait, October 26, 1820, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:414.
64John C. Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, November 6, 1820, ibid.,
5:425-426.
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found it preferable to discharge my duties faithfully without 
regard to unjust clamor, I am of the opinion, that a regard to the 
same principles, will in this case induce me to shape my report so 
as to make but little derangement in the existing establishment. I 
still hope that even the rank & file will not be touched.^6
While Calhoun polished his report, General Brown (and no doubt 
other officers as well) was calculating every advantage that the army 
could win for itself in the short time that remained before Congress 
took up the reduction question once more. Having learned that the Maine 
congressional delegation was, as Brown put it, "less friendly to the 
Army than, perhaps, they would [be] if an additional military Force was 
ordered to that State," he frankly appealed to Calhoun for military 
pork-barrel; Brown continued, "Their new condition naturally tends to 
increase their pretentions [sic], and comprising as they do a most impor­
tant Flank of the Confederacy I think it will be seen that their claims 
to some additional national Troops, and Fortifications, are not unreason­
able .1,67
One week into the second session of the Sixteenth Congress, the
batteries of retrenchment opened up on the War Department once again.
John Cocke of Tennessee moved that the House instruct the Committee on
68
Military Affairs to discuss the expediency of reducing the army. 
Crawford's report on the state of the nation's finances followed shortly. 
The Secretary of the Treasury estimated that the coming year's deficit
66John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, November 12, 1820, ibid.,
5:432.
67
'Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, November 14, 1820, ibid., 
5:436-437.
68U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 2d sess., p. 444.
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would be even more severe than that of the year before; he put the figure
at $7,452,000. Coincidentally, the estimate which Crawford gave for
69
projected military expenditures was $7,445,000. The similarity of 
these two figures, it seems, did not escape general notice, and certainly 
not Calhoun's; both figures quoted by Secretary Crawford were far off 
the mark.
Calhoun sent his report on the expansible army to Congress some 
eleven days later, on December 12, 1820.^ The Secretary of War readily 
adopted the sum and substance of his generals' recommendations. Cal­
houn's report was perhaps more elegantly phrased, and pretended to more 
high-mindedness than those of the officers, but certainly the expansible 
army concept which it contained was not a Calhoun creation. One might 
be moved to grant that Calhoun recognized a good idea when he saw one; 
and as has been pointed out, the concept had the crucial merit of adapta­
bility to the republic's needs, especially at this time. But even if 
Calhoun had been disposed to extensive military retrenchment, there 
would have been little profit in opposing his own military constituency; 
there certainly would have been no commensurate gain in his congressional 
popularity and by this time Calhoun knew it. He was not, of course, 
favorable to what he called "false economy." Calhoun believed that the 
principles for which he and his generals stood were immutable. And prin­
ciples of military nationalism, he felt, were not fit subjects for 
partisan bartering.
69Ibid., p. 493. Figures are rounded off to the nearest thousand
70The discussion of the expansible army which follows is based 
upon Calhoun's remarks and the charts attached in "Reduction of the Army, 
December 12, 1820, ASPMA, 2:188-198. The text of Calhoun's message may 
be found in John C. Calhoun to John W. Taylor, December 12, 1820, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:480-491.
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Unlike his generals, the Secretary wasted no time arguing for a 
standing army; he observed that the resolution at least took that much 
for granted. He was more interested in the character that the new army 
would assume and the principles which governed its maintenance. Knowing 
that the question before him was no longer the old one of militia versus 
standing army, Calhoun was not hesitant about expressing his preference 
for the latter. Friends of the militia, therefore, saw no defense of 
that institution in Calhoun's remarks. Instead, the Secretary's jaundiced 
view of the militia, confined until now in his private correspondence, 
assumed full expression. In Calhoun's opinion the rapid advancement of 
the science of war had passed the militia by; at the most, they could 
serve as auxiliaries to the Regular Army or as a sort of home or terri­
torial guard. It was as sweeping an attack on military amateurism as had 
ever been delivered in the United States by a public official; the fact 
that Calhoun made it at this particular time indicates that there was no
longer a serious competition between military professionalism and mili- 
71
tary amateurism.
The foundation of Calhoun's plan, like those of his generals,
was premised upon retaining the officer corps very nearly intact. That
corps, educated and trained in peacetime, was the essential difference
between an armed crowd and an effective defense, Calhoun said. This
being so, Calhoun devoted the majority of his report to convincing
Congress that somehow the officer corps should be preserved and presenting
72.
a plan which did so.
71, .. 72., ..Ibid. Ibid.
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What Calhoun actually recommended to Congress was an amalgam of
the different plans he had received earlier in the year. The generals
had been so well agreed in their plans that Calhoun really did not have
to choose between them. Under Calhoun's proposal, the rifle regiment
would merge with the infantry, making nine infantry regiments in all.
The light and heavy artillery would be merged also and absorb the old
Ordnance department to form a Corps of Artillery, which for the first
time, would have a chief and staff. Officers of this new branch would
rotate between the three different elements of the corps, learning the
techniques of each. Both the artillery and infantry companies would be
maintained far below combat strength: an artillery company would be com-
7
prised of 64 non-commissioned officers and men, an infantry company, 37.
Calhoun took this opportunity to try to fill out the general 
staff by recommending the creation of a Judge Advocate General, a pro­
posal he had made in 1818 and which had been refused even then. This 
post would fill out a complement of general officers supervising the 
distinct branches of the Regular Army, all of whom would be located in 
Washington under the control of the Secretary. Thus, in Calhoun's plan 
there were three distinct parts of the army: the general staff, the
artillery, and the infantry. Charts accompanying Calhoun's report 
showed that this army would total 6,391 officers and men after reorgani­
zation. These charts were incorrect: including the 737 officers in the
staff and the line the total number of men in this new army would be more 
than 7,000 men. This expansible army had become expanded indeed: 
between the congressional resolution and Calhoun's report, it had
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
increased by 1,000 men. Gliding over the mathematical error in the
charts, Calhoun estimated that simply by augmenting this skeletal struc-
74
ture, a wartime force could be raised quickly to a level of 20,000 men.
The report was the signal for the anti-army forces to gather in
Congress, and they were considerable. Crawford's erroneous treasury
report did not so much initiate this undercurrent of feeling as reinforce
it. "Our good, & pure Republicans of Virginia & elsewhere are displeased
with the military parade, as they call it, the same smelling strong of
75
Monarchy & military Govt, [sic]," observed Rufus King. Even before
Calhoun delivered his report, Newton Cannon was protesting the Military
Academy's expenses again, hoping either to eliminate the institution or
76curtail its operations altogether. Congressman Cocke rammed through a
resolution asking for a new report from Calhoun on the Johnson con- 
77tract. By all evidence it seemed that the army question would be 
forced into debate early in the session.
Army officers watched ejqpectantly as retrenchment-minded 
congressmen made their first moves and persuaded themselves that the 
worst could not happen. Out in Missouri Henry Atkinson wrote to General 
Jesup:
I have at no time before been under much apprehension of a reduc­
tion, and I think if the Army escapes a triming [sic] down by the 
present effort we may look to something like permanency. In 
revolving the matter over in my mind I do not see how Congress is
7^See the chart marked "A," in ibid., 5:191-192.
75Rufus King to Christopher Gore, December 1, 1820, King Corre­
spondence , 6:364.
76U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 502-503.
77Ibid., pp. 473-476.
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very easily to begin a reduction. Genl [sic] Jackson is the 
favorite of the South & West & Cenl [sic] Brown of the North &
East, and if they reduce at all one of these gentlemen must go out.
If neither party yields the Army may escape.^®
From his headquarters in upstate New York General Brown had seen
Calhoun's report to Congress by the end of December. Brown thought that
it was all that it should have been, but he told the Secretary that he
79
still "most anxiously hope[d] that the Army will not be reduced." The
general thought that any reduction would have a "demoralizing influence."
Besides, Brown argued, the army had real value now in peacetime: "Let
us erect as many military works, improve as many roads, & cultivate as
much land as you please. Such labours will improve the moral & physical
powers of the military establishment & aid much in sustaining this most
80
important arm of the country."
The debate on the military peace establishment began in earnest
in early January, 1821. The pro-War Department forces were led by the
ineffectual Alexander Smyth of Virginia and Eldred Simkins. Simkins
began, on January 4, by accusing Newton Cannon of harassing Calhoun by
calling for information on the Military Academy. Cannon's repeated
demands for reports from the War Department amounted to little more than
a tactic "calculated to give needless trouble to the public officers,"
81said Simkins. Smyth was the chairman of the Committee on Military 
affairs, and his loyalty was suspect since he had been appointed by
78Henry Atkinson to Thomas Jesup, December 27, 1820, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:516.
79Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, December 30, 1820, ibid.,
5:518.
Ibid.
81U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 2d sess., p. 735.
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Crawford partisan John W. Taylor of New York, the Speaker of the House.
Nevertheless, Smyth managed an able defense of the army by maligning the
militia. He told the House:
The militia are a portion of the people; and we should remember that 
the regular troops are also a portion of the people. We are apt to 
view the latter as if they were strangers. It is the difference of 
organization that constitutes the difference between the militia 
and the regular troops in the service of the United States; both are 
composed of citizens; and the same man may alternatively serve in 
both.82
The militia, Smyth said, was not deserving of "the confidence of
the nation for carrying on war.i: They were expensive to maintain and
deranged the economy when they were called out. The Regular Army, said
83
Smyth, was everything the militia was not. Shortly afterward Simkins 
spoke again (and at length) in defense of an enlarged army, but aside 
from Smyth and Simkins only one other congressman, Alfred Cuthbert of 
Georgia,, spoke for the Calhoun proposals. Withal, it was a poor showing 
for the army.
It remained only for the leaders of the "economy" faction to 
state their case. Only a few days after Calhoun's report went to Con­
gress, Crawford had issued a correction of his earlier mistake in 
computing the deficit; because of the different methods of accounting in
the various departments, Crawford said, there had been an error in
84
reckoning the deficit of almost three million dollars. This statement 
went largely unnoticed during the army debates. Lewis Williams of North 
Carolina carried the retrenchment banner and cast most of his remarks 
against Calhoun personally. Williams declared:
fty QO
Ibid., p. 745. Ibid.
^Ibid., pp. 689-691.
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The Secretary of War . . . has invariably adhered to this branch of 
the Army [the officer corps] with wonderful tenacity. That he should 
have done so, in the report made at the present session, is, to me, 
a matter of perfect surprise. He knew well the condition of the 
Treasury; he knew there would be a deficit of several millions; he 
also knew that the officers materially contributed to the expense of 
supporting the Army, and, yet, after all this information, he gravely 
recommends that the officers should be retained. I should have sup­
posed that a very different course would have been pursued.
Aside from the economy argument, proponents of reduction concen­
trated on the most obvious shortcoming of Calhoun's report: the
secretary's attempt to save the officer corps from retrenchment.
Calhoun's response to the resolution had not, of course, been a straight­
forward one, and his attempt to circumvent the real sense of the 
resolution was pointed out on several occasions. One of the army's 
opponents paid a compliment to the Secretary of War for his audacity. 
Thomas Cobb of Georgia told the House that Calhoun's report was accept­
able except insofar as it retained the general staff. Notwithstanding 
this and other serious difficulties with Calhoun's proposals, Cobb said,
"I yet agree that it is the ablest, most ingenious, and, upon the whole, 
the best defence of a standing army in time of peace which I have seen
in print since the commencement of Mr. Adams' administration to the 
86present day." All that being so, Cobb concluded, "I can see no
87
utility in an army of officers." Lewis Williams claimed that "all 
have seemed to think, that the number of officers in the Army was unneces-
• i « „ 8 8sanly great.
On January 23, 1821, the House of Representatives voted 109 to
89
48 in favor of reducing the army, officers and all, to 6,000 men.
85
Ibid., p. 778.
86Ibid., p. 728.
87
Ibid., p. 729.
88Ibid., p. 778.
89Ibid., p. 937.
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Andrew Jackson, as General Brown had predicted he would be the year
before, was virtually legislated out of the service by a provision in
the bill that there be only one brigadier general in the service. The
light and heavy artillery were combined, as Calhoun had recommended, but
the Ordnance department remained a separate entity. A Judge Advocate
General was created (Calhoun had long wanted this) in the House version
90
of the bill, but the position was later excised in the Senate.
The one consolation to supporters of the army was that through­
out the debates in Congress, no one had advocated eliminating the military 
establishment. Apparently not even the retrenchment bloc was strong 
enough (or willing) to destroy the army. To Senator Mahlon Dickerson of 
New Jersey this was not a very consoling revelation. Dickerson told his 
fellow senators:
The exertions which have been made, and I fear successfully made, to 
produce a revolution in the public mind, upon the subject of standing 
armies in time of peace, I will confess, fill me with apprehension.
. . . The apathy of the people upon this subject, to judge from their 
silence, would indicate that their former jealousies of permanently 
standing armies, by some strange influence, had been put to rest 
forever
Once again, while considering provisions for West Point,
Dickerson worried aloud about the military influence in the United States
and how it had grown. He had no particular objection to the Military
Academy, Dickerson said, except "that it may enlist too many friends in
92
favor of standing armies."
Dickerson need not have bothered himself about the army's 
friends. Other observers agreed that pro-military forces had not been 
able to put up much of a fight. Rufus King found congressional affairs
90 91 92
Ibid., pp. 934-935. Ibid., p. 367. Ibid., p. 372.
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"in a most extraordinary condition." As the administration's programs
were being assailed daily by advocates of retrenchment, "no one offers
himself to explain or to support those measures wh. [sic] are supposed
93
to have the recommendations of the Extive. [sic]." William Plumer,
Jr., of New Hampshire agreed; he wrote to his father:
We have lately given a pretty strong proof of the little influence 
possessed, by the Administration, over the House of Representatives, 
by the passage of the Army bill— The Secretary of War & all his 
friends, in & out of doors, opposed it by every expedient in their 
power— The President was known to be against it— & probably other 
members of the Cabinet— but it was carried, notwithstanding many 
defects in the details of the bill, by an overwhelming majority.
Naturally, the friends of the army were stunned. Major Stephen
Long, newly returned from the Missouri exploration, wrote bitterly to
Calhoun after hearing of the House vote: "In this enlightened age,
where patriotism is valued according to the wealth it yields, I am
inclined to think that Cincinnatus himself would be loath to turn 
95farmer." This hostility to Congress was not Long's alone. Major 
John J. Abert, for one, thought that there was much more to the army 
vote than the ordinary anti-military hostility. Abert wrote to Vande-
*
venter in late January:
This vote on the Army bill beats all I could have imagined. If 
reduction was to be made, the project of the Secretary is the only 
one in which System & Science [sic] were incorporated and which had 
the Singular [sic] advantage of lessening our numbers without weak­
ening our means. But it seems to have been entirely disregarded—
93Rufus King to C. King, January 19, 1821, King Correspondence,
6:378.
William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., January 27, 1821, 
in Edward Somerville Brown, ed., The Missouri Compromise and Presidential 
Politics, 1820-1825 (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society, 1926),
p. 63 (hereafter cited as Plumer Correspondence).
95Stephen Long to John C. Calhoun, February 18, 1821, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:636.
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Surely the State [sic] of intelligence in the house of Reps [sic] is 
far behind him; and their conduct if I may judge, very from the 
wishes of the people.
The West wishes to avoid the possibility of taxing their lands—  
there lies the rub— And to effect this they have gull'd the Atlantic 
over into our abandonment of the defenses of their towns; for to say 
nothing of the erroneous plan on which the reduction is to be made, 
it will all be taken on the line of the Atlantic. The West will 
make a-hell-of-a-noise, if a move the less is on their frontier.
And from where are the garrisons for Florida to be taken? The Reso­
lution [sic] requiring a System [sic] of reduction from the Secretary 
was made when it was probable we should not acquire this, the event 
proving otherwise, even that, excellent as it is, I should have 
thought would not have been adopted. But when determined to reduce, 
to turn their backs upon the ablest plan of reducing an Army, ever 
handed in by any war minister under our government, and to adopt one 
of the shape of that in the present bill . . .Is [sic] to me most 
singular. So let me into the Secret [sic].
For other officers in the army the shock of reduction wore off
much quicker than Abert’s anger. An excited scramble for places began
even before Congress passed the final reduction bill. Quartermaster
General Jesup asked for Calhoun's permission to assign young officers to
97
work with him in that department, taking the place of civilian clerks.
Bartlett Yancey wrote from North Carolina on behalf of a local boy's
98retaining a captaincy. General Winfield Scott, obviously unconcerned
about his own security, brought "the extraordinary pretensions" of Abram
99Eustis to Calhoun's notice. Calhoun had his favorites, too. He 
consoled Major Stephen Long, assuring him that reduction would not affect
96J. J. Abert to Christopher Vandeventer, January 25, 1821, 
Vandeventer Papers.
97Thomas Jesup to John C. Calhoun, February 3, 1821, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:592-593.
98Bartlett Yancey to John C, Calhoun, February 9, 1821, ibid.,
5:623-624.
99
Winfield Scott to John C. Calhoun, February 12, 1821, ibid.,
5:625-626.
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the young explorer. The Secretary made sure that Andrew Jackson knew
that one of his favorite young officers, Colonel James Gadsden, would
emerge from reduction unscathed.'*'^
In order to determine the fate of officers who were perhaps less
well connected, Calhoun set up a "Board of General Officers," which con-
102
vened in April with Jacob Brown as chairman. As the board did its
work during the following weeks, it too had to deal with political
influence. One irate officer, Colonel Roger Jones, threatened Brown
that he would use his connections with the Virginia delegation in Congress
. . 103to abolish Brown's position. Jones was retained.
At the end of the Congress' last session Calhoun and John Quincy
Adams walked home together. Adams thought that Calhoun seemed "dispirited"
because of the attacks upon him and his department. The Secretary of War
ruminated on the causes of the agitation against him in the Congress. He
tried to fix in his mind where the administration had gone wrong: the
repeal of internal taxes, a huge revenue-consuming pension bill for
veterans of the Revolution— both of these acts had been a mistake, Calhoun
thought. Calhoun was habituated to thinking in terms of issues, even at 
104
that late date.
''■^Stephen Long to John C. Calhoun, February 18, 1821, ibid.,
5:636.
-*-0^John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, March 7, 1821, ibid., 5:664.
102Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, April 11, 1821, ibid., 6:40-41. 
Here Brown describes the criteria the board will use in determining 
which officers to retain in service and which others to discharge.
103John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, August 18, 1821, ibid., 
6:348-349. Monroe took a direct interest in rearranging the officer 
corps after reduction was mandated. These rearrangements would even­
tually become an issue at the next session of Congress.
104
Adams, Diary, 5:314-315.
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It is interesting to watch the progress of Calhoun's thoughts 
during the spring of 1821. At the beginning of the year, he merely dis­
approved in general of those who wanted to reduce expenditures; he 
thought that they were seeking fugitive advantages in temporary popu­
larity. By the time he walked with Adams, Calhoun personally
identified the coalition which wreaked havoc on the War Department. 
Calhoun's obvious disapproval of retrenchment was now widely known, and 
Adams thought that Crawford saw Calhoun mainly as somebody else's— maybe 
Adams'— supporter. With that egoism which always makes one believe that 
he is the subject of others' calculations, Adams thought that the attack 
on Calhoun was merely an oblique means of attacking himself. But of
Crawford's responsibility for the dismantling of the army, Adams had no 
106doubt. Neither did Calhoun. He told Andrew Jackson shortly thereafter
The Individual [sic] to whom you attribute the disorders in our 
affairs or rather the House of Representatives is not free from 
suspicion here. What part he may have taken, I cannot say, but it 
is certain that his personal friends have many of them been very 
active to embarrass. They have in particular been very pointed in 
their attacks on me personally. My course is fixed and nothing will 
turn me from it.-*-^
The work of the last session of Congress had devastated Calhoun's 
departmental programs. Reduction of the army had, as General Brown 
feared, disrupted the officer corps significantly: some of these offi­
cers had become even more politically sensitive than they had been 
formerly and would eventually take a direct hand in the upcoming presi­
dential election. The money for fortifications had been reduced by
"^^John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxey, January 14, 1821, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:557.
^^Adams, Diary, 5:314-315.
107John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, March 7, 1821, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:663.
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seventy-five per cent. Although the new reorganization law had mandated 
the continuance of the Ordnance department, no funds had been set aside
for its operation. The appropriation for Indian affairs had been cut
. . . . .  108 cleanly in half.
The immediate political cox;iaquences of Calhoun's defeat notwith­
standing, the Secretary's attempted War Department reforms were not so 
chimerical as his friends and opponents believed. Each of these parties 
had its reasons for thinking so: his friends wanted his advancement;
his enemies understood better that visions made for poor politics. The 
Secretary's reputation as a visionary invested his reforms with that 
quality; his contemporaries would have said the reverse.
In only one respect was Calhoun the innovator: he was perhaps
this nation's first national security manager. Unconcerned by anti­
military traditions, Calhoun sought to weld the military establishment to 
the cause of national progress. In order to do so Calhoun needed a pro­
fessional military establishment with a repertoire of functions far more 
extensive than had ever existed. But an enlarged and improved army was 
merely an end to a means, as Calhoun saw it, and this is what most 
differentiates him from the crass militarism of which he was later 
accused. Calhoun never submerged himself into the military culture; 
always, he was the civilian nationalist.
It is interesting, therefore, that it was his report on the 
expansible army which set his reputation in American military history, 
and not his report on internal improvements, for it is the latter which 
best represents Calhoun's philosophy of managing the nation's security.
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The expansible army report would never have been written but for the 
demands of Congress, and even had this kind of army been created, Cal­
houn's ambitions for the American military establishment would not have 
been realized. The report nevertheless came to be considered as the 
professional army's best defense against democracy during the nineteenth 
century. In 1879 General William T. Sherman, testifying before Congress 
on peacetime military requirements, referred directly to Secretary 
Calhoun's report, then over half a century old. The report was, in
1 0 9
Sherman's opinion, "so exhaustive . . . nothing more need be written." 
Later, when General Emory Upton urged (again) the creation of a profes­
sional army, he spoke of Calhoun's report in glowing t e r m s . T h e s e  
men misunderstood, however; the expansible army was Calhoun's reaction 
to congressional pressures. It was not a bonafide reform.
Ill
The Secretary of War was fond of saying that he stood on his 
principles and that those who opposed him were merely looking for advan­
tages in the passions of the moment. Calhoun suspected the proficient 
politician, and he himself was not, after all, a very good politician if 
one considers William Crawford as the best representative of that breed. 
And although Calhoun did attempt the contest with Crawford and his kind, 
there was always the feeling of distaste when he did so.
109Quoted in Walter Millis, ea., American Military Thought 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966), p. 164.
lirjEmory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (Wash­
ington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1917), pp. 149-
158.
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Calhoun's first substantial moves to promote himself politically
had to do with the Speaker's position in the House of Representatives.
Anticipating trouble in the fall of 1820, Calhoun attempted to persuade
his old friend and fellow South Carolinian, William Lowndes, to run for
the Speaker's chair, which Henry Clay was known to be vacating for the
time b e i n g . C a l h o u n  thought that the time was propitious for a change
in the House leadership. With the nearly obligatory re-election of
James Monroe assured, the republic's debt to the Virginia dynasty would
be paid; the Federalists did not even bother to put up a candidate.
This boded ill for any programs the administration might wish to sponsor
in the future: there would be few in the House who would care to stand
112by the obsolescing Monroe. Calhoun knew he had a friend in Lowndes.
In the course of trying to convince the ailing Lowndes to stand for the 
speakership, Calhoun remarked: "I consider the measures of this govern­
ment, as very much depending on the Speaker of the house [sic]. It is 
certain, that no elevated course of policy can be well sustained, without 
an enlightened and firm Speaker.
Lowndes did stand for the position, and as the session opened, 
led the balloting for the first few votes. His principal opponent was
John W. Taylor of New York, a known supporter of Treasury Secretary Craw-
114
ford. After twenty-three ballots, Taylor won the victory. The
‘'■'^John C. Calhoun to William Lowndes, October 12, 1820, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:390.
112Rufus King to C. King, January 19, 1821, King Correspondence,
6:378.
113John C. Calhoun to William Lowndes, October 12, 1820, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:390.
114U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 435-438.
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importance of Taylor's election shortly became evident. "Mr. Speaker
Taylor has done us much mischief, by carefully arranging the military
and naval comts. [sic] of the House so as to secure a majority hostile
115
in each, to both Army and Navy," remarked General Brown.
In April, 1820, after the Sixteenth Congress had done its work,
Calhoun publicly aired his complaints. Still seething over Congress'
destructive assault on his programs, Calhoun wrote an article for the
National Intelligencer entitled "Fortifications," and signed it 
116"Vauban." Calhoun's piece was only nominally about coastal defense,
however; he reserved the bulk of his comments for those who had attacked
the department's programs. Chief among his complaints was the "unfor-
117
Lu.iate formation of the important committees." Those in the House of
Representatives who were genuinely interested in retrenchment, he wrote,
combined with "the few who were really hostile to our military and naval
establishments" and the latter "acquired . . .  an influence beyond their 
118just standing." The whole majority, Calhoun thought, "evidently acted
119
under a panic, arising from the supposed state of the Treasury." He 
had no objections to an honest reduction of expenditure, but retrench­
ment, he argued, applied to "improper or useless expenditures," none of
■''■''^ Jacob Brown to Joseph G. Swift, February 3, 1820, Swift Papers.
116"Vauban [John C. Calhoun]," "Fortifications," National Intelli­
gencer , April 10, 1821. See the text of this article in Calhoun Papers, 
6:31-39. The authorship of this article was not attributed until 
recently, when the editors of the Calhoun Papers found a note of Calhoun's 
to Virgil Maxey, April 11, 1821, ibid., 6:41-42. References below refer 
to text in Calhoun Papers.
117Ibid., 6:32-33. 118Ibid., 6:33.
119Ibid., 6:32.
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which had to do with War Department programs. "Similar conduct in pri-
120
vate life would invariably be called folly," Calhoun said.
It is doubtful that many in Washington were deceived by Calhoun's
nom de plume. Suspicions that Calhoun had his eye on a higher office had
been current since the beginning of the year, and they had been dismissed
121
as unreasonable: Calhoun was too young. "So many are visibly before
122
him in the race," observed William Plumer, Jr.
Throughout the trying year Calhoun frankly communicated his dis­
appointments to any correspondent who would listen. Calhoun and Jackson 
commisserated with each other over the duplicity of William Crawford,
particularly after Jackson was banished to the governship of the new 
123Florida territory. Calhoun's private correspondence began to concen­
trate noticeably on several states: New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.
All were states in which Calhoun's view of internal improvements, protec­
tionism, the bank, and other of his nationalist sentiments would stand 
him in favor. The Secretary was heartened when his old friend, Micah 
Sterling of New York, bid fair to win a congressional seat. He congratu­
lated Sterling by saying, "We want talents, frankness and firmness much 
124in the House." And as Calhoun realized that the nationalism upon 
Ibid., 6:33.
121William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., January 27,
1821, Plumer Correspondence, pp. 63-64.
1 2 2 T W ^Ibid.
123John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, April 8, 1821, Calhoun 
Papers, 6:25-26.
124 . . .John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, April 23, 1821, ibid.,
6:67.
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which his career had thus far been based was in danger, the more intrans­
igent he became. "My course is fixed," he said. "I will not tamper with
125the high destiny of this country." There were those politicians who
still listened to this kind of rhetoric, and Calhoun was particularly
susceptible to it when it was turned in his direction. General Jackson
was especially handy with this kind of phrase:
The course pursued by last Congress [sic] is universely [sic] con­
demned, whilst your course, & report is approbated by nine-tenths of 
the citizens of the country through which I have passed; indeed it 
is approved by all who, from political and popular views have been 
with the majority— and finding themselves now in the minority cannot 
consistantly [sic] retreat.
But Calhoun did not really need such praise to drive him on. "I
127
have formed no connection with anyone," Calhoun said that summer. In 
all probability Calhoun had by that time decided that it was up to others 
to form connections with him. In August, 1820, Calhoun took his family 
to Bedford Springs, Pennsylvania, to "take the waters" for his health.
And although no direct evidence exists which shows that this trip was 
anything more than personal, it seems highly likely, as two of the fore­
most Calhoun scholars suggest, that it was here that Calhoun formed an
128
alliance with the so-called "Family party" of Pennsylvania. By the 
time he returned to Washington in September, Calhoun was predicting that
125John C. Calhoun to Charles Tait, April 23, 1821, ibid., 6:70. 
^^Andrew Jackson to John C. Calhoun, May 22, 1821, ibid.,
6:142.
127John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, July 3, 1821, ibid.,
6:237.
128See Wiltse, Calhoun, p. 232; and Capers, Opportunist, p. 84.
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the coming session of Congress would at least be an "interesting" one.
He fully expected a repetition of the agitation in the last session of
129Congress, and he expected to be involved in it.
Since in all likelihood Calhoun already had the assurances of 
Pennsylvania's support, he once again attempted to influence the election 
of the new Speaker of the House. Moving into the highly charged atmos­
phere with foolish confidence, Calhoun believed that he was providing 
the administration with the support which had been so noticeably absent 
during the previous session. He was sure that the other leading con­
tender for the presidency, John Quincy Adams, had little support either 
in the House or in his home section and therefore could not carry on 
administration programs. Although he had likely heard rumors of Calhoun's 
ambitions, Adams did not yet see Calhoun as a competitor. For his part, 
Calhoun had already decided that Adams' was an ineffectual candidacy, 
opening the way for the calamity of a sweep of Congress and presidency 
by William Crawford's "radicals." Calhoun thought that Adams, "with
bitter temper and views, the dread of insinuations, growing out of his
130
former political opinions would render his policy feeble and timid."
Whether Adams suspected it or not, Calhoun was already drawing 
up plans for a national political organization devoted to his election 
to the presidency in 1824. He had no thought to move into the public 
light as yet. "My age and my position, would both seem to require, that
129John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, September 24, 1821; and 
John C. Calhoun to Moses Waddell, September 25, 1821, Calhoun Papers, 
6:386-387.
130John C. Calhoun to Lewis Cass, December 9, 1821, ibid.,
6:560-561.
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I should be protruded on the publick notice," he told Lewis Cass in 
December.^^
The way [Calhoun said] ought to be prepared by conversation and 
correspondence, where it can be safely done, previously to any 
publick demonstration, and when that is to be made the proper points 
to commence would be Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York, particularly 
the two first.
Meanwhile, the contest for Speaker of the House went badly for 
Calhoun. Before the session began John Quincy Adams and Taylor had 
apparently agreed that Taylor would have the support of the administra­
tion in return for more favorable appointments to the House committees. 
When Adams talked with Calhoun about Taylor's re-election, Calhoun would 
not go along. Instead, the Secretary of War was bent on keeping Taylor 
out of the Speaker's chair at all costs. Calhoun was strong enough to
prevent Taylor's being seated and unwittingly paved the way for the
133election of Philip Barbour, a Crawford radical. Although Calhoun
could hardly have believed it, Taylor was moderate compared to Barbour,
who promptly filled committees in the House loyal to Crawford. Because
of the momentous issues awaiting the House, the stresses and strains of
twelve hotly contested ballots before Barbour was chosen caused "more
dissension in the House than there was in the whole of the last 
134
Congress." One immediate result of this agitation was Taylor's
135recruitment to the ranks of ‘the radicals.
1 132 .Ibid. Ibid.
133
For two accounts see William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, 
Sr., December 3, 1821, Plumer Correspondence, pp. 64-65; and Adams, 
Diary, 5^451.
134Adams, Diary, 5:451, 474.
135William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., December 11, 
1821, Plumer Correspondence, pp. 67-68.
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A few days after the speaker's election, the General Assembly of
South Carolina caucused and nominated William Lowndes for the presidency
by a vote of fifty-eight to fifty-four. The fifty-four votes went to Calhoun.
136
Lowndes was on his way to Washington at the moment of the vote. One
scholar speculates that the news of Lowndes' nomination reached Washington
137before Lowndes did. It is possible; the South Carolina assembly voted
on December 18. Ten days later a group of Pennsylvania men went to Calhoun's
house and arranged to support the Secretary's own nomination. The word of
138
this occurrence was out the following day. Several days later Calhoun 
took pains to explain the sequence of events to Virgil Maxcy, and the Sec­
retary intimated that Lowndes was already in Washington and that they had 
already discussed Calhoun's decision to run for the presidency when word 
arrived from South Carolina. Calhoun declared to Maxcy:
It so happened before we heard of this rash measure, that I had a full 
and free conversation with Mr. Lowndes, in which I stated, that I had 
determined, that I would not resist the opinion of those, who thought, 
that at any hazard, I ought to be brought forward, and my reasons for13g 
this determination, in the sufficiency of which, he fully acquiesced.
Calhoun added that he thought the movement in South Carolina "very 
140rash and foolish." Whether or not Calhoun knew in advance about 
Lowndes' nomination, it is highly unlikely that Calhoun would have 
altered his course. Believing (as he said) that Adams did not have 
enough northern support to combat Crawford in a national contest,
Calhoun had long since decided that he was the man to take Crawford on.
1.36On the local context of the South Carolina General Assembly's 
nomination of Lowndes, see Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p. 105.
137 138Capers, Opportunist, p. 83. Adams, Diary, 5:466.
■^39j0}in Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, December 31, 1821, Calhoun 
Papers, 6:595-597.
140Ibid., 6:595.
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One scholar has taken Calhoun to task for not deferring to
Lowndes' nomination. If Calhoun was interested only in stopping the
radicals, so the argument goes, he should have fallen in behind Lowndes'
141candidacy rather than staking out a claim of his own. But it is
easy enough to see Calhoun's thinking at this point: he knew Lowndes to
142be an ailing man. Lowndes had a limited constituency, whereas
Calhoun was by now a national figure. Lowndes had managed to win the
nomination only because the caucus had been boycotted by a third of the
143members of the assembly. So while Lowndes had only a part of South 
Carolina, Calhoun had almost as large a part, plus Pennsylvania as well.
It was true, as Calhoun's friend Micah Sterling told Adams, that
the nomination of Lowndes (and Calhoun's) "would set the whole continent
144
to premature electioneering." The leading contenders and their friends
were galvanized by the news from South Carolina and Pennsylvania.
"Nothing has been said or thought of, for some days past, but the Presi­
dential election, & almost everybody has been sounded on the subject,"
145observed one friend of Adams. Another of Adams' supporters entreated
the Secretary of State not to be so quiescent; "if something should not 
be done to counteract the caballing, public opinion would be forestalled,
141Capers, Opportunist, p. 85.
142Lowndes died less than one year later. He resigned at the 
end of the first session of the Seventeenth Congress. He died at sea 
on his way to England in October, 1822.
143Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p. 105.
144
Adams, Diary, 5:470.
145William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., January 3, 1822, 
Plumer Correspondence, p. 71.
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and a party too strong to be broken would be formed," said Adams'
146
partisan. Adams merely fumed at his young colleague's pretensions.
Even before the year was out Calhoun was sure that he could win 
the election. Although he had been upset by the Lowndes nomination, he 
nevertheless thought that "it demonstrate[d] to the North Mr. Crawford's 
want of popularity to the South, which I am satisfied, that time will
147continue to confirm": Crawford, he thought, had "gone down rapidly."
Calhoun, meanwhile, was simply not willing to face up to his 
desire for the presidency. It was every bit as keen as was Adams', or 
Crawford's, or Clay's, but from the beginning the Secretary of War cast 
his candidacy in the guise of a crusade for progress. This unreality 
was a parody on the disinterested, elevated politician of the republic's 
past, and Calhoun never overcame the pose. His own motives, which he 
believed were so noble, were in the observer's eyes transparently self- 
interested.
Calhoun took pains to explain himself and his new course to John 
Quincy Adams. Perhaps Calhoun thought that Adams, of all politicians, 
would understand his motives, but Adams came to think of Calhoun only as 
a grasping spoiler, little better than William Crawford. When Adams' 
friend Plumer went to see Calhoun shortly after the announcement of 
Pennsylvania's support, Calhoun talked long and apparently freely to 
Plumer, doubtless knowing that Plumer would tell Adams all (as he did). 
The Secretary went on at length about haw his candidacy was a "qualified"
146Adams, Diary, 5:468.
147John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, December 31, 1821, Calhoun 
Papers, 6:596-597.
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one: he was standing not so much against Adams as against Crawford.
Plumer was not disposed to see the difference; what Plumer did see was
"the eagerness with which he grasps at the splendid phantom which plays
before his eyes . . .  a proof of equal ambition and want of judgment—
148or rather the blindness of self-love."
148William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., January 3, 1822, 
Plumer Correspondence, p. 73.
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CHAPTER VI
"THE SPLENDID PHANTOM":
CALHOUN AND THE ELECTION OF 1824
"I have set my life upon a cast,
And I will stand the hazard of the die:
I think there be Six Richmonds in the field."
Richard III
Scholars have analyzed the presidential campaign of 1824 to 
distraction. The roles of the various actors have been studied on both 
the national and state levels. The issues which animated the campaign, 
those chosen by the candidates such as internal improvements, protec­
tionism, the national bank; and those which the electorate forced upon 
them, such as the death of the caucus and the expansion of suffrage, 
have all been considered in depth. The narrative of the campaign, with 
some exceptions, has been explained repeatedly in these works. More 
philosophical and ideological conjurings have been inspired by this 
period than nearly any other: old and new Republicans, old and new
nationalists, the radical reaction under Crawford, Jackson and the vox 
populi— all have been compared, contrasted, contrived, discounted, trum­
peted, dismissed.'*' Those who wish to write more on the subject are left 
only with reduction, prolixity, or mere redundancy.
^See, for a few examples, Dangerfield, American Nationalism, 
pp. 212-230; Sydnor, Southern Sectionalism, pp. 134-156; Norman K. Ris- 
jord, The Old Republicans: Southern Conservatism in the Age of Jefferson
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 175-256 (hereafter
cited as Risjord, The Old Republicans); J. D. Russo, "Southern
300
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
301
Thus the following remarks are concerned less with the election's
history than with Calhoun's. His activities have been well documented
also, but the motives and attitudes of this complex man have been less
satisfactorily explained than perhaps any other actor's in the campaigns 
2
of 1824. There is, first of all, considerable disagreement on this
3
man's character among scholars. This is important on two counts: evalua­
tions have generally turned on how different the actual Calhoun was from 
the figure he believed himself to be. Scholars have implicitly confronted 
the problem of evaluation by trying to judge Calhoun's sincerity. Either 
the Secretary of War was true to the nationalist beliefs he espoused, or
Republicans and American Nationalism, 1817-1825," unpublished Ph.D. dis­
sertation, Yale University, 1966, pp. 293-326 (hereafter cited as Russo, 
"Southern Republicans"); Mooney, Crawford, pp. 269-301; Philip S. Klein, 
Pennsylvania Politics, 1817-1825: A Game without Rules (Philadelphia:
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1940; reprint ed., Philadelphia: 
Porcupine Press, 1974), pp. 132-187 (hereafter cited as Klein, Pennsyl­
vania Politics); C. H. Rammelkamp, "The Campaign of 1824 in New York," 
Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1904 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1905), pp. 177-201 (hereafter cited as Rammel­
kamp, "The Campaign of 1824"); T. R. Hay, "John C. Calhoun and the 
Presidential Campaign of 1824," North Carolina Historical Review, 12 
(January, 1S35), pp. 20-44 (hereafter cited as Hay, "Calhoun and 1824"); 
Bemis, Adams and the Union, pp. 11-32.
2
The differences between Calhoun's thought and action (the first 
too professedly noble to be quite true— the second, ineffectual) have 
produced the greatest disagreements about Calhoun's character. For two 
extreme views, compare, Margaret Coit, John C. Calhoun: An American
Portrait (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950) and H. E. Von Holst, John C.
Calhoun (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1882).
^It is possible to classify scholarly views of Calhoun in terms 
of the opinions held by his adversaries during the campaign of 1824. 
Crawford thought Calhoun was brilliant, but chimerical and impractical. 
Adams saw Calhoun as a deceitful political adventurer. Jackson even­
tually thought of Calhoun as a secret enemy. Clay viewed him as 
presumptuous. Calhoun thought of himself as a disinterested statesman.
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he was an ambitious charlatan. Other Calhoun students have been more 
relativistic, but somehow their moral disapproval of Calhoun shows 
through.^ Scholarly determinations having been made, their suspicions 
remain that, for all his nationalist rhetoric, the forging of the "cast- 
iron" man was done here in the era of good feelings. These are still 
proper matters for consideration.
One important aspect of the election has been neglected. To 
some Americans Calhoun was as much an "army candidate" as General Andrew 
Jackson. Jackson's heroic image precluded his being attacked as a "man 
on horseback": the hero was indomitable; neither the British nor the
creed of militarism could dominate his character. The hero's mantle 
freed the general from such institutional loyalties. Unlike Jackson, 
the Secretary drew much of his image from these very institutions. 
Calhoun was comfortable with institutions because he believed that he 
could dominate them.
Compare Russo, "Southern Nationalists," pp. 293-294, with Von 
Holst, Calhoun, pp. 55-58. The latter scholar was the first to use John 
Quincy Adams' diary, then only recently published; accordingly, Von 
Holst's view of Calhoun is that of Adams' after the Secretary of State 
was spurned by the Carolinian in late 1821.
5
"'Capers, Opportunist, pp. 83-85.
£
By this is not meant that Jackson was not perceived as a mili­
tary figure. He was, but by and large Jackson's image did not contradict 
the nation's anti-military traditions. In fact Jackson's celebrity 
confirms that these traditions were still alive and well in some 
quarters. As shall be seen, some observers did not make refined dis­
tinctions between the associations which Jackson and Calhoun had with 
the military establishment. On the question of Calhoun's success with 
other institutions, his rapid political rise hardly needs pointing out. 
Obviously, Calhoun had learned well how to manipulate political insti­
tutions in order to advance his career.
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One of those institutions was the army. Jackson certainly felt
7
less community with the professional army than Calhoun did. Just as 
Calhoun and Jackson were divided in their sentiments on the professional 
military establishment, so too were the views of the officers toward the 
Secretary and the general. In the ensuing presidential campaign both 
contenders would recruit military workers to their causes. So would 
some of the other candidates, but it is clear that of all the contes­
tants for the presidency, Calhoun depended upon the military establish­
ment for support far more than did any of his competitors. Whether he 
was likewise the army's candidate is less clear. However, it is 
important to note that of the several candidates for the presidency in 
1824, two had intimate connections with the military establishment, and 
not all of those connections were seen by the public eye. Not since the 
election of George Washington had a candidate been so identified with 
things military. From then until the election of 1824, political aspi­
rants were required to be impeccably civilian in outlook and manner. By 
the time Calhoun and Jackson had set their courses for the White House, 
a military association was obviously no longer a political liability. 
This fact, when considered in connection with the exertions of several 
military men at high levels of the campaign, make the election of 1824 
one in which the army took an inordinate, direct interest. The activi­
ties of Calhoun's War Department operatives, then, added a new and 
unique element to the Secretary of War's presidential campaign.
7
See Jackson's criticism of the Executive in his letter to Henry 
Atkinson, May 15, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 4:63; and his pointed view of 
the War Department in Andrew Jackson to Winfield Scott, December 3,
1817, Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, 2:338-339.
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The extent to which military men were involved in the campaign 
tells a good deal more about the army than about Calhoun, however. He 
had not become "militarized," but he had gone far to cultivate the poli-
Q
tical senses of a group of important and well placed military figures. 
Consequently there was no military caballing, no plans laid on for 
military revolt; instead, members of the War Department establishment 
who rallied to Calhoun's side adhered to the rules of the political game, 
such as they were, and gave no thought to militarizing the political 
process.
The War Department was nevertheless of considerable value to
Calhoun during the presidential contest; likewise, he could be of use to
certain military figures. When Calhoun became an acknowledged candidate
for the presidency in December, 1821, the opponents of the army in
Congress had just presented him with yet another opportunity to wield
his power over the officer corps by deciding which officers would be
kept after reduction and which would not. Although the Board of General
Officers had been constituted, retention was, after all, a political
question, and the mere existence of the board did not mean that the
9
Secretary had capitulated to retrenchment. All of the other candidates—  
Crawford, Adams, Clay— with the exception of Andrew Jackson called upon
0
"Military figures," as it is used here has reference to men who 
were in the army or recently retired from service, or civilians who were 
connected with the War Department in some way. Outsiders, for instance, 
differed little in the case of Thomas McKenney, who, although a civilian, 
was a War Department employee for most of Calhoun's career as Secretary.
It was almost automatically assumed that whatever McKenney did politi­
cally was dictated by Calhoun himself.
q
In fact Calhoun and President Monroe deliberately attempted to 
circumvent or otherwise blunt what they considered to be the more egre­
gious effects of retrenchment. See pp, 311-312 below.
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their political kingdoms for assistance as did Calhoun. The Secretary of 
War had by now a large circle of correspondents in various states; he had 
influence over appointments within the War Department and an opportunity 
to influence presidential appointments at times. He could control troop 
dispositions if he wished (there is no evidence that he used this device 
as perhaps it could have been used), and of course he had the benefit of 
official franking (which he did use extensively). Perhaps most benefi­
cial to Calhoun were the military men themselves, stationed at various 
points, known to each other, and fairly well agreed that elevating 
Calhoun to power could hardly be against their interests. When the cam­
paign was finished, however, there was no indication that any of the 
candidates had actively and consciously sought out the support of the 
army as an institution in their quests for power.
II
Calhoun was encouraged by his Pennsylvania visitors and from the 
first he counted on that state's support in the campaign to influence 
still other states where he was not so strong. But the assurances of 
the Family party's backing, contrary to what Calhoun believed, did not 
automatically confer that state's blessing upon him."^ Calhoun thought 
that his Pennsylvania ancestry and northern education would endear him
^The leaders of the Family party in Pennsylvania were Samuel 
Ingham and George M. Dallas. Both were young, well-placed, rising poli­
ticians in their state. The leading scholar of this state's politics 
during this period has described Ingham as "the front," and Dallas as 
"the brains" of the party. Ingham was the backer of the Bucks County 
Messenger and had some claim to the fine arts of political management. 
Dallas was the son of Alexander J. Dallas and, though young, was possessed 
of as much political talent as his late father. Other members of the 
party were Thomas J. Rogers, and Richard Bache, of the Philadelphia 
Aurora, a grandson of Benjamin Franklin. See Klein, Pennsylvania 
Politics, pp. 90, 128-129.
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there; if he could split Crawford's strength in the South and use Penn­
sylvania as the belly/ether of his campaign in the Middle Atlantic states, 
then the Presidency was within his reach.^ He did not know (and probably 
would have discounted it if he had) that Andrew Jackson had already
received a letter from a Pennsylvanian in August, 1821, hinting of wide- 
12spread support. Exactly one year after Calhoun received his Pennsyl­
vanians, the Jackson movement in that state held its first mass meeting
• „ u 13in Greensburg.
For good or ill the campaign of 1824 was underway. One of the
several peculiar aspects of the contest was that the politicians did not
choose the issues. Only a relatively few persons were concerned with
the issues that interested Calhoun. He saw the election as a referendum
on nationalism: to him it was to be a choice between progressive and
14
atavistic Republicanism, upheld by Crawford. To Crawford it was a
contest between orthodoxy and the new amalgam of old Federalism and new
15
Republicanism— heterodox, and dangerous to state sovereignty. These 
were merely niceties, however; the real matter at hand was the power of 
political office, and none of the leading politicians were beyond sub­
verting any position as long as power could be achieved.
^R. H. Holworth to Azariah Flagg, December 28, 1821, quoted in 
Hay, "Calhoun and 1824," p. 24.
12Samuel Overton to Andrew Jackson, August 1, 1821, Bassett, 
Jackson Correspondence, 3:105-106.
13Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, p. 123.
14John C. Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, November 2, 1822, Calhoun 
Papers, 7:326-328.
"''^ Robert Garnett to Joseph G. Swift, August 12, [18]]?], Swift
Papers.
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Crawford meant tu uSiCG the presidency in the very same way
earlier candidates had: by dominating first the Congress, and thereby
the congressional caucus which ultimately decided upon the Republican
candidate. Early in his deliberations Crawford took his prospects of
election somewhat for granted. Power over the congressional caucus
ordinarily meant that there would be little need to take notice of the
states themselves. Even though the support of the New York-Virginia axis
which had made presidents for a good long while was still crucial to
Crawford, he was still complaisant. He said in 1821 that he had "never
been so silly as to expect anything in relation to myself" from New York.
So long as the state's congressional delegates were managed by Martin Van
16
Buren, there was no need for Crawford to be anxious.
But by then the caucus itself was becoming an issue. The low
repute in which the caucus was held by this time was made abundantly
clear by Hezekiah Niles during the first days of 1822. Niles wrote that
he would sooner "learn that the halls of Congress were converted into
17
brothels, than that, caucuses . . . should be held in them." Throughout 
the campaign Niles did not relent in his opposition to any kind of "poli­
tical management," and for this reason the Niles' Weekly Register, 
although not committed to any one candidate, worked against any pro-caucus 
candidate.^
All this agitation over the caucus meant that Calhoun and his 
fellow candidates, if they were to stop Crawford, had somehow to change
"^Mooney, Crawford, p. 231.
17Niles' Weekly Register, January 26, 1822.
18
Ibid., November 9, 1822.
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the scene of the contest. Crawford's power in Congress (made evident by 
the dismantling of Calhoun's military programs during the last session) 
would have to be somehow blunted. That being done, Calhoun and the 
other candidates had to make sure that the contest would be moved from 
Congress to the individual states, where, by various means, the succes­
sion of Monroe could be decided. This strategy assumed, of course, that 
Calhoun would first have to survive what the Crawfordites had in store 
for him during the present session of Congress.
It was almost a certainty that the Crawford radicals would renew
their attacks on Calhoun and the War Department. He had given them every
cause to do so. The news of his pretensions was out. As the members
returned from, the holidays they were greeted by a report in the Washington
Gazette entitled, "Training for the Presidency," which read that "members
of the Legislature of South Carolina, taking 'time by the forelock,' are
trying Mr Lowndes [sic] and Mr Calhoun [sic], in advance on the political
19turf of that state." Moreover, Calhoun had wantonly interfered in the 
election to choose a Speaker of the House for two years in a row, and his 
vindictiveness was so great against John Taylor that the second time 
Calhoun opposed Taylor, the Secretary did not even have a substitute in 
mind. Adams thought that James Barbour, who had been able to slip into 
the Speaker's chair because of Calhoun interference, was "ten times 
worse" than Taylor. By the end of the session Calhoun was inclined to 
agree with Adams: the Secretary of War's spring had been very unpleasant.
19City of Washington Gazette, January 3, 1822.
20Adams, Diary, 5:474, 524.
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The radicals had shown every willingness to renew their campaign
against the War Department in the spring of 1822. Dominating the most
important committees in Congress, radicals forced examinations of the
Rip Rap and Dauphin Island fortifications contracts in the Senate and
21
the expenses of West Point in the House of Representatives. Thomas 
Hart Benton pressed home his assault on the factory system from his new 
seat on the Senate committee on Indian affairs. All of these investiga­
tions produced recommendations hostile to Calhoun and his department.
But the prospects of the War Department improved when the work of the 
radical committeemen reached the floor of the Congress for debates. The 
Secretary of War had recently acquired some new support. The impetuous 
and combative George McDuffie had just arrived to become South Carolina's 
newest representative; so had the erudite Joel Poinsett. From New York 
and Connecticut came Micah and Ansel Sterling; Micah and Calhoun had
been friends at Yale. Now, too, several members of the Pennsylvania dele-
22gation were voluble in their defense of Calhoun and the War Department.
The results of the session, therefore, were neither as salutary 
as Calhoun had wanted, nor as bad as he had every right to expect. Only 
West Point emerged unscathed. The House had pointedly censured Vandeventer 
and Mix for their association in the Rip Rap project, but funds were not
21U. S., Annals of Congress, 17th Cong., 1st sess., p. 345.
22Ibid., p. 343. Of the newest congressional champions of the 
War Department, George McDuffie got the highest marks, even from hostile 
observers. John Elliot, editor of the anti-administration Washington 
Gazette, said of McDuffie1s defense of the War Department during debates 
over the military appropriations that the young South Carolinian's 
speeches were "incomparably the best," although they were marked by a 
"want of tenderness" toward other members of the House. City of Wash­
ington Gazette, April 18, 1822.
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stopped completely, as in the case of the fort on Dauphin Island.
Thomas McKenney's Office of Indian Trade and the factory trading system
24were both abolished. Radical demands for retrenchment seemingly had 
alienated more moderate members of Congress, and it is reasonable to 
assume that the appearance of McDuffie, Poinsett, the Sterlings, and 
some Pennsylvanians to champion War Department programs moderated radical 
demands.^
The attention that Calhoun and Crawford paid to each other in 
early 1822 indicated that each man saw the other as his main opponent.
Of the two, Calhoun was the easier target of criticism: he administered
revenue-consuming programs, whereas Crawford merely managed the available 
monies for government. The operations" of the Treasury Department were 
simply beyond the understanding of most people (politicians included), but 
all flattered themselves that anyone could fathom military administra­
tion— it was a subject requiring minimal knowledge and was ready made for 
simplistic judgments.
23A move was made by the radicals in both houses to implicitly 
censure Elijah Mix by voting funds for Forts Monroe and Calhoun, but 
stipulating that the appropriation did not imply approval of Mix's 
contract. It was voted down by the House meeting in a committee of the 
whole. See U. S., Annals of Congress, 17th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1876, 1895
24
U. S. Stat., Ill, pp. 679-680. See also Chapter IV, pp.
above.
25Professor Wiltse shows Calhoun's programs emerging from Con­
gress during this session in rather better shape than I do. Presidential 
politics had galvanized this session, with the friends of the several 
candidates acting in various combinations which are virtually impossible 
to trace from the surviving data. Inasmuch as Crawford was then con­
sidered the front runner for the presidency, the friends of his opponents 
logically could be expected to work against him. This is not to say 
as Wiltse does, however, that Calhoun was that much stronger. Wiltse, 
Calhoun, p. 253.
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During the winter of 1821-1822 Crawford and his supporters
attempted to turn the disruption caused by the Army Reorganization Act
of 1821 to their advantage. By late 1821 the work of the General Board
supervising the reduction was finished, and quite naturally there were
many dissatisfied army officers for the Crawfordites to exploit. By
December Crawford was being very solicitous of disgruntled officers who
26
had been removed from the service or transferred to another command.
Public notice was given early in January that the Crawfordites in Congress
meant to make officer displacement an issue. The Washington Gazette
reported that John Floyd of Virginia was about to bring on an investiga-
tion of how the army bill had been executed. Floyd had reportedly
complained that "there are many respectable officers, who consider
themselves aggrieved by the appointments" made under the reorganization 
27act. On January 21, 1822, President Monroe sent a new list of military
appointments which reflected the reorganization to Congress. Monroe had
recommended Colonel Nathan Towson to be Paymaster Gei ral and Colonel
28
James Gadsden to be the new Adjutant General of the army. Both these
officers were known to have close ties with Calhoun. In the Senate,
which had to confirm Monroe's proposed appointments, Towson's and Gadsden's
nominations ran into heavy opposition. "The organization of the Army is
making great noise here," reported a Jackson man to his chief. "I am fear-
25
ful that our friend Gadsden will be placed in an unpleasant situation."
2%illiam Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., December 11, 1821, 
Plumer Correspondence, pp. 67-68.
^ City of Washington Gazette, January 2, 1822.
28John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, March [n.d.], 1822, Calhoun 
Papers, 6:720-721.
29U. S., Annals of Congress, 17th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 476, 478,
509-510. James C. Bronaugh to Andrew Jackson, February 8, 1822, Bassett,
Jackson Correspondence, 3:147-148.
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President Monroe took the unusual step of withdrawing the two 
nominations and resubmitting them with an explanation of how he had con­
strued the reduction act of the year before. This difficulty upset the 
President: "I have never known such a state of things as has existed 
here," he told Madison, "nor have I personally ever experienced so much 
embarrassment and mortification."^0 In the end both officers were denied 
their appointments, but Monroe and Calhoun saw to it that they were
given the jobs unofficially, intending to submit the appointments again
31
when the political climate was improved.
Although it was no doubt true, as Monroe said, that there was
"great discontent" in a "host of disbanded officers," Calhoun's opponents
suspected that there were a great many more officers who would support
32their Secretary of War. For example, Colonel Gadsden had already been
aciing in Calhoun's behalf. As early as November, 1821, Gadsden had
asked General Jackson for his confidential opinion on the presidential
33chances of Adams and Calhoun. Colonel Towson was shortly recruited by
Calhoun to use his influence in his home state of Maryland; having suf­
fered at the hands of the radicals, Towson was pronounced "perfectly
34
safe" by the Secretary of War for political uses.
James Monroe to James Madison, May 10, 1822, Hamilton, Monroe 
Papers, 6:286-289.
Ibid.
32Ibid. The officers of the army could at least count on Calhoun 
not to be actively hostile against their interests if he were elected 
president. They had no such confidence in any other candidate.
33James Gadsden to Andrew Jackson, November 20, 1821, Bassett, 
Jackson Correspondence, 3:132-133.
34John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, June 25, 1822, Calhoun Papers,
7:182.
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Another recruit to the Calhoun camp was General Winfield Scott. 
Always in the eye of controversy, he had been carrying on a dispute with 
General Gaines over which was higher in rank since the reorganization 
act. Scott had recently finished his compilation of army regulations, 
several passages of which had a direct bearing upon his dispute with 
Gaines. Radical congressman John Floyd had singled out these items in 
the regulations and accused Scott publicly of crying to fix the new rules 
in such a way that Gaines was inferior to Scott in rank. Already con­
templating leaving the army because he was tired of disputes of this 
kind, Scott threw caution away and dispatched seconds to call on Floyd 
to apologize or to demand satisfaction; wisely, Scott's seconds asked 
for Floyd's explanation first. The congressman explained that his 
charges had been based upon an error which the printers had made in the 
final composition, and cheerfully (and publicly) apologized. Scott, 
nonetheless, continued to entertain dislike for the radicals who had 
brought this latest controversy upon him, and took up Calhoun's cause 
against them. Scott's new loyalty to the Secretary of War was made 
easier because he had gained the impression from Calhoun that when 
General Brown retired, he would be Brown's replacement. It was said 
later that Calhoun had also promised General Gaines the same thing, but
this allegation is more likely a demonstration of Scott's ability to 
35delude himself.
35Charles W. Elliott, Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the Man
(New York: Macmillan and Co., 1937), pp. 227-233 (hereafter cited as
Elliott, Winfield Scott). Elliott bases his account of Calhoun's dup­
licity upon Adams' diary. Wiltse's, Calhoun, pp. 261-262, disputes 
Adams' account. There is an aide memoire, dated March 16, 1825, in the 
papers of Christopher Vandeventer which recalls a recent meeting between 
Scott and Calhoun on this question in which Calhoun is represented as 
having "invariably refused" to decide between the two generals.
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William Crawford pretended to know nothing of the origins of the
appointments dispute in Congress, but he felt sure that Calhoun had
poisoned Monroe's opinion of him. There had been so much discussion,
moreover, in cabinet and Congress about the controversy, Crawford was
36surprised when the public paid so little attention to it all. It is
difficult to take Crawford's protestations of innocence very seriously;
when he made them, the Washington Gazette had already sided with the
Secretary of Treasury, and Calhoun had been the paper's main target for 
37
some time.
In mid-March that exemplar of old republicanism, John Randolph,
set sail for Europe on a leave of absence from Congress. His sympathies
being with Crawford, Randolph fired off a parting shot at Calhoun. It
was, said Randolph, his special ambition to be a part of the government
which would eventually choose the next president. This was important to
him, he said, because "for the first time since the institution of this
government, we have presented to the people the army candidate for the
presidency, in the person of him, who, judging from present appearance,
will receive the support of the bank of the U. States [sic] also." The
outcome of the election, he predicted, might well decide the character
38
of the government— "perhaps forever."
36William Crawford to Albert Gallatin, May 13, June 26, 1822, 
Adams, Gallatin Correspondence, pp. 580-582, 583; Adams, Diary, 5:488.
37Until the end of April, 1822, the Washington Gazette printed 
some articles which came to Calhoun's defense. By May, 1822, this was 
no longer so; after that time the tenor of articles printed by the 
Gazette were clearly to Crawford's benefit and took the radical line.
38
Niles' Weekly Register, March 30, 1822.
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The Washington Gazette's editor, Elliot, seized upon Randolph's 
phrase, "army candidate," with alacrity. Elliot's position on the presi­
dential candidates was clear only in that he generally■attacked Calhoun 
and wrote little untoward about Crawford, but he was still "for sale" as 
yet. The Rip Rap scandal had been given full play almost daily since the 
investigations had begun in Congress, and Elliot had continually assumed
that Calhoun was interested in some way in the contracts for the fort
39that carried his name. But Elliot had been careful not to make a
general attack on the administration; noticing John Randolph's farewell
speech, in which, along with his cutting remarks about Calhoun, Randolph
had referred to Monroe as an "incubus" sitting atop the government,
40
Elliot attacked Randolph for his "hypocondriacal vapouring." In March 
Elliot was still making distinctions between members of the administra­
tion. The editor would not do so for long. Elliot approvingly reprinted 
an attack on Calhoun in mid-April which originated with the Richmond 
Enquirer and which played heavi.ly upon an anti-military theme. The 
Enquirer's editorial read:
What ever propriety there may have been in the selection of Washing­
ton, as the first to fill this highly responsible station it should 
be the prayer of the patriot and lover of the American constitution, 
that he should be t^| last military chieftain upon whom the office 
shall be conferred.
Thereafter Elliot used his paper against Calhoun savagely. He
denied that Calhoun had accomplished anything in the War Department.
39City of Washington Gazette, April 1, 22, May 16, 1822.
40Ibid., March 28, 1822.
41Richmond Enquirer, April 16, 1822, reprinted in ibid., Aprxl 19,
1822.
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Thereafter Elliot used his paper against Calhoun savagely. He
denied that Calhoun had accomplished anything in the War Department.
"At what period," Elliot asked, "in a time of profound peace, has the
administration of the War Department been more wretchedly . . . more
42shamefully and corruptly managed." [sic] The anti-military rhetoric
rose to a new hysteria in early June, when the editor accused Calhoun
and his supporters of laying a trap for the people by advertising the
peaceful attainments of the army in an attempt to "soften the terrors of 
43
the bayonets."
It is a testament to Calhoun's confidence that he went through
these travails without being shattered. Throughout the spring of 1822
the Secretary of War kept up an almost cheerful correspondence with those
on whom he intended to rely during the months ahead. At the very height
of the army debates in Congress Calhoun calculated that Lowndes would
not stand in the way of his own candidacy. In his estimation Lowndes
had many admirers, but none who was "warm" or "ardent" for his candidacy.
This, of course, meant that Calhoun could have South Carolina all to
himself. For once at least the Washington Gazette had been accurate
when it reported that "Mr. Lowndes has found a rival where he expected 
44to find a friend." Furthermore, Calhoun saw the radicals' assaults 
upon him and his department as acknowledgments of his new strength as a 
presidential contender. Toward the end of the session Calhoun was con­
fident that the radicals had been turned back in their mad retrenchment
42 43Ibid., May 15, 1822. Ibid., June 10, 1822.
44
John C. Calhoun to John Ewing Colhoun, March 19, 1822, Calhoun 
Papers, 6:754; City of Washington Gazette, January 15, 1822.
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45schemes. Although still cheerful in his letters to relatives and
friends, Calhoun was becoming obsessed with stopping Crawford, and the 
Washington Gazette had become, in Calhoun's mind, the voice of the Secre­
tary of the Treasury himself. Now Crawford had become "the hand behind 
the curtain" to the Secretary of War. Earlier Calhoun had lightheartedly
told a relative that "my friends the Radicals have selected me as the
46
object of their peculiar favors;" but shortly afterward he told a 
Pennsylvania supporter that "the Gazette [sic] continues to pour its
torrent of filth against me, but with effects different from what it
• „ - „47intends.
In this estimation of radical popularity, or lack of it, Calhoun 
may have been right. Crawford himself believed that Calhoun had emerged 
from the spring session's trials a stronger candidate than when Congress 
opened the previous December. "The Secretary of War is now, in the 
estimation of the public, lord of the ascendant," Crawford observed in
May, 1822, and it was evident to him that Calhoun had acquired popularity
48 . . . .
at radical expense. Robert S. Garnett, a conservative Virginia
republican, was anxious lest the excesses of the congressional radicals 
damage the reputation of orthodox republicanism. Reflecting on the work 
of the radicals at the end of 1822, Garnett wrote:
45John C. Calhoun to John Ewing Colhoun, May 14, 1822, Calhoun
Papers, 7:111.
7:155.
46Ibid.; Adams, Diary, 5:538-539.
^John C. Calhoun to Thomas J. Rogers, June 9, 1822, ibid.,
4ft
William H. Crawford to Albert Gallatin, May 13, 1822, Adams,
Gallatin Correspondence, p. 580.
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One thing is certain, the people did not support their representa­
tives in the intrigues & wrangling of the last session, and that 
circumstance, together with the failure of the Rip Raps [sic] and 
Russell schemes, has taught them a great deal of discretion. . . .
It is very clear, that the radicals have been forced, as Tom Crib 
says, to sing small.49
Garnett thought of the radicals at this point as ideological hooligans. 
None of the candidates' views entirely pleased him; he had objections to 
all and he believed that the election would eventually come down to a 
choice between evils. The Virginian told one of Calhoun's friends that 
his view of Crawford, who was already claiming Virginia's support, 
depended upon "how far Crawford, is connected with the radicals and sup­
ports them, because my respect for him would be in great measure 
determined by it."^°
Meanwhile "the army candidate" was availing himself of certain 
political opportunities which the army reorganization act had presented.
In order to make certain that there were no radical sympathizers in the 
War Department, Calhoun used the reorganization to his best advantage. 
Most of the higher functionaries in the War Department were either 
enthusiastic about their Secretary's candidacy or were circumspect 
enough not to reveal their opposition. General Jacob Brown, for instance, 
harbored resentments against Calhoun because of the Secretary's tendency 
to gather unto himself as much organizational control as he could.
Brown was nevertheless careful not to let Calhoun know of his feelings, 
and only when it seemed certain that the Secretary would fail in his 
presidential aspirations did the general openly take sides with John
49Robert S. Garnett to Joseph G. Swift, December 28, 1822, Swift
Papers.
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51
Quincy Adams. The same was true of General Thomas Jesup, who eventually
52favored Clay for the presidency. However, Adjutant and Inspector 
General Daniel Parker was no stranger to political controversy, and he 
was not so cautious as his fellow officers. Parker had originally come 
to the War Department as a chief clerk, appointed by Secretary of War 
William Eustis. During the War of 1812 Parker had not been on good 
terms with Secretary of State James Monroe and, besides taking Secretary 
of War John Armstrong's part in the Chesapeake strategy disputes, had 
gone so far as to complain to President Madison about Monroe's inter­
ference with the War Department. Parker, then, was a friend of 
Armstrong's, who was no friend of Monroe's; and Parker was a friend of 
Eustis', who was certainly not friendly to Calhoun. Eustis was in 1822 
a Crawford partisan, and it was Eustis Who had lately presided over the 
House committee on military affairs with radical zeal. Calhoun naturally 
concluded that Eustis' sympathies were those of Parker. The Secretary of 
War's hostility toward Parker was confirmed when it was rumored that 
General Parker had criticised one of Calhoun's i 
establishment. An extraordinary scene followed.
In 1823 General Brown wrote to Ambrose Spencer, a New York 
judge then seeking a federal position, that it might be well to send some 
letters recommending him to Calhoun: "Finer hands never touched paper,"
Brown said. By early 1824 Brown was acting as an Adams' partisan, 
attempting to woo DeWitt Clinton into the Secretary of State's camp. See 
Jacob Brown to Ambrose Spencer, April 7, 1823, and Jacob Brown to DeWitt 
Clinton, January 8, 1824. See also Jacob Brown to Ambrose Spencer,
December 14, 1824, on relations between Adams and Calhoun at this impor­
tant point. All these letters may be found in The Papers of Jacob Brown, 
William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 
(hereafter cited as Brown Papers). Concerning the matter of Brown's 
eventual hostility toward Calhoun because of the Secretary's centraliza­
tion of War Department programs, see Entry of November 1, 1825, Vandeventer 
Diary.
52
Entry of January 12, 1825, lbxd.
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Calhoun called General Parker to his office, where, in the pre­
sence of a witness, the Secretary of War interrogated the general about 
his criticism of the report which Calhoun had written- Parker equivo­
cated when Calhoun asked him whether he was the author of these adverse 
remarks. But now the Secretary was bound to remove Parker from the 
staff if he could, and the reorganization provided Calhoun with the per­
fect opportunity. When Parker's position as Adjutant General was 
eliminated by the reorganization act, he had become the Paymaster General 
for the army. In the spring of 1822, when Colonel Nathan Towson's 
appointment as a regimental commander had been blocked by the Senate, 
Calhoun and Monroe had resubmitted Towson's name as the new Paymaster 
General, thus displacing Parker. Regardless of the fact that the Senate 
blocked this appointment also, Towson was still given the job temporarily, 
and Parker was out of a place. In desperation and feeling ill-used by
Calhoun, Parker solicited John Quincy Adams' advice and told the whole
53
sorry tale to the Secretary of State.
Cal'noun had been correct in his assumption of Parker's hostility. 
Newly displaced from office and highly resentful, Parker had told Adams 
that "the management of the War Department had been inefficient and extra­
vagant, which was very susceptible of demonstration." Throughout the 
spring Parker had been in contact with Crawford and his friends as well. 
Crawford had sent Parker word that "there was an intrigue for turning
him out of office," and the Treasury Secretary had eventually offered
54
Parker a clerkship in the Treasury. There was also one other factor 
which may have led to Parker's abrupt dismissal by Calhoun: Christopher
53 54
Adams, Diary, 5:527; 6:3-9. Ibid., 6:8.
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Vandeventer, undaunted by the Rip Raps investigation, was probably seeking 
Parker's job for himself. Vandeventer's ambitions were well understood 
by his friends, and as early as 1819 it was rumored that the chief clerk 
had his eye on a staff position. William McRee wrote General Swift con­
cerning the clerk:
I am told, that our friend Vandeventer, intends applying for the Pay 
Mastr Genlship [sic]. If it is true, and he succeeds I am satisfied 
he will ultimately repent it. It leads to nothing. It is a stopper. 
It may enable him to live comfortably and even genteely, at the city 
of W [sic]; but it will enable him to do nothing else.55
Calhoun had far more pleasant relations with his military friends.
General Winfield Scott was then considering running for Congress from his
home state of Virginia, but by the summer he had decided instead to become
a partisan of Calhoun's. During the following months General Scott would
also become one of Calhoun's propagandists in the radical stronghold of
Virginia and a contributor, despite his limited funds, supporting a pro-
56Calhoun newspaper in New York City. in the West Colonel Henry Atkinson
declared himself for the Secretary of War in a cautious way. In a confi­
dential letter to Vandeventer, Atkinson discussed western politics at 
length and speculated upon Henry Clay's strength, which he thought was 
greater than that of all the other candidates. If Clay somehow made a 
misstep, however, Atkinson thought that Calhoun would benefit the most. 
Clay and Calhoun were the only two candidates spoken of in St. Louis, 
and Calhoun was Atkinson's favorite, or so the colonel told Vandeventer. 
"My own feelings toward Mr. Calhoun urges [sic] me to take an active
^William McRee to Joseph G. Swift, September 27, 1819, Swift
Papers.
"^Elliott, Winfield Scott, pp. 233-234.
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part in his favor," Atkinson said, "but I fear to do it loudly lest it
57might be injurious to him, [my] being in the Army."
Atkinson was rightly cautious about his involvement in the cam­
paign, for politics was a dangerous business for American soldiers to be 
interested in; miscalculations could end one's career prematurely, as 
Daniel Parker had found out. For a candidate such as Calhoun, who was 
closely identified with his department, it was all too easy for his 
opponents to cast him as "the army candidate." The Secretary of War's 
natural aggressiveness also played into the hands of his critics; such a 
trait fitted all too well into supposed military characteristics and 
could be turned by the opposition candidates to their advantage. One of 
the newspapers opposing Calhoun did just that. Washington Gazette editor 
Elliot wrote of the Secretary of War: "We cannot refrain from a decided
opposition to the man who advances to the presidency, as though he was
58
resolved to take it by a coup de main."
Some of Calhoun's most avid partisans came from the War Depart­
ment establishment. Aside from Scott, Christopher Vandeventer was of 
course acting as a political correspondent for the duration of the campaign. 
The former and present aides-de-camp to General Brown, Charles K. Gardner 
and John A. Dix, were both involved with the New York Patriot, which was 
created specifically to promote Calhoun's chances in New York. Acting as 
a free-lance political correspondent as well as being involved with the 
New York Patriot was the ex-engineer general, Joseph G. Swift, who had
57Henry Atkinson to Christopher Vandeventer, November 14, 1822, 
Vandeventer Papers.
58
City of Washington Gazette, May 27, 1822.
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family as well as military connections in North Carolina which were put 
59to good use. Paymaster Nathan Towson had connections m  Maryland 
which Calhoun did not hesitate to make use of, and because Towson was 
indebted to the Secretary for his new place on the staff, the colonel 
could hardly refuse to help in Calhoun's campaign.60
Another member of Calhoun's political entourage was drawn from 
the Secretary's official associations. Because Congress had abolished 
the Office of Indian Trade during the last session, Superintendent 
Thomas McKenney found himself without a place. By May, 1822, the 
Washington Gazette had come out openly in favor of William Crawford, and 
Calhoun wished for an "independent newspaper" solely, he said, "to 
expose the intrigues" of Clay and Crawford. Adams, with whom Calhoun 
was talking on this subject, replied wryly that an "independent news­
paper" would be welcome in the city of Washington.6-*- Just how impartial 
the newest paper in the city was when it came out later that summer was 
open to question, but the new Washington Republican and Congressional 
Examiner, with former Superintendent of Indian Trade McKenney as the
59Hay, "Calhoun and 1824," p. 27; Jabez D. Hammond, The History 
of political parties in the state of New York, from the ratification of 
the Federal Constitution to December 1840, 3 vols. (Syracuse: Hall,
Mills & Co., 1852), 2:130 (hereafter cited as Hammond, New York Politics) 
Swift, Memoirs, p. 192. Professor Hay writes in the piece cited above 
that General brown was "warm" for Calhoun's candidacy, and the involve­
ment of Gardner and Dix in Calhoun's campaign in New York City is given 
as evidence of the general's attachment. But Gardner and Dix were much 
more enthusiastic about Calhoun than Brown ever was; Brown was ill at 
this time, and being his aide, Dix's duty was to be at his side. Dix 
decided, however, to stay on in the city to work with the Patriot. 
Christopher Vandeventer, of course, was a native of New York as well, 
and he made several trips to that state in Calhoun's behalf.
60John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxey, June 25, 1822, Calhoun Papers,
7:182.
61
Adams, Diary, 5:538-539; 6:46.
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editor, left no doubt that it opposed the radicals. After only the first
62
few issues, a newspaper war was raging along the banks of the Potomac.
The political roles avidly played by the men of the War Department 
and the anti-military campaign rhetoric used against Calhoun by his oppo­
nents suggest that a martial shadow was cast over this presidential 
contest. Calhoun's presence among the contenders was responsible in the 
first instance for the unprecedented involvement of the American military 
establishment in the politics of the nation. A Secretary of War had 
never run for the highest office in the land before, nor would a Secretary
of War ever again attempt to use the War Department as a springboard to 
63the White House. The involvement of soldier-politicians in the campaign 
of 1824 was not, of course, the most important feature of the contest, nor 
did it become a major issue, but neither did Calhoun's opponents completely 
ignore the possibilities with which "the army candidate" presented them.
It is worth noting that all of Calhoun's soldier-politicians were 
younger, well-educated men, anxious for their own success. Scott, Swift, 
and McKenney, for instance, were all younger than the Secretary himself, 
who was not yet forty when he announced that he would battle for the 
presidential succession. Calhoun's youth, success, and the audacity of 
his public ambition all made of him an appealing figure to men like him­
self. Jabez Hammond, a New York politico who was not enamored of Calhoun, 
remarked that at the beginning of the campaign that "there scarcely could
62Ibid., 6:63.
6 3Of course there would be other "military candidates" running 
for office, but none of these did so possessing the advantages which 
Calhoun enjoyed by supervising the War Department while a candidate.
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be found an enterprising young man for whom Calhoun was not the favorite 
64
candidate."
III
Calhoun remarked to a youthful supporter that he had rarely "seen
a more propitious moment for young men of talents and energy," and in
65
saying this he was really assessing his own fortunes. The disappoint­
ments of his own political youth had been few. That he was about to 
experience the vicissitudes of political failure, Calhoun had no fear.
And yet the fact of his failure in the campaign of 1824 may have been one 
of the more salient features of his entire public life.
Reading Calhoun's campaign letters from this period, one might
66
easily accept the Secretary of War's professions at face value. He 
thought of himself, he said, as the defender of the progressive Repub­
licanism which the Monroe administration had manifested during the postwar 
67years. It was a kind of Republicanism, Calhoun claimed, which was 
entirely consistent with that of the fathers of the party. Neither 
Jefferson, nor Madison, nor Monroe had ever argued that the party should 
remain static; they all believed, as Calhoun did, that national progress 
and political stagnation were incompatible. Calhoun's reading of his 
party's history convinced him that Republicanism was intrinsically a
64
Hammond, New York Politics, 2:126.
^John C. Calhoun to John P. Kennedy, June 10, 1823, Calhoun 
Papers, 8:101.
66Russo, "Southern Republicans," p. 293.
67John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, August 20, 1822, Calhoun 
Papers, 7:248.
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dynamic party. His own progressive nationalism was a demonstration of 
his faith in that ideal. Very late in the campaign, after he had all but 
capitulated to the other candidates, Calhoun defended himself to a con­
servative Virginian:
I have [never] done an act, which, if condemned in me, Mr. Jefferson, 
Mr. Madison, and Mr. Monroe must not be equally condemned . . . must 
I then be judged more rigidly than these old Republican veterans, 
and they be excused for what I am condemned?^®
Calhoun did not trouble to reconcile nationalism and Republican­
ism, because for him they were identical. Thus, he saw no inconsistency 
in saying in one breath that he was faithful to "the principles of '76,"
and adding in the next that he supported "the system of measures, which
69
the experience of half a century has shown to be necessary." Those 
"measures" that Calhoun defended were precisely the problem for many 
Republicans when they considered the Secretary of War's candidacy: since
his first days in Congress, Calhoun had argued for internal improvements, 
national banks, protective tariffs, and an enlarged national defense 
establishment. Robert Garnett feared Calhoun for his "ultra-federa], 
politics on the subject of litigated question[s] between the States & 
the general Governments,"^ but Calhoun denied that he had any such pro­
clivities. He insisted that he thought the balance of power between 
state and nation "the most novel and beautiful feature in our whole system.
68John C. Calhoun to Robert S. Garnett, July 3, 1824, ibid.,
9:200.
69John C. Calhoun to Charles Fisher, August 1, 1823, ibid.,
8:204.
70Robert S. Garnett to Joseph G. Swift, December 28, 1822, Swift
Papers.
71John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, August 24, 1823, Calhoun 
Papers, 8:243.
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Because Calhoun's orthodoxy was suspect in some quarters, he 
attempted constantly to convince others that his policies and those of
72
"the political fathers of the Republican church" were precisely the same,
and in particular he sought to portray himself as Monroe's rightful
73successor because of his ideological affinity with his President. This 
was Calhoun's public face, but his self-confidence carried him much 
farther than he ever publicly admitted. The Secretary of War considered 
himself the standard bearer of his party's evolution. Although he 
claimed to be the direct political descendant of Jefferson, Madison, and
Pol n n ^aa4* ».?-i 4-Vi Ma/^ i awrl MnnrAa aw» iW 4 W. S/W / WM4>»«VW«» tiMW ■*. UW O V WM WiM 4 li.
the matter of internal improvements. While Calhoun was still in Congress,
he had worked ardently for the so-called "Bonus Bill" in which revenues
derived from the B. U. S. would be applied to works sponsored by the
national government. After he and other young Republicans had shepherded
the bill past a narrow vote, Calhoun was taken aback when President
74
Madison vetoed the bill on constitutional grounds. Once again, when
Calhoun was in the War Office, his stand on internal improvements was
altogether too expansive to suit President Monroe's tastes, and Monroe
insisted that Calhoun modify his views on the subject before the Secretary
75submitted them to Congress. During this last instance, a friend asked 
Calhoun how he and the President got along on constitutional questions,
73
John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, August 20, 1822, Calhoun 
Papers, 7:243.
74
Capers, Opportunist, pp. 54-55.
75
Adams, Diary, 4:218.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
328
76and Calhoun replied that there was no difficulty. Calhoun nevertheless 
nursed a desire to go beyond the policies which had been established by 
the men he said were his political forebears. If one views Christopher 
Vandeventer's remarkable 1818 "campaign biography" of Calhoun as being 
sanctioned by the Secretary himself, one statement contained there stands 
out as an expression of how Calhoun really viewed his place in the party: 
"The highest eulogium which can be paid to his political career," Vande­
venter wrote, "is the circumstance that all parties have adopted his
77
leading opinions as settled axioms of national policy." Calhoun may 
have seen himself, therefore, not merely as the arch-representative of 
evolving Republicanism, but as the harbinger of a new Republican faith 
which was a synthesis of principle and experience. Not even James Monroe 
was willing to undertake this kind of amalgamation.
Calhoun's eclectic Republicanism enabled him to see himself as 
the only bridge between the old and new politics, but there was one element 
of the political past which he would not alter. He had his sights set on 
a noble political future; it was a future peopled by benevolent aristocrats 
and statesmen, much as he imagined the past had been, when politicians 
were supposedly less interested in power than principles. He had an 
affinity for those days when suffrage was so restricted that the well­
born and fortunate could afford to be democrats, days in which the credo
76John C. Calhoun to J. G. Jackson, March 31, 1818, Calhoun 
Papers, 2:216.
77Christopher Vandeventer, "The Secretary of War," dated 1818, 
Vandeventer Papers.
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demanded that offices should be awarded rather than fought over with the
78vulgar methods of demagoguery.
His attachment to the ideals of the gentleman politician was
manifested in two ways. He first posed as the defender of what he called
"the cause"; that is to say, the triumph of his kind of Republicanism
over radicalism. By casting himself as the disinterested crusader, Calhoun
acted out the only aspect of the Republican past of which he truly approved.
He argued constantly that his political views were those of the party's
founders, but in fact their images (as he saw them) were the only features
of the past which he did not rejects Early in the campaign Calhoun wrote
to a supporter in this style:
I know I am, without any self-deception, much more attached to the 
cause than to my personal advancement. I would much rather go down 
in pursuing, that system of policy, to which I am attached, than 
rise by persuing [sic] any other.79
Calhoun thought that only under the stewardship of such men
could the nation progress. A man who watched over the happiness and
greatness of the country, must inevitably be rewarded by the people.
This, Calhoun said, was "the highest Republican principle, a fixed con-
80
fidence in the virtue and intelligence of the people."
What, then, was the "gentleman politician" of old to do when 
set adrift in the turbulent waters of the era of good feelings? He
78Calhoun's view of what a politician should be corresponded 
most closely with that discussed by Charles Sydnor, in his American 
Revolutionaries in the Making: Political Practices in Washington's
Virginia (New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1970), pp. 60-62.
79John C. Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, April 5, 1822, Calhoun 
Papers, 7:13.
80Ibid.
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first looked about and disapproved of what he saw. If the people were
as virtuous as he supposed, how could a party rise up which was inimical
to popular interests? The answer was clear enough to Calhoun: the
people in their virtue believed their statesmen were also good. Dangerous
and unscrupulous imposters had risen instead and were on the verge of
gulling the people with their manipulations. It was in just such a light
that John Calhoun saw Crawford and his radical supporters. Radicalism
was not only the antithesis of Republicanism in Calhoun's view, but of
81
democracy as well— "the last and most dangerous enemy," he thought. In
order to combat the radical enemy, then, Calhoun sortied forth. If the
tricks of deception, maneuver, a.nd "political juggling" were used by the
enemy, the true champion of Republicanism had on his side the certain
knowledge that when the people were warned of the dangers they faced they
82
would destroy this aberration.
So riddled with solecisms were Calhoun's elaborate justifications 
for his candidacy that it is doubtful that he ever understood completely 
how profound his delusions were. They were the products of a mind over­
taken by itself, trapped somewhere between dreams and reality. Obviously 
Calhoun's candidacy could not hope to flourish if it was guided by such 
tortured opinions. The place where such views as Calhoun's had survived 
best had been in the congressional caucuses; but instead of besting radi­
calism in Congress, Calhoun took his disembodied views on the hustings, 
where they mattered least. His campaigns in the various states were 
handicapped from the beginning.
81John C. Calhoun to Samuel L. Gouveneur, May 25, 1823, ibid.,
8:74.
82
John C. Calhoun to Henry Wheaton, October 12, 1823, ibid., 8:308.
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Calhoun submitted his candidacy to the states in the first place
because he thought that victory had already been denied him in Congress
by the radical phalanx, not because he had an aversion to this kind of 
83president-making. None of the candidates opposing Crawford was willing 
to remind the voters that the last three Presidents had been chosen in 
just this fashion. Being the man most likely to win in a congressional 
caucus, Crawford certainly had no mind to attack this method. The Secre­
tary of War considered the states a fair field, where political manipulation 
had not yet taken hold. He did not understand that as suffrage had 
expanded so had the techniques of power politics. The campaign was thus 
a bitter education for Calhoun, for as he came to realize that principles 
alone, dispassionately stated, would not win him the election, he found
also that there were other candidates who were much more adroit at this
84
new sort of politics than he.
The techniques and men used by Calhoun in the various states 
during the campaign of 1824 at once contradicted his own olympian pro­
nouncements about the crusade against radicalism. At first, however, 
the Secretary seems to have thought that radicalism could be beaten 
merely by exposing it to the light of public opinion. A great deal of 
Calhoun's early campaign was devoted to the subvention of newspapers in 
areas where he thought he had the best chance of success. In March,
1822, the Franklin Gazette began to print, under the guiding hands of
83As shall be seen, Calhoun originally thought that his candidacy 
would succeed if only he could arrange for his friends to present a dis­
passionate and reasoned discourse of his principles to the people. See 
below, p» 332.
84Calhoun's attempt to use the very kind of manipulative poli­
tics as his opponents (and his failure) can be seen below, p, 338.
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Calhoun's partisans in the Family party, a life of the Secretary of War
which immediately drew the fire of Crawford's Washington Gazette. The
Franklin Gazette's pieces on Calhoun ran over a period of four months,
reaching well into the summer. With each issue's appearance, Jonathon
Elliot, the editor of the Washington Gazette, reached new peaks of hyster-
85
ical invective against Calhoun. Calhoun was also careful to see that
articles favorable to his candidacy reached newspapers which were not
committed to one contender or another, and Professor Wiltse believes that
some of these pieces may have been written by Calhoun himself.88 It is
certain that Calhoun made suggestions about the contents of some of this
87campaign literature. In one letter to a partisan, Calhoun instructed
him on the finer points of his own career suitable for publication:
My past services, my identity with the late war, & with the 
admn [sic], my uniform Republican course, my habits of industry 
and business, the distinctness of my political principles, and the 
openness and candour which even my enemies concede to me all furnish. QQ
topicks [sic] for arguments to sustain the cause.00
This was pretty dry stuff, but Calhoun was persuaded that it was
the stuff of politics in the states. Another means of getting his
message of anti-radicalism out to the states was by private correspondence.
He entreated his trusted friends to "write and get your correspondents to 
89write." Early in 1823 former general Joseph Swift visited the candidate
85City of Washington Gazette, July 9, 1822.
88Wiltse, Calhoun, p. 258.
87John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, April 12, 1822, and John C. 
Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, April 1, 1823, Calhoun Papers, 7:30; and 8:4.
O Q
John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, March 27, 1823, ibid.,
7:546-547.
89John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, April 1, 1823, ibid., 8:4.
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in Washington and returned home to New York with an extensive list of
90
men dedicated to the cause with whom he was supposed to keep in touch.
At the same time Calhoun attempted to use what influence he had 
to dispense patronage, and in this he counted heavily upon Monroe's 
friendship. The Secretary of War entertained the idea that, since he was 
casting himself as the administration's champion, the President should 
endorse his candidacy as a matter of course. In the summer of 1822, 
having presented Monroe with a list of appointments he wished the Presi­
dent to make, Calhoun wrote to Ninian Edwards that Monroe "begins to 
feel the necessity of taking a decided stand." Calhoun had used the
opportunity of their meeting to urge Monroe to come out against the
91
radicals as soon as possible, but Monroe equivocated. The President
would not openly declare for one candidate or another, but insofar as he
favored anyone, it was probably Calhoun. The Secretary thought that
Monroe was quietly on his side: "That he has taken his stand to support
[the] administration, I cannot doubt;" Calhoun said in October, "it is
92
high time that he should." However strict Monroe's neutrality has
seemed to scholars of this period, the fact remains that the other two
leading candidates in 1822 and 1823 believed completely in Monroe's
partiality to the young Secretary of War. By the summer of 1822 John
Quincy Adams thought that the President devoted most of his time to
93
defending Calhoun against his opponents. William Crawford had come
90Swift, Memoirs, p. 122.
91John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, August 20, 1822, Calhoun 
Papers, 7:247-249. Calhoun discusses patronage throughout this entire 
letter.
92John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, October 5, 18]], ibid., 7:294-
295.
93Adams, Diary, 6:8; Russo, "Southern Republicans," p. 304.
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94around to the same opinion earlier. Calhoun managed td secure appoint­
ments normally outside his gift. The most notable of these was the 
appointment of Ohioan John McLean, first as Commissioner of the General
Land Office (a post usually controlled by Crawford) and then as Post- 
95
master General. The Secretary of War may also have had a hand in
several appointments in the new Florida territorial government, including
that of Governor William P. Duval. This last post was ordinarily within
96
the gift of the Secretary of State. Quite a dispenser of patronage
himself, William Crawford complained about the inroads being made into
those gifts of office he wanted to hand out himself. "Certain it is,
Crawford said, "that every appointment in Florida was made without my
knowledge, and even the appointments connected with my own Department
97
have been made without regard to my wishes."
It is easy to exaggerate the effect of Calhoun's relatively close 
association with Monroe, his modest success at handing out places, and 
the literary activities of Calhoun's friends. These methods could only 
have had a limited effect. Such techniques did have their political 
rewards for the candidate who used them well, but they were no substitute 
for the ability to manage oneself into a position of power. For this, 
one needed the new masters of political operation.
94William Crawford to Albert Gallatin, May 13, 1822, Adams, 
Gallatin Correspondence, pp. 580-581.
95 . . .Francis P. Weisenburger, The Life of John McLean; A Politician
on the United States Supreme Court (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1937; reprint ed., New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), p. 48 (here­
after cited as Weisenburger, McLean). Wiltse, Calhoun, p. 260.
96Wiltse, Calhoun, p. 260.
97See note 94, above.
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Doubtless many of the men who worked for Calhoun's election were 
motivated in one way or another by their own self interest. One thinks 
immediately of Thomas McKenney and Joseph G. Swift, both of whom stood 
to benefit personally by Calhoun's elevation to the presidency. Winfield 
Scott's ardor for Calhoun's candidacy obviously went much deeper than his 
commitment to the cause of anti-radicalism. Samuel Ingham and George M. 
Dallas of Pennsylvania's Family party had their eyes on local power as 
much as did the energetic Henry Wheaton, who helped run Calhoun's New 
York Patriot. No doubt, too, every one of the contenders for the prize 
of 1824 had such men working for them, but among several of Calhoun's 
key supporters there was an optimism which transcended the Secretary of 
War's chances at any time, and indeed matched that of the candidate him­
self. Such confidence could only be possessed by the political dilettante.
For a candidate who had yet to be nominated by any method, Calhoun
was beset by few doubts in 1822 that he would u.ltimately win the election.
Actually, he had ample reason to be pess imi st-.c. A caucus of the South
Carolina assembly had pointedly rec-. ..uued Lowndes over Calhoun, who was
decidedly the second choice until the seriousness of Lowndes' illness
became known. Even after Lowndes had left for England in the fall of
1822, Calhoun's friends back home were hesitant to make a move in the
98assembly for the Secretary. Before the year was out, however, two
98See Robert Y. Hayne to William Lowndes, January 21, 1822, in 
Theodore D. Jervey, Robert Y. Hayne and his Times (New York: Macmillan,
1909; reprint ed., New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), pp. 126-127 (here­
after cited as Jervey, Hayne). The South Carolina assembly resolution 
nominating Lowndes was so obviously lukewarm about Calhoun that the 
Washington Gazette, January 8, 1822, reprinted it— not so much to help 
Lowndes as to damage Calhoun. On the reluctance of Calhounites to move 
for a nomination in the assembly after Lowndes'■death, see Eldred Simkins 
to Christopher Vandeventer, December 17, 1822, Vandeventer Papers.
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more candidates did win the support of their state legislatures. Andrew
Jackson was offered to the voters by the Tennessee legislature in July.
Henry Clay was unanimously acclaimed in Kentucky in November, but a
similar move for Clay in the Ohio legislature ended in a badly bungled 
99caucus. Far from being distressed by the westerner's appearance in
the li ts, Calhoun was heartened by the prospect that Clay and Jackson
might split the section so that he could win a unity vote.'''00 The
Secretary was sure that he was the only candidate whose popularity
crossed the mountains. Alone, he said, the West "is too weak and young
jLGx
to carry the Presidential election yet.""L x He knew that Andrew Jackson
would certainly try to block any move for Crawford in the western states.
The general had already made his position clear on the Georgian: "I
102
would support the Devil first."
Of all the candidates, Adams' fortunes seemed to Calhoun to be 
improving. The western situation and the fact that the Secretary of 
State was the only candidate from a free state gave Adams "great advan­
tages," Calhoun thought, "if he know how to improve them."'''00 At the 
same time, relations between these two candidates, once fairly close, 
were becoming strained. Adams kept his dislike for the Secretary of War
99Glyndon Van Deusen, The Life of Henry Clay (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1937), pp. 168-169 (hereafter cited as Van Deusen, Clay).
■'■°°John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, August 22, 1822, Calhoun 
Papers, 7:249.
■'^ "'■John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, January 20, 1823, ibid.,
7:432.
102Andrew Jackson to James Gadsden, November 20, 1821, Bassett, 
Jackson Correspondence, 3:141.
■'■°°John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, August 20, 1822, Calhoun 
Papers, 7:249.
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104confined to his diary, but only barely. Calhoun kept up a semblance 
of civility throughout 1822, but it became more evident that he too was 
not as open toward Adams as before."*"^ The South Carolinian was increas­
ingly hard pressed in succeeding months to keep the focus of his campaign 
upon anti-radicalism, and he hoped that Adams and the other candidates 
would do the same; but Calhoun was also trying simultaneously to dispel 
the impression that he was merely a stalking horse for the New Englander."*-1 
Just how much Calhoun had become a candidate in his own right, rather than 
merely the anti-radical crusader as he had originally styled himself, is 
indicated by a letter Calhoun wrote to Samuel Ingham late in 1822.
Earlier, Calhoun had explained to William Plumer that he had become a 
candidate only because he feared that Adams was not strong enough to stop
Crawford. Now a year later Calhoun told Ingham that an Adams-Calhoun
107
coalition in Pennsylvania "would be fatal to the common cause." Yet
108
Crawford and Adams seemed strong in New York. If Adams could, with
Calhoun's help, win Pennsylvania, the Secretary of State would be in an 
excellent position to stop Crawford, the avowed purpose of Calhoun's 
candidacy. Samuel Ingham seems to have suggested just such a coalition 
to Calhoun, but Calhoun told his supporter not to take any step "at this
104Adams, Diary, 5:524-525; 6:43.
"*"°^ John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, May 21, 1823, Calhoun 
Papers, 8:70.
"*"^John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, April 28, 1823, ibid.,
8:37.
107John C. Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, November 2, 1822, ibid.,
7:327.
"*"^John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, March 23, 1823, ibid.,
7'546.
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time particularly in your State which would have the appearance of
109
yielding me up for him." Not only was Calhoun unwilling to share 
Pennsylvania with Adams for the sake of "the cause," he did not want to 
help anyone else against the radicals if he could not directly benefit.
By the end of 1822 it is extremely doubtful that Calhoun's statesmanlike 
pose fooled anyone, except perhaps Calhoun himself.
During the following year Calhoun's image of himself was put to 
the severest test. That Crawford and Calhoun had few ideological affin­
ities was unquestionable, but Calhoun's prejudice against the Georgian 
became almost obsessive. Calhoun became convinced that Crawford was 
aiming to dupe the people into giving him the presidency. How else 
could a man so devoid of principles hope for office? Calhoun wondered. 
Crawford's chances for the presidency rested, said Calhoun, "on a single 
ground, that of being a thorough partisan.""'''^ Most disturbing to the 
Secretary of War was the thought that it was entirely possible that 
political management alone might decide the election. Referring to the 
election in New York, Calhoun told a friend:
If a candidate can be elected without services, or qualifications 
by sheer management, it must be by the instrumentality of that 
active, but unprincipled class of politicians, which a powerful 
combination of causes had engendered in your State. Unsustained 
by New York the cause [of intrigue] is desperate; but with its 
support the struggle must be severe and doubtful.I12
109John C. Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, November 2, 1822, ibid.,
7:327.
'*''*'^See Calhoun's tirade against Crawford's character and political 
principles (or lack thereof) in Adams, Diary, 5:497.
^^John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcyr August 2, 1822, Calhoun 
Papers, 7:231.
112John C. Calhoun to Samuel Gouveneur, April 29, 1823, ibid.,
8:33.
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Although the Calhounites made much of their candidate's attach­
ment to certain principles, and despite the fact that Calhoun had 
associated radicalism with a contempt for democracy, his own techniques 
were scarcely distinguishable from Crawford's. Calhoun and his men 
demonstrated a willingness to use whatever means were available to win 
the approval of the key states, and local conditions— not principles—  
determined what those methods would be. Aside from the electioneering 
propaganda in the newspapers, there was not a hint of the elegant cam­
paign on principle suggested in Calhoun's rhetoric.
Throughout 1822 Calhoun had been sure that Pennsylvania would
stand by him, regardless of what happened elsewhere. It may have been
that the leading members of the faction known as the Family party had
been too optimistic in their appraisals of their strength within that
state, but Calhoun took every bit of information he received from them
113
to heart. Any rumor fed his enthusiasm. A Republican convention to 
nominate a governor was due to be held at Harrisburg in March, 1823, and 
its importance to Calhoun and the Family party lay in whether the nominee 
would support Calhoun. He was obviously counting upon the Family party 
to manage the convention so that he would receive the call of the state 
to run for the presidency, and he thought little about whether such a 
nomination would be ultra- or anti-democratic. George M. Dallas went to 
Washington to confer with Calhoun in February about making some sort of 
move at the upcoming convention. As always, Calhoun was hopeful. After 
having talked with Dallas, Calhoun wrote to his friend Virgil Maxcy in 
Maryland:
113John C. Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, April 5, 1822, ibid.,
7:12-13.
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I have but little doubt but a movement will be made at Harrisburgh 
[sic]. You see the importance of the moment. Should it take place 
and be properly managed, it must go far to decide the question which 
now agitates the country.^
Perhaps Calhoun did not know that there was then a serious 
resistance building in the rural areas of the state to his nomination, 
which was spoken of as simply another measure "adopted by the dictatorial 
politicians of Philadelphia."'*''*'^  It was known by the Family party surely 
that one of the leading gubernatorial contenders, George Bryan, was not 
impressed by Calhoun. Upon his return from Washington, Dallas and the 
other members of his faction set about trying to deny Bryan the nomina­
tion and substitute a nominee in his place who would owe his success to 
116
the Calhounites.
Dallas and the other Calhounites succeeded only partially at 
Harrisburg in early March. The man they backed, John A. Shultz, did 
win the nomination for governor, but when Dallas and his friends attempted 
to place Calhoun's name before the meeting, they were upstaged by the 
delegates from Westmoreland County, who presented the name of Andrew 
Jackson to the convention. What was described as a "bear garden scene" 
followed; the uproarious convention closed without a decision. In the 
commotion Dallas and the Family party members on hand thought it best not 
to bring up Calhoun's name at all, because of the wild aspect of the meeting.
114John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, February 23, 1823, ibid., 7:491.
^^Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, p. 133.
13.6Ibid., pp. 134-135; see evidence of the Family party's support 
for gubernatorial candidate John A. Shultz in Samuel Ingham to Joseph G. 
Swift, October 10, 1823, Swift Papers.
117Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, pp. 138-139. Klein theorizes that 
the Family party had agreed to back George Bryan after the first ballot; 
instead Dallas and his men had put their votes behind Shultz from the start. 
Dallas may have decided upon this strategy during consultations he held with 
Calhoun in Washington the month before the convention.
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Descriptions of the volatile disposition of the convention mem­
bers may have unnerved Calhoun, but he did his best not to show anxiety. 
Dallas had told him that, notwithstanding the fact that no presidential 
candidate had been approved, he still had two-thirds of the conventioneers 
pledged to his candidacy. This being so, Calhoun said, all that was
left to do was to "bring out the next Legislature at the comt. [sic] of 
119the session." The Secretary's anxiety did show, however, in a letter
to Congressman Thomas Rogers. Although Calhoun praised Dallas and his
friends, he nonetheless asked Rogers if something more could be done "in
the counties, when they come to act on the Govr's [sic] nomination? And
could it not be so managed as to induce the Republicans of the Legislature
120
to make some expression of their opinion before adjournment?" In his
suggestions to his workers in Pennsylvania, then, Calhoun was not in the
least concerned about the mode of his nomination, only that it be finally
made. As to the idea of a caucus deciding upon the next president, a
matter which had become one of the true issues of the campaign, Calhoun
was hardly opposed. The important question, he said, was not the mode
121
of election, but the character of the man raised up by it.
Meanwhile in Pennsylvania it seemed to many that the Calhounites 
themselves were a mighty cabal, bent on dictating a presidential choice
118John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, March 12, 1823, Calhoun
Papers, 7:515.
n 9T,.,Ibid.
120John C. Calhoun to Thomas J. Rogers, March 12, 1823, ibid.,
7:516.
121John C. Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, June 25, 1823, ibid.,
8:131.
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to the people. The friends of the defeated George Bryan were particularly
chagrined; one Bryanite wrote that "there never was exhibited in any
deliberative body such a scene of political Juggling, manoeuvering and
122chicanery as was at Harrisburg on this occasion."
It was strange that did Calhoun see any threat in the wholly unex­
pected surge of Jackson's popularity at the Harrisburg convention. "I 
consider Jackson's strength as ours," Calhoun wrote. "We are personally 
friends and his intimate friends are my intimate friends. All he gains 
will be gained by us." The only danger Calhoun saw at this point from the
Hero of New Orleans was "the possibility of Jackson's strength passing to 
123Adams." By the fall of 1823 the general's strength in the state had
become evident even to Calhoun, who acknowledged in September that he and
124
Jackson divided the state between them. ' Members of the Family party
were guardedly optimistic; John Conard wrote:
I am afraid we shall have more difficulty with the name of Jackson 
in this State than was apprehended some time back. It is a name 
that has great weight with the mass of uninformed and unreflecting 
people, but as for Crawford we consider him altogether out of" the way 
in this State and [he] can give us no trouble unless their [sic] 
weight should be thrown into the scale of Jackson to destroy the vote
of Penn'a. [sic] altogether.125
One of the reasons that Calhoun had been so sanguine about his 
chances in Pennsylvania to begin with was because Crawford stood no
122Andrew Boder to George Bryan, March 6, 1823, quoted in Klein, 
Pennsylvania Politics, p. 139.
123John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, August 24, 1823, Calhoun 
Papers, 8:244.
124John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, September 23, 1823, ibid.,
8:281.
125John Conard to Joseph G. Swift, September 18, 1823, Swift
Papers.
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chance there, but in the state of New York an entirely different situa­
tion obtained. It was in New York that Calhoun and Crawford would send 
their partisans directly against each other, and, counting as he did on 
Pennsylvania's support, Calhoun believed that New York would decide the 
contest for the presidency. "The greatest danger" of radical success, 
he said, "is in New York. Her politicks are so much a matter of calcu­
lation of personal interest and sudden combinations, that it is
X 26
impossible to form a satisfactory opinion."
Calhoun's description of New York politics was a fair one.
During the past two years there had been a general revolt among the 
Republicans of the state against the faction led by DeWitt Clinton. The 
guiding light of the so-called "Bucktails" was Martin Van Buren, already 
emerging as one of the wiliest politicians in the state. By 1822 Van 
Buren and his followers had control of the state government in Albany 
and had been christened "the Albany Regency." The Byzantinism of New 
York politics worked considerably against the development of any but the 
most flexible political principles. Jabez Hammond, who served in the 
legislature at the time, believed that there was "not a shade of differ­
ence between the Clintonian and anti-Clintonian democrats in this state. 
This was the sort of politics in which a master operator like William 
Crawford could shine.
Van Buren did not immediately declare Crawford as the favorite 
of the Regency, but keen observers saw nevertheless that the Regency's 
organ, the Albany Argus, was slanting its articles in favor of the
X 26John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, May 31, 1822, Calhoun 
Papers, 7:138.
127Hammond, New York Politics, 2:87.
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traditional methods of president-making— that is to say, the congressional
caucus. Rufus King suspected as early as February, 1823, that Van Buren
meant to sustain the old New York-Virginia axis which had elected presi-
128dents since Jefferson.
Calhoun's only hope to win New York, therefore, was to campaign, 
as an anti-caucus, anti-Regency candidate, and however distasteful it 
must be, forge an alliance with any Clintonians willing to support him.
The Secretary of War began his campaign in New York City with the estab­
lishment of the New York Patriot, which was to be supported by the 
Republican committee of the city. But this was to be a foothold in the
state only: "from this, as a center, measures will be taken to extend
129
the operation over the State," Calhoun told a supporter. Upstate in
Watertown, Calhoun's old friend Micah Sterling flatly told Calhoun that
there the contest was chiefly between Adams and Crawford. For the present
Calhoun decided to settle for a coalition with the supporters of Adams,
Clay and Jackson against the "radical chief." Elsewhere, Calhoun thought
130
that his prospects were "flattering."
Doubtless, to some figures in New York politics the intrusion of 
the presidential question was an unwelcome complication. What had been 
a contest of wills between the Clintonians and the Albany Regency was 
transformed into a battle over how the state would cast its vote for the 
next President. Committed to Crawford, and therefore bound to support
1 2 8
Rammelkamp, "The Campaign of 1824," pp. 177-178.
129John C. Calhoun to Samuel Southard, April 9, 1823, Calhoun 
Papers, 8:10-11.
1^John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, April 28, 1823, ibid.,
8:36-37.
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the congressional caucus, Van Buren and the Regency could only hold their 
ground, while the Clintonians and the friends of the other presidential 
contenders attacked the Regency— in an interesting turnabout— for being 
anti-democratic.
Calhoun, who was less than concerned about the popular will in
Pennsylvania, set his New York friends to propagandizing the cause of
popular voting for presidential electors. Again in contrast to his
tactics in Pennsylvania, in the case of New York Calhoun and his workers
spoke out against "political management" from the beginning, and styled
themselves as the true friends of the people. Elsewhere Calhoun had
little enough to say on this score: it was only in connection with his
New York campaign that Calhoun became the great democrat, albeit an
anxious one. There, he said, the people were in danger. Crawford
looked forward in’New York, Calhoun said, to "advancement on principles,
which cannot be sustained . and "used means that were subversive of
the publick happiness." Most alarming to Calhoun was the fact that in
New York, unfortunately, "there abounds, but too much materials [sic]
132
for his mode of operation." Other leading Calhounites displayed a 
similar flexibility on the question of popular democracy. George 
McDuffie, one of Calhoun's closest friends and advisors, saw in the early 
Jackson movement in Pennsylvania nothing but "grog shop politicians & 
the rabble." In a fair convention held in that state, McDuffie believed, 
nonetheless, that Calhoun was sure to eventually win the nod, but only
'*'^ '*'Rammelkamp, "The Campaign of 1824," pp. 178-179.
132
John C. Calhoun to Samuel Southard, June 14, 1823, Calhoun 
Papers, 8:117-118.
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133apparently if the scum were excluded. Later, referring to the Albany
Regency's opposition to the repeal of New York's election law, McDuffie
told General Swift that "the miserable and ingenuous attempt to evade
the wishes of the people by fraudulent manoeuver, will in all probability
render the partizans of Crawford so odious, as to produce a union for the
134people's ticket, that will insure a majority."
McDuffie's remark concerning the "people's ticket" had reference
to the latest spate of anti-Regency activity in the state. Beginning in
the summer of 1823 the Calhounites, with the help of the new New York
Patriot and Republican committeeman Ogden Edwards, staged a coup d 'etat
135
against the Tammany machine in the city. Planning for the upcoming 
fall elections for gubernatorial and legislative seats, the Tammany com­
mittee had fashioned a list of candidates which looked as though it had 
been written by Van Buren himself. When the slate was presented to the 
Republicans of the city a general revolt broke out, probably because none 
of the prospective candidates had pledged himself on the method of 
choosing electors. Out of the revolt the so-called "People's party" was 
formed. At the forefront of the new party were Samuel Gouveneur (James 
Monroe's brother-in-law), Henry Wheaton (a major contributor to the New 
York Patriot), and Joseph G. Swift, Calhounites all.
All parties claimed victory in the fall elections of 1823.
Calhoun was elated by the news that Wheaton and Gouveneur had been
133QUOte(j -j_n Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, p. 130. 
l^^George McDuffie to Joseph G. Swift, January 23, 1824, Swift
Papers.
135John C. Calhoun to Samuel Southard, April 9, 1823, Calhoun 
Papers, 8:10-11.
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elected to the legislature and counted the whole election as having been
137decisively in his favor. Whether indeed these elections told much
about the desires of the people is highly uncertain; one student of this
period guesses that most of the new legislators were favorable to a
change in the old election law, but there were almost as many new formulae
138
for casting the state's vote as there were politicians.
The lack of a clear decision at the polls meant that the presi­
dential question would be agitated in the state legislature after all.
That fall the Calhounites estimated their chances in the legislature and 
wondered about what position that the new governor, John Yates, would 
take. Henry Wheaton led off the discussions as soon as the legislative 
session began, proposing a bill for the popular election of presidential 
electors. The Regency men countered by proposing the creation of a com- 
mittee of nine to consider the entire question; significantly, a majority 
of the committee was loyal to Crawford. When the committee of nine 
finally reported a bill which effectually postponed the question of
presidential electors until the fall of 1824, it passed by a large 
139majority. In both votes on the floor of the legislature, the numbers 
approving were signs that a Calhoun debacle was in the making.
In the aftermath of the vote to refer the presidential question 
to the committee of nine, the address of Governor Yates was anticlimactic. 
Yates managed to avoid the question entirely, recommending a constitutional
137John C. Calhoun to Samuel Gouveneur, November 9, 1823; John C. 
Calhoun to C. G. Haines, November 9, 1823; and John C. Calhoun to 
Joseph G. Swift, November 9, 1823, Calhoun Papers, 8:354-357.
138Rammelkamp, "The Campaign of 1824," p. 185.
139Ibid., pp. 186-187.
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amendment, a means hardly satisfying to the Calhounites. Wheaton was 
disgusted by the governor's stand, but still hopeful that something 
could be done to forestall a rush toward a state caucus. "Poor Yates 
blubbers, & says he was deceived & made to believe the People did not 
want to be set free," Wheaton told Swift. Before the work of the com­
mittee of nine was completed, Wheaton was still doing his best to work 
for a state-wide convention. "If we push this as we pushed the electoral 
Law [sic]— vigorously & zealously— we shall obtain a glorious Triumph—
The Country have not the slightest doubt of the practicability of
140collecting a very respectable Convention. . . . Have at 'em my boys!"
The decision of the New York state legislature to postpone the
question of choosing electors was a defeat for Calhoun. He contented
himself with believing that the choice would eventually come to the people
of New York in some fashion; the people had been too aroused (and in this
he was right) to let the old methods stand unopposed. The Secretary of
War's only solace was that Pennsylvania's decision on a favorite candidate
had yet to be made. New York did not matter so much after all, he
decided. "We can give them New York and still beat them," Calhoun said,
"Penna [sic] is as firm as a rock. The 4th of March will develope [sic]
her choice and we feel the fullest assurance, that it will be such, as 
141we desire." March 4 was the date chosen for the opgmng of the 
Republican state convention at Harrisburg.
140Henry Wheaton to Joseph G. Swift, [January?], 1824, Swift
Papers.
141John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, January 25, 1824, Calhoun 
Papers, 8:504.
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During February, 1824, the Pennsylvanians went about the business
of choosing delegates for the convention. In the Calhoun camp there was
little anxiety. Samuel Gouveneur, conferring in Washington with Calhoun,
was encouraged by what he knew of the delegates already chosen. Gouveneur
believed that if Pennsylvania went for Calhoun then his own state of New
York would insist on a popular election of presidential electors and
assure his candidate's success. He depended as much as did Calhoun upon
Pennsylvania to affect the course of the other states. "There is the
least reason to expect, that he will [not] be nominated on that occasion
by an overwhelming majority," Gouveneur wrote a fellow Calhounite back 
142home.
But Calhoun's fate in Pennsylvania was decided much earlier than 
the Harrisburg convention. Just a few days after Gouveneur and Calhoun 
met, on February 18, a meeting was held in Philadelphia to choose that 
city's delegates to the convention. Calhoun had no inkling that anything 
untoward would occur there; Philadelphia was the stronghold of the Family
party and most of his supporters in the state would be in evidence. It
\
came as a great surprise to onlookers, then, as George M. Dallas addressed 
the meeting. The congressional caucus had been held at Washington only a 
few days before, Dallas told the audience, and William Crawford had been 
selected by "a miserable and infatuated minority." A crisis, he said, 
had been reached. It was now the duty of the friends of the people to 
unite behind the candidate who stood the fairest chance of defeating 
Crawford and the dreaded radicals. Accordingly, he proposed resolutions
142Samuel Gouveneur to Joseph G. Swift, February 1, 1824, Swift
Papers.
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withdrawing the name of John C. Calhoun from consideration as a presi-
143
dential nominee and substituting that of Andrew Jackson m  his place.
Dallas' move was utterly unexpected, but the news of it deter­
mined the course of the Harrisburg convention the next month. Of the
125 votes cast at Harrisburg, only one did not go to Jackson. Eighty-
144
seven votes were cast recommending Calhoun as Vice-President. Their 
business done, the Harrisburg delegates adjourned their convention in a 
hubbub, leaving Calhoun's presidential aspirations in a wreck.
Other Calhounites were dumbfounded at Dallas' apostasy. When 
news of the Pennsylvania defection reached Raleigh, North Carolina, B. B. 
Smith reported:
Such was the feeling on the occasion, that a general burst of indig­
nation was manifested by three fourths of the Citizens of this city, 
and, had it been possible to have laid hands on that Judas Iscariot, 
George M. Dallas, nothing short of absolute crucifixion, could have 
appeased the wrath of the infuriated populace for his villianous [sic] 
desertion & political treachery.145
Even staunch old Republican Robert S. Garnett of Virginia was
shocked by the turn of events in Pennsylvania. "I cannot pardon such
versatility," he said gravely, "such readiness— such eagerness to assist
in consummating the change.
The candidate himself remained philosophical. Dallas had told
him about a week before the meeting in Philadelphia that it was feared
143See George Dallas’ speech to the Philadelphia meeting reported 
in Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, p. 161.
144Ibid., p. 165.
145
B. B. Smith to Joseph G. Swift, April 17, 1824, Swift Papers.
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the cause was lost in that state. Combined with the news of the caucus
in Washington, Dallas had thought it best to throw his weight behind
Jackson. Nevertheless, Calhoun had not expected the end to come so
quickly. As to Dallas himself, Calhoun thought only (or would say only)
that his move was "ill timed." That being so, Calhoun told Virgil Maxcy,
"taking the U. S. together I never had a fairer prospect than on the day
147
we lost the State."
All that remained for the Calhounites was to assess the damage
done in Pennsylvania, and it appeared to be considerable. Calhounites
in other states had waited upon a decision in Pennsylvania; so certain
was that state in Calhoun's favor, success there could only influence
other states to take a stiffer stand for the South Carolinian. Now that
the worst had happened in Pennsylvania, Calhoun's fortunes in Maryland
148and Ohio dropped accordingly. In North Carolina the congressional
caucus' appeal to that state's delegation had already caused a good deal
or worry among the Calhounites; by January, 1824, it looked already as
though Calhoun's campaign there might stall. General Swift's brother
wrote him from that state:
The activities of our Representatives in Congress [are] favorable 
to Crawfords [sic] pretensions & unless an immediate & correspon­
ding zeal on the part of Mr. Cns [sic] friends is evinced, this 
State now unquestionably favorable to Mr. Cn [sic] is lost to a 
certainty. Rely upon this.149
147
John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, February 27, 1824, Calhoun 
Papers, 8:554-555.
148John McLean of Ohio, for instance, was convinced even before 
the Pennsylvania defeat that Calhoun should content himself with the 
vice-presidency. After the Harrisburg convention, McLean became an 
Adams partisan. Weisenburger, Life of McLean, pp. 48-49.
149W. R. Swift to Joseph G. Swift, January 26, 1824, Swift
Papers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
352
After the decision in Pennsylvania was known, supporters in North
Carolina simply capitulated. "Since fate has decided against us, it now
becomes us to bow and acquiesce like Christians [sic] & philosophers,
and not to repine at events, over which we have no control, however much
150
& deeply we may lament their occurrence," wrote one North Carolinian.
It^was left to Christopher Vandeventer, however, always so much at the
center of events during the past several years, to sum up the impact of
Calhoun's Pennsylvania defeat:
The late movement in Philadelphia by which the friends of Mr. Calhoun 
surrendered him, and fell into the ranks of Genl [sic] Jackson, was 
as unexpected here as it could have been to you. That measure was 
not founded on any communications from this place, but arose entirely 
from the great excitement which prevails in Pennsylvania in favour 
of Genl Jackson, and which a gentleman from that State affirms was 
as difficult to oppose as the fury of a whirlwind. . . . Pennsylvania 
was the foundation on which our hopes principally rested, and it is 
to be feared that the late movement in Philadelphia will not only 
lose us that state, but will greatly contribute to blast our pros­
pects elsewhere. A short time will exhibit the full effect of the 
measure. In the mean time [sic] it appears to us here, that the 
Signified [sic] course for the friends of Mr. Calhoun . . .  to 
pursue will be to stand by and suffer matters to take their own 
course. It certainly is not for us to surrender our favorite at 
the very first approach of adverse fortune, though at the same time 
candor would require at our hands an acknowledgement that his 
prospects have been very much impaired, if not destroyed.-*-51
IV
February was the decisive month in the campaign of 1824. Not 
only had Jackson risen on the ashes of the Calhounites in Pennsylvania, 
but the long-awaited congressional caucus had gone awry. In late 1823 
William Crawford had become gravely ill and when the caucus was finally
B. Smith to Joseph G. Swift, April 17, 1824, ibid.
151Christopher Vandeventer to an unknown addressee, February 
[n.d.], 1824, Vandeventer Papers.
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held in Washington on February 14, much of his support had eroded. It
appeared that the toils of the campaigns in the states, together with
Crawford's illness, had been too much for the radicals. The defeat of
152
radicalism was John C. Calhoun's only consolation that year.
To all outward appearances Calhoun remained a neutral vice- 
presidential candidate during 1824 and was really the only one who had 
a serious claim on that office. He, Adams, and Jackson had always had 
difficulty in defining precisely how they differed, and although Calhoun 
made no profession of support for either Adams or Jackson he was not
153
displeased with the prospect of having either man in the presidency.
Some Calhounites took the same view as Calhoun obviously did.
In New York there was still work to be done, and Henry Wheaton outlined
a post-Pennsylvania strategy for General Swift:
Our principle is to oppose the Caucus Candidate [sic], who is also 
the Virginia & Radical Candidate, and to rally in every State on the 
Strongest anti Crawford man [sic] . In North &_ South Carolina we can 
no longer refrain from taking up Jackson, because he is strongest, 
because the People [sic] understand that without Pennsylvania it is 
wise to push Calhoun a because there is danger that Crawford may 
occupy Calhoun's Southern grounds if it [sic] is not immediately 
occupied by Jackson.
Furthermore, Wheaton added, "Mr. Calhoun acquiesces in taking any position
155
his friends may assign him."
152Mooney, Crawford, pp. 240-241. See also John C. Calhoun to 
Thomas J. Rogers, June 5, 1824, Calhoun Papers, 9:140.
153John C. Calhoun to an unknown addressee, October 8, 1824, 
Calhoun Papers, 9:344.
15^Henry Wheaton to Joseph G. Swift, March 11, 1824, Swift
Papers.
155^.,Ibid.
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Not wanting to spoil the chances of success for any candidate
other than Crawford, Calhoun nonetheless dabbled in New York politics in
a way that was inexplicable, even to his friends. The ex-candidate 
believed that Adams would win New York by October, but he evidently 
calculated on the possibility that the New Englander's campaign might 
fail there. Calhoun considered, at least for a time, that in the event 
Adams could not carry the state, the Calhounites should throw their 
support to Crawford rather than Clay. Christopher Vandeventer was 
appalled that such a calculation would even cross the Secretary of War's 
mind. The chief clerk evidently discussed the matter with Calhoun at 
some length. On October 30, Vandeventer wrote to Micah Sterling that
"our friend . . . fully agrees with me that it would be better to give
i:
it [their support] to Mr Clay [sic] if it can't be given to Mr. Adams." 
Why Calhoun thought (even for an instant) to give Crawford any help at 
all in New York is beyond understanding. Perhaps the Secretary of War 
had made some calculation that Jackson would be served by such a move—  
that the general could somehow win enough popular votes to keep the 
final decision on the presidency out of the House of Representatives, 
where it had long been assumed the outcome would be settled.
Knowing nothing of Calhoun's intentions, John Quincy Adams was 
doubly anxious, lest the Hero of New Orleans steal a march on him in the 
last few months of the campaign. Now that the number of candidates was 
considerably narrowed, Adams no longer pretended to have much affection 
for Jackson and devoted himself to winning out over the general. "The
156Christopher Vandeventer to Micah Sterling, October 29, 30, 
1824, Vandeventer Papers.
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army candidate," an epithet which had earlier been applied to Calhoun, 
now was attached to General Jackson, and Adams' supporters wondered at 
Jackson's unexpected new strength. Adams' friend Plumer wrote to his 
father:
Is it not a bad omen that mere military glory, for he has no 
character or reputation as a Statesman [sic], should thus captivate 
the popular feeling, & throw the nation headlong into the arms of 
a military despot?-*-57
In the siammer of 1824, for the first time, Adams' friends began
thinking about a rapprochement with Clay. Postmaster General John
McLean, only recently attached to Calhoun, thought that such an alliance
would be fruitful. "Mr. Adams is opposed to a union with Clay," McLean
wrote, "but I have no doubt of its policy. . . . There is nothing against
it on Principle [sic], for it would give a true representation of the
public sentiment."'*'^
Suspecting that Calhoun really wanted Jackson to succeed, Adams
began a campaign in October to woo the Secretary of War away from
Jackson. Probably at Adams' request George Sullivan of New Hampshire
began lobbying with other members of the House from New England to vote
for Calhoun as Vice-President. On November 6 Adams' newspaper in the
capital, the National Journal, made the Secretary of State's support for 
159Calhoun official. From Calhoun's point of view all of Adams' support
was hardly necessary, but, of course, Adams was not thinking of Calhoun's 
welfare.
157William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., February 29,
1824, Plumer Correspondence, pp. 102-103.
153John McLean to Joseph G. Swift, October 29, 1824, Swift
Papers.
159Bemis, Adams and ’the Union, pp. 34-35.
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The only way in which Adams could hope to gain the South Caro­
linian's help against Jackson was to promise Calhoun something for the 
future. In December, 1824, Adams made another overture to Calhoun through 
an intermediary. On the 11th of December, George Sullivan met with 
Christopher Vandeventer at the War Department. Adams' man told the chief 
clerk that "it was in the interest of Mr. Calhoun that his friends should
support Mr Adams [sic]." In turn, Sullivan said, "all the New England
States [sic] would support Calhoun for next president." The whole con­
versation seemed to revolve, Vandeventer wrote in his diary, on this 
proposition: "Let Calhoun's friends make Adams P. & [sic] New England
will in turn make Calhoun."
What Vandeventer thought of the proposition is indicated by the 
fact that he remained silent for over a month before revealing it to 
Calhoun. When he finally did hear of the meeting, Calhoun was unim­
pressed. He thought Adams' supporters now included too many old radicals 
"which would make it difficult for Mr. A. to form an administration which 
would have the support of the country." Although Calhoun said that "he
would not move for either candidate," Vandeventer thought nonetheless
that his superior "decidedly prefers Jackson."161
At almost the same time that Sullivan paid his call upon Vande­
venter, Robert Letcher of Kentucky was opening discussions with Adams on 
Clay's behalf. Letcher told Adams that Clay's friends (Letcher professed 
that he did not speak with Clay's sanction) wanted some indication that 
an Adams administration could find a post for Clay. Adams was
166Entry of December 11, 1824, Vandeventer Diary.
161Entry of January 13, 1825, ibid.
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diplomatic and noncommittal. Several other discussions between Adams 
and Letcher took place in December, and by January 9, 1825, the ground­
work had been laid for a meeting between the principals. At this
meeting Clay pledged himself to support Adams, but there is no evidence
162
that Adams promised anything to Clay in return.
Whether in fact Adams and Clay had reached a modus vivendi, the
Secretary of State was at the very least interested in the votes of the
Kentucky delegation. Two days before the Adams-Clay meeting, the state
legislature requested their congressional delegation to cast their votes
for Jackson. Upon hearing the news, the Kentuckians in Congress vowed
to follow their own consciences in the matter; this boded ill for Jackson's 
1 63
fortunes. Even before his candidate had met with Clay, William Plumer
was counting up the states whose support an Adams-Clay alliance might
create; Plumer reckoned on Ohio, Missouri, Maryland, and of course
, 164
Kentucky.
Rumors were certain to be bandied about in the wake of the first 
Adams-Clay meeting, and Christopher Vandeventer duly recorded them all 
in his diary. On January 14, Vandeventer heard that "the Adamsites are 
certain of Success [sic]— having formed an alliance with the Crawfordites 
to share equally the honors of the administration."'*'^ On the next day
] 66
George Sullivan told the chief clerk that the rumor was patently absurd.
162Bemis, Adams and the Union, pp. 36-37.
163Van Deusen, Clay, p. 187.
164William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., January 2, 1825, 
Plumer Correspondence, pp. 126-129.
165Entry of January 14, 1825, Vandeventer Diary.
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But on January 19, Vandeventer learned from Charles Fenton Mercer of
Virginia, a Clay supporter, new information which at least lay within the
realm of possibility. Vandeventer wrote in his diary:
Colo. Mercer of H. R. [sic] told me that the friends of Mr. Clay had 
decided to go for Mr. Adams & that Mr. Clay was to be Secy [sic] of 
State— The Speech of Mr Webster [sic] on the bill appropriating 
money for continuance of the Cumberland Road to Zanesville was a 
confirmation of the understanding on the part of Mr. Adams. Genl [sic] 
Jesup who was a week ago as violently opposed to Mr Adams [sic] as 
any man in the country npw thinks that Mr Clay's friends of whom ha 
is one, will support Mr A [sic] & will carry over to him 6 western 
States. La Miss 111. Ohio Keny & Inda [sic] He talked as if this 
was on the whole, the best course.167
The clerk told Calhoun of his discussion with Mercer the very 
next day. Calhoun "replied it was an idle scheme." The Secretary of 
War thought that "Clay himself doubtless would give his arm to elect 
Adams— but neither he nor his friends dare do it— that Genl [sic]
Jackson would be elected in spite of all their efforts." After their 
conversation Vandeventer wondered if Calhoun really wanted to see 
Jackson elected. "He has often said to me he did," the clerk wrote,
"but I believe he prefers the election of Adams not because he thinks 
it [sic] would make the best president— but because a northern president 
would become his designs 4. [sic] or 8 years hence." There were wheels 
within wheels in John C. Calhoun's mind, Vandeventer mused, "He pro-
3.68
fesses to act on higher grounds."
The real truth behind the rumor which Vandeventer heard became 
entirely academic during the following days. On January 24, 1825, the 
Ohio and Kentucky congressional delegations,announced that they would 
cast their votes for Adams. Charges of corrupt dealings began to fly
167Entry of January 19, 1825, ibid.
168
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immediately thereafter, with the opening shot coming from an anonymous
article in the Columbian Observer of Philadelphia, written by House
member George Kremer. On January 31, Clay published a reply to Kremer's
article in the National Intelligencer, demanding that the dastardly
169writer of the piece in the Observer acknowledge his authorship.
Calhoun derived a perverse satisfaction from all these doings,
but by February 5 Vandeventer thought that the Secretary of War had
finally resigned himself to being Adams1 vice-president instead of 
170Jackson's. Four days later, John Quincy Adams was elected president
by the House of Representatives, and Calhoun became Vice-President by a
171large majority vote. On February 12, 1825, Adams offered Henry Clay 
the post of Secretary of State and shortly after the Kentuckian accepted 
When the presidential choice was finally made known, Calhoun 
appeared somewhat overwhelmed by what had happened. Just after the 
House had made its decision for Adams, the new Vice-President elect 
wrote to his old friend Maxcy that "things have taken a strange turn" at 
the capital and cautioned him not to accept at face value everything he
• 4-v, 173saw m  the newspapers.
For the rest of the month Calhoun quietly prepared to take his 
leave of the Department of War. On March 3, 1825, John C. Calhoun gave
169
Van Deusen, Clay, pp. 188-189.
170Entry of February 5, 1825, Vandeventer Diary.
171Niles' Weekly Register, February 12, 1825.
172Van Deusen, Clay, p. 192.
173John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, February 18, 1825, Calhoun 
Papers, 9:570.
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up his post. As the officers of the department drew up to bid Calhoun 
farewell, Christopher Vandeventer stood among them. The clerk remarked 
that Calhoun "appeared much affected in separating himself. . . .  My own
feelings were warmly excited by his warm and friendly manner toward
174myself." Calhoun took up his duties as Vice-President the next day.
He did not look back.
It was not in Calhoun's nature to ruminate about his past mis­
takes, nor indeed to admit that he ever made any. When he permitted the 
writing of his biography eighteen years later, his time in the War 
Department would occupy only a small space. Fewer pages were devoted 
to his career as a Secretary of War than the number of years he had 
served in that position. Too many momentous events had intervened in 
the meantime.
A few days later the new Secretary of War appointed by Adams, 
James Barbour of Virginia, arrived to assume the office. Barbour called 
all the officers together and assured them that he was entirely depen­
dent upon their experience and good will. After his remarks the 
conversation grew increasingly stiff and uncomfortable. Barbour ventured 
that it might be well to take a close look at the engineer and Indian 
departments, both of which promised "the greatest difficulty." General 
Macomb, chief of engineers, answered that the Quartermaster's department 
was important too. Barbour agreed politely. Quartermaster General Jesup 
volunteered that the engineers needed more men. When the vast extent of 
the country was taken into account, the corps of engineers was dispropor­
tionately small. Moreover, Jesup added, there were considerable
174Entry of March 3, 1825, Vandeventer Diary.
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differences between the situation in America and that in Europe. It
175
was the beginning of James Barbour's military education. Doubtless 
the War Department would handily survive his administration as it had 
all the others.
175
Entry of March 8, 1825, ibid.
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EPILOGUE:
CALHOUN AND THE FUTURE
Calhoun had predicted that the election of John Quincy Adams 
would "distract" the party and the nation, and that inevitably a new 
party would rise up in opposition to an Adams presidency."^" But why 
Calhoun helped bring this renascence of faction about by gradually 
moving toward an alliance with Andrew Jackson is a question worth 
asking.
Superficially, Adams and Calhoun were much alike. Adams cer­
tainly had a wider experience than the younger Calhoun, but both men
were cultured, well educated, and polished. Civility was no effort for
2
them; this was certainly not true in Jackson's case. Both Adams and 
Calhoun prided themselves on their mental gifts, and justly so. Each 
man professed to have certain political principles and sought to articu­
late them, believing that in politics, principles were still important. 
Because their principles were so similar, these two candidates had
"'"John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, March 27, 1823, Calhoun 
Papers, 7:547.
2
John H. Eaton to Mrs. Andrew Jackson, December 18, 1823, Bassett, 
Jackson Correspondence, 3:217. Margaret Bayard Smith reported that at the 
height of the campaign, she saw Adams, Crawford, and Calhoun joking 
together at a party. Later, in a conversation with Mrs. Smith, Calhoun 
claimed that he kept his personal associations quite separated from his 
political activities. He would, he claimed, take the result of the elec­
tion (of 1828) "with moderation, but above all, as far as possible to 
avoid mingling personal, with political feelings. Margaret Bayard Smith 
to J. Bayard H. Smith, January [n.d.], 1829, in Smith, First Forty Years, 
p. 269.
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difficulty in disentangling themselves from one another during the cam­
paign. By contrast, Jackson's candidacy seemed to represent something 
about politics that was dark, inexplicable, and faintly absurd. Little 
of Jackson's political creed could be divined, and what was worse, his 
obscure politics seemed not to matter to the electorate. Calhoun— and 
perhaps Adams to a lesser degree— consistently underestimated Andrew 
Jackson. The Secretary of War first did so during the Florida contro­
versy, and later when he thought that he could conceal his earlier 
opinions from the general. In 1824 the possibility of Jackson's winning 
in Pennsylvania seemed so remote to Calhoun that he and his supporters 
could not believe the result when it came. Yet in the end Calhoun 
rejected Adams' proffered alliance and went instead to the general's side. 
"War is the general cry and will come speedily too," wrote Calhoun's
friend Samuel Gouveneur, "Jackson and Calhoun will lead the peoples [sic]
3
party, & who would wish to follow more honest & efficient men.[sic]"
Far from having nothing in common, Jackson and Calhoun shared 
perhaps the most crucial affinities of all: a contempt for doctrine and
a certain impatience with the restraints of democracy. Being a more 
elemental sort, Jackson expressed his proclivities in his actions—
Calhoun by his thoughts. Jackson had less guile than Calhoun, but in the 
end their natures showed through just the same. These were the character­
istics of the leiter: to Jackson or Calhoun doctrine was important only
if they were responsible for its invention. They believed that democracy 
could reach its fullest potential in America if they were appointed its
^Samuel Gouveneur to Joseph G. Swift, [n.d., probably March,
1825], Swift Papers.
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stewards. This was not a role which could be played by someone who was 
merely an archtypical democrat; a special figure was required, one who 
transcended doctrine and form.
Intransigence played an important part in both men's character as 
well, and it fed their vindictiveness. Once again, Jackson was more 
forthright than Calhoun, and the episodes in which the general allowed 
these characteristics to work upon his actions are so many as to defy 
enumeration. Calhoun's utter belief in himself and his ideals was some­
what obscured by his brilliance in the early part of his career, and 
during the war the Republicans generally found these qualities useful 
against the Federalists, but the campaign of 1824 brought them into full 
view. When the results of the campaign did not satisfy Calhoun's 
expectations, his only refuge was to lay the blame elsewhere and to turn 
the fury of his disappointment toward John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay. 
Less than a week after he had assumed his new office, Calhoun declared:
The mass of moral and political power which carried the late admin­
istration through in triumph, has been wholly neglected in the new 
organization; and in the final stage of the situation, the voice and 
the power of the people has been set at naught, and the result has 
been a President elected not by them, but by a few ambitious men with 
a view to their own interest, I fear. There is a solemn feeling of 
duty, that it must be corrected at another election, or the liberty 
of the country will be in danger. It is my opinion, that the country 
will never be great till the example is corrected, and the Constitu­
tion so amended as to prevent the recurence [sic] of the danger. . . . 
Principles cannot be violated in this country with impunity. . . .  I 
cannot but see what must come; and I shall never separate from prin­
ciples, let the consequences be what it may [sic].4
The affinities which Calhoun and Jackson possessed were hardly 
of the kind that made for lasting personal or political relationships.
In Andrew Jackson, John Calhoun would eventually encounter a will every
4
John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, March 10, 1825, ibid.
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bit as strong and unbending as his own, and the result would be a des­
perate constitutional crisis of awful promise.
It was only after Calhoun left the War Department that the 
foundations of the nullification crisis were laid by the South Carolinian. 
Walking along the Potomac with John Quincy Adams during the Missouri
debates, Calhoun impressed the New Englander with his lack of passion for 
5
the subject. He was so unconcerned with state rights during his presi­
dential campaign that he actually suggested that his own expansive views 
were entirely orthodox. In 1824 he had the temerity to explain his 
opinions of the Constitution to Robert S. Garnett in terms which could 
only have impressed the orthodox Garnett as "variable construction."
Calhoun argued that the Constitution should be interpreted broadly in
7
some cases and strictly in others. Just four years later, Calhoun would 
secretly write his most famous discussion of the state rights doctrine,
The South Carolina Exposition and Protest. This document and the momen­
tous events which succeeded it fixed Calhoun's place in American history 
and threw a shadow over his earlier accomplishments as a Secretary of 
War, as though the Exposition was lurking all the while within John C. 
Calhoun, waiting for its chance to emerge.
Calhoun's War Department years were a period in which he received 
an extensive political education, and in the process, a severe test of 
his own character. His reaction to his experiences were a kind not
5Adams, Diary, 4:531.
John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, August 24, 1823, Calhoun 
Papers, 8:242-243.
7
John C. Calhoun to Robert S. Garnett, July 3, 1824, ibid., 
9:198-202.
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unknown to human beings: he retreated within his own thoughts, the only
kind that would satisfy him completely. There in those thoughts was 
born Mrs. Martineau's "cast-iron man."
Calhoun's service as a Secretary of War created a reputation for 
the American military establishment that it had never before enjoyed in 
times of peace. It was no less his goal than President Monroe's to make 
of the United States a modern and self-sufficient nation militarily.
Under Calhoun's stewardship and Sylvanus Thayer's adroit management,
West Point finally began to function in the way that its earliest pro­
moters had imagined. Elsewhere in the military establishment, officers 
of intellect and promise found in the Secretary of War an enthusiastic 
ally and supporter. With the help of such men as General Jacob Brown 
and the military explorer, Stephen Long, Calhoun sought ways in which 
the army could be put to peaceful uses beneficial to an expanding nation. 
That Calhoun's grandest designs failed hardly diminished the Secretary 
in the eyes of his soldiers. To them the blame lay elsewhere.
In truth the War Department and the army formed the perfect con­
stituency for John C. Calhoun. His relationship with the military 
establishment was not one which could be called democratic, but it was 
one in which Calhoun's magnanimity was allowed as much play as its 
master dared. He was not often the martinet as a Secretary of War.
Having received what was doubtless a favorable description of Calhoun's 
way of working in the department from Christopher Vandeventer, former 
Secretary of War John Armstrong replied to the clerk:
There is an order of men, upon whom a little brief authority, does 
great mischief, perverting morals, manners temp- [sic] er and under­
standing. To be obliged to be near such and subject to their 
caprices, is quite as bad as the oar of a galley, but, on the other
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hand, to be near a liberal, intelligent man, who, while he exacts 
from others what may be due to himself, never forgets what is due 
to them— is nothing— the harness is to [sic] easy and light, that 
one forgets it is on; and if we do remember it it is only as a 
wholsome [sic] restraint from things, which ought not to be done 
which are better omitted.8
It is entirely possible that the changes which occurred during 
the Calhoun years would have taken place regardless of who the Secretary 
happened to be. Mahlon Dickerson had been correct in telling his fellow 
congressmen that a revolution had taken place in the public mind 
regarding the American military establishment. Not even the most stri­
dently anti-military politicians contemplated totally abolishing the 
army after the war of 1812; the great question to be resolved was the 
role of the army in democracy. Congress provided the answer in the 
reorganization of 1821: the army could be maintained, but only with the
proviso that it not intrude upon the nation's life. The role for the 
army as the bellwether of national expansion which Calhoun and others 
had contemplated was thus rejected. Expansion would remain the business 
of civilians. It is probable, too, that the professionalism which 
leading officers of the army had lately acquired would have found expres­
sion without Calhoun's encouragement. Calhoun merely attempted to 
fashion an organization which exploited this new professional mentality, 
and so made for himself a certain reputation in American military history.
Certain it is, however, that few men could have brought the 
American military establishment into such intimate political associations 
as did John C. Calhoun. If his role as a Secretary of War enabled the 
military establishment to evolve beyond its amateur beginnings, Calhoun's
Q
John Armstrong to Christopher Vandeventer, November 11, 1819, 
Vandeventer Papers.
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role as a leading politician interfered with that evolution and shaped
it in a way in which Calhoun and his officers had not reckoned upon.
Seldom, perhaps, had so many officers taken a direct interest in
politics. Regardless of the fact that two candidates for the presidency
ir. 1824 had claims upon the officers' sympathies, they nevertheless
went about their political chores in mufti. No attempt was made from
any quarter to turn the political contest into a military campaign. It
is fitting, then, to close this work with Hezekiah Niles' description
of the day in which the House of Representatives decided the presidency:
The house of representatives assembled an hour earlier than usual. 
The galleries were already filled, to overflowing, with spectators 
from almost every part of the union, and the lobbies and apartments 
adjacent, were crowded with well dressed and orderly persons— but 
there was not any bustle or confusion— no officer appeared to com­
mand the peace, nor did any one in the garb of a soldier pollute 
the walls of the capitol with his presence. Such was the respect 
voluntarily paid to the majesty of the constitution.9
^Niles' Weekly Register, February 12, 1825.
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